JUDGMENT Devendra Kumar Arora, J. Heard Sri Mohd. Wazid Irfan, learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel. 2. Feeling aggrieved by the cancellation of his fire-arm licence by the District Magistrate, Faizabad, vide order dated 20.8.2007 and rejection of his appeal by the Commissioner, Faizabad, vide order dated 18.9.2008 preferred against the order of cancellation, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition. 3. Submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was issued a firearm license of Revolver. An FIR was lodged against the petitioner under Sections 323, 504, 506, 336,338,326 IPC at Police Station Raunahi, District Faizabad. A cross FIR was also registered at Case crime no. 414A/2006 under Sections 323/504/506/336/338/325 IPC/ It has been asserted that there was no allegation of use of revolver by the petitioner. On account of pressure exerted by the rival group, a show cause notice was issued on 29.3.2007 as to why his licence may not be cancelled to which petitioner tendered his reply dated 31.5.2007. Thereafter, the firearm license of the petitioner was cancelled by the District Magistrate vide order dated 20.8.2007 without considering the reply submitted by the petitioner, merely on apprehension of petitioner's misusing his firearm. 4. It has been vehemently contended by the learned counsel for petitioner that under Section 17(3)(b) of the Act, power has been conferred upon the licensing authority to suspend or revoke a license of fire-arm, if he deems necessary to do so for the security of public peace, but in the present case the opposite party no.2 while passing the impugned order dated 29.06.2009 failed to show at least, prima-facie, that as to how the possession of the arms by the petitioner would endanger the public peace. Thus, it is clear that the same has been passed only on the basis of recommendations submitted by the opposite party. Thus, it is clear that the same has been passed only on the basis of false report of police authorities. 5. In contrast, learned State Counsel while opposing the writ petition, submitted that the impugned orders have been passed in consonance with provisions of the Act as the licensing authority after considering the material facts on record has given a categorical finding of fact that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of arms license. 5. In contrast, learned State Counsel while opposing the writ petition, submitted that the impugned orders have been passed in consonance with provisions of the Act as the licensing authority after considering the material facts on record has given a categorical finding of fact that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of arms license. It is submitted that the impugned orders are absolutely correct and the same are legally justified as the same have been passed after affording due opportunity to the petitioner. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. Thus, the trivial question involved in this writ petition is as to whether licensing authority is vested with the power under the Arms Act to revoke/cancel the license of a public person mere on involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case. 7. To answer the aforesaid question, it would be apt to refer relevant paragraphs of Rakesh Kumar Vs. District Magistrate, Raebareli and others; [ 2013(31) LCD 1313 ], wherein it has been held that merely because of pendency of a criminal case, the arms- licenses of the petitioner cannot be cancelled. Relevant para read as under: - "12. Further, this Court in the case of Sahab Singh Vs. Commissioner Agra Region, Agra and others, 2006 (24) LCD 374 , in paragraph No. 3 held as under: - The submission of the petitioner is That merely because of pendency of a criminal case, the arms licence of the petitioner cannot be cancelled. in support of the said submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on two decisions of this Court in the case of Hausla Prasad Tiwari v. State of U.P. and Ishwar @ Bhuri v. State of U.P. . It has further been submitted that in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in the cases of Balaram Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. Kailash Nath v. State of U.P. 1985 A.W.C. 493 as well as the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sadri Ram v. District Magistrate, Azamgarh and Ors. , the arms licence of the petitioner cannot be placed under suspension pending enquiry." 8. In the case of Mulayam Singh v. State of U.P., 2013 (80) ACC 786 in paragraph Nos. , the arms licence of the petitioner cannot be placed under suspension pending enquiry." 8. In the case of Mulayam Singh v. State of U.P., 2013 (80) ACC 786 in paragraph Nos. 11 and 12 held as under: - "Para No. 11 - The question as to whether mere involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case can be a ground for revocation of licence under the Arms Act, has been dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court reported in 1978 AWC, 122 (Sheo Prasad Mishra vs. District Magistrate). The division Bench relied upon the earlier decision of another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Masi Uddin vs. Commissioner, Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 573 wherein it has been held: - "A licence may be cancelled, inter-alia, on the ground that it is "necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety, to do so. The District Magistrate has not recorded a finding that it was necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to revoke the licence. The mere existence of enmity between a licencee and another person would not establish the "necessary" connection with security of the public peace or public safety. In the case before us also the District Magistrate has not recorded any finding that it was necessary to cancel the licence for the security of public peace or for public safety. All that he has done is to have referred to some applications and reports lodged against the petitioner. The mere fact that some reports had been lodged against the petitioner could not form basis for cancelling the licence. The order passed by the District Magistrate and that passed by the Commissioner cannot, therefore, be upheld on the basis of anything contained in Section 17(3)(b) of the Act." Para No. 12 - Similar view has been taken by this Court in various decisions relying upon the Division Bench judgment passed in Sheo Prasad Mishra( supra). There is no doubt that the District Magistrate and the Commissioner i.e. administrative authorities are bound to take appropriate action in the matter of grant of licence and also its cancellation for the purpose of maintaining peace and harmony in the society. There is no doubt that the District Magistrate and the Commissioner i.e. administrative authorities are bound to take appropriate action in the matter of grant of licence and also its cancellation for the purpose of maintaining peace and harmony in the society. The assessment of administrative authorities with regard to grant or cancellation of licence should not be interfered in usual course by the Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction unless there is illegality or arbitrariness." 9. In the case of Raj Kumar Verma Vs. State of U.P., 2013 (80) ACC 231 this Court in paragraph No. 3 held as under: - "The ground for issue of show-cause notice, suspension and ultimately cancellation of the licence is that one and precisely one criminal case was registered against the petitioner. The District Magistrate has also held that the petitioner has been enlarged on bail. He has gone further to observe that if the licence remained intact, the petitioner, may disturb public peace and tranquility. The same findings have been given by the Commissioner, Unmindful of the fact that this Court is repeating the law of the land, but the deaf ears of the administrative officers do not ready to succumb the law of the land. The settled law is that mere involvement in a criminal case without any finding that involvement in such criminal case shall be detrimental to public peace and tranquility shall not create the ground for the cancellation of Armed Licence. In Ram Suchi vs. Commissioner, Devipatan Division reported in 2004 (22) LCD 1643, it was held that this law was relied upon in Balram Singh vs. State of UP 2006 (24) LCD 1359 . Mere apprehension without substance is simply an opinion which has no legs to stand. Personal whims are not allowed to be reflected while acting as a public servant." 10. In Thakur Prasad Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in [ 2013 (31) LCD 1460 ], this court propounded that "Public Peace" or "Public Safety" do not mean ordinary disturbance of law and order, but the public safety means safety of the public at large and not safety of few persons only. Relevant paras 9, 10 and 11 of the said case read as under: "9. Relevant paras 9, 10 and 11 of the said case read as under: "9. Further, while passing the impugned order also the licensing authority has not given any adequate finding that if petitioner holds the arms license then the same shall be against the public peace or public safety. "10. Public peace" or "public safety" do not mean ordinary disturbance of law and order public safety means safety of the public at large and not safety of few persons only and before passing of the order of cancellation of arm license as per Section 17(3) of the Act the Licensing Authority is under an obligation to apply his mind to the question as to whether there was eminent danger to public peace and safety involved in the case in view of the judgment given by this Court in the case of Ram Murli Madhukar Vs. District Magistrate, Sitapur [1998(16) LCD 905], wherein it has been held that license can not be suspended or revoked on the ground of public interest (Jan-hit) merely on the registration of an F.I.R. and pending of a criminal case." 11. The question as to whether mere involvement in a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case can be a ground for revocation of licence under Arms Act, has been dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court Sheo Prasad Misra Vs. The District Magistrate, Basti & others [supra] wherein the Division Bench relying upon the earlier decision of Masiuddin Vs. Commissioner, Allahabad, found that mere involvement in criminal case cannot in any way affect the public security or public interest. The law propounded in the said decisions has been subsequently followed in Habib Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2002 ACC 783, and Ram Sanehi Vs. Commissioner, Devi Patan Division, Gonda & another [supra] and other cases. 12. There is yet another reason that during the pendency of the present writ petition, the petitioner has been acquitted from the aforesaid criminal case and at present there is neither any case pending, nor any conviction has been attributed to the petitioner, as is evident from the averments made in the supplementary-affidavit filed by the petitioner. In this view of the matter, the petitioner is entitled to have the fire-arm licence. 13. In this view of the matter, the petitioner is entitled to have the fire-arm licence. 13. The order passed by the District Magistrate cannot, therefore, cannot be upheld in absence of anything as contained in Section 17(3) of the Act. The Appellate Court has also committed an error in not considering the facts in its correct prospective and has also failed to appreciate the grounds mentioned in Section 17(3) of the Arms Act regarding revocation or for suspending a licence. It is well settled in law that mere pendency of criminal case or apprehension of abuse of arm are not sufficient grounds for passing the order of suspension or revocation of license under Section 17 (3) of the Act. Here, as averred above, the petitioner has been acquitted in the said criminal case. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, the order passed by the Appellate Authority cannot be legally sustained. 14. Accordingly the orders dated 18.9.2008 passed by the Commissioner and the order dated 20.8.2007 passed by the District Magistrate are hereby quashed. The licensing authority is directed to renew the fire-arm license of the petitioner, which was cancelled, within a maximum period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. 15. The writ petition stands allowed in above terms.