Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 2977 (ALL)

BON TON PLASTICS PVT. LTD. , DELHI v. RAMESH CHAWLA

2016-08-30

PANKAJ MITHAL

body2016
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pankaj Mithal, J.—Heard Sri Vijay Prakash, learned counsel for the defendant-revisionist and Sri Ranjit Saxena, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondents. 2. The order dated 31.5.2016 passed by the Additional District Judge in exercise of power as Judge, Small Cause Court, rejecting the application of the defendant-revisionist (paper No. 33-Ga) for taking on record its written statement is subject of this revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act, 1887. 3. It appears that the plaintiff-respondents filed SCC Suit No. 75 of 2013 for eviction of the defendant-revisionist on the ground of arrears of rent after determining its tenancy. The defendant-revisionist in the said suit had put in its appearance on 20.11.2013. The defendant-revisionist on 24.7.2015 filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint. The said application was rejected vide order dated 18.1.2016. 4. The defendant revisionist after rejection of the above application filed an application on 17.2.2016 to allow time to challenge the above order before the High Court. The application was allowed and the order was challenged in SCC Revision No. 75 of 2016 which is pending. 5. Thereafter the defendant-revisionist on 24.2.2016 filed an application seeking time to file written statement and the Court permitted time for filing written statement in accordance with the provisions of C.P.C. subject to payment of costs of Rs. 1000/-. 6. The defendant-revisionist thereafter on 4.3.2016 submitted application paper No. 33-Ga enclosing written statement seeking permission to file it. 7. The aforesaid application has been rejected by the impugned order as Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. permits only 30 days time for filing written statement from the date of appearance which can be extended by the Court to a maximum of 90 days. 8. Admittedly, the defendant-revisionist had not filed the written statement within the above period of 30 days or the extended period of 90 days but much later for which the Court found no justification. 9. The submission of Sri Vijay Prakash, learned counsel for the defendant-revisionist is that the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. are not mandatory but directory in nature. The time provided therein for filing written statement can be extended even beyond 90 days for sufficient reasons. 9. The submission of Sri Vijay Prakash, learned counsel for the defendant-revisionist is that the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. are not mandatory but directory in nature. The time provided therein for filing written statement can be extended even beyond 90 days for sufficient reasons. Since the defendant-revisionist bonafidely, on legal advise was pursuing its application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. the time spent thereon was liable to be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The Court below therefore, ought to have accepted the written statement by extending time beyond 90 days of its appearance in the case. 10. Sri Ranjit Saxena on the other hand, contends that the object of the defendant-revisionist was to delay the disposal of the suit by filing unnecessary applications. No valid reason existed for extending the time for filing written statement beyond the period of 90 days stipulated under Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. 11. Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. makes provisions for the filing of written statement, set-off and counter claim. Rule 1 of Order 8 C.P.C. as amended, provides that the defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence. The proviso to it lays down that where the written statement is not filed within a period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file it for reasons to be recorded and on payment of such costs as the Court deems fit but not beyond 90 days from the date of service of summons. 12. In other words, the aforesaid provision mandates for filing of written statement within 30 days of service of summons upon the defendant which period can be extended for reasons to be recorded to a maximum period of 90 days from the date of service of summons. 13. The use of the word ‘shall’ therein prima facie makes the provision mandatory in the nature but as sometimes the use of the word ‘shall’ is taken to mean ‘may’ a controversy arose about the nature of the said provision. 14. 13. The use of the word ‘shall’ therein prima facie makes the provision mandatory in the nature but as sometimes the use of the word ‘shall’ is taken to mean ‘may’ a controversy arose about the nature of the said provision. 14. The above provision came up for consideration before the three Judges Bench in the case of Kailash v. Nanhku and others, (2005) 4 SCC 480 and their Lordships of the Supreme Court ruled that the aforesaid provision is not mandatory but directory in nature and that the Court may extend the time for filing of written statement even though the time referred in the aforesaid provision of 30 days and 90 days have expired. 15. On the other hand, a co-ordinate Bench of three Judges in Dr. J.J. Merchant and others v. Shrinath Chaturvedi, (2002) 6 SCC 635 , while dealing with the similar and identical provision of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which lays down time period of 30 days + 15 days = 45 days for filing defence in consumer complaint cases on consideration of the case of Kailash (supra) held that in no case the period of 45 days can be extended for filing defence in the complaint case. 16. It is in view of the above two decisions that when a similar matter relating to time limit for filing of defence version came up for consideration in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2016 SC 86 , the Apex Court finally approved the view taken in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) and observed that the Co-ordinate Bench in Kailash (supra) was bound by the view taken in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) and ought to have followed it with respect. 17. The three Judges Bench in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) despite agreeing with the view taken in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) and ignoring that of Kailash (supra) fell short of either over-ruling or holding that the view expressed in Kailash (supra) is per incurium or is not in accordance with law. Thus, the view taken in Kailash (supra) as regards the nature of the provision of Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. and extension of time beyond 90 days in filing the written statement was not over-ruled. 18. In New India Assurance Co. Thus, the view taken in Kailash (supra) as regards the nature of the provision of Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. and extension of time beyond 90 days in filing the written statement was not over-ruled. 18. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court in observing as aforesaid had not taken note of another three Judges decision in the case of Salem Advocates Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353 . In the aforesaid case the Bench dealt with the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. in extenso and held that as the aforesaid provision or as a matter of fact the entire C.P.C. is procedural in nature, the provision of Order 8 Rule 1 despite use of word ‘shall’ cannot be held to be mandatory in nature and is rather directory in nature. The aforesaid provision do not place any restriction from granting additional time after the expiry of 90 days stipulated therein for the purposes of filing written statement. Thus, the time for filing written statement can be extended even beyond the time limit of 90 days fixed therein in exceptional and hard cases but not as a matter of routine and the said discretion cannot be utilized by the Court frequently and in a routine way so as to nullify the existence of Rule 1 of Order 8 C.P.C. 19. A complete reading of the entire case law on the subject and considering the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C., it is clear that the view expressed in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) and Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) are confined to cases arising out and under the provisions of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the dictum of law laid down therein cannot be applied to proceedings governed by the procedure laid down under C.P.C. The suits governed by the procedure established by the C.P.C. have to abide by the radio decidendi of Salem Advocates Bar Association (supra) and that of Kailash (supra) in so far as they directly express the view in relation to Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. 20. Accordingly, in my opinion the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 are directory in nature and the extended time limit of 90 days provided therein for filing written statement can further be extended at the discretion of the Court for reasons to be recorded in exceptional and rare cases but not in a routine manner. 21. In view of the above, the Court below has the discretion to extend or not to extend the time for filing written statement beyond 90 days provided sufficient cause is shown justifying extension of time. 22. There is no dispute that the defendant-revisionist had put in appearance in the suit on 2.11.2013. They filed written statement vide application paper No. 33-Ga dated 4.3.2016 i.e. after about two and half years of appearance which is obviously after service of summons. 23. The defendant-revisionist had filed application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. on 24.7.2015 and the same was rejected on 18.1.2016. The explanation that the defendant-revisionist could not file the written statement on account of pendency of the above application is completely irrelevant and not material. The period of 30 days for filing written statement as well as the extended period of 90 days had expired much before the application under Order 7 Rule 11 was filed. There is no explanation or material on record to justify the non-filing of the written statement by the defendant-revisionist within the above period. Therefore, the defendant-revisionist even if entitle to exclusion of time spent in pursuing the application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. has miserably failed to submit any explanation or justification for not filing the written statement within 90 days of its appearance which had expired before the filing of application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. 24. Moreover, the filing of the aforesaid application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. in no way had stopped the defendant-revisionist from filing the written statement. The said application was rejected on 18.1.2016 but the written statement was presented in the Court on 4.3.2016 and in the meantime the defendant-revisionist had moved two applications seeking time to move to the High Court and for filing written statement. The manner and conduct in which the defendant-revisionist handled the suit and took time for filing of written statement speaks for itself that the intention was to prolong the matter rather to contest it on merit and git it concluded. The manner and conduct in which the defendant-revisionist handled the suit and took time for filing of written statement speaks for itself that the intention was to prolong the matter rather to contest it on merit and git it concluded. These facts do not justify to make out an exceptional and rare case fit for extending time for filing written statement beyond the period of 90 days. 25. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, if the Court of first instance has exercised its discretionary power and has rejected the application paper No. 33-Ga of the defendant-revisionist by refusing to accept the written statement filed by the defendant-revisionist, the said discretion is not liable to be disturbed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 26. Accordingly, I find no merit in this revision and the same is dismissed with costs upon the parties.