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Jharkhand High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 286 (JHR)

Dhananjay Kumar v. State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary

2016-02-08

PRAMATH PATNAIK

body2016
Order : In the accompanied writ application, prayer has been made for quashing of the office order dated 29.08.2012, relating to rejection of representation of the petitioner and for a direction to the respondents to grant petitioner the benefits of 3rd M.A.C.P. from 30.04.2009 after completion of 30 years of service as per the resolution of the Finance Department, State of Jharkhand and for a direction to the respondents to forthwith release all retiral dues on the basis of the last pay certificate, and for a direction to the respondents to shift the date of exemption from the date of passing of the departmental examination from 16.10.2004 to 10.01.2002 as the petitioner after completion of 50 years of age and to grant the benefits of 1st A.C.P. w.e.f. 10.01.2002 and consequently, the benefits of 2nd A.C.P. be shifted accordingly and for a direction to the respondents for quashing of the letter dated 04.07.2014, wherein the respondents have directed the petitioner to deposit Rs. 1,58,073/- in the Treasury, which has been paid excess to the petitioner on account of wrong fixation of pay. 2. Sans details, facts as disclosed in the writ application, is that, initially, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant on 30.04.1979 in the office of the Advocate General, Govt. of Bihar and after completion of 60 years of age, the petitioner retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.12.2011 from the post of Section Officer, Drinking Water and Sanitation Department, Government of Jharkhand. The Departmental Screening Committee on the basis of the Resolution dated 14.08.2002, decided to give benefit of 2nd A.C.P. to the petitioner from 16.10.2004 i.e. from the date from which the petitioner had been exempted from appearing in the departmental examination in the light of the departmental resolution dated 15.05.1992. The Resolution dated 14.08.2002, issued by the Finance Department, Government of Jharkhand envisages in para (IV) that if any Government servant fulfills all the criterias and completes 24 years in regular service and has not been given two or one regular promotion, then he will be directly given the benefits of 2nd A.C.P. and the same has been extended to the petitioner from the date of his exemption from the departmental examination. The memo dated 16.10.2004 exempts the petitioner from appearing in the departmental examination on attaining the 50 years' of age. The memo dated 16.10.2004 exempts the petitioner from appearing in the departmental examination on attaining the 50 years' of age. The grant of 2nd A.C.P. from 16.10.2004 has been confirmed vide Memo dated 12.10.2011, since the petitioner had already completed 24 years in regular service. The Modified Assured Career Progression, in short, referred to as the 'M.A.C.P.' was adopted by the State Government, which inter alia, stipulates, if any Government employee either had received two promotions or has been granted the benefit of the old A.C.P. by getting 2nd A.C.P. after 24 years of regular service, then he should be given the benefit of 3rd A.C.P. after completion of 30 years of service, provided he has not been given their promotion in this grade. To the utter surprise and dismay, vide order dated 25.01.2012 issued under the signature of the Deputy Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand, the respondents changed the date of grant of 1st A.C.P. and the 2nd A.C.P. to the detriment of the petitioner without issuing any show-cause and that too after superannuation of the petitioner. 3. Being aggrieved by the order dated 25.01.2012, the petitioner approached this Court by filing writ application being W.P. (S) No. 1223 of 2012 and the same was disposed of vide order dated 29.06.2012 with liberty to the respondents-State to take action in accordance with law so far grant of A.C.P. benefit is concerned if the respondents so decide, but only after a show-cause notice and an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. Thereafter, vide office order dated-29.08.2012, issued under the signature of the Deputy Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand, the respondents rejected the representation filed by the petitioner after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner by supporting their earlier office order dated 25.01.2012, by which the respondents had changed the date of grant of 1st A.C.P. and the 2nd A.C.P. to the disadvantage of the petitioner and the said order is under challenge in this writ application. 4. The petitioner, in the writ application, has also stated that in the matter of one similarly situated employee, namely, Alok Prasad (at Serial No. 6 of Annexure-1), writ petition bearing W.P. (S) No. 2027 of 2009 has been allowed and the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the decision rendered in the aforesaid case. 4. The petitioner, in the writ application, has also stated that in the matter of one similarly situated employee, namely, Alok Prasad (at Serial No. 6 of Annexure-1), writ petition bearing W.P. (S) No. 2027 of 2009 has been allowed and the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the decision rendered in the aforesaid case. It is further submitted that without issuing any notice or without giving any show-cause or without conducting any proper departmental enquiry vide order dated 04.07.2014, the respondents directed the petitioner to deposit Rs.1,58,073/- in the Treasury, which had been paid in excess to the petitioner on account of wrong fixation of pay. 5. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent no. 3, repelling the contentions made in the writ application. It has been inter alia, submitted in the counter affidavit, that the petitioner was otherwise, eligible to be considered for grant of A.C.P. w.e.f. 09.08.1999. However, on account of his not having passed the departmental examination, he was entitled to same w.e.f. 16.12.2004 i.e. from the date, he was exempted from the requirement of passing the departmental examination. Thus, grant of 1st A.C.P. to the petitioner was delayed by about 5 years, 2 months and 7 days. It is further submitted that as per the provision of clause 3 (IV) of resolution dated 14.08.2002, if 1st A.C.P. has been delayed to an employee on account of his disqualification or because of a departmental proceeding pending against him, such delay would affect his 2nd A.C.P. also and the Resolution dated 14.08.2002 has been annexed as Annexure-A to the counter affidavit. It is further submitted that since the petitioner joined service on 30.07.1979, he completed 24 years of service on 30.04.2003 and had the petitioner been otherwise qualified, he would have been considered for grant of 2nd A.C.P. w.e.f. 30.04.2003. However, since 1st A.C.P has been delayed by a period of 5 years, 2 months and 7 days, the grant of 2nd A.C.P. has also to be delayed by the said period. However, since 1st A.C.P has been delayed by a period of 5 years, 2 months and 7 days, the grant of 2nd A.C.P. has also to be delayed by the said period. Therefore, in that view of the matter, the impugned order has been issued, entitling him to the pay-scale of 1st A.C.P. w.e.f. 16.12.2004 and the 2nd A.C.P. with effect from 07.07.2008 and accordingly, grant of 3rd M.A.C.P. has also to be delayed by 5 years, 2 months and 7 days since the petitioner retired from service and prior to completing this period, he is not entitled to the grant of the 3rd M.A.C.P. 6. Heard Mrs. Ritu Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Abhijeet Kumar Singh, learned J.C. to G.P. 5 and perused the records. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted with vehemence, that the respondents have misinterpreted the Finance Department Resolution dated 14.08.2002 to the detriment of the petitioner and therefore, the action of the respondents is without jurisdiction and against the settled principles of law. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the ratio decided in W.P. (S) No. 2027 of 2009 and the petitioner's case stand on the same footing, so he is entitled to be extended with the same benefit. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the letter dated 04.07.2014, pertaining to recovery, is in the teeth of the judgment of the Hon'ble apex Court, therefore, the same is liable to be quashed. 8. The learned counsel for the Respondent-State has strenuously urged before this Court that there is no infirmity or illegality in the order passed by the State. 9. 8. The learned counsel for the Respondent-State has strenuously urged before this Court that there is no infirmity or illegality in the order passed by the State. 9. After hearing the learned counsel for the respective parties, the petitioner has been able to make out a case for interference due to the reasons stated hereinbelow: - (i) Admittedly, the petitioner had been granted the exemption in the year 2004 and he had been exempted from appearing in the departmental examination on the basis of completion of terms, as contained in the departmental resolution dated 15.05.1992 vide Memo dated 16.10.2004 and the petitioner had been entitled to get the 1st and the 2nd A.C.P. from 09.08.1999 and 16.10.2004 respectively i.e. after completion of 12 and 24 years of service and the petitioner is also entitled to get the 3rd M.A.C.P. after completion of 30 years of service on 30.04.2009 as per the resolution dated 14.08.2002. So far as shifting of the date of exemption from passing the departmental examination from 16.10.2004 to 10.01.2002, which is the date of completion of 50 years of age, the petitioner does not want to press the same relief. 10. In view of the above circumstances, the reasons given vide the impugned order dated 29.08.2012, as contained in Annexure-10 cannot be sustained and the said order is hereby quashed and set aside and the respondents are directed to take consequential action in respect of the petitioner expeditiously, preferably within a period of 16 weeks from the date of communication or receipt of the copy of the order. 11. With the aforesaid direction, the writ petition stands disposed of.