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2016 DIGILAW 298 (RAJ)

Hari Prasad Sharma v. State of Rajasthan

2016-02-19

AJIT SINGH, ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL

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JUDGMENT : Anupinder Singh Grewal, J. The appellant has challenged the order of the Single Bench dated 17/2/2009, whereby the writ petition preferred by the appellant challenging the order forfeiting his past service, was dismissed. 2. The appellant had been appointed as Class IV employee with the respondents on 25th June, 1987. He had remained absent from duty without leave from 12th October, 1990 to 30th July, 1991. He was issued a show cause notice on 30th January, 1992 under Rule 86(1) of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1957'). The reply of the appellant was not found satisfactory, and the competent authority vide order dated 25th July, 1992 forfeited his past service by invoking Rule 86(1) of the Rules of 1957. The competent authority had also recommended initiation of disciplinary action against the appellant under the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958. The appellant preferred an appeal before the Collector, who while upholding the forfeiture of his past service, partly allowed his appeal vide order dated 25th April, 1994 by setting aside the initiation of disciplinary action against him. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that there was no justification for forfeiture of appellant's service, and the same should also have been set aside by the appellate authority. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, and with their assistance, perused the record. 5. The question, which arises for consideration in the appeal, is whether the action of the competent authority in forfeiting past service of the appellant is justified under Rule 86 of Rajasthan Civil Service Rules. Rule 86 is reproduced hereunder:- "[Rule 86. Absence after expiry of leave:- (1) A Government servant who is absent from duty without leave or before leave applied for has been sanctioned by the competent authority shall be treated to have remained will fully absent from duty; and such absence shall amount to interruption in service involving forfeiture of past service unless, on satisfactory reasons being furnished, the absence is regularised by grant of leave due or is commuted into extraordinary leave by the authority competent to sanction leave. (2)(a) A Government servant who remains absent from duty after the expiry of the sanctioned leave or after communication of refusal of extension of leave is not entitled to any pay and allowances for the period of such absence and the period of such absence shall be commuted into extra ordinary leave unless on satisfactory reasons being furnished, the period of absence is regularised by grant of leave due by the authority to grant leave. (b) Willful absence from duty after the expiry of leave renders a Government servant liable to disciplinary action. (3) Notwithstanding the provisions contained in sub-rules (1) and (2) above the disciplinary authority may initiate departmental proceeding under Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules against a Government servant who will fully remains absent from duty for a period exceeding one month and if the charge of will full absence from duty is proved against him, he may be removed from service. (4) Unless the State Government, in view of the special circumstances of the case, determines otherwise a State Government employee who remains absent from duty for a continuous period exceeding five years other than on foreign service, whether with or without leave, shall be deemed to have resigned from service. Provided that a reasonable opportunity to explain the reasons for such absence shall be given to the employee before the provisions of this sub-rule are invoked." 6. A bare reading of Rule 86(1) of the Rules of 1957 reveals that in case a Government servant remains absent from duty without leave, he shall be treated as having will-fully absented from duty and this absence would amount to interruption in service involving forfeiture of past service unless satisfactory explanation for alleged absence has been furnished by him. 7. Therefore, until and unless a positive order is passed by the competent authority for accepting explanation for the absence from duty, forfeiture of past service for such interruption in service is inherent in Rule 86(1). 8. It is also evident from Rule 86(3) that for the will-ful absence from duty disciplinary action under the CCA Rules can also be initiated against the delinquent officer. 9. In the case at hand, the appellant has remained absent from duty with effect from 12th October, 1992 to 30th July, 1991. 8. It is also evident from Rule 86(3) that for the will-ful absence from duty disciplinary action under the CCA Rules can also be initiated against the delinquent officer. 9. In the case at hand, the appellant has remained absent from duty with effect from 12th October, 1992 to 30th July, 1991. Despite issuance of notices dated 4/12/1990, 7/2/1991 and 26/6/1991 to report back for duty, the appellant chose to remain absent. These notices are stated to have been duly served upon the appellant. 10. It is, thus, patent that the action of the competent authority in forfeiting his past service by invoking Rule 86(1) of the Rules of 1957 does not suffer from any infirmity. It is only in case when the reasons furnished by the delinquent for his absence are found to be satisfactory by the competent authority, this period of absence can be regularised. The competent authority having not found explanation for the period of absence to be satisfactory had rightly invoked Rule 86(1) and forfeited his past service. In case, the competent authority did not choose to initiate disciplinary proceedings in terms of Rule 86(3), it is not open to the appellant to contend that for this reason his past service should not have been forfeited. Rule 86(1) and Rule 86(3) operate in different fields and invocation of Rule 86(1) is independent of invocation of Rule 83(3). 11. For these reasons, we do not find any manifest illegality in the judgment of the Single Bench warranting any interference in appeal. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.