JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Heard Mr. A. Dey, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State. 2. By means of this revision petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C, the judgment and order dated 10.04.2014 delivered in Criminal Appeal 04(03) of 2013 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sonamura, West Tripura, has been called in question. By the impugned judgment, the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 03.07.2013 delivered in case no. GR 395 of 2008 passed by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sonamura, West Tripura has been affirmed. 3. The prosecution case is rooted in the ejahar (Exhibit 2) filed by one Khayerul Hossain on 07.08.2008 disclosing that one cruiser vehicle bearing no. TR-03-4308 having been driven rashly and negligently dashed a five years old boy, namely, Bijoy Majumder at a place called Rangamatia on the Agartala-Sonamura road coming on the wrong side of the road. The said boy received several bleeding injuries and when he was taken to Melaghar hospital, the Medical Officer on duty declared him dead. 4. Based on the said ejahar, Sonamura P.S. case No. 163 of 2008 under Section 279/304(A) was registered. After investigation, the final police form under Section 173 was filed. Having taken the cognizance, the petitioner was read the substance of accusation to which he pleaded not guilty. 5. In the trial, as many as 13 witnesses were examined by the prosecution. That apart the Court summoned and examined two other witnesses. The prosecution has also placed some documentary evidence (Exhibit 1 to Exhibit-9) including the post mortem report in respect of the death of the said boy in the evidence. Even the prosecution placed in the evidence the inspection report of the Motor Vehicle Inspector who found that the vehicle was not having any mechanical defect. After recording the prosecution evidence, as stated, the petitioner was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C and thereafter by the judgment and order dated 03.07.2013, he was convicted and sentenced, as stated. 6. Mr. De, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that being dis-satisfied with the said judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 03.07.2013 delivered in GR 395 of 2008, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 374(3) of the Cr.P.C being Criminal Appeal no. 04(03) of 2013. 6. Mr. De, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that being dis-satisfied with the said judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 03.07.2013 delivered in GR 395 of 2008, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 374(3) of the Cr.P.C being Criminal Appeal no. 04(03) of 2013. By the impugned judgment dated 10.04.2014, the said appeal was dismissed by observing that “in the instant case I find that the accused did not disclose anything about the plea taken during cross-examination of the witnesses. PW-7 in his deposition stated that he is the owner of vehicle bearing no. TR-03-4308. On 07.08.2008 his vehicle met with an accident at Rangamatia. He came to learn from Syndicate that Biplab Das drove the vehicle at the material time of accident. Police seized the vehicle during investigation. He also identified the accused person in the dock. In cross-examination the witness denied the suggestion that Biplab Das was impleaded falsely in the instant case. From the prosecution evidence I find that PW 1, PW 3 and PW 4 are the eye witnesses of the occurrence and they fully corroborated in respect of number of the offending vehicle as well as the fact of incident how the offending vehicle dashed the deceased boy as well as subsequently ran over him. I do not find any discrepancy in the testimony of the eye witnesses and I hold that learned court below rightly appreciated the evidence of the eye witnesses. I also find that learned court below rightly relied upon the testimony of PW 7, the owner of the offending vehicle who identified the accused in the court”. 7. Mr. De, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised solitary objection on reliance of the evidence of PW 7. According to Mr. De, learned counsel, the substance of the knowledge about who was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident fulls in the class of hearsay and is hit by the provision of Section 60 of the Evidence Act, inasmuch as the person who informed PW 7 from the Syndicate was not examined in the trial. 8. In response to this plea, as raised by Mr. De, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State submitted that PW 1, namely, Aminul Islam identified the accused petitioner in the dock, as the driver of the vehicle. 8. In response to this plea, as raised by Mr. De, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State submitted that PW 1, namely, Aminul Islam identified the accused petitioner in the dock, as the driver of the vehicle. 9. After appreciating the records, as produced before the court, as well as the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that, Aminul Islam (PW 1) for the first time identified the driver of the vehicle and in the cross examination he failed to find out from the previous statement, as recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C, that he disclosed that fact to the police officer. Even the police officer has submitted in his cross examination that none disclosed the name of the driver to him ever. 10. From a close scrutiny of the testimony of Aminul Islam (PW 1), it would appear that Aminul Islam also did not know the name of the driver. Therefore, even if he had stated to the Investigating Officer that he would have been able to identify the driver by face then it was the duty of the Investigating Officer to conduct the Test Identification Parade under Section 9 of the Evidence Act when the accused petitioner was arrested following the procedure but that was admittedly not followed in this case. Secondly, this Court has considered the testimony of PW-7. 11. It clearly appears there from that he did not know but he had heard from a person of the Syndicate about who had driven the vehicle at the relevant part of time. This piece of evidence cannot at all be relied as the legal evidence for establishing the identification who drove the vehicle at the time of the accident and as such, the other evidentiary material cannot involve the petitioner with the offence. The judgment of conviction as returned by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court is therefore, liable to be interfered with. Accordingly, it is so ordered. 12. Having held that, the petitioner is acquitted from the charge under Section 279/304(A) of the IPC and the sureties are discharged from their respective obligations. 13. In the result, the revision petition stands allowed. Send down the LCRs forthwith.