JUDGMENT : Ranjit Kumar Bag, J. The petitioner has preferred this revision under Section 401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the judgment and order dated December 9, 2013 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Second Fast Track Court, Bichar Bhawan, Calcutta in Criminal Revision no.183 of 2013 whereby the order dated November 6, 2013 passed by learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta in connection with Case no. POR 51/WL of 2013-2014 dated September 15, 2013 was set aside. Learned Additional Sessions Judge gave direction to learned Magistrate for passing fresh order regarding disposal of the seized vehicle. 2. On September 15, 2013 the opposite party was carrying 21 Parakeets and 151 Munias by his taxi bearing no.WB 04A - 9977 when the taxi was intercepted by the officers of Wild Life Wing. The authorised officer searched the said taxi, seized the birds, arrested the persons who were carrying the birds along with the opposite party and seized the said taxi for violation of the provisions of Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. One complaint was filed before the court of learned Magistrate against the opposite party and two others for commission of the offence punishable under Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 for violation of the provisions of Sections 9, 39, 44, 48, 49 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. On September 26, 2013 the Divisional Forest Officer, (Wildlife Headquarters), West Bengal issued a notice to the opposite party calling upon him to explain in writing why the seized taxi will not be confiscated to the State. The opposite party gave reply in writing which was considered by the said Forest Officer. On October 29, 2013 the Forest Officer issued summons to the opposite party calling upon him to appear before the said authorised Officer on November 12, 2013 in connection with hearing of confiscation of the seized taxi. In the meantime, the opposite party moved an application before the court of learned Magistrate praying for return of the seized taxi on interim custody. On November 6, 2013 learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta refused to release the seized taxi in favour of the opposite party. The said order was challenged before the court of sessions by the opposite party by preferring Criminal Revision no.183 of 2013. On November 6, 2013 learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta refused to release the seized taxi in favour of the opposite party. The said order was challenged before the court of sessions by the opposite party by preferring Criminal Revision no.183 of 2013. On December 9, 2013 learned Additional Sessions Judge, Second Fast Track Court, Bichar Bhawan, Calcutta disposed of Criminal Revision no.183 of 2013 by setting aside the order passed by learned Magistrate and by giving direction to learned Magistrate to pass fresh order for return of the seized taxi in the light of the observations made by learned Additional Sessions Judge. On January 9, 2014 the authorised Officer and Deputy Conservator of Forests, Wildlife, West Bengal passed an order of confiscation of the seized taxi under Section 59A(3) of the Indian Forest Act. The petitioner being the Enquiry Officer-Forest Range Officer, Wildlife Wing, Vigilance Section, (Wildlife Headquarters), Directorate of Forest, has preferred this revision challenging the order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Second Fast Track Court, Bichar Bhawan, Calcutta. 3. With the above factual matrix, Mr. Ayan Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the seized taxi of the opposite party is confiscated by the authorised officer under Section 59A(3) of the Indian Forest Act as amended by the State of West Bengal and the said order will prevail over the interim order of custody of the vehicle passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Bhattacharjee submits that the provision of Indian Forest Act, 1927 can be invoked for confiscation of the vehicle seized for commission of the offence under the provisions of Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. By referring to some provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and some provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, Mr. Bhattacharjee has tried to impress upon the Court that the authorised Officer can invoke the provision of Indian Forest Act, 1927 for confiscation of the vehicle which was seized for commission of the offence punishable under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. By referring to the provision of Section 59G of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the State of West Bengal, Mr. By referring to the provision of Section 59G of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the State of West Bengal, Mr. Bhattacharjee submits that there is bar of jurisdiction of the court when the vehicle is confiscated by the authorised Officer by invoking the provisions of Section 59A of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the State of West Bengal. The further submission of Mr. Bhattacharjee is that the only remedy of the opposite party is by way of preferring an appeal before learned District Judge under Section 59D of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the State of West Bengal. He has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in “State (NCT of Delhi) v. Narender” reported in 2014 (1) AICLR 666 in support of his above contention. 4. Mr. Krishnendu Bhattacharya, learned counsel for the opposite party submits that the provision of Indian Forest Act cannot be invoked by the authorised Officer for confiscation of the seized taxi, as the said taxi was seized for violation of the provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. By referring to the notice served on the opposite party by the authorised Officer, Mr. Bhattacharya submits that the vehicle was seized on the allegation of violation of the provisions of Section 9/39/44/48/49 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. He further submits that the seized vehicle cannot be treated as Government property under Section 39 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 unless and until the seized vehicle is finally adjudicated as Government property by a competent court of law. He has cited the decision of our High Court in “Timir Chowdhury v. State of West Bengal” reported in 2006 (4) CHN 693 and two decisions of the Supreme Court in “State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madhukar Rao” reported in (2008) 14 SCC 624 and the case of “Principal Chief Conservator of Forest v. J.K. Johnson” reported in (2011) 10 SCC 794 in support of the contention that the articles seized for commission of the offence punishable under Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 cannot be treated as Government property under Section 39 of the said Act for the purpose of confiscation or forfeiture unless and until the competent court of law decides the said seized articles as Government property after conclusion of trial. The gist of submission of Mr. The gist of submission of Mr. Bhattacharya is that the general provision of Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked for return of seized vehicle as an interim custody when the vehicle was seized for violation of the provisions of Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. 5. Admittedly, on September 15, 2013 the complaint was filed by the petitioner against the opposite party and two others on the allegation of committing offence punishable under Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. It is alleged that 21 Parakeets, 151 of Munias and liquid cash of Rs.1,43,000/- were found in the taxi bearing no.WB 04A- 9977 which was driven by the opposite party. The reply given by the opposite party to the authorised Officer in response to the notice dated September 26, 2013 indicates that the opposite party was carrying two persons and 21 Parakeets and 151 Munias kept inside two cages which were found inside the said taxi. The reply of the opposite party further indicates that the opposite party was transporting the said birds and the passengers by taking extra fare for carrying the birds. The notice issued to the opposite party by the Authorised Officer on September 26, 2013 and the subsequent summons issued to the opposite party by the Authorised Officer on October 29, 2013 (annexure P/1 and annexure P/2 to the revisional application) indicate that the opposite party was arrested and the vehicle being taxi bearing no. WB 04A-9977 was seized for violation of the provisions of Section 9/39/44/48/49 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. Naturally the question for consideration of the Court is whether the general provision of Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked for return of the seized vehicle as an interim custody pending final decision of commission of the offences punishable under Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 by the opposite party and other co-accused persons before the competent court of law. 6. In “Timir Chowdhury v. State of West Bengal” reported in 2006 (4) CHN 693 one fishing vessel was seized for carrying 41 sharks without valid documents and one complaint was filed against 14 persons for commission of offences punishable under Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 for violation of the provisions of Sections 9/39/49B of the said Act. The application filed by the owner of the seized vessel for return of the same on interim custody was rejected by learned Magistrate and the said order was affirmed by learned Additional Sessions Judge. Learned single Judge of this Court was pleased to set aside the order of refusal to return the seized vessel on the ground that the authorised Officer can confiscate the seized vessel under the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 only when it is proved before the court of law that the vessel was used for commission of the offence and thereby it becomes the property of the Government under the provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. In this Report learned single Judge did not consider whether the provision of Indian Forest Act, 1927 can be invoked for confiscation of the seized vessel when the vessel was seized for violation of the provisions of Sections 9/39/49B of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 which is punishable under Section 51 of the said Act and as such the said decision has no relevance in the present case. 7. In “State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madhukar Rao” reported in (2008) 14 SCC 624 it is held by the Supreme Court that the provisions of Section 39 (1)(d) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 cannot be used to brand the vehicle seized under Section 50 of the said Act as Government property for denial of power of learned Magistrate to release the said seized vehicle on interim custody under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Similarly, in “Principal Chief Conservator of Forests v. J.K. Johnson” reported in (2011) 10 SCC 794 it is held by the Supreme Court that the property seized under Section 50 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 has to be dealt with by learned Magistrate in accordance with law. It is also held in the said report that the Officer authorised under Section 54 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act 1972 to compound the offences under the said Act, has no power, competence and authority to order forfeiture of the seized articles in connection with the offences suspected to have been committed by a person under the provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. The ratio of the above decision of the Supreme Court is that the property seized under Section 50 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 can be branded as Government property under Section 39 (1)(d) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 only after conclusion of trial of the case by a competent court of law. 8. Let us now consider the provisions of Indian Forest Act for confiscation of the vehicle seized for commission of the forest offence punishable under Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. In “State of West Bengal v. Sujit Kumar Rana” reported in 2004 SCC (Cri.) 984 it is held by the Supreme Court that a proceeding for confiscation under Section 59A of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the State of West Bengal with effect from February 3, 1989 can be initiated by the Forest Officer irrespective of whether prosecution for commission of the forest offences has been lodged. In the said report it is also held that a confiscation proceeding is independent of a criminal proceeding under the provisions of Indian Forest Act, 1927. A confiscation, thus, envisages a civil liability whereas an order of forfeiture of forest produce must be preceded by a judgment of conviction. What has been laid down by the Supreme Court in this report is that once a confiscation proceeding is initiated under Section 59A of the Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the State of West Bengal with effect from February 3, 1989, the jurisdiction of the criminal court is ousted and as such the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure for interim release of seized vehicle on execution of the bond. Accordingly, the order passed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for giving delivery of custody of the seized vehicle to its owner on execution of the bond to the satisfaction of the Divisional Forest Officer was set aside by the Supreme Court in this Report. 9. Accordingly, the order passed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for giving delivery of custody of the seized vehicle to its owner on execution of the bond to the satisfaction of the Divisional Forest Officer was set aside by the Supreme Court in this Report. 9. In “State (NCT of Delhi) v. Narender” reported in 2014(1) AICLR 666 the Supreme Court dealt with the power of the court to pass order of interim custody of seized vehicle under general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the power of confiscation and release of the seized vehicle is given to the Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of the Delhi Excise Act, 2009. The Supreme Court held in paragraph 11 of the Report that there is specific bar under Section 61 of the Delhi Excise Act, 2009 to make any order by any court with regard to the property used in the commission of the offence under said Act of 2009. In view of the specific provision of confiscation of the seized vehicle under Section 58 of the Delhi Excise Act, 2009 and the provision of creating an embargo on the jurisdiction of the court under Section 61 of the said Act and the overriding effect given to the provision of Delhi Excise Act, 2009 by Section 59 of the said Act, the Supreme Court held that the general provisions for disposal of property under Sections 451/452/457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must yield to the special provisions with regard to confiscation and disposal of the property under Section 59 of the Delhi Excise Act, 2009. This decision may have relevance in connection with the seizure of vehicle under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, but the same has no relevance in connection with the property seized under the provisions of Section 50 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. 10. On perusal of the provisions of Section 59A to Section 59G of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the State of West Bengal with effect from February 3, 1989, I find that the legislature has given power to the Forest Officer for confiscation of the forest produce and the property used in commission of the forest offence under Section 59A of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. There is specific embargo on the jurisdiction of the court when the power is exercised by the Forest Officer under Section 59G of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the State of West Bengal. However, there is provision of appeal before the learned District Judge against the order of confiscation passed by the Forest Officer under Section 59D of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the State of West Bengal. On an analysis of various provisions of the Indian Forest Act as amended by the State of West Bengal the Supreme Court has held in “State of West Bengal v. Sujit Kumar Rana” (supra) that a proceeding for confiscation under Section 59A of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the State of West Bengal can be initiated by the Forest Officer irrespective of commencement of prosecution for commission of the forest offence before the competent court of law. This power of confiscation exercised by the Forest Officer under Section 59A of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the State of West Bengal is not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The provisions of the Indian Forest Act as amended by the State of West Bengal are similar to the provisions of the Delhi Excise Act, 2009 and as such the Supreme Court held in “State (NCT of Delhi) v. Narender” (supra) that the general provisions of disposal of property under Sections 451/452/457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must yield to the special provisions with regard to confiscation and disposal of the seized property under Section 59 of the Delhi Excise Act, 2009. The upshot of my entire above observation is that this Court cannot exercise the revisional jurisdiction for setting aside any order passed by the Forest Officer or the Authorised Officer under Section 59A of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 on January 9, 2014 as amended by the State of West Bengal with effect from February 3, 1989. The validity of the order passed by the Authorised Officer under Section 59A(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 on 09.01.2014 remains open for decision by the appropriate court of law in future. 11. In the instant case, the seizure of taxi bearing no. WB 04A - 9977 was done under Section 50 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. The validity of the order passed by the Authorised Officer under Section 59A(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 on 09.01.2014 remains open for decision by the appropriate court of law in future. 11. In the instant case, the seizure of taxi bearing no. WB 04A - 9977 was done under Section 50 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. The allegation against the opposite party is that he was carrying 21 Parakeets and 151 Munias by the seized taxi along with two passengers. These birds are falling within the entry nos.44 and 50 of Schedule (IV) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and as such those birds will come within the ambit of the “captive animal” as defined in Section 2(5) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. These birds may also fall within the ambit of “Wild animal” defined in Section 2(8) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by Section 3 of West Bengal Act 39 of 1981. However, learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to show how the opposite party has committed an offence punishable under the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Nor can I persuade myself to hold that the opposite party has committed any offence punishable under the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the State of West Bengal. The petitioner has also lodged specific complaint against the opposite party and other co-accused persons before the court of learned Magistrate for violation the provisions of Sections 9/39/44/48 and 49 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 which is punishable under Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. Since the petitioner has lodged the complaint against the opposite party in order to prosecute him under Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and since the seizure of the taxi is done under Section 50 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, I fail to understand how the Authorised Officer can initiate the proceeding for confiscation of the seized taxi under Section 59A of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the State of West Bengal. In view of proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in “State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madhukar Rao” reported in (2008) 14 SCC 624 I am of the view that the seized taxi cannot be branded as the property of the Government under Section 39 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 for denial of power of learned Magistrate to return the said seized taxi under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on interim custody till conclusion of trial of the case pending before the competent court of law. In view of my above findings, I do not find any illegality in the order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge which is under challenge in this revision. As a result, the judgment and order dated December 9, 2013 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Second Fast Track Court, Bichar Bhawan, Calcutta in Criminal Revision no.183 of 2013 is hereby affirmed. Criminal revision is, thus, dismissed. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned counsel for the parties, upon compliance of all formalities. Revisional application is dismissed.