JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Shiv Nath Singh, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri J.P. Singh learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 5 as well as Sri R.N. Pandey, learned Standing Counsel representing the State respondents. 2. The appellant was a caveator in a writ petition preferred by the fifth respondent (original petitioner). The writ petition challenged an order dated 17/26 May 2016 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Burhanpur, Azamgarh. This communication of the Sub Divisional Magistrate addressed to the Block Development Officer noted that a petition had been submitted by the Gram Pradhan, Bhaupur on 3 May 2016 seeking the establishment of a fair price shop in village Sarangpur. The communication records that the fair price shop of the original petitioner is situate in village Khanpur which is at a distance of 3.5 Kms. from village Sarangpur. The Sub Divisional Magistrate noting the inconvenience which was being caused to the residents of village Sarangpur and in public interest recommended that the establishment of a fair price shop at the said village may be duly considered. Pursuant to the said communication, the Gram Sabha is said to have convened a meeting on 10 July 2016 in which the appellant is said to have been selected as the fair price shop dealer. These proceedings were impugned in the writ petition. While various submissions were advanced before the learned Single Judge, the writ petition itself has come to be allowed on the short ground that the original petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of hearing before the issuance of the communication dated 17/26 May 2016. On this ground alone, the learned Single Judge proceeded to quash the communication of the Sub Divisional Officer while leaving it open to the respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with law. 3. The grant of a license to run a fair price shop is admittedly governed by the provisions of the U.P. Scheduled Commodities Distribution Order 2004 (2004 Order). No provision of the 2004 Order grants an exclusive right of operation to a dealer. Neither the 2004 Order nor any provision of the license issued to a dealer guarantees or ensures a particular level of revenue or profit. No provision of the 2004 Order grants an exclusive right of operation to a dealer. Neither the 2004 Order nor any provision of the license issued to a dealer guarantees or ensures a particular level of revenue or profit. Despite repeated queries, counsel for the fifth respondent was unable to bring to our notice or refer to any provision of either the license or the 2004 Order which granted him an exclusive right to operate a fair price shop in the area concerned to the exclusion of all others. Learned counsel for the respondent, we may note, candidly admitted that the license did not guarantee either an exclusive area of operation or level of revenue. The issue primarily which therefore, arises for consideration is whether an existing licensee has a legal right to object to the establishment of an additional fair price shop. 4. The answer to this question in our view, has to be in the negative based on the age old principle of damnum sine injuria. A person engaged in a particular trade or business fundamentally does not have a right to oppose the establishment of a competing business unless it fall foul of some statutory prohibition. This essentially because what the law protects is a legal wrong. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution does not confer a right on a person to carry on a trade or business without competition. The coming into existence of a competitor in business may result in the trade or business of the existing person being adversely affected. This however, does not result in creation of a locus standi in favour of the existing trader to challenge such establishment in view of the fact that no legal right vested in him stands infringed. This issue was dealt with by the Supreme Court as far back as in Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N. Teekappa Gowda & Bros, (1970) 1 SCC 575 . A challenge of a similar nature as raised before the Supreme Court was answered thus: “Section 8 (3) (c) is merely regulatory, if it is not complied with the appellants may probably be exposed to a penalty, but a competitor in the business cannot seek to prevent the appellants from exercising their right to carry on business, because of the default, nor can the rice mill of the appellants be regard as a new rice mill. Competition in the trade or business may be subject to such restrictions as are permissible and are imposed by the State by a law enacted in the interests of the general public under Art. 19 (6), but a person cannot claim independently of such restriction that another person shall not carry on business or trade so as to affect his trade or business adversely. The appellants complied with the statutory requirements for carrying on rice milling operations in the building on the new site. Even assuming that no previous permission was obtained, the respondents would have no locus standi for challenging the grant of the permission, because no right vested in the respondents was infringed.” (emphasis supplied) 5. In Hans Raj Kehar v. State of U.P., (1975) 1 SCC 40 , the right of existing bus operators to seek exclusion of additional permit holders was negatived with the following observations: “The contention that the impugned notification is violative of the rights of the appellants under article 19(1)(f) or (g) of the Constitution is equally devoid of force. There is nothing in the notification which prevents the appellants from acquiring, holding and disposing of their property or prevents them from practising any profession or from carrying on any occupation. trade or business. The fact that some others have also been enabled to obtain permits for running buses cannot constitute a violation of the appellants, rights under the above two clauses of article 19 of the Constitution. The above provisions are not intended to grant a kind of monopoly to a few bus operators to the exclusion of other eligible persons. No right is guaranteed to any private party by article 19 of the Constitution of carrying on trade and business without competition from other eligible persons. Clause (g) of article 19(1) gives a right to all citizens subject to article 19(6) to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. It is an enabling provision and does not confer a right on those already practising a profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business to exclude and debar fresh eligible entrants from practising that profession or from carrying on that occupation, trade or business. The said provision is not intended to make any profession, business or trade the exclusive preserve of a few persons. The said provision is not intended to make any profession, business or trade the exclusive preserve of a few persons. We, therefore, find no valid basis for holding that the impugned provisions are violative of article 19.” (emphasis supplied) The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976) 1 SCC 671 , where it held as under: “Thus, in substance, the appellant’s stand is that the setting up of a rival cinema house in the town will adversely affect his monopolistic commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and loss of business from competition. Such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law, because it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest, the business competition causing it being a lawful activity. Juridically, harm of this description is called demnum sine injuria, the term injuria being here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law. The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at large. In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He ‘has no legal peg for’ a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a ‘person aggrieved’ and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the No-objection Certificate.” (emphasis supplied) 6. The above judgements were duly noted and the principles elucidated therein reaffirmed in Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 168 . 7. It is in light of the aforementioned legal principles enunciated by the Supreme Court that the judgment of the learned Single Judge then needs to be tested. As is evident from the judgement impugned, the order dated 17/26 May 2016 has been set aside only on the short ground of a breach of the principles of natural justice. 7. It is in light of the aforementioned legal principles enunciated by the Supreme Court that the judgment of the learned Single Judge then needs to be tested. As is evident from the judgement impugned, the order dated 17/26 May 2016 has been set aside only on the short ground of a breach of the principles of natural justice. The said conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge, in our view, proceeds on an assumption that a legal right conferred upon the original petitioner had been infringed. A right of hearing would stand attracted to a case only where a legal right of a person is infringed or a legal wrong is inflicted. However, as noted above, we have already found that no legal right of the original petitioner stood infringed. In view of the above, the question of an opportunity of hearing being afforded to the original petitioner before formulation of a resolution clearly did not arise. We are therefore, unable to sustain the judgment of the learned Single Judge on this ground. 8. Sri J.P. Singh learned counsel for the original petitioner however proceeded to address us on the merits of the challenge and laid emphasis on the provisions of a Government Order dated 10 August 1999 and submitted that in the absence of a finding being recorded by the competent authority that more than 4000 units are existing in the village a second fair price shop could not be permitted to be established. It was his submission that the Government Order, which had been issued in exercise of statutory powers, clearly prohibited the establishment of an additional fair price shop in a village which had less than 4000 units. He submitted that the material brought on record before the learned Single Judge clearly established that the village in question had less than 4000 units and therefore, contended that the judgment rendered and impugned herein be not interfered with. We are unable to accept the above submission for reasons which we indicate hereinbelow. 9. The Government order dated 10 August 1999, as is evident from its plain language seeks to consolidate guidelines framed and issued by the State Government for the purposes of establishment of fair price shops on 3 May 1999, 18 May 1999 and 30 July 1999. We are unable to accept the above submission for reasons which we indicate hereinbelow. 9. The Government order dated 10 August 1999, as is evident from its plain language seeks to consolidate guidelines framed and issued by the State Government for the purposes of establishment of fair price shops on 3 May 1999, 18 May 1999 and 30 July 1999. The clause upon which much stress is laid by Sri Singh is in the following terms: ^^xzkeh.k {ks= esa mfpr nj dh nqdkuksa dk p;u vc vafre :i ls xzke lHkkvksa }kjk gh fd;k tk;sxk] ÁR;sd xzke lHkk esa mfpr nj dh ,d nqdku [kksyh tk,xh] ftu xzke lHkkvksa esa 4000 ls vf/kd ;wfuV gS ogka ;fn xzke lHkk ;g eglwl djkrh gS dh ,d ls vf/kd nqdkus [kksyus esa yksxksa dks lqfo/kk gksxh rks xkao lHkk ,d ls vf/kd nqdku [kksyus dh dk;Zokgh dj ldrh gS] mfpr nj dh nqdkuksa dk p;u xzke lHkk dh [kqyh cSBd esa cgqer ls ÁLrkc ikfjr dj fd;k tk;sxkA^^ 10. To buttress his submission, Sri Singh has further relied upon a decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Dulare Prajapati v. State of U.P., 2012(4) ADJ 11 . 11. At the outset we may note that Ram Dulare is a judgment which is clearly distinguishable on facts. Firstly, it related to a fact situation where two shops were to be established in the same Gram Panchayat. Additionally, the Division Bench found that the subsequent licensee could not have been permitted to establish a fair price shop as he was the real brother of the Gram Pradhan and therefore, an appointment in his favour would violate an express prohibition contained in the Government Order dated 10 August 1999. 12. We have already noted and deem it fit to reiterate that in the facts of the present case, the resolution for the establishment of an additional shop came to be passed on the back of a prayer made by the villagers themselves who expressed difficulty in traversing a distance of 3.5 Kms. to obtain food items and articles meant for daily sustenance. The resolution made in light of the above facts clearly, in our opinion, subserves the public interest which of course must be conferred paramount importance and obviously must guide all State action. 13. to obtain food items and articles meant for daily sustenance. The resolution made in light of the above facts clearly, in our opinion, subserves the public interest which of course must be conferred paramount importance and obviously must guide all State action. 13. Additionally, we find upon a plain reading of the clause on which much reliance was placed, is really not a prohibition for the establishment of an additional fair price shop. As is evident from the plain terms of the said clause all that it makes provision for is to the effect that in those Gram Sabhas where units be more than 4000, in such cases and upon the Gram Sabha being of the opinion that the opening of an additional shop would be necessitated for the convenience of the villagers, a proposal may be processed for the establishment of an additional fair price shop. On a plain reading of the said provision, we are of the view that the same is merely an enabling provision and is not liable to be viewed as a prohibition against the establishment of an additional fair price shop where public interest so mandates. For all the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to sustain the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 14. We accordingly allow this special appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 18 July 2016 and consequently dismiss the writ petition preferred by the original petitioner. The Sub Divisional Magistrate may proceed in the matter on the basis of the resolution passed by the Gram Sabha and take such further steps as may be mandated in accordance with law.