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2016 DIGILAW 2998 (ALL)

Uma Shukla v. Director, C. D. R. I. , Lucknow

2016-08-31

ANANT KUMAR, NARAYAN SHUKLA

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JUDGMENT Heard Mr. Raj Vikram Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Asit Kumar Chaturvedi, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents. The petitioner is aggrieved with the order dated 26.08.2016 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in Original Application No.77 of 2016 whereby the petitioner's application to stay the order of termination has been rejected. The petitioner had filed an original application before the Tribunal seeking relief to issue a direction to the opposite parties to regularize the services of the applicant/petitioner as per rules and the precedents of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as Hon'ble High Court and any other relief, which this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit just and proper. The application filed by the petitioner was pending consideration. In the meanwhile the respondents had considered the petitioner's matter of absorption and found that since no relaxation in age was provided by the department for absorption of the petitioner, there was no occasion to allow the petitioner to continue in service and accordingly, the respondents terminated the petitioner's service w.e.f. 16.07.2016. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that since the petitioner had continued in service with the respondents for about 26 years, she had prayed for absorption in the department seeking relaxation in age since whatever age limit was crossed that was crossed during discharge of duty in the respondents' office, however, the contentions of the petitioner could not be found to the satisfaction of the respondents. Since they terminated the petitioner's service, the petitioner had moved an application for amendment of the original application. That was allowed and the original application was amended accordingly. Under the strength of final relief, the petitioner had also sought an interim relief to stay the order of termination during the pendency of the original application, whereas the Tribunal rejected it with the observation that "it is a matter of adjudication after receipt of reply from the respondents. At this stage, there is not enough information to clearly demark the case of the applicant from that of the others in para 3. Hence rejected the petitioner's interim relief". At this stage, there is not enough information to clearly demark the case of the applicant from that of the others in para 3. Hence rejected the petitioner's interim relief". In Para-3 of the order, there is a reference of some original applications, one of which is original application no.276 of 2016 in which also the Tribunal had rejected the application for interim relief against which the applicant had filed a writ petition being writ petition no.14901 (S/B) of 2016. This Court disposed of the writ petition with the following observations: "We have considered the submissions made and we find that the petitioners had continued for a fairly long time in the establishment and as such, their termination has brought about a cessation of their services that gave rise to the Original Application. The question as to whether they can be continued or otherwise be extended any such benefits as claimed by them therefore has to be gone into finally. The respondents are therefore directed to file their response to the Original Application within three weeks from today and rejoinder to the same may be filed within one week thereafter before the Tribunal. In view of the nature of the dispute and the fact that the petitioners had continued in service for a fairly long time and would not be eligible for any other government employment elsewhere, it would be appropriate that the Tribunal makes an expeditious disposal of the matter at the earliest. We earnestly request the Tribunal to dispose of the matter at its convenience preferably within three months from today. The observations made in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the impugned order being prima facie shall not be treated as final while disposing of the matter. Disposed off with the said observations." Since this Court has not interfered with the order passed by the Tribunal rejecting the petitioner's application for interim relief in the said matter, Mr. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the propriety demands that this Court should also not interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal and the matter be left open to the Tribunal to decide it finally on its own merit. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the propriety demands that this Court should also not interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal and the matter be left open to the Tribunal to decide it finally on its own merit. In support of his submissions, he also placed a judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench passed in writ petition no.1590 (S/B) of 2013 in which relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. & others v. Sunanda Prasad & another; (1999) 6 SCC 34 , this Court has not interfered with the order passed by the Tribunal rejecting the petitioner's application for interim relief. In State of U.P. & others v. Sunanda Prasad & another (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "though ordinarily this Court does not interfere with an interim order passed by the High Court, but in the case in hand the High Court having entertained a writ petition while the grievance of the respondents is still pending before the Central Administrative Tribunal and having passed an interim order annulling the order of the Tribunal, we think it appropriate to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court". The Supreme Court further held that "we have no doubt in our mind that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining a writ application when the legality of the order; of transfer is a subject-matter of a pending proceeding before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal has passed an order of status quo. If the appellant authority has violated any interim direction of the Tribunal, the appropriate remedy is to file an application for contempt and we are told that such application has been filed, which is pending before the Tribunal. The Tribunal has also fixed up the hearing of the matter on 16-7-1999". A bare reading of the aforesaid order of the Supreme Court shows that in the said case the Tribunal has passed an order of status quo that was an interim relief granted to the applicant, but here the position is altogether different as in this case the Tribunal had rejected the petitioner's application, therefore, the occasion had arisen to consider the submission of the petitioner as has been made in the present writ petition in continuation of the application for interim relief moved before the Tribunal. The facts in brief of the case are that the petitioner/applicant had continued in service with the respondents for about 26 years without break. She had crossed the age limit for absorption during discharge of duty in the department, therefore, she has sought relaxation in age in absorption but the respondents had rejected the petitioner's claim of absorption having been crossed the age limit. Not only this they had terminated her service only for the reason that she could not be absorbed without assigning any other reason. The order of termination does not reveal any blemish point against the petitioner, therefore, considering the peculiar facts of the present case, we are of the view that till her termination order is adjudicated upon finally by the Tribunal, she is entitled to be allowed to continue in service on the status maintained on the date of termination. Therefore, we hereby quash the order impugned dated 26.08.2016 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow rejecting the petitioner's application for interim relief and stay the order of termination with direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service on the position as it was before the order of termination. In this view the petitioner's application for interim relief is allowed. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition stands allowed.