JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing counsel on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, Sri M.C. Chaturvedi learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Shivam Yadav learned counsel on behalf of respondent No. 3. 2. Petitioner before this Court seeks mandamus commanding respondents not to dispossess the petitioner from the land in dispute and for declaring the land acquisition proceeding in respect of plot No. 731 measuring 1.178 hectares and plot No. 760 measuring 0.569 hectare situated in Village Singhpur Kachhar, Kanpur Nagar (hereinafter referred to the disputed land) illegal. The amendment application has been filed which shall be decided at the later stage. 3. The facts in short leading to the present writ petition reads as follows. The aforesaid disputed land is claim to belong to a society duly registered under the Societies Registration Act. The society alleged to have been involved in establishing and running educational institutions. The disputed land was subject mater of Notifications under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17 of the U.P. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 7.9.1996 and under Section 6(1) of the Act dated 17.12.1997. The petitioner was not aggrieved by the said notification and did not challenge or question the same at any point of time. According to the material available on record the petitioner in fact accepted 80% of the compensation in respect of the said acquisition without protest. 4. The acquisition proceeding was however, challenged by a society namely M/s Mahabir Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd and several other persons in Writ Court being writ petition No. 201 of 1998 and other connected matters. The writ petitions are allowed and the notification issued under Section 4 and 6 of the Act were quashed vide judgment and order dated 26.3.1999. Not being satisfied with the judgement and order of the Writ Court, Leave to Appeal was filed before the Apex Court which was converted into Civil Appeal No. 5517 of 1999 alongwith connected appeals. These appeals were partly allowed vide judgment and order dated 6.10.2004. The order of the High Court in so far as it quashed Section 6 notification was upheld, but the Hon’ble Supreme Court maintained the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. Liberty was granted to the State to issue a fresh notification under Section 6(1) of the Act. These appeals were partly allowed vide judgment and order dated 6.10.2004. The order of the High Court in so far as it quashed Section 6 notification was upheld, but the Hon’ble Supreme Court maintained the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. Liberty was granted to the State to issue a fresh notification under Section 6(1) of the Act. Following the directions contained in the order of the Apex Court, the State Government is stated to have published a Notification under Section 6 (1) of the Act on 3.10.2005 which was again challenged before the High Court by means of the writ petition No. 66471 of 2005 alongwith other connected matters. The High Court allowed the writ petition only on the ground that there has been 18 days delay in the statutory period provided under first proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act. 5. The Division bench, however, specifically recorded that such quashing would be only in respect of lands of the writ petitioners and the entire notification in general was not quashed. The operative portion of the Writ Court order reads as follows : “The result, therefore, is that the Statutory prescribed period for making the declaration under Section 6 of the Act having lapsed, all actions and consequences subsequent to the notification under Section 4 of the Act stand vitiated. The impugned declaration under Section 6 of the Act dated 3.10.2005 is quashed, so far as the land involved in these petitions are concerned. The writ petitions accordingly succeed and are allowed with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.” 6. The Kanpur Development Authority not being satisfied with the judgment of the Division bench filed Special Leave to Appeal No. 2302 of 2007 alongwith connected appeals before the Apex Court, these appeals were dismissed vide judgment and order dated 31.3.2008. The net result of the aforesaid proceeding was that so far as the writ petitioners before the High Court were concerned, Section 6 of the notification was quashed for them only and the order in that regard became final with the dismissal of the Civil Appeals in the year 2008. The petitioner did not challenge the subsequent notification dated 3.10.2005 nor he did seek any other relief within a reasonable time thereafter. 7. As a matter of fact, qua the petitioner, the notification under Section 6(1) made on 3.10.2005 stands on record. The petitioner did not challenge the subsequent notification dated 3.10.2005 nor he did seek any other relief within a reasonable time thereafter. 7. As a matter of fact, qua the petitioner, the notification under Section 6(1) made on 3.10.2005 stands on record. We find that an award was made with reference to the aforesaid proceeding on 9.2.2010, even at this stage the petitioner did not approach this Court and took three years thereafter to file the present writ petition to be precise on 18.12.2013 for the relief as has been quoted herein-above. The only explanation furnished for not approaching this Court for more than 7 years of the notification under Section 6 and after three years of the award is that the petitioner has been writing letters to the respondents to take back the compensation which has been paid and to release the land. 8. On behalf of the respondents, counter-affidavit has been filed and it has been stated that large scale development has taken place over the land in question and in support thereof, the photographs depicting the development which has been taken place have also been enclosed. 9. It is the case of the respondents that the petitioners was sitting on the fence and was watching the proceeding in respect of the acquisition. Such petitioner cannot be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at such belated stage and constructions which have already been raised by the Kanpur Development Authority may not be put in jeopardy because of such belated action. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sawaran Lata ETC v. State of Haryana and others, 2010 (4) SCC 532 and Urban Improvement Trust v. Bheru Lal, 2002 (7) SCC 712 . 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance placed upon the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi and others v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others, 2013 (1) SCC 353 . 12. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance placed upon the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi and others v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others, 2013 (1) SCC 353 . 12. It is stated before this Court that if any interference is placed by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in respect of the acquisition proceedings and the land of the petitioner is declared to be excluded therefrom, the net result would be that the construction worth crores of rupees which have already been raised in the land in question would be required to be demolished causing loss of public exchequer which would not be in the interest of the larger public good. 13. Sri Manish Goyal learned counsel for the petitioner points out that award in respect of the proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act has to be made within two years of the notification which in the facts of the case would expire in the year 2007 and since the award has been made in the year 2010, the proceeding would lapse in view of the simple language of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. With regard to delay in approaching this Court it is explained that the writ petition was filed in the year 2013. In reply to Right to Information query the petitioner was informed that the zonal plan was under preparation and, therefore, the question of any construction being raised prior to the filing of the writ petition does not arise. 14. It is lastly submitted that the respondents had altered their position despite being aware of the pendency of the writ petition then such alteration cannot be approved in their favour. 15. By means of the amendment application the attempts have been made to challenge the award which has been made on 9.2.2010. In the alternative, prayer is to pay compensation in accordance with the prevailing rates in terms of the provisions contained under Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to Act of 2013). 16. In the alternative, prayer is to pay compensation in accordance with the prevailing rates in terms of the provisions contained under Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to Act of 2013). 16. So far as the challenge to the award and the proceeding under Section 6 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act are concerned, by means of the amendment it is sought to be introduced after more than five years of the award and after more than 11 years of notification under Section 6 (1) of the Act. 17. We cannot permit such amendments at such belated stage specifically in the circumstance when the explanation furnished by the petitioner is too vague to be accepted by this Court. The knowledge of the land acquisition proceeding since 1996 is admitted to the petitioner and there is no denial to this fact at any point of time. 18. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any good ground to permit the amendment in the prayer clause in so far as the prayer for quashing of the award and the notification under Section 6 are concerned. 19. So far as the issue of payment of compensation under the Act, 2013 is concerned, we find that Section 24 contemplates payment of compensation under the Act, 2013, only when the condition mentioned therein are satisfied. In the fact of the case learned counsel for the petitioner hopelessly failed to establish that any of the conditions mentioned stands attracted to justify the order of this Court. The amendment application is, therefore, rejected. 20. This takes us to the basic issue as to whether in the facts of the case and in view of the development which has been taken place this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for declaring the acquisition proceeding as having lapsed. The Apex Court in the case of Laxmi Devi v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 2015 SC 2710 , has explained the difference between lapsing of the proceeding and quashing of the proceeding. 21. In the facts of the case, we find that Section 4 notification in respect of the land in question has been upheld by the Apex Court and the only direction issued was to publish a fresh notification under Section 6 (1) of the Act. 21. In the facts of the case, we find that Section 4 notification in respect of the land in question has been upheld by the Apex Court and the only direction issued was to publish a fresh notification under Section 6 (1) of the Act. 22. The directions issued by the Apex Court under the order dated 6.10.2004 reads as follows. : “Under the circumstances, these appeals are entitled to succeed partly; in other words, the notification issued under Section 6(1) of the Act is quashed while sustaining the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act in all other respects, the impugned orders are not disturbed. We direct that the respondents shall be given opportunity of hearing during the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, after giving fresh notice of hearing indicating a fixed date. It is open to the respondents-land owners to bring to the notice of the Land Acquisition Officer as regards the subsequent developments. The land acquisition authorities, after holding enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, as directed, shall proceed in accordance with law.” 23. However, in view of the provision of Section 6 (1) as well as in view of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, there cannot be any further direction to publish any notification under Section 6 with reference to Section 4 notification issued in the year 1996 by this Court. 24. We may also take notice of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Savitri Devi v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC 21 , wherein the Apex Court after taking note of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gajraj Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2011(11) ADJ 1 , wherein the Court after considering the construction which has been raised over the acquired land has refused to grant the relief of quashing of the notification or for returning of the land to the tenure holders and instead thought it fit and proper to permit that the land holders may be provided additional compensation by 64.7% with 10% of the developed land. 25. We are of the considered opinion that in the facts of the case where such massive constructions have already taken place and Government money has been spent in raising such constructions, larger public interest must prevail over the interest of the private persons. 26. 25. We are of the considered opinion that in the facts of the case where such massive constructions have already taken place and Government money has been spent in raising such constructions, larger public interest must prevail over the interest of the private persons. 26. In our opinion it would be in the interest of justice to permit the petitioner to get benefit of the Full Bench judgment in the case of Gajraj Singh (supra) as has been provided for by the Apex Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra). 27. For the aforesaid reasons, we dispose of the present writ petition on the same terms and with the same directions as given by the Apex Court in Savitri Devi (supra) in paragraphs 48.1, 48.2 and 48.3 : “48.1. Increasing the compensation by 64.7%; 48.2. Directing allotment of developed abadi land to the extent of 10% of the land acquired of each of the landowners; 48.3. Compensation which is increased @ 64.7% is payable immediately without taking away the rights of the landowners to claim higher compensation under the machinery provided in the Land Acquisition Act wherein the matter would be examined on the basis of the evidence produced to arrive at just and fair market value.” 28. As a matter of fact the petitioner has accepted 80% of the compensation after the notification under Section 6(1) of the Act dated 17.12.1997 had been quashed, meaning thereby that the petitioner even after quashing the notification was more than willing to accept the acquisition of its land holding by the State Authority. 29. Let the enhanced compensation of 64.7% alongwith 10% of the developed land be provided to the petitioner within two months from the date of filing of the certified copy this order before the Vice-Chairman, Kanpur Development Authority. 30. With the above observations and directions, the writ petition is disposed of.