JUDGMENT Anil Kumar,J. Heard Sri Dipak Seth, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Manoj Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for respondent/ Landlords. 2. Facts, in brief , of the present case are that respondents no. 2 to 7 /landlords/ landladies have moved an application for release of the shop numbered as premises no. 10, Faizabad Road , Daliganj, P.S. Hasanganj, Lucknow under Section 21(1) (a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Building (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act (Act No. XIII of 1972), registered as P.A. Case no. 86 of 1983 before the prescribed authority/ Civil Judge Malihabad, Lucknow. Petitioner, who is tenant in the said shop, filed his written statement. By order dated 19.12.1987, prescribed authority after taking into consideration the material on record, rejected the application for release holding therein that the premises was not bonafidely required for running the hotel business by Mohd Aris Khan in respect to whom the need has been set up in the release application and also held that the tenant is a reputed and established doctor, who will suffer great hardship. 3. Aggrieved by the said order, respondents preferred an appeal, appellate authority vide order dated 14.10.1993, dismissed the same by holding that though the need of the landlady is genuine, it cannot be released as the tenant will suffer greater hardship. Thereafter respondent/landlords challenged the order dated 19.12.1987 passed by prescribed authority and the order dated 14.10.1993 passed by appellate authority by filing Writ Petition No.8 (RC) of 1994 ( Smt. Bibi Begum Vs. Dr. Awdhesh Narain and others), vide order dated 13.10.2008, the relevant portion is quoted as under: - " In view of above discussion, the writ petition is allowed and the order passed by the appellate court dated 14.10.1993 is quashed. The matter is remanded to the appellate authority for deciding if afresh. This Court is of the view that the appellate authority should given a fresh look to the appeal taking into account the latest rent laws, which have been spelt out in the present judgment and other judgments which may be placed by the contesting parties including tenant and form its opinion based on law and after considering all these points, the appellate authority shall deliver its judgment. The appeal shall be decided within two months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order. The appeal shall be decided within two months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order. It is made clear that unnecessary adjournment shall be avoided." 4. Accordingly, the matter came up for consideration in Rent Appeal 5 of 1988 ( Bibi Begum and others Vs. Dr. Awadhesh Narain ) before appellate authority / Additional District Judge, Court no.13 , Lucknow, who by means of order dated 6.3.2009 allowed the same on the ground that the need as set up in the release application, that the shop in dispute is required for running business by Mohd. Aris Khan who is still unemployed, is genuine and bona fide coupled with the fact that no alternative accommodation has been searched out by the tenant. 5. Sri Dipak Seth, learned counsel for the petitioner while challenging the impugned order submits that during the pendency of litigation before this Court landlord/landladies has got possession of another shop situated at the same place under the tenancy of Ramesh Chandr @ Ramesh Sindhi and from the said shop Mohd. Aris has started his business. In this regard he has placed reliance on the averments made in para 5,6, 7 and 8 of the third supplementary affidavit filed by the tenant , the same are reproduced as under: - "5.That it was brought out by the petitioner that the shop( adjacent to the premises in question) which was in the tenancy of Hasa Mal was vacated but the same was let out to Shri Ramesh Chandra@ Ramesh Sindhi in 1979 who started running a chat & sweets shop. The said shop has recently been vacated by Shri Ramesh Chandra @ Ramesh Sindhi also. The said shop vacated by Shri Ramesh Chandra @ Ramesh Sindhi is almost equivalent to the shop/ premises in question. 6. That Shri Ramesh Chandra @ Ramesh Sindhi vacated the aforesaid shop, adjoining the shop in question, in june 2015 and got the electricity connection, which was in his name, permanently disconnected.True copes of the meter sealing certificate on permanent disconnection dated 18.6.2015 and the receipt dated 16.6.2015 of the fee for permanent disconnection are being annexed herewith as Annexure no.S-1 & S-2 to this affidavit. 7. That Mr.Mohd. 7. That Mr.Mohd. Aris, whose need for starting his business was the very basis of the present litigation, has started business in the shop vacated by Shri Ramesh Chandra @ Ranesh Sindhi in the name and style of" Chup Tea Centre" The need projected for Mohd Aris in the present litigation therefore does not survive any more. 8. That the shop of the respondents no. 2,3 and 4, namely, Mohd. Yonus Khan, Mohd Arif Khand And Mohd Aris Khan , who are real brothers, are adjacent to each other in the same building where the ship in question situates and they are running their independent businesses. Some of the photographs showing (L to R) STD/ISD shop of Mohd. Yonus Khan, Raja Digital Photo Palace of Mohd. Arif Khan and "Chup Tea Centre" of Mohd. Aris Khan and the clinic of the petitioner are being collectively annexed herewith as Annexure no. S-3 to this affidavit." 6. On the basis of said averments, Sri Dipak Seth, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the needs as set up by landlord/ landladies in the release application for vacation of shop in question under the tenancy of petitioner for doing busines by Sri Mohd Aris no longer exists due to happening of said subsequent event, so the impugned order dated 6.3.2009 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court no.13, Lucknow passed in Rent Appeal no. 5 of 1988 ( Mohd. Yunus Khan and others Vs. Dr. Oudhesh Narain) liable to be set aside. In this regard he has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Ram Kumar Barnwal Vs. Ram Lakhan (dead) (2007) 5 Supreme Court Cases, 660; 2007 (68) alr 136 (SC), as well as this Court in the case of Girdhar Das Vs. IInd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Varanasi and others, 1985(1) Allahabad Rent Cases, 450 ; 1985 (1) ARC 450 and Suresh Chandra Tiwari and another Vs. Chandra Bhan Paliwal, 2014 (1) ARC 678 . 7. Sri Manoj Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for respondents/ landlords/ landladies submits that need as set up by the respondents/ landlords/ landladies still exists and there is still need to get accommodation for runing the business of Mohd Aris Khan . He further submits that the landlord is the best judge to see from which place / premises he may do the business . He further submits that the landlord is the best judge to see from which place / premises he may do the business . Keeping in view of the said fact as well as the fact that petitioner is the tenant of the shop since long and the release application has been moved in the year 1955 and the finding given by the appellate court while passing the judgment dated 6.3.2009 is perfectly valid, so the arguments which advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner has got no force , so the writ petition filed by the petitioner liable to be dismissed. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 9. As per undisputed facts of the present case after passing of the judgment by appellate court dated 6.3.2009 under challenge in the instant matter certain subsequent development has taken place as stated above and mentioned in the third supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner during the pendency of litigation before this Court. and the same are not denied by the respondents/ landlords/ landladies. 10. Thus, the core and foremost question to be decided in the present case is what is the effect of above mentioned subsequent events which has taken place during the pendecy of present writ petition in regard to decide the bona fide need and comparative hardship between the parties. As this Court in the case of Sri Rajendra Prasad v. VIII Addl. D. J. Meerut Allahabad Rent Cases 1978 page 209 after placing reliance on the judgment given in the case of Raj Narain Jain v. IV Addl. District Judge AIR 1975 SC 1409 ; 1976 (2) ALR 595 in paragraph no.7 (relevant portion of the same) held that the subsequent event which has taken place during the consideration of release of premises should be taken into account ............... : - "The tenant also contends that after filing of these proceedings the landlord has also obtained possession over another shop at a short distance from the shop in dispute and he can fulfil his need, if any, from the same. These new facts which have been placed before me were not before the Prescribed Authority or the learned Addl. District Judge. They deserve consideration because they will have an important bearing on the determination of the aforesaid questions. These new facts which have been placed before me were not before the Prescribed Authority or the learned Addl. District Judge. They deserve consideration because they will have an important bearing on the determination of the aforesaid questions. As held by this court in the case of Raj Narain Jain (Supra) it is open to the court to take into account subsequent events which may have material bearing on the continued existence of the landlords need. In this case reliance was placed on the case of R. B. Ghosel v. The State of West Bengal AIR 1975 SC 1409 . I am not competent to express any opinion on the merit of the respective contentions of the parties. It deserves to be considered by the learned Additional Distt. Judge." In the case of Ved Prakash vs. IInd Addl. District Judge, Aligarh and others Allahabad Rent Cases 1984 (2) page 485, this Court held as under : - "It is well known by now that subsequent events can be taken into account which have come into existence during the pendency of the writ petition in this Hon'ble Court. In the present case it has not been disputed that during the pendency of the writ petition, the landlady opposite party has got possession over the shop in possession of the one Baij Nath. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has suggested that the aforesaid shop in possession of Baij Nath was needed for the need of the landlady's son named Sita Ram. It has been also come to my notice that the accommodation in possession of one Hamid was also released in favour of the landlady-opposite party no.3 in the present writ petition. The suggestion of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party is that those accommodations were needed for Sita Ram another son of the landlady, hence the subsequent events relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner would not effect the finding recorded by the appellate court. I think that the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party is not quite correct. It needs investigation by the appellate court while determining the question of hardship between the tenant-petitioners and the landlady opposite party no.3 in the present case. I think that the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party is not quite correct. It needs investigation by the appellate court while determining the question of hardship between the tenant-petitioners and the landlady opposite party no.3 in the present case. If the landlady succeeded in getting two accommodations during the pendency of the release application giving rise to the present writ petition, their effect should be considered by the lower appellate court while determining the question of hardship between the tenant-petitioner and the landlady opposite party. (See Smt. Malti Sharma vs. The Vith Addl. District Judge, Lucknow and others Allahabad Rent Cases, 1988 (1) page 176)." In the case of Tribhuvan Nath Mehrotra vs. District Judge, Allahabad and others Allahabad Rent Cases 1988 (1) page 536; 1988 (14) ALR 352, this Court held as under : - "In M/s. Variety Emporium v. V. R. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina, AIR 1985 SC 207 : 1985 SCFBRC 52 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is well settled now that in a proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement under a statute controlling the eviction of tenants unless statute prescribes to the contrary, the requirement must continue to exist on the date when the proceeding is finally disposed of either in appeal or revision, by the relevant authority. It has further been held that the tenant is entitled to show that the need or requirement of the landlord no more exits by pointing out the subsequent events to the Courts." 11. This Court in the case of Dr. Ramesh Chandra Agarwal and others vs. District Judge, Hardoi and another Allahabad Rent Cases, 1999 (1) 572 has held as under : - "In Mahabir Prasad v. Vith Additional District Judge, Gonda and others 1993 (11) LCD 861 : 1993 (2) ARC 401 (LB), this Court has also come to the conclusion by relying upon certain judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the subsequent event coming into existence during the pendency of the writ petition can be taken into account. In the light of the view taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is crystal clear that the subsequent events can be taken into account under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." 12. In the light of the view taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is crystal clear that the subsequent events can be taken into account under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." 12. In the case of Atma S. Berar vs. Mukhtiar Singh 2003 (2) SCC page 3 after placing reliance on the earlier judgment given in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 this Court held as under : - "Dealing with this aspect, analysed the concept of bona fide requirement and said that the requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant refers to a state of mind prevailing with the landlord. The only way of peeping into mind of the landlord is an exercise undertaken by the judge of facts by placing himself in the armchair of the landlord and then posing a question to himself-whether in the given facts, substantiated by the landlord, the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. We do not think that we can usefully add anything to the exposition of law of requirement for self-occupation than what has been already stated in the three precedents." 13. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Kedar Nath Agrawal (Dead) and another vs. Dhanraji Devi (Dead) by Lrs. And another SCC (2004) 8 SCC page 76; 2004 (57) ALR 419 (SC) =2004 (23) AIC 31 held as under : - "The High Court held that the objection raised by the heirs of the applicants was well founded and the Court could not take into account the subsequent event of death of the applicants during the pendency of writ petition. It was also observed that a party could not be penalised for the delay in court and when the order of eviction was legally passed in favour of the applicants, it could not be set aside by considering the subsequent event of death of the applicants. The High Court also observed that the decisions cited on behalf of the writ petitioners wherein subsequent evens were taken into account were in appeals. The High Court also observed that the decisions cited on behalf of the writ petitioners wherein subsequent evens were taken into account were in appeals. According to the High Court, an appeal can be said to be a "continuation of suit" but not a writ petition. It was observed that once the case was decided by the prescribed authority and appeal was dismissed by the District Judge, the High Court had no power to consider subsequent events in the proceedings under Articles 226/227 of the constitution and accordingly it dismissed the writ petition. In our opinion, by not taking into account the subsequent event, the High Court has committed an error of law and also an error of jurisdiction. In our judgment, the law is well settled on the point, and it is this: the basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit or proceeding and suitction should be tried at all stages on the cause of action as it existed at the commencement of the suitction. This, however, does not mean that events happening after institution of a suit/proceeding, cannot be considered at all. It is the power and duty of the court to consider changed circumstances. A court of law may take into account subsequent events inter alia in the following circumstances : - i. the relief claimed originally has by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate ; or ii. it is necessary to take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten litigation ; or iii. it is necessary to do so in order to do complete justice between the parties. 14. And in the case of Ram Kumar Barnwal ( Supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: - "In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders ( 1975 (1) SCC 770 ) it was observed as follows: "3.Two submissions were advanced by Sri K. S. Ramamurthy to salvage his client's case. He argued that it was illegal for the High Court to have taken cognizance of subsequent events, disastrous as they proved to be. He argued that it was illegal for the High Court to have taken cognizance of subsequent events, disastrous as they proved to be. Secondly, he urged that once the High Court held-as it did- that the appellate tribunal acted illegally in remitting the whole case to the Rent Controller, it could not go further to dismiss his whole eviction proceedings, a misfortune heavier than would have been, had he not moved the High Court at all. 4. We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myraid. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments (subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case, has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict in view of the inhibition written into Section 10(3)(iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact. 5. The law we have set out is of ancient vintage. We will merely refer to Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri (AIR 1941 FC 5) which is a leading case on the point. Gwyer C.J., in the above case, referred to the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Patterson v. State of Alabama (294 U.S. 600, 607) : We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered. and said that that view of the Court's powers was reaffirmed once again in the then recent case of Minnesota v. National Tea Co. 309 U.S. 551, 555. Sulaiman J., in the same case (AIR 1941 FC 5) relied on English cases and took the view that an appeal is by way of a re-hearing and the Court may make such order as the Judge of the first instance could have made if the case had been heard by him at the date on which the appeal was heard, Varadachariar J., dealt with the same point a little more comprehensively. We may content ourselves with excerpting one passage which brings out the point luminously : 'It is also on the theory of an appeal being in the nature of a re-hearing that the courts in this country have in numerous cases recognized that in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the court of appeal is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against." 15. Recently, this Court in the case of Ayodhya Prasad Vs. Recently, this Court in the case of Ayodhya Prasad Vs. Additional District Judge, Unnao, 2015 (2) ARC 234 has held as under: - "In the case of Hasmat Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad, 1981 (3) SCC 103 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the need of the landlords pleaded by him must not only exist on the date of filing of the release application but must subsist till the final order for release is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which would show that the landlords requirement is wholly satisfied then in that case his action must fail. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligation of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the Court is not precluded from taking a 'cautious cognizance' of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief." 16. Accordingly, taking into consideration the above said position of laws and facts of the present case that during the pendency of the litigation before this Court, the landlord has got possession of a shop which was under the tenancy of Sri Ramesh Chandra@ Ranesh Sindhi and form the said shop Sri Mohd Aris Khan has started his business , for whose need the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 has been moved, thus the case has to be reconsidered and decided keeping in view the fact that whether after happening of above said subsequent event, the need of landlord as set up in the release application still exists and taking into consideration the said fact bona fide need and comparative hardship between the parties is to be adjudicated. The said exercise is to be done by the appellate court where the parties can press their claim by way of pleading and evidence (oral and documentary) in order to prove their case. (See Girdhar Das vs. IInd Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Varanasi and others Allahabad Rent Cases, 1985 (1) page 449 and Smt. Jai Devi and others vs. Vith Addl. (See Girdhar Das vs. IInd Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Varanasi and others Allahabad Rent Cases, 1985 (1) page 449 and Smt. Jai Devi and others vs. Vith Addl. District Judge, Moradabad and anoterh Allahabad Rent cases, 1985 (2) page 549) 17. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 6.3.2009 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court no.13, Lucknow passed in Rent Appeal no. 5 of 1988 ( Mohd. Yunus Khan and others Vs. Dr. Oudhesh Narain) is set aside and the matter is remanded to the appellate authority to decide afresh in view of the observations made herein above, say within a period of six month, if possible, from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him in accordance with law after hearing learned counsel for the parties.