JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Subject matter of this appeal is the award dated 12th October, 2009, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’), in M.A.C. No. 91 of 2005/04, whereby the claim petition came to be dismissed (hereinafter referred to as ‘the impugned award’). 2. Claimant Balbir Kumar had filed the claim petition before the Tribunal for grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.10.00 lacs, as per the break-ups given in the claim petition. 3. Precisely, the case of the appellant-claimant was that on 4th March, 2004, he was traveling in jeep bearing registration No HP-23-3144, at place near Ghagas, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P., at about 7.30 p.m., which was being driven by respondent No. 2, Ajay Kumar, rashly and negligently, hit it on the right side of the road, resulting in multiple injuries to him. He was taken to District Hospital, Bilaspur, where he remained admitted for about 19 days. 4. The respondents resisted and contested the claim petition on the grounds taken in the memo of their objections. 5. Following issues came to be framed by the Tribunal: “i. Whether the petitioner has sustained injuries in the accident which has taken place due to the rash and negligent driving of vehicle No. HP-23-3144 driven by respondent No. 2 as alleged? …OPP ii. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to and from whom? …OPP iii. Whether the driver of the offending vehicle was not having a valid and effective driving license at the time of the accident, if so, its effect? …OPR-3 iv. Whether the petitioner was traveling as gratuitous passenger, if so, its effect? ….OPR-3 v. Relief.” 6. The claimant has examined Hem Raj (PW-2), Sita Ram (PW-3) and also appeared himself in the witness box as PW-1. The owner and insurer have not examined any witness. Only driver appeared in the witness box as RW-1. Thus, the evidence led by the claimant has remained unrebutted. Issue No. 1. 7. ….OPR-3 v. Relief.” 6. The claimant has examined Hem Raj (PW-2), Sita Ram (PW-3) and also appeared himself in the witness box as PW-1. The owner and insurer have not examined any witness. Only driver appeared in the witness box as RW-1. Thus, the evidence led by the claimant has remained unrebutted. Issue No. 1. 7. The claimant has proved that on 4th March, 2004, driver, namely, Ajay Kumar, has driven the offending vehicle, rashly and negligently, at place near Ghagas, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P., at about 7.30 p.m., caused the accident and FIR No. 93/2004, dated 4.3.2004, under Sections 279 & 337 of the Indian Penal Code, Police Station, Sadar, District Bilaspur (Ext. C-1) was registered. The respondents have not led any evidence. Thus, the evidence led by the claimant has remained unrebutted. Having said so, the claimant has proved that the driver has driven the offending vehicle, rashly and negligently, at the relevant point of time and caused the accident. 8. The Tribunal has fallen in an error in holding that the claimant has failed to prove issue No. 1. It appears that the Tribunal has taken this case as a civil case or a criminal case. 9. It is a beaten law of the land that strict proof is not required, but the claimant has prima-facie to prove, that the accident is outcome of rash and negligent driving of the driver. 10. My this view is fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case titled as N.K.V. Bros. (P.) Ltd. versus M. Karumai Ammal and others etc., reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1354. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 3 of the judgment herein: “3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specifically when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accident Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. Accident Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasising this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their “neighbour”. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parcimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Art. 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Court should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard." (Emphasis Added) 11. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case titled as Oriental Insurance Co. versus Mst. Zarifa and others, reported in AIR 1995 Jammu and Kashmir 81, held that the MV Act is Social Welfare Legislation and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the purpose of the Act. It is profitable to reproduce para 20 of the judgment herein: “20. Before concluding, it is also observed that it is a social welfare legislation under which the compensation is provided by way of Award to the people who sustain bodily injuries or get killed in the vehicular accident. It is profitable to reproduce para 20 of the judgment herein: “20. Before concluding, it is also observed that it is a social welfare legislation under which the compensation is provided by way of Award to the people who sustain bodily injuries or get killed in the vehicular accident. These people who sustain injuries or whose kith and kins are killed, are necessarily to be provided such relief in a short span of time and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the just purpose of the Act, under which such compensation is to be paid to such claimants.” 12. It would also be profitable to reproduce relevant portion of para 12 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case titled as Sohan Lal Passi versus P. Sesh Reddy and others, reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 2627, herein: “12. ..................While interpreting the contract of insurance, the Tribunals and Courts have to be conscious of the fact that right to claim compensation by heirs and legal representatives of the victims of the accident is not defeated on technical grounds. Unless it is established on the materials on record that it was the insured who had wilfully violated the condition of the policy by allowing a person not duly licensed to drive the vehicle when the accident took place, the insurer shall be deemed to be a judgment-debtor in respect of the liability in view of sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Act. It need not be pointed out that the whole concept of getting the vehicle insured by an insurance company is to provide an easy mode of getting compensation by the claimants, otherwise in normal course they had to pursue their claim against the owner from one forum to the other and ultimately to execute the order of the Accident Claims Tribunal for realisation of such amount by sale of properties of the owner of the vehicle. The procedure and result of the execution of the decree is well known.” 13. The Apex Court in a case titled Dulcina Fernandes and others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another, reported in (2013) 10 Supreme Court Cases 646 has laid down the same principle and held that strict proof and strict links are not required. 14. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in a series of cases. 15. The Apex Court in a case titled Dulcina Fernandes and others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another, reported in (2013) 10 Supreme Court Cases 646 has laid down the same principle and held that strict proof and strict links are not required. 14. The same principle has been laid down by this Court in a series of cases. 15. A Single Judge of this Court in FAO No. 127 of 1999, titled as Bimla Devi and others versus Himachal Road Transport Corporation and others, decided on 22.08.2005, held that the claimants have to prove the case by leading cogent evidence and applied the mandate of CPC read with the Evidence Act, was questioned before the Apex Court by the medium of Civil Appeal No. 2538 of 2009, titled as Bimla Devi & Ors. versus Himachal Road Transport Corpn. & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 4298, and the Apex Court set aside the said judgment and held that strict proof is not required. It is apt to reproduce paras 2 and 12 to 15 of the judgment herein: "2. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 22.8.2005 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla in FAO No. 127 of 1999 whereby and whereunder an appeal preferred against a judgment and award dated 28.10.1998 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II [MACT (I), Nahan] in MAC Petition No. 21-NL/2 of 1997, was set aside. xxx xxx xxx 12. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimants predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a post mortem report vis-a-vis the averments made in a claim petition. 13. The deceased was a Constable. Death took place near a police station. 13. The deceased was a Constable. Death took place near a police station. The post mortem report clearly suggests that the deceased died of a brain injury. The place of accident is not far from the police station. It is, therefore, difficult to believe the story of the driver of the bus that he slept in the bus and in the morning found a dead body wrapped in a blanket. If the death of a constable has taken place earlier, it is wholly unlikely that his dead body in a small town like Dharampur would remain undetected throughout the night particularly when it was lying at a bus stand and near a police station. In such an event, the court can presume that the police officers themselves should have taken possession of the dead body. 14. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly proceeded on the basis that apparently there was absolutely no reason to falsely implicate the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Claimant was not at the place of occurrence. She, therefore, might not be aware of the details as to how the accident took place but the fact that the First Information Report had been lodged in relation to an accident could not have been ignored. Some discrepancies in the evidences of the claimant s witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties." 16. The claimant has prima facie proved that the driver of the offending vehicle had driven the same, rashly and negligently, at the relevant point of time and had caused the accident, in which the claimant sustained injuries. Accordingly, the issue No. 1 is decided in favour of the claimant and respondent No. 2 and the findings returned by the Tribunal on issue No. 1 are set aside. Issues No. 3 & 4. 17. Before I deal with issue No. 2, I deem it proper to deal with Issues 3 & 4. 18. It was for the insurer to discharge onus to prove issues No. 3 to 4, have not led any evidence, thus have failed to discharge the onus. Accordingly, the issues No. 3 & 4 are decided against the insurer and in favour of the driver, owner and the claimant. Having said so, the findings returned by the Tribunal on issues No. 3 & 4 are set aside. Issue No. 2 19. Now the question is, to what amount of compensation, the claimant is entitled to. Admittedly, the claimant was admitted in the hospital. He has placed on record disability certificate Ext. C-14, which does disclose that he has suffered permanent disability to the extent of 5%. The discharge slip (Ext. C-11) is also on the record which shows that the claimant remained admitted in the hospital w.e.f. 4th March, 2004 to 23rd March, 2004. He has also placed on record medical bills, Ext. C-2 to Ext. C-10. 20. In view of the above, I am of the considered view that at least Rs. 50,000/- should have been awarded to the claimant under the head of ‘medical expenses’ and Rs. 1,00,000/-, under the head of ‘loss of amenities of life and pain and sufferings’. 21. The factum of insurance is admitted. Accordingly, I deem it proper to saddle the insurer-insurance company with the liability. 22. 50,000/- should have been awarded to the claimant under the head of ‘medical expenses’ and Rs. 1,00,000/-, under the head of ‘loss of amenities of life and pain and sufferings’. 21. The factum of insurance is admitted. Accordingly, I deem it proper to saddle the insurer-insurance company with the liability. 22. Viewed thus, I deem it proper to award the compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000/-, in lump sum, in favour of the claimant and direct the insurer to deposit the same before the Registry of this Court within six weeks from today. In default, the interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum shall be paid by the insurer from the date of filing of the claim petition till its realization. On deposit, the same be released in favour of the claimant through payees’ account cheque or by paying the same in his account. 23. Send down the records after placing a copy of the judgment on the file of the claim petition.