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2016 DIGILAW 292 (UTT)

87015344 Head Constable Ram Pal Singh v. Union of India

2016-07-01

SUDHANSHU DHULIA

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JUDGMENT : Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. 1. The petitioner was appointed in Indo Tibetan Border Police Force (in short “ITBP”) on 06.10.1987 and subsequently, promoted to the post of Head Constable on 25.12.2001. Presently, the petitioner has challenged his dismissal order dated 08/09.05.2013 as well as order dated 21.10.2014 passed by respondent No. 3 i.e. Deputy Inspector General (Dehradun) in departmental appeal. In the first instance, the petitioner filed a writ petition (WPSS No. 636 of 2014) before this Court. However, the said writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 18.06.2014 on the ground of alternative remedy to file statutory appeal before the Higher Authority. The order dated 18.06.2014 passed in WPSS No. 636 of 2014 reads as under:- “The petitioner is a Head Constable in Indo-Tibetan Border Police who has been dismissed from service vide order dated 08/09.05.2013. Against the said order, petitioner has filed present writ petition before this Court. 2. The learned Senior Advocate, Mr. V.B.S. Negi has raised a preliminary objection that petitioner infact has a statutory remedy by way of filing an appeal before the next higher authority under Rule 28 of the Indo- Tibetan Border Police Force Rules, 1994. Rule 28 of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force Rules, 1994 reads as under:- “28. Appeal against orders of dismissal, removal or retirement.- A person subject to the Act other than an officer who has been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired from service, shall have the right to put in an appeal against the termination of his service to any of the authority, higher than the one who has passed the termination order within ninety days of the termination of service. (2) In the case of officers, appeal shall lie to the Central Government and such appeal shall be filed within ninety days of the termination of service. (3) Where the appellate authority sets aside the order of dismissal, removal or retirement under this rule, such authority shall pass such orders as may be necessary in respect of the period of absence from duty of the person whose dismissal, removal or retirement has been set aside.” 3. In view of the above statutory remedy, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. No order as to costs.” 2. Subsequently, the petitioner moved an appeal before the appropriate authority, which was subsequently dismissed vide order dated 21.10.2014. In view of the above statutory remedy, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. No order as to costs.” 2. Subsequently, the petitioner moved an appeal before the appropriate authority, which was subsequently dismissed vide order dated 21.10.2014. According to the petitioner, he was the Head Constable and posted at Joshimath at the relevant time when the impugned order of dismissal was passed. At the relevant time writ petitions (WPSS Nos. 1107 of 2012 and 1009 of 2007) were pending before this Court, in which ITBP was one of the respondents. The petitioner was asked by the Superior Authority to go to High Court (Nainital) and prepare the counter affidavits in the above writ petitions. Consequently, the petitioner reached at Nainital on 12.11.2012 and counter affidavits were prepared on 13.11.2012, but thereafter instead of returning to Joshimath, he proceeded to Delhi. In spite of several reminders of the authorities at his address, including his village address, the petitioner did not respond. Consequently, vide order dated 01.02.2013, he was declared as ‘deserter’. A publication was also made in this regard. The petitioner never responded and consequently, an ex-parte proceeding was initiated against him, in which it was found that the petitioner had gone on 12.11.2012 to instruct the counsel at Nainital about the case and prepared the counter affidavits but thereafter he did not return to his place of posting. The Department on 05.06.2012 wrote to his wife about the petitioner not joining his duties. The matter was also reported at Police Thana Joahimath where First Information Report was also lodged to this effect. As per the provision of Section 74(1) of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force Act, 1992, a court of inquiry was also conducted, as regarding the absence of the petitioner. The committee gave a finding that there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner had sought extension of his leave, in fact, the petitioner is habitual absentee in such matters. It has come on record that the petitioner had reported for his duties late after exhausting his actual leave, on various occasions earlier. For example in the year 1997, the petitioner was given sanctioned leave of thirty days, but in stead of joining after thirty days he reported to his duty after availing sixty two days leave i.e. after thirty two days of his actual sanctioned leave. For example in the year 1997, the petitioner was given sanctioned leave of thirty days, but in stead of joining after thirty days he reported to his duty after availing sixty two days leave i.e. after thirty two days of his actual sanctioned leave. Vide its order dated 24.02.1997, the department condoned the delay marking him ‘absent without leave’. Similar fate was repeated by the petitioner in the year 2005 when he went on leave for sixty days and returned late after forty one days. The matter was again condoned by the authority concerned vide its order dated 31.10.2005. The petitioner repeated it again in the year 2007 when he went for five days leave but returned after fifty two days and again delay was condoned by the department giving warning to the petitioner vide order dated 31.10.2007. The petitioner did not improve in his habit, as again in the year 2008, while he had availed leave for sixty days, but again he returned after three hundred and three days i.e. he joined his duty after two hundred and forty three days delay. Again strict warning was given to him, but no major penalty was imposed on the petitioner. Hence the petitioner is a habitual offender in such matters, and therefore, department did not find any reason to exempt the petitioner again and again and ultimately order of his dismissal from service was passed by the authority concerned vide order dated 08/09.05.2013. Subsequently, his departmental appeal was also dismissed by the Higher Authority on 21.10.2014. 3. For the first time the petitioner contends here that he reached at Nainital on 12.11.2012 and thereafter on 13.11.2012 instead of returning to Joshimath, he proceeded to Delhi, as he had pain in his spine. Admittedly the petitioner never gave any written request or letter to the authorities in this matter. According to the petitioner, he remained under medical treatment for thirty seven days i.e. from 24.12.2012 to 30.01.2013. In this regard, the petitioner has annexed a medical certificate, as annexure No. 2 to the writ petition. It appears to be from a private clinic, which only says that the petitioner was suffering from piles/Fistula. So, there is apparently a contradiction as far as the actual ailment of petitioner is concerned. In case the petitioner got operated there is nothing on record to show that this was actually done. It appears to be from a private clinic, which only says that the petitioner was suffering from piles/Fistula. So, there is apparently a contradiction as far as the actual ailment of petitioner is concerned. In case the petitioner got operated there is nothing on record to show that this was actually done. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner had a genuine problem during that period, there is nothing on record, which may suggest that the petitioner had made any effort to report for his duties at Joshimath on 31.01.2013. Moreover, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner ever moved any application or letter to the authority for seeking condonation of delay or no such communication has been attached by the petitioner in this regard. 4. In view of the admitted facts of the case that the petitioner is a habitual offender and has repeatedly done the same mistake again and again, at least five times reported late for his duties and in one occasion late after two hundred and forty three days, the conduct of the petitioner cannot be condoned. It is true that the past conduct of the petitioner could not have been taken into consideration while initiating a disciplinary proceeding in the matter, but it is definitely a factor to be considered while imposing the quantum of punishment. Although this Court is of a considered view that the petitioner has a family to support and the punishment is disproportionate to the alleged act of the petitioner, which could be at least converted the punishment into compulsory retirement as provided under Section 51(d) of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force Act, 1992. 5. Learned counsel for the Union of India, on the other hand, contends that since this may have cascading effect, in the disciplinary force like ITBP, he request the Court that instead of converting the punishment into compulsory retirement, liberty may be granted to the authority concerned i.e. Deputy Inspector General (respondent No. 3) who has decided the appeal, to consider the matter of the petitioner afresh for reducing the punishment into compulsory retirement. 6. Considering the case of the petitioner as well as the fact that the ITBP is a disciplinary force, let the Deputy Inspector General/respondent No. 3 take a decision only to a limited extent of compulsory retirement, and in case, he finds fit, review its earlier order. 6. Considering the case of the petitioner as well as the fact that the ITBP is a disciplinary force, let the Deputy Inspector General/respondent No. 3 take a decision only to a limited extent of compulsory retirement, and in case, he finds fit, review its earlier order. It is, however, made clear that there is no positive direction of this Court to the authority concerned to do so. The directions are only for the above consideration. 7. With the aforesaid observation, the writ petition stands dismissed.