Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 302 (GUJ)

B. C. Nanavati v. UCO Bank

2016-02-08

AKIL ABDUL HAMID KURESHI

body2016
JUDGMENT : Akil Abdul Hamid Kureshi, J. 1. The petitioner has challenged an order dated 13.7.1999 passed by the disciplinary authority by which he was dismissed from the bank service. He has challenged the appellate order dated 21.12.1999 under which his departmental appeal came to be dismissed. Briefly stated, facts are that the petitioner was employed by respondent No. 1 UCO bank, a nationalised bank. At the relevant time he was posted as an Operator clerk. The bank issued a charge-sheet dated 30.9.1997 in which as many as 13 different charges were levelled against him. The crux of the charges was that on one instance, the petitioner had processed an application for opening the bank account of M/s. Sandeep Textiles. The form was filled by the petitioner himself. The introducer M/s. A.K. Prints was found to be a bogus party. Similarly, introducer M/s. A.K. Printers was used for opening other accounts as well. It was therefore, alleged that the petitioner indulged in opening such fictitious accounts. The other element of charge against the petitioner was he was involved in the business of cheque discounting for commission. Several instances of such nature were brought to the notice of the bank that the petitioner had with the help of his other family members being carrying out such activities. It was held that several forged endorsement on the reverse side of demand drafts were put by the petitioner in his own handwriting which was a serious offence. This charge therefore, had multiple facets, namely, of being involved in the business of cheque and demand draft discounting, taking help of family members to disguise such business and putting forged signatures on such negotiable instruments for the purpose of his business. 2. The petitioner appeared before the inquiry officer and denied the charges. The departmental inquiry was conducted, at the end of which the inquiry officer submitted his report dated 15.4.1999. He held that all the charges were proved. The disciplinary authority issued a show cause notice dated 22.6.1999 along with which he supplied a copy of Inquiry officer's report to the petitioner and called upon the petitioner to show cause why the punishment of dismissal should not be imposed. He also offered personal hearing to the petitioner on 29.6.1999. 3. He held that all the charges were proved. The disciplinary authority issued a show cause notice dated 22.6.1999 along with which he supplied a copy of Inquiry officer's report to the petitioner and called upon the petitioner to show cause why the punishment of dismissal should not be imposed. He also offered personal hearing to the petitioner on 29.6.1999. 3. The petitioner replied to such notice under communication dated 29.6.1999, raised several grounds for breach of principles of natural justice in conduct of inquiry and requested that the charges be dropped. It is undisputed that the petitioner was also heard in person by the disciplinary authority. 4. The disciplinary authority thereupon passed a detailed order dated 13.7.1999. He gave his independent reasons for concurring with the findings of the inquiry officer and eventually imposed the punishment of dismissal from service against the petitioner. Against such order of disciplinary authority, the petitioner preferred appeal before the appellate authority. In addition to highlighting the grounds of principles of natural justice, he also prayed for personal hearing before the appellate authority. The appellate authority however, proceeded to dismiss the appeal by the impugned order dated 21.12.1999 without hearing the petitioner in person. These orders are challenged by the petitioners in the present petition. 5. Learned counsel Shri Sashtri for the petitioner raised the following contentions: (1) The inquiry was conducted in breach of principles of natural justice inasmuch as, (a) one Shri L.J. Gabani who was the disciplinary authority as per the bank rules, was examined as a witness. (b) on 23.3.1999, when the petitioner was admitted in the hospital, the inquiry officer without adjourning the proceedings, though medical certificate was produced before him, concluded the inquiry. (c) this conclusion of inquiry in absence of the petitioner resulted into gross violation of principles of natural justice. (d) the appellate authority refused to grant personal hearing though demanded by the petitioner. (2) Counsel submitted that, in any case, the petitioner had put in 33 years of unblemished service. There was no charge of doubtful integrity. The petitioner was a Union leader and was therefore, targeted at the instance of a rival Union leader. In any case, the punishment is extremely harsh and unjust. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel Shri Desai for the bank opposed the petition contending that the charges against the petitioners were extremely serious. There was no charge of doubtful integrity. The petitioner was a Union leader and was therefore, targeted at the instance of a rival Union leader. In any case, the punishment is extremely harsh and unjust. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel Shri Desai for the bank opposed the petition contending that the charges against the petitioners were extremely serious. All the charges were held to have been proved. There was no breach of principles of natural justice. The petitioner had earlier also remained absent consistently. In any case, upon conclusion of the inquiry on 23.3.1999, the petitioner suffered no prejudice. Counsel relied on the decision of Supreme Court in case of State Bank of India and another v. Bela Bagchi and others reported in IIII CLR 420 SC : AIR 2005 SC 3272 to contend that as a bank officer, the petitioner owed a duty to maintain utmost integrity which he failed to do. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the documents on record, one may recall that the petitioner was visited with as many as 13 charges principally, on two sets of allegations. First was that the petitioner had indulged in opening of bogus bank accounts with the aid of introducers who were found to be bogus. The charge was held to have been proved during inquiry. Second set of charges against the petitioner was that he had over a long period of time indulged in the business of cheque discounting. In the process, he had utilised the name and help of family members. On several occasions, he had also indulged in putting forged signatures on reverse side of the bank draft and cheques. These charges were also proved. As per the proved charges, thus the petitioner had indulged in serious malpractice. While discharging duties as a bank officer, it was of utmost importance that the petitioner conducts himself with due diligence and highest integrity. Instead, the petitioner indulged in the business of cheque discounting and also in the process on several occasions was found to be putting forged signatures. 8. The inquiry officer in his report dated 15.4.1999 had recorded the procedure followed by him as under: "7. Procedure I have adopted the following procedure in the enquiry: (a) The charges levelled against CSE were read over and explained to him (EPR 13). 8. The inquiry officer in his report dated 15.4.1999 had recorded the procedure followed by him as under: "7. Procedure I have adopted the following procedure in the enquiry: (a) The charges levelled against CSE were read over and explained to him (EPR 13). (b) The CSE denied the charges levelled against him (EPR 13). (c) The Management Witnesses were then examined one by one in support of the charges and the CSE/D.R. Were afforded an reasonable opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses to their satisfaction. (d) The CSE was then asked to adduce evidences to rebut the charges in his defence (EPR-8/15). (e) After the close of evidences, the CSE was called upon to make his statement. However the CSE/D.R. remained absent. (f) The examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination were recorded in the question and answers form. (g) The Xerox copies of each day Enquiry Proceeding which was duly acknowledged by EO, PO, CSE and D.R. Were supplied to concerned PO, CSE/D.R. (h) The Xerox copies of the Exhibits were given to both the parties. (i) On completion of hearing, the PO had submitted the written arguments on 27.3.1999. The D.R. submitted written briefs on 30.3.1999. (j) The Enquiry Proceedings were held in the presence of Enquiry Officer, PO, CSE, D.R. the hearings were adjourned so many times. However, on 22.3.1999 the D.R. remained present but the CSE remained absent. On 23.3.1999 both the D.R. and CSE remained absent and therefore the proceedings were held ex-parte on 23.3.1999. (k) The documents requisitioned by CSE/DR were made available to them to their satisfaction." 9. To these aspects, the petitioner has not pointed out any discrepancies. If that be so, it could be safely concluded that upon the management witnesses being examined one by one, they were offered for cross-examination to the satisfaction of the petitioner. Only thereafter, the petitioner was asked to adduce evidence in his defence to rebut the charges. After the evidence of the petitioner was closed, he was asked to make his statement. 10. The grievance therefore, that on 23.3.1999, on account of his absence due to illness, the petitioner missed an important opportunity to cross-examine a witness is not borne out from the record at all. The inquiry officer records that all witnesses were offered for cross-examination. It was only then that the petitioner was asked to produce his defence witnesses. 10. The grievance therefore, that on 23.3.1999, on account of his absence due to illness, the petitioner missed an important opportunity to cross-examine a witness is not borne out from the record at all. The inquiry officer records that all witnesses were offered for cross-examination. It was only then that the petitioner was asked to produce his defence witnesses. After this stage was over, the petitioner was called upon to present his brief. 11. Even if therefore, on 23.3.1999, the inquiry officer did not wait for the petitioner to appear, no prejudice was caused to the petitioner. He merely had to tender his defence brief which I am told he did about 10 days later. In fact, the inquiry officer's report would suggest that he took into account all the contentions of the petitioner while drawing his report. 12. Simultaneously, I also notice that the petitioner had remained absent on various occasions earlier also. Had it been a case of isolated absence for valid reasons, the inquiry officer is duty bound to adjourn the proceedings for a reasonable period. However, in past on number of occasions, the petitioner had remained absent for some reason or the other and on some occasions, without citing any reasons at all. Combined effect of these conclusions namely, that absence of 23.3.1999 was not an isolated instance and that in any case, no prejudice was demonstrated by the petitioner against the inquiry officer in not adjourning the proceedings on such date, would persuade the not to strike down the inquiry proceedings merely on this ground. Merely because Shri Gabani happened to be a witness and therefore, was examined by the department during the course of inquiry would not vitiate the proceedings since Shri Gabani happened to be a disciplinary authority also. If Shri Gabani had acted in such capacity, having deposed against the petitioner, surely it would have been a serious breach of principles of natural justice since a person interested would be judging the ultimate cause. However, this has not happened in the present case. It is undisputed that on account of such quandary, the department appointed the Regional Manager as ad-hoc disciplinary authority instead of Shri Gabani to pass the ultimate order. 13. Regarding the personal hearing in appellate proceedings, no rule has been pointed out which would mandate the authorities to do so. However, this has not happened in the present case. It is undisputed that on account of such quandary, the department appointed the Regional Manager as ad-hoc disciplinary authority instead of Shri Gabani to pass the ultimate order. 13. Regarding the personal hearing in appellate proceedings, no rule has been pointed out which would mandate the authorities to do so. It is well settled that while following the principles of natural justice, requirement of hearing would not in all cases, include personal hearing. In the departmental proceedings, it is not unknown that the appellate authority would proceed on the basis of available material on record without in all cases granting personal hearing. The disciplinary authority, we may recall, granted such personal hearing to the petitioner. 14. Though it is orally contended that the disciplinary authority did not supply a copy of inquiry officer's report along with the show cause notice, the show cause notice in question itself records that a copy of inquiry officer's report is annexed. This statement has not been disputed by the petitioner. Importantly, in the representation that the petitioner made in response to such notice, no such contention has been taken. I would therefore, proceed on the basis that the petitioner was, in fact, as recorded in the show cause notice, provided a copy of inquiry officer's report and called upon him to show cause why punishment of dismissal be not imposed on him. 15. In the result, I do not find any breach of procedural requirement which would vitiate the inquiry. Charges against the petitioner were serious and were held to have been proved. The petition is therefore, dismissed.