JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Mangukiya, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Shukla, learned advocate and Mr. Pipaliya, learned advocate for respondent No. 3 to 5. 2. In this petition, the petitioner has prayed that the order dated 30.4.2004 passed by respondents No. 3 to 5 terminating his service after he had withdrawn the option/resignation submitted by him in response to Voluntary Retirement Scheme ('the scheme' for short) floated by respondents No. 3 to 5. 3. The petitioner has prayed that:- "25(A) be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to quash and set aside the decision of the respondents of terminating the services of the petitioner on and from April 30, 2004 after office hours. (B) be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction and hold and declare that the respondents have no right, authority or competence to terminate the service of the petitioner after withdrawal of the consent for voluntary retirement." 4. The factual background involved in and leading to the submission of present petition is that:- 4.1. At the relevant time, the petitioner was working as Office Superintendent with respondent No. 4. He claimed that initially, he had joined as a Clerk with a company named Ahmedabad New Textile Mill with effect form February 1979. 4.2. Subsequently, in response to an advertisement published by respondent No. 4 for the post of Office Superintendent, he had submitted an application and after interview, which was conducted in July/August 1990, he was selected for the post of Office Superintendent and was appointed by the respondents. 4.3. He further alleged that somewhere in March 1993, respondent No. 4 filed reference before the Board of Industries and Financial Reconstruction. Subsequently, vide order dated 19.2.2002, the board sanctioned the scheme for revival/reconstruction of respondent No. 4. The petitioner further alleged that while the proceedings of the said Case No. 535 of 1992 was pending before the board and while the scheme was under operation, respondent No. 4 floated a scheme and invited resignations from the workmen interested to avail said scheme. 4.4. The petitioner further alleged that while the proceedings of the said Case No. 535 of 1992 was pending before the board and while the scheme was under operation, respondent No. 4 floated a scheme and invited resignations from the workmen interested to avail said scheme. 4.4. He claimed that initially, the scheme was declared in May 1992, however, subsequently, the scheme was modified and the modification was declared and floated in the name and style of modified scheme. 4.5. The petitioner further alleged that the first notice declaring the scheme was notified on or around 24.3.2004. 4.6. The petitioner claimed that in response to the said scheme, he had submitted his option vide his letter dated 23.4.2004. 4.7. The petitioner further alleged that upon further consideration and deliberation, he found that the submission of the option was a mistake and it was also against his as well as family's interest and that, therefore, vide his letter dated 29.4.2004 he had withdrawn the option. 4.8. The petitioner also submitted that he had withdrawn the resignation before it was accepted. 4.9. Having said thus, the petitioner also claimed that the notice dated 24.3.2004 under which the scheme was notified for the first time was actually not implemented at any point of time by respondent No. 4 and the respondents had abandoned the scheme and that, therefore, the option submitted by him in pursuance of erstwhile/pre-modified scheme was even otherwise invalid. The scheme was re-notified in March 2004 with modifications and fresh options were invited vide notice published on or around 22.9.2004 and that, therefore, the option submitted by him in pursuance of erstwhile/pre-modified scheme was even otherwise invalid. He further submitted that actually before the he had already withdrawn the option/resignation (which was submitted by him pursuant to the erstwhile scheme which was notified on 24.3.2004) on 29.4.2004. 4.10. The petitioner further submitted that since he had withdrawn the option/resignation, he was under the belief that his service would not be terminated, however, the respondents served order dated 30.4.2004 informing him that he stands discharged from service after office hours on 30.4.2004. 4.11. The petitioner claimed that after the said order dated 30.4.2004, he continuously made representation. 4.10. The petitioner further submitted that since he had withdrawn the option/resignation, he was under the belief that his service would not be terminated, however, the respondents served order dated 30.4.2004 informing him that he stands discharged from service after office hours on 30.4.2004. 4.11. The petitioner claimed that after the said order dated 30.4.2004, he continuously made representation. He claimed that one representation was submitted on or around 27.8.2004 and thereafter the respondents, for the first time, after about 5 months, informed the petitioner vide communication dated 2.9.2004 that his resignation was accepted on 30.4.2004 and he should collect his terminal benefits. He also claimed that he had withdrawn the option/resignation on 29.4.2004. 4.12. Since the petitioner's request was not accepted by the respondents, he filed present petition. 5. The petitioner has controverted the respondent's reply by filing rejoinder. In his rejoinder dated 21.4.2005, the petitioner has stated that: "8. With reference to para 4.3 of the Affidavit-in-Reply, I submit that the facts are not fully true and therefore I deny the same. I do not know how many of the employees have submitted their applications seeking voluntary retirement scheme and therefore I do not admit the same. I have no personal knowledge about the said factual matrix and therefore I am advised not to admit the same. It is true that the petitioner submitted his application for modified Voluntary Retirement Scheme on 23.04.2004. However the respondent is making incorrect statement on facts that the said application was accepted. If the application submitted by the petitioner was accepted on 23.04.2004, the same would have been implemented and the petitioner would have been paid on the same day. The order dated 30.04.2004 shows that the application submitted by the petitioner on 23.04.2004 was accepted only on April 30, 2004, admittedly after withdrawal for the consent for modified voluntary retirement scheme. I say that since I have withdrawn my consent for voluntary retirement scheme, the question of acceptance thereof does not arise and therefore the petitioner did not accept the cheque for retirement benefits." 6. Any sur-rejoinder in reply (to the said rejoinder) is not filed by the respondents. 7. I say that since I have withdrawn my consent for voluntary retirement scheme, the question of acceptance thereof does not arise and therefore the petitioner did not accept the cheque for retirement benefits." 6. Any sur-rejoinder in reply (to the said rejoinder) is not filed by the respondents. 7. Respondents No. 4 and 5 have, however, by filing an additional affidavit dated 7.12.2015 declared that the establishment is closed with effect from 7.2.2009 in pursuance of the permission for closure granted by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour under section 25-O(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 8. In the light of the facts aforesaid, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that in response to the scheme floated by the respondents, the petitioner had tendered his option/resignation, however, before the competent authority accepted the option/resignation, the petitioner had withdrawn the same and that, therefore, the competent authority could not have acted upon the option/resignation submitted by the petitioner in response to the scheme. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted that the respondent had not acted upon and had not implemented the scheme notified vide notice dated 24.3.2004 and the said scheme was actually abandoned inasmuch as subsequently in September 2004, fresh options vide notice dated 22.9.2004 were invited and that, therefore also the resignation submitted in response to the notice dated 24.3.2004 could not have been acted upon, more so when it was withdrawn before acceptance. Learned advocate for the petitioner also sought to contend that though the scheme was styled as Voluntary Retirement Scheme actually it was compulsory retirement scheme and the employees were required to submit their resignations under the scheme. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that after the petitioner withdrew the resignation offered under the scheme notified on 24.3.2004 vide his communication dated 29.4.2004, the respondents passed order dated 30.4.2004 only with a view to creating an impression that the petitioner's option was accepted, however, even before the said date, i.e. before 30.4.2004, the petitioner had already withdrawn his option and therefore, the authority could not have acted upon the said option submitted on 23.4.2004. Learned advocate for the petitioner relied on the decision in the case of Chand Mal Chayal vs. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 10 SCC 258 and the decision in the case of North Zone Cultural Centre vs. Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar, (2003) 5 SCC 455 and the decision in the case of Bank of India vs. Pale Ram Dhania, (2004) 9 SCC 36 . 9. Per contra, learned advocate for the respondents reiterated the facts and contentions mentioned in the affidavit. Learned advocate for the respondents submitted that the petitioner was surplus employee and therefore, the petitioner was relieved vide order dated 30.4.2004 on and from 30.4.2004 after office hours. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that after issuing the order dated 30.4.2004, the respondent corporation had prepared a cheque of Rs. 9,78,091.40 on 30.4.2004 towards full and final payment under the scheme and the petitioner was informed to collect the cheque from the corporation from time to time, however, the petitioner did not turn up and the petitioner is not justified in claiming that the order dated 30.4.2004 should be set aside. Learned advocate for the respondent corporation submitted that the petitioner filed petition about six months after the order dated 30.4.2004 and that, therefore also the petition does not deserve to be entertained. Learned advocate for the respondent corporation also claimed that while submitting his option under the scheme notified in March 2004, the petitioner had stated and assured that he will not withdraw the option and that, therefore, it is not permissible to the petitioner to withdraw the option and therefore also the petition does not deserve to be entertained. Learned advocate for the respondents relied on the decision in the case of Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, A.P. SIDC Ltd. vs. R. Varaprasad, (2003) 11 SCC 572 . 10. So as to consider and decide the dispute and controversy raised by the contesting parties, it is relevant to take into account some events and facts and the provisions under the scheme and the decisions. 11. It is not in dispute that somewhere on 23.3.2004 the respondent No. 4 floated the scheme and in response to the said scheme, the petitioner tendered his option on 23.4.2004. 11.1. The petitioner had withdrawn option/resignation vide communication dated 29.4.2004. 11.2. 11. It is not in dispute that somewhere on 23.3.2004 the respondent No. 4 floated the scheme and in response to the said scheme, the petitioner tendered his option on 23.4.2004. 11.1. The petitioner had withdrawn option/resignation vide communication dated 29.4.2004. 11.2. It is also not in dispute that the scheme which was originally notified in March 2004 was subsequently modified and the modified scheme was notified on or around 22.9.2004 and fresh options were invited in view of modification in the original/erstwhile scheme. 11.3. The competent authority accepted the option/resignation vide order dated 30.4.2004, i.e. one day after the day the petitioner withdrew his option/resignation. 12. In this background, the issue which arises for consideration is whether respondent No. 4 could have acted upon the option initially submitted by the petitioner after he withdrew the option. 12.1. For the said purpose, it is relevant to take into account relevant provisions under the scheme. 12.2. Clause 2.1 of the scheme prescribed eligibility. Clause 2.3 prescribed retirement for voluntary retirement will not be accepted. The scheme also prescribed that the management reserved the right to accept or reject employees offer for voluntary retirement under this Scheme. Clause 4 prescribed the benefit which would be granted under the scheme. Clause 5.1 prescribed the procedure for submitting the option and for its acceptance/rejection and licence of the option. 12.3. Clause 6 prescribed that notwithstanding any of the provisions, the scheme of Voluntary Retirement does not confer any right on any employee to have his/her request for voluntary retirement accepted by the management. 12.4. So far as modified scheme is concerned, clause 1.3 of the said modified scheme prescribed the scope and clause 1.4 prescribed the eligibility. The said clauses 1.3 and 1.4 read thus: "1.3. The schemes shall apply to all regular/permanent employees, badli/substitute/ temporary/casual workers (by whatever name called) who are within the sanctioned strength and whose name appear in the muster roll of 39 mills as per Annexure-II in the phase-I and 21 Mills as per Annexure-III in the phase-II. However, the scheme will be extended only in 20 mills as per Annexure-I immediately and the date of applicability in other mills will be notified in due course. 1.4. However, the scheme will be extended only in 20 mills as per Annexure-I immediately and the date of applicability in other mills will be notified in due course. 1.4. Modified Voluntary Retirement Scheme (MVRS) Regular/Permanent employees, Badli/Substitute/Temporary/Casual workers (by whatever name called and are being paid regular wages) within the sanctioned strength and whose name appear in the muster roll of NTC Mills as indicated in para 1.3 above are eligible to opt for voluntary retirement by tendering resignation from the post held in NTC in the prescribed form. The benefits under the Scheme are given at para 3.1. The Trainees under any scheme are not eligible for MVRS." 13. Clause 1.6 of the modified scheme prescribed that management reserves the right to refuse the resignation/option without assigning any reasons. Clause 3.0 of the modified scheme prescribed the benefits offered under the scheme and clause 5.0 prescribed the procedure. The relevant provisions under clause 5.0 are clauses 5.1, 5.3, 5.7, 5.8, 5.10. The said clauses read thus: "5.1. An eligible employee may submit an application in the prescribed form for voluntary retirement under the scheme by tendering resignation from the post held and service in NTC to the Competent Authority. The post falling vacant as a result of an employee's voluntary retirement under the scheme shall in all cases stand abolished simultaneously while accepting resignation and order to that effect issued simultaneously before disbursing retirement benefits to employees under this scheme and no person (Permanent/badli/substitute/temporary, etc.) shall be engaged. 5.3. An employee retiring under this scheme shall not be eligible for appointment in any mills/office/retail showrooms etc. of NTC group in any capacity, whatsoever. 5.7. In the case of show-room employees of Retail Marketing Division the calculation of compensation/ex-gratia will be on the basis of their average salary plus average of incentive/commission earned by them over a period of best five years. 5.8. The Modified VR Scheme is also applicable to Casual/Temporary (by whatever name called) workers of NTC mill provided they had worked for minimum 240 days in a year. 5.10. Once an employee avails himself/herself of voluntary retirement from a PSU, he/she shall not be allowed to take up employment in any other PSU. If he/she desires to do so, he/she shall have to return the VRS compensation received by him/her to the PSU concerned. 5.10. Once an employee avails himself/herself of voluntary retirement from a PSU, he/she shall not be allowed to take up employment in any other PSU. If he/she desires to do so, he/she shall have to return the VRS compensation received by him/her to the PSU concerned. Where the compensation was paid out of a Government grant, the PSU concerned shall remit the refunded amount to the Government. In case the PSU is already closed/merged, the VRS compensation shall be returned directly to the Government." 13.1. Learned advocate for the respondent corporation relied on the decision in the case of Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, A.P. SIDC Ltd. (supra) to support the submission that withdrawal of option once submitted is impermissible and that, therefore, it was not open for the petitioner to withdraw the option which he submitted in April 2004 in response to the scheme notified on 24.3.2004. 13.2. However, in view of facts of present case, the said decision does not render any assistance to the respondent inasmuch as the facts of present case are materially different from the facts involved in the cited decision. 13.3. Essentially, in the said decision, the issue before the Hon'ble Apex Court was with regard to the relevant date for the purpose of calculation of VRS benefits and applicable mode for calculation of the benefits under VRS. In the cited decision, 28.2.1998 was fixed the cut-off date, however, the employees were continued in service until 31.7.1998. Therefore, it was contended that the workmen would be entitled to retiral benefits under VRS, as on 31.7.1998. What is relevant and important in the light of the facts of the case is that in the cited decision, the corporation had accepted the options on 24.11.1998 and 27.10.1998 and that the respondents, i.e. the applicants themselves had acknowledged the acceptance on 26.11.1998 and 2.11.1998 respectively. From the facts of the cited decision it has also emerged that despite the fact that the options were accepted on 27.10.1998 and 24.11.1998 and the said acceptance was conveyed to the respondents on 2.11.1998 and 26.11.1998 respectively and the respondents acknowledged the intimation, the concerned persons applied for withdrawal of the options on 8.1.1999 and 26.2.1999, i.e. after the acceptance of the option and after communication of the acceptance to the concerned persons. In that context, Hon'ble Apex Court observed in paragraph No. 15 of the decision that: "15. In that context, Hon'ble Apex Court observed in paragraph No. 15 of the decision that: "15. Rights and benefits available to the employees under a particular VRS ought to be examined in the light of the specific terms and conditions governing them. Since this has not been done the Division Bench committed an error in recording its findings. On the other hand, there appears to have been consistency in the stand of the Corporation. Added to this the amendment as per Annexure P-3, reference to which has already been made above, justifies the stand of the appellants for the reasons that no separate notice was required to be given and if an employee had drawn the salary during the notice period, he would not be entitled to claim pay for notice period again. In this view we answer the point No. 2 in the negative and against the respondents. 18. Unlike in those decisions these respondents filed applications offering to take voluntary retirement under the Scheme; their applications were accepted by the Corporation which were acknowledged by these respondents; they made representations for withdrawal from the VRS Scheme several days after the Corporation accepted their applications made seeking voluntary retirement; merely because they could not be relieved in view of the interim order passed by the High Court in the writ petitions and that they could not be relieved immediately after the cut off date for want of funds to be received from the Government by the Corporation, they could not take away the result or escape consequence of the acceptance of their voluntary retirement by the Corporation. In other words, question of withdrawal of their applications made for seeking voluntary retirement after their acceptance did not arise and they could not be permitted to do so in law. It is fairly settled now that the voluntary retirement once accepted in terms of the Scheme or rules, as the case may be, cannot be withdrawn. In these appeals from the facts it is clear that the applications of the respondents opting for voluntary retirement under the Scheme were accepted and even the acceptance was communicated to them. Thereafter, they filed the writ petitions. Hence the High Court was not right in allowing the writ petitions holding that they applied for withdrawal before the effective date considering the date of relieving the employees as the effective date. Thereafter, they filed the writ petitions. Hence the High Court was not right in allowing the writ petitions holding that they applied for withdrawal before the effective date considering the date of relieving the employees as the effective date. In the light of the discussions made in Civil Appeal No. 5638 of 1999 the High Court, in our view, was wrong in treating 31.7.1999 as an effective date. The decisions relied on by the respondents before the High Court or in this Court on facts do not help them. Moreover, position is to be examined on the facts, terms of the VRS and circumstances governing a particular case of withdrawal offer made seeking voluntary retirement after its due acceptance." (Emphasis supplied) 14. It emerges from the said observations that the concerned persons in the cited decisions sought to withdraw their options after the option was accepted and after the acceptance was communicated to the concerned persons. Whereas in present case, the facts are otherwise. Even in the said decision emphasis is on "voluntary retirement once accepted" (then it cannot be withdrawn). 14.1. Actually, the very observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said decision defeats the case of the respondent corporation in present case inasmuch as the facts in present case have established that the petitioner had submitted the option on 23.4.2004 but he submitted the withdrawal application (seeking withdrawal of the option) on 29.4.2004 however until that date his option was not accepted by the respondent corporation. Actually the respondent passed order on 30.4.2004 which was one day after the petitioner withdrew his option on 29.4.2004 and even the cheque for the amount payable under the scheme was also prepared on 30.4.2004. 14.2. The said order passed by the respondent corporation on 30.4.2004 and the cheque which was prepared only on 30.4.2004, could have been forwarded/conveyed to the petitioner, at the earliest, on the next day i.e. after 30.4.2004 or at the earliest on 30.4.2004 but certainly not on 29.4.2004 (when the petitioner withdrew his option and submitted his application withdrawing his option) i.e. certainly not before 30.4.2004. Under the circumstances, the cited decision does not help the respondents. 14.3. Under the circumstances, the cited decision does not help the respondents. 14.3. While the option/resignation is once accepted and the acceptance is communicated cannot be withdrawn, it is equally true that if the option/resignation is withdrawn by the employee before the option is accepted then such withdrawal would be permissible, of course subject to the special provision/condition under the scheme. Until the resignation is accepted and/or until the effective date i.e. the date from which the resignation is to be effective according to the stipulation in the letter of resignation the relationship of employer and employee does not come to an end and the said relation continues. Therefore before the effective date the employee can withdraw the resignation. In the case where resignation is tendered under some scheme then the said right of the employee would be subject to the condition, if specifically prescribed in the scheme, under the scheme. 15. On this count, it is necessary and appropriate to mention at this stage that when the schemes floated by the respondent corporation in present case i.e. original scheme as well as modified scheme are examined, then it emerges that there is no provision under the said schemes which prohibit withdrawal of the option once submitted. Under the circumstances, the petitioner was not prohibited from reconsidering his decision and withdrawing the option before the option was accepted. 15.1. In this context, it would be appropriate to take into account the decision in case of Srikantha S.M. v. Bharath Earth Movers Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 314 . In the said decision, the employee tenderedly resignation on 4.1.1993. In the letter of resignation, he mentioned that he may be relieved from duty as per the company rules. The letter of resignation was processed and the applicant was informed that his resignation had been accepted and he would be relieved with immediate effect. However, by another letter of even date, the employee was informed that his casual leave had been sanctioned for the period from 5.1.1993 to 13.1.1993 and he would be relieved by the close of working hours on 15.1.1993. In this background, the employee changed his mind and withdrew his resignation by letter dated 8.1.1993. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the letter of resignation submitted by the employee would be effective from 15.1.1993 whereas the employee had withdrawn his resignation on 8.1.1993. In this background, the employee changed his mind and withdrew his resignation by letter dated 8.1.1993. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the letter of resignation submitted by the employee would be effective from 15.1.1993 whereas the employee had withdrawn his resignation on 8.1.1993. The Hon'ble Apex Court considered the said facts and applicable rules and observed, interalia, that:- "21. In Power Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Pramod Kumar Bhatia, a workman applied for voluntary retirement pursuant to the scheme framed by the Corporation to relieve surplus staff. The Corporation vide an order dated December 20, 1994 accepted voluntary retirement of the workman with effect from December 31, 1994 subject to certain conditions. Subsequently, however, the Corporation withdrew the scheme. It was held that the order dated December 20, 1994 was conditional and unless the employee was relieved from the duty on the fulfillment of the those conditions, the order of voluntary retirement did not become effective. The employee, therefore, could not assert that the voluntary retirement was effective and claim benefits on that basis. 22. The Court said: (SCC p. 282, para 7) "7. It is now settled legal position that unless the employee is relieved of the duty after acceptance of the offer of voluntary retirement or resignation, jural relationship of the employee and the employer does not come to an end. Since the order accepting the voluntary retirement was a conditional one, the conditions ought to have been complied with. Before the conditions could be complied with, the appellant withdrew the scheme. Consequently, the order accepting voluntary retirement did not become effective. Thereby no vested right his been created in favour of the respondent. The High Court, therefore, was not right in holding that the respondent has acquired a vested right and, therefore, the appellant has no right to withdraw the scheme subsequently." (Emphasis supplied). 23. In J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India, a notice of voluntary retirement was given by an employee on October 03, 1989 which was to come into effect from January 31, 1990. The notice was accepted by the Government on November 02, 1989 but the employee withdrew the notice vide his letter dated December 11, 1989. It was held that withdrawal was permissible though it was accepted by the Government, since it was to be made effective from January 31, 1990 and before that date it was withdrawn. 26. The notice was accepted by the Government on November 02, 1989 but the employee withdrew the notice vide his letter dated December 11, 1989. It was held that withdrawal was permissible though it was accepted by the Government, since it was to be made effective from January 31, 1990 and before that date it was withdrawn. 26. On the basis of the above decisions, in our opinion, the learned counsel for the appellant is right in contending that though the respondent-Company had accepted the resignation of the appellant on January 04, 1993 and was ordered to be relieved on that day, by a subsequent letter, he was granted casual leave from January 04, 1993 to January 13, 1993. Moreover, he was informed that he would be relieved after office hours on January 15, 1993. The vinculum juris, therefore, in our considered opinion, continued and the relationship of employer and employee did not come to an end on January 04, 1993. The relieving order and payment of salary also make it abundantly clear that he was continued in service of the Company upto January 15, 1993. 27. It is thus proved that upto January 15, 1993, the appellant remained in service. If it is so, our opinion, as per settled law, the appellant could have withdrawn his resignation before that date. It is an admitted fact that a letter of withdrawal of resignation was submitted by the appellant on January 08, 1993. It was, therefore, incumbent on the Company to give effect to the said letter. By not doing so, the Company has acted contrary to the law and against the decisions of this Court and hence, the action of the Company deserves to be quashed and set aside. The High Court, in our opinion, was in error in not granting relief to the appellant. Accordingly, the action of the Company as upheld by the High Court is hereby set aside." (Emphasis supplied) 15.2. In the decision in case of Balram Gupta v. Union of India & Anr. 1987 (Supp) SCC 228, Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter-alia, that:- "12. In this case the guidelines are that ordinarily permission should not be granted unless the officer concerned is in a position to show that there has been a material change in the circumstances in consideration of which the notice was originally given. 1987 (Supp) SCC 228, Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter-alia, that:- "12. In this case the guidelines are that ordinarily permission should not be granted unless the officer concerned is in a position to show that there has been a material change in the circumstances in consideration of which the notice was originally given. In the facts of the instant case such indication has been given. The appellant has stated that on the persistent and personal requests of the staff members he had dropped the idea of seeking voluntary retirement. We do not see how this could not be a good and valid reason. It is true that he was resigning and in the notice for resignation he had not given any reason except to state that he sought voluntary retirement. We see nothing wrong in this. In the modern age we should not put embargo upon people's choice or freedom. If, however the administration had made arrangements acting on his resignation or letter of retirement to make other employee available for his job, that would be another matter but the offer to retire and withdrawal of appellant's of the same happened in so quick succession that it cannot be said that any administrative set up or arrangement was affected. The administration has now taken a long time by its own attitude to communicate the matter. For this purpose the respondent is to blame and not the appellant. 13. We hold, therefore, that there was no valid reason for withholding the permission by the respondent. We hold further that there has been compliance with the guidelines because the appellant has indicated that there was a change in the circumstances, namely, the persistent and personal requests from the staff members and relations which changed his attitude towards continuing in Government service and induced the appellant to withdraw the notice. In the modern and uncertain age it is very difficult to arrange one's future with any amount of certainly, a certain amount of flexibility is required, and if such flexibility does not jeopardize Government or administration, administration should be graceful enough to respond and acknowledge the flexibility of human mind and attitude and allow the appellant to withdraw his letter of retirement in the facts and circumstances of this case. Much complications which had arisen could have been thus avoided by such graceful attitude. Much complications which had arisen could have been thus avoided by such graceful attitude. The court cannot but condemn circuitous ways "to case out" uncomfortable employees. As a model employer the government must conduct itself with high probity and candour with its employees." (Emphasis supplied) 16. The voluntary retirement scheme floated and offered by an employer and submission of option by an employee in terms of the scheme are part of a transaction which is, ordinarily, contractual in nature i.e. unless the scheme is statutory scheme. Invitation for an offer, submission of option and the acceptance are part of and ingredients of contract between the employer and the employee. The invitation to offer may contain a clause reserving right in the employer to accept or reject the submission of option. The principles of law related to contract allow the person making the offer to withdraw it at any time before it is accepted. Acceptance of an offer after it is withdrawn cannot translate into a valid and binding agreement - contract. In light of the ingredients and principles of valid and binding contract, a person making an offer can withdraw the same at any time before the offer is accepted and post withdrawal acceptance of the offer (i.e. if the offer is accepted after its withdrawal is conveyed) will not bring about a valid and binding contract. A voluntary retirement scheme is an invitation for resignation. Unless the scheme is statutory and contains a clause prohibiting withdrawal of the option after it is tendered an employee who tenders the option in response to such scheme can withdraw it before its acceptance. 16.1. In other cases, more particularly under the contractual scheme, the option/ resignation can be withdrawn before its acceptance and it cannot be accepted after person who tendered the resignation has withdrawn it. Acceptance of option/resignation after its withdrawal will not be legally binding and enforceable. 17. A profitable reference may also be made to the decision in case of Chand Mal Chayal v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 10 SCC 258 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter-alia, that:- "3. By now it is well-settled principle of law that an incumbent is entitled to withdraw his resignation before the acceptance. 17. A profitable reference may also be made to the decision in case of Chand Mal Chayal v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 10 SCC 258 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter-alia, that:- "3. By now it is well-settled principle of law that an incumbent is entitled to withdraw his resignation before the acceptance. Once his resignation is accepted there is no jural relationship between the employee and the employer and the employee cannot claim for withdrawal of the resignation nor reinstatement in the post. In the present case, it is not very clear in the application submitted by the appellant on 12.2.1990 the prayer of the appellant, but it would be clear from various correspondences between the High Court and the Government that he seeks for re-employment. The above being the settled position of law, we have repeatedly requested the learned senior counsel for the appellant to show us as to whether there is any provision in service rule providing for re-employment after the resignation has been accepted. This is more so because from the various correspondences issued by the Financial Department and the Administrative Department that there is no such provision in service rules for re-employment." (Emphasis supplied) 17.1. Thus, as held by Hon'ble Apex Court, an employee is entitled to withdraw his resignation before it is accepted, but once his resignation is accepted, then there will not be any relation, rather any jural relationship, between employer and employee and the employee cannot claim right or privilege to withdraw the resignation and/or to be reinstated. 17.2. On the other hand, in the decision in case of Nand Keshwar Prasad v. M/s. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Cooperative Ltd. & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 558 , Hon'ble Apex Court considered a situation where the employee tendered resignation and thereafter, he accepted and used the amount paid by the employer and subsequently, he raised the plea that the resignation was obtained under coercion. In the said factual backdrop, Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:- "11. AIR 1999 SC 558 , Hon'ble Apex Court considered a situation where the employee tendered resignation and thereafter, he accepted and used the amount paid by the employer and subsequently, he raised the plea that the resignation was obtained under coercion. In the said factual backdrop, Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:- "11. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that the law is well settled by this Court in a number of decisions that unless controlled by condition of service or the statutory provisions, the retirement mentioned in the letter of resignation must take effect from the date mentioned therein and such date cannot be advanced by accepting the resignation from an earlier date when the concerned employee did not intend to retire from such earlier date. It has also been held by this Court that it is open to the concerned employee to withdraw letter of resignation before the same becomes effective. 12. It, however, appears to us that it is not the case of the appellant that though he had tendered resignation voluntarily intending to retire from a prospective date but later on he had changed his mind and had withdrawn the same before it became effective. Persistently, the appellant's case on the contrary is that he had not tendered resignation voluntarily and the letter of voluntary resignation was obtained under coercion and by giving out threat of disciplinary proceeding. The appellant, therefore, intended to resume his duties by asking the concerned authorities not to take notice of the purported letter of resignation. It has, however, been found by the Labour Court on evidence adduced by the parties that the appellant had submitted letter of resignation voluntarily and in the absence of any threat or coercion. Since the appellant did not intimate that he intended to withdraw the letter of voluntary resignation, it cannot be held in the facts of the case, that letter of voluntary resignation was intended to be withdrawn before expiry of the date from which the resignation was to take effect. The appellant on the contrary, took the stand that there was no voluntary resignation on his part but a letter purporting to be voluntary resignation was obtained from him under threat and coercion and such purported resignation letter could not be given effect to. The appellant on the contrary, took the stand that there was no voluntary resignation on his part but a letter purporting to be voluntary resignation was obtained from him under threat and coercion and such purported resignation letter could not be given effect to. It may also be indicated here that the appellant even did not return the salary received by him from the employer for the entire period, namely, from the date of submission of letter of retirement up to the period from which resignation was to be effective. 13. The High Court has considered such special features of the case and therefore refused to interfere in the writ petition. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, we do not think any interference by this Court is called for in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs." 17.3. The facts in the cited case are, to an extent, converse to the facts in present case inasmuch as in the cited decision, the concerned employee persistently claimed that he had not tendered the resignation, whereas in present case the petitioner concedes the fact that he had submitted the option/resignation but he claims that he had withdrawn his option/resignation before the option/resignation was accepted. In this view of the matter, the above-quoted observations by Hon'ble Apex Court become relevant inasmuch as Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that since the petitioner did not intimate the employer that he had intended to withdraw the resignation in the facts of the case it cannot be said that he had withdrawn his resignation and conveyed his decision to the respondent before the respondent had accepted the resignation. Above quoted observations by Apex Court explain and clarify that if the resignation is withdrawn before its acceptance and if withdrawal is not prohibited then such withdrawal would be valid and enforceable in law. 18. In view of the fact that in present case the option/resignation was withdrawn and intimation about withdrawal of the option/resignation was given to the respondent before the option/resignation was accepted, the respondent could not have passed order on the next day, i.e. on 30.4.2004 after the petitioner had already withdrawn the option/ resignation. 18.1. 18. In view of the fact that in present case the option/resignation was withdrawn and intimation about withdrawal of the option/resignation was given to the respondent before the option/resignation was accepted, the respondent could not have passed order on the next day, i.e. on 30.4.2004 after the petitioner had already withdrawn the option/ resignation. 18.1. It is pertinent that until 29.4.2004 i.e. until the date on which the petitioner withdrew his option/resignation, the respondent had not accepted it and had not conveyed the decision that the option/resignation is accepted and even the cheque for the amount payable as per the scheme was not even prepared or drawn and issued and the cheque was not given/amount was not paid to the petitioner. Thus, the respondent had not, in any manner whatsoever, altered and changed its position/status, much less adverse to or prejudicial to its interest. 18.2. If, pursuant to submission of the resignation the employer has acted and altered his position - after accepting the resignation - in manner adverse - prejudicial to his interest and if the employer establishes that aspect, then he may be justified in rejecting the application seeking withdrawal of resignation but in absence of such alternation, and before acceptance of the option/resignation if the resignation is withdrawn then the refusal cannot be justified and sustained. 18.3. However, when resignation/option is submitted under a scheme it would be, primarily, governed or controlled by specific condition under the scheme but in absence of any restrictive clause under the scheme, the right of withdrawal of resignation before its acceptance cannot be denied. 18.4. Hence, when the scheme in present case did not contain any restrictive clause and when the respondent had not altered its position adversely and had not acted to his prejudice and had not taken any step in connection with the resignation/option, there was no justification to decline the withdrawal of the resignation/option (when the decision to withdraw the option/resignation was submitted before its acceptance). 18.5. As observed by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Balram Gupta (supra), it is very difficult in this modern and uncertain age to arrange one's affairs with any amount of certainty and that, therefore, certain amount of flexibility is required. 18.5. As observed by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Balram Gupta (supra), it is very difficult in this modern and uncertain age to arrange one's affairs with any amount of certainty and that, therefore, certain amount of flexibility is required. Some flexibility or latitude, so long as it does not jeopardize the administration, ought to be allowed and in cases where the administration has not taken any steps or action in pursuance of the communication by him and it has not altered its position in manner prejudicial to its interest, should be gracefully granted and the administration should allow the employee to withdraw letter of retirement. 18.6. The action of the respondent of passing order on 30.4.2004 after the petitioner withdrew his option/resignation on previous day (i.e. 29.4.2004) is arbitrary, illegal, unjustified and incompetent. After the option/resignation was expressly withdrawn (on 29.4.2004) by virtue of specific intimation in writing, the authority could not have passed order on the next day (i.e. on 30.4.2004) of accepting the option/resignation which was already withdrawn. 18.7. Reliance placed on the decision in case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Raghuvir Singh Narang & Anr. (2010) 5 SCC 335 also does not support the case of the respondent inasmuch as in the said decision, Hon'ble Apex Court was considering the matter in light of the fact that the scheme floated by the employer, specifically prohibited the employee from withdrawing the option of voluntary retirement after it was submitted by the employee. In the said decision, Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:- "10. It is true that the principles of Contract Law relating to offer and acceptance enables the person making the offer to withdraw the offer any time before its acceptance; and that any subsequent acceptance of the offer by the offeree, after such withdrawal, will not result in a binding contract. Where the voluntary retirement is governed by a contractual scheme, as contrasted from a statutory scheme, the said principle of Contract will apply and consequently the letter of voluntary retirement will be considered as an offer by the employee and therefore any time before its acceptance, the employee could withdraw the offer. But the said general principle of Contract will be inapplicable where the voluntary retirement is under a statutory scheme which categorically bars the employee, from withdrawing the option once exercised. But the said general principle of Contract will be inapplicable where the voluntary retirement is under a statutory scheme which categorically bars the employee, from withdrawing the option once exercised. The terms of the statutory scheme will prevail over the general principles of contract. This distinction has been recognized by a series of decisions of this Court." After considering the said decision and legal position, Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter-alia, that:- "15. In this case the statutory scheme contains a specific provision that a Development Officer shall not be eligible to withdraw the option once made for Special Voluntary Retirement Package. In view of the said statutory provision, the general principle of contract that an offer could be withdrawn any time before its acceptance stands excluded." 18.8. Thus, since there was specific and express provision inbuilt in the scheme which prohibited withdrawal of the option once submitted that Hon'ble Apex Court held that the option could not have been withdrawn (in view of specific prohibition under the scheme). However in absence of such specific and express prohibition the option/resignation can be withdrawn before it is accepted by the employer or before the employer alters his position. 19. When the facts in present case are examined in light of the above quoted observations by Hon'ble Apex Court, following aspects emerge:- (a) The petitioner submitted his option in response to the scheme on 23.4.2004. (b) Within six days, i.e. on 29.4.2004, he submitted an application withdrawing the option. (c) At any time, on or before 29.4.2004, the respondent No. 4/respondent No. 5 had not accepted the petitioner's option and had not even processed his option/resignation and had not taken any decision and/or any action with regard to the petitioner's option. (d) For the first time, the petitioner's option was considered and decision thereon was taken only on 30.4.2004 i.e. one day after the petitioner submitted his application withdrawing the option. (e) Even the cheque for the amount payable under the scheme was prepared on 30.4.2004 i.e. after the withdrawal of option/resignation. (f) The amount was not given/paid to the petitioner. (g) Thus, until the date on which the petitioner withdrew his option/resignation, the respondent had not, in any manner whatsoever altered its position, much less to its prejudice. (h) Therefore, it becomes clear that the petitioner withdrew his option before the option was accepted. (f) The amount was not given/paid to the petitioner. (g) Thus, until the date on which the petitioner withdrew his option/resignation, the respondent had not, in any manner whatsoever altered its position, much less to its prejudice. (h) Therefore, it becomes clear that the petitioner withdrew his option before the option was accepted. (i) The scheme floated by the respondent No. 4 - corporation does not contain any provision which specifically prohibits withdrawal of the option once submitted. 19.1. In this view of the matter, it was legally permissible and open for the petitioner to withdraw the resignation before it was accepted and became effective. 20. So as to wriggle out of this situation, learned advocate for the respondent relied on the stipulation in the printed form of the option which stated that the employee will not withdraw his option/resignation. 20.1. As mentioned earlier, when the scheme was floated by the respondent No. 4 - corporation it did not contain any clause specifically prohibiting the employee from withdrawing the option. Thus, the statement in the printed form cannot act as restriction against the petitioner from withdrawing the option as such condition was not part of the terms and conditions of the scheme. 20.2. In this context, it is appropriate to keep in focus that in present case, the scheme floated by the respondent No. 4 - corporation is purely contractual and it is not statutory in nature. Under the circumstances, the position which obtained in the decision in case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. (supra) and/or in the case of Vice Chairman & Managing Director, A.P. SIDC (supra) would not apply in present case. In that view of the matter it was open and permissible for the petitioner to withdraw his option before it was considered and accepted. 21. In present case, it is also relevant and appropriate to mention that the petitioner offered good reason and explanation to justify and support his decision and his action of withdrawing the option viz. hardship to his family. The intimation by the petitioner makes it clear that after having tendered the option, he had realized that he had not only made mistake in tendering the option but his action was against the interest of his family who wholly relied on his income. hardship to his family. The intimation by the petitioner makes it clear that after having tendered the option, he had realized that he had not only made mistake in tendering the option but his action was against the interest of his family who wholly relied on his income. The petitioner had, on proper and peaceful reflection with regard to his initial decision realised that his action would invite difficulties and financial hardships for his family and that, therefore, he immediately acted and withdrew the option/resignation under his intimation dated 29.4.2004. In his communication dated 27.8.2004, the petitioner specifically mentioned that:- "While notice dated 24-3-2004 100% resignation were asked except Spinning. Winding deptt. & Watch & Ward Deptt. On 28-4-2004 I came to know that I may be retreached I withdraw my resignation on 29-4-2004 (Xerox copy of said application is enclosed). But on 30-4-2004 I was discharged from my duties so far. I have neither excepted the discharge order nor the cheque. I am only 48 years old. I have got eldest marriageable aged daughter and two younger sons. Studying in college. My job is the only source of my income to feed my family. My losing a job will bring me on road. Considering above facts I appeal to you sir, that I may please be reinstated immediately for survival of me & my family." 22. In this view of the matter, it was not just and proper for the respondent No. 4 - corporation to pass order on 30.4.2004 accepting the option/resignation after the petitioner had expressly withdrawn it vide his communication dated 29.4.2004 i.e. on previous day. In view of the fact that until then the option/resignation was not accepted, the respondent's should have in all fairness respected the petitioner's decision to withdraw the option/resignation. 23. In the facts of the case, it has become clear that it was only with a view to frustrate the petitioner's communication dated 29.4.2004 that the authority suddenly woke-up on 30.4.2004 and acted upon the petitioner's option/resignation which was submitted on 29.4.2004. 23.1. It is also pertinent to note that on 30.4.2004, the respondent merely passed the order on 30.4.2004 but it did not make the payment of i.e. the employer did not actually pay the amount (payable under the scheme) to the petitioner. 23.1. It is also pertinent to note that on 30.4.2004, the respondent merely passed the order on 30.4.2004 but it did not make the payment of i.e. the employer did not actually pay the amount (payable under the scheme) to the petitioner. Even the cheque for the amount, which would otherwise be payable on acceptance of the option/resignation (if it had not been withdrawn before acceptance) was also prepared/drawn/issued on 30.4.2004. Further, it is also relevant to note, the petitioner was merely informed to collect the amount from the respondent. Meaning thereby, even on 30.4.2004 the amount was not paid to the petitioner. 23.2. In present matter, it is not the case even of the respondent that the petitioner had accepted the amount payable under the scheme and thereby he had acted in furtherance of his option and therefore, it was not permissible to him to withdraw the option. In present case, neither the amount was paid to the petitioner nor the amount was even offered before he withdrew the option/resignation. 23.3. Under the circumstances, the respondent had not altered its position in any manner whatsoever or to any extent before the petitioner withdrew his option/resignation and it is not even the respondent's case that it had, in any manner or to any extent, not altered its position to its disadvantage or in manner prejudicial or adverse to its interest. Unless the employer has, on account of and in light of employee's resignation/option altered his position to his disadvantage or in a manner prejudicial or adverse to his interest the employer would have no basis or justification to disallow the withdrawal of the option/resignation before its acceptance. The stand of the respondent and/or the order dated 30.4.2004 are not justified. Further, the respondent conveniently ignored the fact that what was introduced was voluntary scheme and that, therefore, it should be operated in its true sense and right spirit, i.e. it should be kept 'voluntary' in all sense and in every respect and manner and it should not be converted, impliedly, into compulsory retirement programme. 24. Unfortunately, in present case, the respondent, which is a limb/instrumentality of State, and is expected to be and supposed to be a model employer, not only acted in arbitrary manner but has also come out with incorrect, unjust and unsustainable claim. 24.1. 24. Unfortunately, in present case, the respondent, which is a limb/instrumentality of State, and is expected to be and supposed to be a model employer, not only acted in arbitrary manner but has also come out with incorrect, unjust and unsustainable claim. 24.1. In this context, it is relevant to note that on 1.10.2004, the petitioner addressed a communication to the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and stated, inter-alia, that:- "As per BIFR order dated 19-2-2002, Ahmedabad New Textile Mills has been declared viable, Hence this mill can function for further period. I want to clarify as under: A notice for MVRS was displayed on the mill notice board on 24-3-2004. As per notice, 100% resignations were asked from all except workers of Spinning, Winding deptt. And watch & ward deptt. Within 30 days from the date of notice. (copy enclosed). To obey the order all Technicians/Officers & Clerks had resigned. I also resigned on the late date i.e. 23-4-2004. On dated 29-4-2004 I had withdrawn my resignation - Copy of said letter is enclosed. Even though - to adjust someone else in my post I have been discharged on 30-4-2004. I inform you sir, that I have not accepted my discharge order nor cheque as I have withdrawn my resignation on 29-4-2004. It is the fact that the post have been abolished for which voluntary resignation have been accepted. Still now my post i.e. AOS/OS is not abolished & work charge of said post has been handed over to Clerk/Typist of the mill. I also draw your kind attention that, Office Superintendent of under mentioned Textile mills are getting their remuneration till now. (1) M/s. Ahmedabad Jupiter Textile Mills Ahmedabad unviable & already closed. (2) M/s. Viramgam Textile Mills - Viramgam unviable & already closed. (3) M/s. Rajnagar Textile Mills - Ahmedabad Viable Mill. Mr. Sanjay Parikh Asstt. Labour Officer Mahalaxmi Textile Mills, Bhavnagar had resigned under M.V.R.S. At Bhavnagar. The said officer was transferred at M/s. Ahmedabad Jupiter Textile Mills, Ahmedabad and discharged in Nov./December 2003 had been reinstated in Ahmedabad New Textile Mills, Ahmedabad from May, 2004. During the visit of Shri V.K. Tripathi Saheb - M.D. National Textile Corporation (Guj.) Ltd. on 27-8-2001 I have requested him to reinstate me in the same post and capacity. The said request letter is enclosed herewith for your kind perusal. During the visit of Shri V.K. Tripathi Saheb - M.D. National Textile Corporation (Guj.) Ltd. on 27-8-2001 I have requested him to reinstate me in the same post and capacity. The said request letter is enclosed herewith for your kind perusal. I request your kind honour that I am 49 years old & I have got eldest marriageable daughter and two younger sons studying in college. Kindly consider my appeal & facts please give necessary directives to NTC (Guj.) Ltd. & oblige me." 24.2. Facing this fact situation, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 sought to raise the contention, which was not advanced by him at the time when he replied the petitioner's contentions. Actually, the submissions by the petitioner and the respondents were completed and due to paucity of time, the matter, was adjourned for dictation of order to next date. At this stage, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 submitted that the petitioner had not submitted the communication/application dated 29.4.2004 withdrawing his option and it is an afterthought created by the petitioner. 24.3. In this context, it is relevant and necessary to mention at this stage that the said allegation is not mentioned by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in their reply affidavit dated 23.2.2004 and was not raised at the time when they replied the petitioner's contentions and at any time before the matter was adjourned (to next day) for dictation of order after completion of submissions by both sides. 24.4. It is pertinent that in his petition, the petitioner has mentioned the fact about his application dated 29.4.2004 in paragraph No. 10 of the petition. The respondent has dealt with the said paragraph No. 10 of the petition in its reply affidavit in paragraph No. 9 (wherein the respondent has dealt with the averments made in paragraph Nos. 10 to 21 of the petition). In the said paragraph No. 9, the respondent has no where claimed that the said communication dated 29.4.2004 was never submitted by the petitioner. 24.5. It is pertinent that the petitioner placed on record a copy of the said communication dated 29.4.2004 at Annexure-D Page 104. 10 to 21 of the petition). In the said paragraph No. 9, the respondent has no where claimed that the said communication dated 29.4.2004 was never submitted by the petitioner. 24.5. It is pertinent that the petitioner placed on record a copy of the said communication dated 29.4.2004 at Annexure-D Page 104. When the said copy of the said communication dated 29.4.2004 is examined, it is noticed that the said copy bears, on its face, a rubber stamp of the textile company (of the office Assistant of the textile company) who has also put his signature and date i.e. 29.4.2004. From the said rubber stamp of the office Assistant, his signature and date, it emerges that the communication dated 29.4.2004 was submitted by the petitioner and it was received/acknowledged by the office Assistant by putting the rubber stamp and his signature. This fact establishes that petitioner had submitted the letter dated 29.4.2004 on the same day i.e. on 29.4.2004 in the office. 25. In light of the copy of the said communication and in view of the fact that the affidavit filed by the respondent is silent on this count, the said respondent's said allegation does not merit any consideration and deserves to be rejected. 25.1. From the facts discussed above, it becomes clear that the respondent has, as an afterthought, come out with the aforesaid allegation/claim which is contrary to the facts of the case and also contrary to material on record. In this view of the matter, the submission of present petitioner to the effect that the respondent's said allegation/claim, is unjustified and mala-fide cannot be said to be baseless or without merits and it does not deserve to be wished-away or brushed aside. 26. Once the petitioner informed in writing, by virtue of application dated 29.4.2004, that he withdraws the option/resignation and when the said intimation was submitted before the option/resignation was accepted by the authority (inasmuch as the material on record and the documents of the respondent conclusively demonstrate that the respondent passed order accepting the petitioner's option/resignation on 30.4.2004), the said order dated 30.4.2004 accepting the option/resignation (which was already withdrawn on previous day on 29.4.2004) could not have been passed. 27. 27. In this view of the matter, the respondent's action of passing order on 30.4.2004 [i.e. after the petitioner withdrew his option/resignation on 29.4.2004 by submitting application (on 29.4.2004) withdrawing the option/resignation] and the respondent's action of informing the petitioner that his intimation/application withdrawing the option/resignation is not accepted, cannot be sustained. The respondent's action and the order dated 30.4.2004 are arbitrary, unjustified, violative of fairness and they are unsustainable. The said actions and decisions of the respondent deserve to be set aside, therefore, the said order dated 30.4.2004 is set aside. 28. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that by its affidavit dated 7.12.2015, the respondent has placed on record the fact that the Office of Labour Commissioner has vide decision dated 23.12.2008 granted permission under Section 25F for the closure of the company and since then the company is closed. On the other hand the petitioner has filed an affidavit dated 27.1.2016 declaring that he is not gainfully employed and that therefore he should be reinstated in service with consequential benefits. 28.1. When the Court has reached the conclusion that the decision of the respondent of not accepting the petitioner's application withdrawing the option is arbitrary, ordinarily the consequences would be direction to the respondent corporation to accept the petitioner's application dated 29.4.2004 and reinstate him with consequential benefits and treat him in the service. However, from the submissions by learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondent, it has emerged that:- (a) The petitioner has crossed age of superannuation and that therefore there is no scope of reinstatement. (b) The Office of Labour Commissioner has granted permission for closure of the company and consequently, the operation of the company are closed in accordance with provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 29. Therefore, having regard to the decision by this Court in case of Jubilee Mills (supra), the petitioner would be entitled to benefits until the date on which he attained age for superannuation or until the date when the legal closure of the company took place in accordance with the Act, whichever is earlier. 30. 29. Therefore, having regard to the decision by this Court in case of Jubilee Mills (supra), the petitioner would be entitled to benefits until the date on which he attained age for superannuation or until the date when the legal closure of the company took place in accordance with the Act, whichever is earlier. 30. As an upshot of the discussion and for the foregoing reasons, the respondent corporation is directed to pay the salary and retiral dues/benefits to the petitioner until the date on which he attained age prescribed for superannuation or the date on which legal closure of the company became effective, which ever is earlier. With aforesaid observations and direction, present petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. At this stage, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that at the relevant time, i.e. on 30.4.2004, the respondent corporation had prepared the cheque for an amount of Rs. 9,78,091.40 which according to it was payable as per the terms of the scheme and the respondent is ready and willing to pay the said amount to the petitioner, however, so far as the additional amount which would be payable to the petitioner in view of present order is concerned, that part of the order may be stayed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the fact that the petitioner has crossed age of superannuation and at present he is about 60 years old and has been out of employment since 2004, the request is rejected.