JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. By means of this petition, the petitioners have challenged the sale of the land measuring 1.50 acres in Mouja-Bikramnagar, Tahasil-Bikramnagar, Sekerkote comprised in Khatian No. 1281/1, 1281/2 C.S. Plots No. 2520, 2517, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2514, 2515 and 2516, hereinafter referred to as the pledged property, pursuant to the sale notice dated 05.07.2010, Annexure-2 to the writ petition. The petitioners have further urged, as consequential reliefs, for prohibiting or restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession of the petitioners in the pledged property and for cancelling Khatian No. 2958 in respect of the said pledged property opened in favour of the respondent No. 3 who purchased the pledged property in terms of the said sale notice, Annexure-2 to the writ petition. 2. The facts are mostly undisputed. The pledged property originally belonged to Sharnamoyee Datta and Brojendra Kishore Datta who transferred the pledged property to Akshay Kr. Das. After death of Akshay Kr. Das the petitioners along with their mother Radha Rani Das, now deceased, inherited the said pledged property in equal shares. Radha Rani Das died on 20.06.2007. Thus, the petitioners became the owners of the said pledged property. Radha Rani Das and the petitioners stood guarantors for the loan availed by the respondent No. 4, hereinafter the borrower, from the respondent No. 1, a financial corporation within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, hereinafter the Act in short. The petitioners and their mother created mortgage by a registered deed. In addition, they deposited the title deed of the pledged property with the respondent No. 1. The petitioners have asserted further that the borrower is their cousin brother. When the Khatian was finally published on 02.03.2011, Radharani Das was shown as the permissive possessor of Swarnamoyee Datta and Brajendra Kishore Datta although they had long ago transferred the land to Akshay Kr. Das. The petitioners asserted their possession over the pledged property stating that “they have been cultivating and growing paddy in the said landed property.” In the middle of July, 2012 the petitioner found the respondent No. 3, the purchaser in the said sale, excavating earth on one part of the pledged property. Das. The petitioners asserted their possession over the pledged property stating that “they have been cultivating and growing paddy in the said landed property.” In the middle of July, 2012 the petitioner found the respondent No. 3, the purchaser in the said sale, excavating earth on one part of the pledged property. When they questioned the purchaser why he was trying to occupy that part of the landed property he disclosed that he purchased the said property from the financial corporation in pursuance to a sale notice. The purchaser further revealed that the record of right (Khatian) in respect of the said land has been mutated in his name. What was revealed by the respondent No. 3 was found to be true on search by the petitioners. They found the said property has been recorded in Khatian No. 2958 in favour of the respondent No. 3 showing the petitioners as permissive occupier under column No. 16. The petitioners came to know that a sale notice was published in ‘Tripura Darpan’ a daily newspaper published from Agartala, on 05.07.2010. Further they came to know that the respondent No. 3 [the respondent No. 3 has been referred in various parts of the writ petition as the respondent No. 4 erroneously as the respondent No. 4 is the borrower, not the purchaser] purchased the land in the sale commenced in pursuance to the sale notice dated 05.07.2010. [Even though at the end of paragraph 4 it has been mentioned that the sale notice dated 05.07.2010 and its English translation are respectively marked Annexures-3 and 4, but no such annexures are available with the writ petition]. 3. The petitioners’ grievance as laid in the writ petition is that even though the property belonged to them but in the sale notice their names were not reflected and thus by suppressing the names of the real owners and only mentioning the name of the borrower the said sale notice was issued. Thereafter, the petitioners have asserted in the paragraph 6 that the respondent No. 3 [again wrongly mentioned, instead of the respondent No. 4] who is a Government school teacher is primarily liable to liquidate the loan as the borrower. Thereafter, the petitioners have asserted in the paragraph 6 that the respondent No. 3 [again wrongly mentioned, instead of the respondent No. 4] who is a Government school teacher is primarily liable to liquidate the loan as the borrower. In the event of the borrower’s failure to repay the loan, the respondents No. 1 and 2 should have proceeded against the borrower for realization of the debt and in case of failure to recover the loan from the borrower, the respondents No. 1 and 2 could have taken the process of the court for realization of the dues/balance dues from the guarantors by filing the regular suit inasmuch as the provision of Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 does not empower the corporation for recovery of the loan money without taking recourse of the court from the guarantors. In the case in hand, according to the petitioners, the respondents No. 1 and 2 did not take any step against the respondent No. 4 for recovery of the loan. The respondents No. 1 and 2 in connivance with the respondent No. 4 issued the sale notice and most illegally sold the pledged property to the respondent No. 3. The petitioners have further submitted that the respondents No. 1 and 2 being the State financial corporation are empowered only to take over the possession of the mortgaged property of the guarantor and to sell the same only by taking recourse to the law as provided for the said purpose in the said Act, as by any stretch of interpretation, a guarantor cannot be included within the meaning of the borrower. The petitioners have further asserted that the respondent-corporation have no right to sell the pledged property by auction without prior notice to the petitioner and without taking any action for recovery of the loan amount from the borrower. Thus, it has been contended that the impugned sale is of no consequence being contrary to law and the said sale is liable to be quashed. Even the mutation granted in favour of the purchaser is illegal, as according to the petitioner, that was so done without any notice to the petitioner. However, the petitioners have not explained how they were entitled to the notice when their names have admittedly not entered as the title holder in the record of right. Even the mutation granted in favour of the purchaser is illegal, as according to the petitioner, that was so done without any notice to the petitioner. However, the petitioners have not explained how they were entitled to the notice when their names have admittedly not entered as the title holder in the record of right. The petitioners by asserting that, they are in possession on the pledged property, urged for a prohibitory order from this court, for their undisturbed possession. 4. The respondents No. 1 and 2, the Corporation-respondents by filing a reply have stated that the borrower obtained a loan amounting to Rs. 1,80,000/- on 20.10.1982 repayable with interest at 13.50% per annum for utilizing the said fund in his transport business by purchase of one heavy vehicle. In respect of the indenture of mortgage created by the petitioners and their mother there is no dispute. Even the other records in this regard stood admitted by the Corporation-respondents. The Corporation-respondents have further admitted the incidence of sale of the pledged property to the purchaser on the basis of the tender. However, the incidence of obstructing the purchaser or connivance of the Corporation-respondents has been denied by the Corporation-respondents. The Corporation-respondents in their reply, have asserted that ‘the petitioners were/are very much aware that the borrower, the respondent No. 4, failed to make the repayment in the loan of the respondent No. 1 and notices were issued to them regarding making payment of the dues of the loan a/c and the demand of the repayment of the borrower as well as of the guarantor and the mortgagor and also for the notice for auction sale of the landed property for recovery of the dues of the loan account were issued, notices were duly received by the petitioners and the borrowers (sic)’. The respondents have further asserted that the sale notice was published in the daily newspaper ‘Dainik Sambad’ on diverse dates viz. 20.06.1990, 23.06.2008 and 05.07.2008. According to the Corporation-respondents the borrower had also created hypothecation in respect of the vehicle he purchased with the loan amount. The said vehicle was also sold in auction in terms of Section 29 of the Act. There cannot be any amount of dispute that the petitioners have taken notice of the auction sale. Notices as published in ‘Tripura Darpan’ and ‘Dainik Sambad’ are available with reply. The said vehicle was also sold in auction in terms of Section 29 of the Act. There cannot be any amount of dispute that the petitioners have taken notice of the auction sale. Notices as published in ‘Tripura Darpan’ and ‘Dainik Sambad’ are available with reply. The Corporation-respondents have stated further in their reply that the liabilities of the guarantor are equal to that of borrower. According to them Section 29 of the Act authorizes the corporation in taking the recourse for recovery of the dues in the loan account even by auction sale of the mortgaged property either of the borrower or of the guarantor, as the case may be. They have denied that the sale is illegal or liable to be interfered with. With their reply, correspondences made by one of the petitioners namely Ashis Kr. Das, the petitioner No. 1 have been annexed as Annexure-C, D, E & H and correspondences as made to the borrower and the petitioners have also been enclosed as Annexures-F&G. The petitioner No. 1 on 15.03.1990 had requested the corporation for taking steps for selling out the hypothecated vehicle and relieving them from their liability as the guarantors by the letter at Annexure-C of the reply filed by the Corporation- respondents. On 15.05.2003 the Corporation without prejudice, proposed for one time settlement by the communication at Annexure-D to the reply filed by the Corporation- respondents. By a communication dated 04.10.1988, Annexure-E to the said reply, the said petitioner had urged the corporation that if the calculation of future interest in the loan account of the vehicle TRL-3102 be stopped from the date of deposit of the amount which might be received after selling the vehicle TRL-3102, sale permission might be given to them (the petitioners) for sale of the vehicle. On 30.10.1998, a legal notice was issued to the borrower demanding payment of the due, in the loan account of the borrower, to the extent of Rs. 16,19,324.79 as on 31.03.1998 with further interest and other charges till final realization, within 15 days from the date of receipt of that letter. On 30.10.1998, a legal notice was issued to the borrower demanding payment of the due, in the loan account of the borrower, to the extent of Rs. 16,19,324.79 as on 31.03.1998 with further interest and other charges till final realization, within 15 days from the date of receipt of that letter. It had been cautioned in the terms as under: “In the case of your failure to comply as above the corporation will be compelled either to take possession and management of your concern under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or to take legal proceeding under Section 31 or 32(c) of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 against you for realization of your entire dues to the corporation and without any further reference to you.” 5. The Corporation-respondents further by the notice dated 05/12.03.1997, Annexure-G to their reply, asked the borrower and the petitioners after revealing the account which is noted below to clear the entire defaulted amount on or before 27.03.1997. This notice was issued prior to the notice dated 31.12.1998. Thus, it appears clearly that neither the borrower nor the petitioners took any initiative for repayment of the outstanding dues. Dues Shown in the Loan Account “Amount outstanding Rs. 12,53,770,33 (30-09-96) Principal overdue Rs. 1,08,688.15 Interest overdue Rs. 11,45,088.20 (upto 30-09-96) Interest tax Rs. 19,188.90” From all these communications, the Corporation-respondents have made an endeavour to show that the petitioners were all along abreast of the development in respect of the said defaulted amount. 6. The respondent No. 4 by filing a reply has submitted that by the special power of attorney which was executed by the petitioners on 22.12.1981, the petitioners had authorized him to do, execute or perform or cause to be done, executed or performed with the said mortgage property in the manner as described in the said power of attorney Annexure R/4/1. They have clearly stated in the deed of power of attorney that they shall ratify or confirm all such acts. In the prelude of the said power of attorney, they have carefully recited inter-alia that: “..........do hereby appoint Sri Bomkesh Chaudhuri, S/o Sri Anandamohan Chaudhury of Vill. They have clearly stated in the deed of power of attorney that they shall ratify or confirm all such acts. In the prelude of the said power of attorney, they have carefully recited inter-alia that: “..........do hereby appoint Sri Bomkesh Chaudhuri, S/o Sri Anandamohan Chaudhury of Vill. Sekerkote, P.S. Amtali, District-West Tripura, as an attorney in our name and on our behalf to mortgage our lands measuring 6(six) kanis 10(ten) gandas and 3(three) karas described more fully in the schedule annexed hereto: to Assam Financial Corporation, Gauhati-5 and to do all acts fully and effectually in connection with as we could do the same ourselves.” 7. In this context, in the para 13 of the counter affidavit, the said respondent No. 4 in his reply has stated as under: “13. That at that point of time, the petitioners and their mother requested the respondent No. 4 to become a borrower of Truck from the respondent No. 1 since already a Truck was borrowed by them i.e. TRL-2382 under HPA. The respondent No. 4 was assured that the loan amount would be re-paid by the petitioners in terms of the agreement and the respondent No. 4 would be a borrower for paper works only. They also assured that the maintenance usage of the said vehicle would be the responsibility of the petitioners. Be it also noted that for securing the loan in the name of the respondent No. 4 the petitioners and their mother executed a special power of attorney, authorizing the respondent No. 4 to deal with the land involved in the writ petition specifically with the respondent No. 1 by Special Power of attorney dated 22-12-1981, a bare perusal of which would substantiate the above contention of the respondent No. 4. The respondent No. 4 humbly submits that since he was deeply obliged for giving him shelter during the period of his student life, he felt indebted to petitioners and their mother and as such he agreed to assist/help the petitioners by applying for the loan as borrower to the respondent No. 1 and 2.” 8. The respondent No. 4 has further submitted that under compulsion he conceded to the terms of the petitioner No. 1 and by pledging the property of the petitioners, the loan was obtained. The respondent No. 4 has further submitted that under compulsion he conceded to the terms of the petitioner No. 1 and by pledging the property of the petitioners, the loan was obtained. It was the petitioner No. 1 who purchased the said vehicle in the name of the respondent No. 4 and he started the transport business. Even though the respondent No. 4 had insisted for transferring the ownership of the vehicle and for clearing the outstanding lying in the loan account, the petitioner No. 1 by stating that he was not doing well with his business and he would not be able to pay of his dues, did not cause transfer of the title. The respondent No. 4 has further stated that in the year 2007 he was appointed as a school teacher. In the paragraph 17 of the said reply, the respondent No. 4 has further stated that when he was informed of piled-up outstanding, he persuaded the petitioner No. 1 to take appropriate measure, else the property under mortgage would consequentially be sold for realization of the dues but the petitioner No. 1 did not give any heed. In the paragraph 21, what the respondent No. 4 has stated is highly relevant and hence the same is reproduced for reference: “21. That it is respectfully submitted that since the respondent No. 4 was the attorney of the landed property and the landed property was mortgaged to secure the loan the notice, annexure-4 to the writ petition, contains the name of the respondent No. 4 and as such the legality of the notice cannot be faulted in any manner. Further since the land was mortgaged by the respondent No. 4 as the attorney of the petitioners when all the powers were given to the respondent No. 4 the attachment and sale of the said land has to be construed to have been an act of recovery of dues from the borrower for all purposes. And therefore this writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed with cost.” 9. On 05.01.2016 the respondents No. 1 and 2 filed one additional counter affidavit basically for purpose of placing before the court three left-out documents viz. And therefore this writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed with cost.” 9. On 05.01.2016 the respondents No. 1 and 2 filed one additional counter affidavit basically for purpose of placing before the court three left-out documents viz. (1) the letter No. 5016-17/F.4(23)/SDM/BLG/EEV/09 dated 06-06-2010 issued by the SDM to the Respondent No. 2 herein, intimating about the deposit of fees to be made for the purpose of demarcation of the mortgaged land through the treasury Challan (2) the letter No. 885/F.7(2)/DCM/BLG/ REV/06 dated, 30-03-2009 issued by the DCM, Bishalgarh to the Respondent No. 2 herein, confirming the records of the mortgaged land under Khatian No. 1283/1 and 1283/2 and (3) the notice No. AFC/AGT/L-136/09-10/383 dated 30-11-2009 issued by the Respondent No. 2 herein to the borrower and the mortgagors with the courier’s receipts which are annexed with the additional affidavit as Annexures-I, J & K series respectively. Needless to say that those are the documents submitted in addition to the documents at Annexures-A-H in the reply. 10. The respondents No. 1 and 2, by the said additional reply, have submitted that the petitioners have made misrepresentation and concealment of fact. Having stated so, in the paragraph 2 of the said additional reply they have asserted as under: “2. That, we the answering Respondents with due notice and information to the Petitioners as well as to the Respondent No. 4 after due demarcation of the mortgaged land through the SDM, Bishalgarh got the land vacant and took over the possession and by auction sale handed over possession to the Respondent No. 3 where there was no illegalities and irregularities in arbitrariness on the part of the answering Respondents.” 11. From the letter dated 06.06.2010, Annexure-I to the additional reply filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2 it appears that Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bishalgarh informed the respondent No. 1 to deposit the required fee by the treasury challan. From the letter 30.03.2009, Annexure-J to the additional reply, addressed to the respondent No. 1, it further appears that it has been confirmed by the Deputy Collector and Magistrate, Bishalgarh Circle that the pledged land was recorded in the name of Swarnamoyee Datta and Brajendra Kishore Datta. From the letter 30.03.2009, Annexure-J to the additional reply, addressed to the respondent No. 1, it further appears that it has been confirmed by the Deputy Collector and Magistrate, Bishalgarh Circle that the pledged land was recorded in the name of Swarnamoyee Datta and Brajendra Kishore Datta. From the notice dated 30.11.2009 issued by the respondent No. 1 to the respondent No. 4 and the petitioners including their mother namely Radha Rani Das, now deceased, it appears that all those persons were specifically informed of taking steps under the Act for recovery of the outstanding dues. At the cost of repeatation, the main text of the said notice is reproduced hereunder: “Dear Sir/Madam, Sub:-Your term loan with the Corporation a/c No. 136. The record of the Corporation shows that an amount of Rs. 66,21,131.96 (Rupees sixty six lakhs twenty one thousand one hundred thirty one and paisa ninety six) only remain outstanding against your loan account No. 136 with the Corporation as on 31-03-2009. The break up of the defaulted amount is as under:- (i) Amount outstanding Rs. 66,21,131.96 (ii) Principal outstanding Rs. 1,11,000.00 (iii) Arrear Interest Rs. 2,84,401.60 (iv) Current Interest Rs. 62,25,730.36 The efforts made by the Corporation to realize the dues from you have so far not met with any success. The Corporation is constrained to inform you that it will have no alternative but to take recourse to the provisions of the SFC’s Act, 1951 for recovery of dues. You may kindly note that the aforesaid action may be proceeded by a notice in the local Newspaper indicating the name of the firm, its owners etc. along with the action proposed to be taken. In view of the above and your repeated failure to honour your commitment to pay the dues, you are hereby finally advised to clear the entire defaulted amount on or before 20th December 2009. Should you fail to respond to this notice as suggested above the Corporation will take necessary legal steps without any further reference to you. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Illigible (R.K. Sharma) Asstt. Manager-In-Charge A.F.C-F.O-Agartala.” It appears further from the Annexure-K series, that the notices were sent individually by the assured service. 12. What has further emerged from the records that the petitioner did not dispute the statements of the respondents by filing any rejoinder. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Illigible (R.K. Sharma) Asstt. Manager-In-Charge A.F.C-F.O-Agartala.” It appears further from the Annexure-K series, that the notices were sent individually by the assured service. 12. What has further emerged from the records that the petitioner did not dispute the statements of the respondents by filing any rejoinder. While questioning the action of the respondent No. 1 in respect of sale of the pledged property, Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners has raised three grounds of objection viz. (1) Section 29 of the Act does not authorize the Corporation to deal with the pledged property which has not been mortgaged by the industrial concern but by the surety. Thus, the auction sale of the pledged property be deemed as illegal ab initio and the pledged property is amenable to be restituted in favour of the petitioners, (2) the petitioners were not given due notice as the guarantor (surety) and unless the due or the part of the due is realized from the borrower first, the liability of the guarantor cannot be invoked. If the industrial concern failed to liquidate the due, the guarantor’s obligation becomes animated, otherwise not and (3) without notice to the petitioner mutation of the existing record of right in favour of the respondent No. 3, the purchaser, is wholly illegal. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has submitted that Section 29 of the Act deals with the rights of the financial corporation in case of default where any industrial concern which is under liability to the corporation makes default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or in meeting its obligations in relation to any guaranty given to the corporation or otherwise or fails to comply any term of the agreement with the corporation, the corporation have the right to take over the management or possession of both of the industrial concern and also to realize the property pledged mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to financial corporation. According to him, Section 29 of the Act does not empower the corporation for sale of the property of the guarantors, pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned as security for loan or advance or for enforcing the liability of any surety etc. According to him, Section 29 of the Act does not empower the corporation for sale of the property of the guarantors, pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned as security for loan or advance or for enforcing the liability of any surety etc. By creating a special provision for such claim of the corporation, Section 31 of the Act has been devised and the reliefs may be secured following the procedures as laid down in Section 32 of the Act. In support of his contention, Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Munnalal Gupta vs. Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation and Another, AIR 1975 All 416 [Full Bench] where it has been held that: “9. The learned Advocate-General who appeared for the Corporation, laid emphasis upon Section 29. Section 29, no doubt, defines the rights of the Financial Corporation to take over the management of the industrial "concern or realise the mortgage property by way of lease or sale. As we have already mentioned, the right given to the Corporation under Section 29 will extend to the property of the surety also. But such a right can be enforced by taking recourse to the ordinary law contained in the Transfer of Property Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. The special and speedy remedy contained in Section 31 of the Act cannot be availed of by the Corporation. There is no conflict between the two provisions. Section 29 defines the general right of the Corporation in cases of default and Section 31 provides for a speedy and summary remedy. From the scheme of the Act, it is clear that the speedy remedy contained in Section 31 is available not against, the surety but against the borrower only. Now, in the instant case the Corporation has sought to avail of the special remedy contained in Section 31. As is evident from Section 32, the reliefs contained in Section 32 can only be granted against the borrower and his property mortgaged with the Corporation. If the Corporation wants to proceed against the property of the surety also, it may do so by taking recourse to the ordinary law. 10. As is evident from Section 32, the reliefs contained in Section 32 can only be granted against the borrower and his property mortgaged with the Corporation. If the Corporation wants to proceed against the property of the surety also, it may do so by taking recourse to the ordinary law. 10. In the case of the U.P. Financial Corporation vs. Deekey Industries (P.) Ltd. (supra) the Bench laid emphasis on Section 29 of the Act and took the view that the unfettered right of the Corporation to proceed against all the mortgaged property could not be cut down by Section 31 or Section 32. There is no conflict between Section 29, Section 31 and Section 32. Section 29 defines the right of the Corporation in general to proceed against the mortgaged property. That right is not taken away by Section 31 or Section 32. That right remains intact but is enforceable by modes other than that contained in Section 31. Sections 31 and 32 read together make it amply clear that a speedy remedy of an application to the District Judge is available to the Corporation only against the borrower industrial concern and if the Corporation wants to enforce its right against the surety, it must take recourse to the ordinary law of realising the debt secured by mortgaged property as contained in the Transfer of Property Act and the Civil Procedure Code. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of U.P. Financial Corporation vs. Deekey Industries (P.) Ltd. (supra). 11. The learned Advocate-General then referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act and clause (ix) of paragraph 2 thereof, which says:- "The Corporation will have special privileges in the matter of enforcement of its claims against borrowers." To us it appears that the objects and reasons read with Clause (ix) of paragraph 2 really support the view that we have taken. The special privileges granted to the Corporation in respect of enforcement of its claim is limited to the borrowers and the borrowers have to be industrial concerns. It is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Advocate-General that the word "borrower" would include a surety. The special privileges granted to the Corporation in respect of enforcement of its claim is limited to the borrowers and the borrowers have to be industrial concerns. It is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Advocate-General that the word "borrower" would include a surety. He says that any person who is a party to a contract of loan with the Corporation will come within the term "borrower" and since Munnalal is also a party to the agreement, he should also be deemed to be a borrower. We have perused the agreement. The preamble of the agreement describes the industrial concern as borrower and describes Munna Lal as the 'mortgagor' who has mortgaged his property in security of the loan. The distinction between the borrower and the surety has been kept throughout the agreement. The agreement has been signed separately by the borrower as also by Munna Lal as the mortgagor. A borrower is obviously a person who borrows and it cannot include the surety who guarantees or secures the loan. No doubt, in the ultimate paragraph of the agreement it is provided:- "Whenever the context so demands qua the property mortgaged the term borrower shall include the "mortgagor." But this clause clearly shows that a mortgagor and the borrower are two separate entities and it is only when the context so demands that the word "borrower" may include the mortgagor. This clause does not, however, in any way modify or amend statutory provision contained in Sections 31 and 32 of the Act. Indeed, it would not be open to the parties to enter into a contract contrary to the statutory provisions. We have already shown above that for the purposes of Sections 31 and 32 of the Act the borrower and the surety could not be placed at par. The clause in question refers to the context of the agreement and does not refer to the context of the statutory provisions.” 13. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has also relied on a decision of the Gauhati High Court at Agartala Bench in Amulya Lal Chowdhury vs. Tripura Industrial Development Corporation, (2007) 3 GLR 776 where Munnalal Gupta (supra) has been referred but the question as raised by Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has not been met in that report. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has also relied on a decision of the Gauhati High Court at Agartala Bench in Amulya Lal Chowdhury vs. Tripura Industrial Development Corporation, (2007) 3 GLR 776 where Munnalal Gupta (supra) has been referred but the question as raised by Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has not been met in that report. The reliance thus has been placed on a decision of the Karnataka High Court in H.I. Shamshuddin vs. Karnataka State Financial Corporation and Others, AIR 2010 Kar 187 where it has been held that: “8. The answer to the question need not detain the court for long as it is no more res integra in the light of the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in Narasimhaiah's case (2008) 5 SCC 176 The Apex Court having regard to Section 29, 30, 31, 32 and 32G interpreted Section 29 as a special provision made in derogation to the general right of the citizen and hence should receive a strict construction. Having regard to the definition of industrial concern under the SFC Act, the State Financial Corporation, for the purpose of enforcing its liability of the industrial concern, it is held, could take recourse both under Section 29 and 31 of the SFC Act. The default contemplated under Section 29 is said to be that of the industrial concern and the creation of a liability of the industrial concern which may arise due to default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment under an agreement or failing to meet its obligation in relation to any guarantee given by the Corporation or complying with the terms of the agreement with the financial corporation. Their lordships interpreting the use of the words "as well as" in the second part of Section 29 of the SFC Act held that the said Section nowhere states that the Corporation can proceed against the surety even if some properties are mortgaged or hypothecated by the surety. The observations of their lordships, in the circumstances, is apposite: 20. Section 29 of the Act nowhere states that the corporation can proceed against the surety even if some properties are mortgaged or hypothecated by it. The right of the financial corporation in terms of Section 29 of the Act must be exercised only on a defaulting party. The observations of their lordships, in the circumstances, is apposite: 20. Section 29 of the Act nowhere states that the corporation can proceed against the surety even if some properties are mortgaged or hypothecated by it. The right of the financial corporation in terms of Section 29 of the Act must be exercised only on a defaulting party. There cannot be any default as is envisaged in Section 29 by a surety or a guarantor. The liabilities of a surety or the guarantor to repay the loan of the principal debtor arises only when a default is made by the latter. 21. The words "as well as" in our opinion play a significant role. They confer two different rights but such rights are to be enforced against the same person viz. The industrial concern. Submission of the learned Senior counsel that the second part of Section 29 having not referred to "industrial concern" any property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the financial corporation can be sold, in our opinion cannot be accepted. It is true that Sub-section (1) of Section 29 speaks of guarantee. But such a guarantee is meant to be furnished by the corporation in favour of a third party for the benefit of the industrial concern. It is does not speaks about a surety or guarantee given in favour of the corporation for the benefit of the industrial concern. 10. The petitioner-surety and mortgagor of the petition schedule immovable property, to secure the loan extended to the 6th respondent, cannot be said to be aggrieved by the communication dated 9.1.2008 Annexure- D addressed to the 6th respondent fixing 10 days time to make payment under the OTS scheme. In that view of the matter the reliefs to quash Annexure-D and to direct the 1strespondent to settle the loan account by accepting Rs. 15,69,256/- and release the property, too, must stand rejected. In the result, the writ petition is allowed in part. The communications dated 2.11.2007 and 25.2.2008 Annexures-B and A respectively and the sale notification Annexure-C are quashed. As a consequence the sale deed dated 12.2.2008 Annexure-E executed by the 2nd respondent in favour of the 4th respondent conveying the petition schedule property is declared as null and void. It is unnecessary to state that respondents 1 to 3 shall forthwith refund the sum of Rs. As a consequence the sale deed dated 12.2.2008 Annexure-E executed by the 2nd respondent in favour of the 4th respondent conveying the petition schedule property is declared as null and void. It is unnecessary to state that respondents 1 to 3 shall forthwith refund the sum of Rs. 19 lakhs with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of deposit upto the date of payment, including stamp duty and registration charges paid by the 4th respondent. The Respondent KSFC is at liberty to recover the money due to it by enforcing the security offered by way of mortgage of the petitioner's property in a manner known to law.” 14. In Ormi Textiles and Another vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2008) 5 SCC 194 , as referred by Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, the apex court has while interpreting the distinction between Section 29 and Section 31 of the Act has observed restating the proposition of Karnataka State Financial Corporation vs. N. Narasimahaiah and Others, AIR 2008 SC 1797 as under: “12. Mr. Shrish Kumar Misra, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would contend: (i) Section 29 of the Act although is in two parts, each part thereof is separate and distinct. (ii) Power of the Corporation to sell the property is not confined only to the mortgaged property but the entire industrial unit as the power to redeem the mortgage provides for an additional remedy. 13. Section 29(1) of the Act reads as under: 29. Rights of Financial Corporation in case of default - (1) Where any industrial concern, which is under a liability to the Financial Corporation under an agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or in meeting its obligations in relation to any guarantee given by the Corporation or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation, the Financial Corporation shall have the right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concerns, as well as the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realize the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation. 14. The Act was enacted to provide for the establishment of the State Financial Corporations. Various statutory powers have been conferred upon the Corporation. 14. The Act was enacted to provide for the establishment of the State Financial Corporations. Various statutory powers have been conferred upon the Corporation. It has power to take recourse to various remedies provided under the Act, apart from the terms of the contract entered into by and between it and the borrower as also the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Its power is, thus, required to be exercised reasonably and fairly. The right of the Corporation in the case of a default on the part of the borrower is a statutory power. The provisions of the Act conferring such a power require to undergo a purposive construction. 15. For the purpose of invoking Section 29 of the Act, the borrower must have a liability to the Corporation under an agreement. It must make a default in repayment of any loan or advance, etc. The Corporation in such a situation shall inter-alia have the right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concerns. This power is in addition to the power of the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realize the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Corporation. The right to transfer by way of lease or sale, however, is not an independent right. Only in case of default, such a right can be exercised. We must keep in mind that the powers contained in two parts of Section 29 of the Act are separate and distinct. The power to take over the management is ordinarily exercised when the concern is an ongoing one. But, when a power is conferred to sell the property unilaterally, the same must have a nexus with the mortgaged property. The power to sale cannot be read in isolation. It can also realize the mortgaged property which would mean that when a property had been sold, only the mortgaged property can be realized and not any other property which was not the subject matter of mortgage. What can be transferred by the mortgagee even in terms of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act is the property which was the subject matter of mortgage and not any other. A power to take over the management or possession is a statutory power. What can be transferred by the mortgagee even in terms of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act is the property which was the subject matter of mortgage and not any other. A power to take over the management or possession is a statutory power. As and when the debt is realized, the Corporation would be bound to handover the management or possession of the property, as the case may be, back to the industrial establishment. 16. A mortgagee can have a right to sell a property even under the contract. The same must necessarily mean that the property to be sold is the one over which he has the right, title and interest. A sale without any right would be a nullity. 17. For proper construction of the provisions of the Act, we may notice the provisions of Section 31 thereof. It provides for an additional remedy. Whereas Section 29 confers a power to sale the property unilaterally, Section 31 provides inter-alia for the same power only through the intervention of the court. 18. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act categorically states that the jurisdiction of the District Judge can be invoked for order of sale of the mortgaged or assigned property in favour of the Corporation. Clause (b) thereof provides for transferring the management of the industrial concern. Clauses (aa) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act provide for additional remedies. When an application is filed in terms of Section 31 of the Act, the procedures laid down in Sub-section (1A) of Section 32 of the Act are required to be followed. A further additional remedy has been provided to a Financial Corporation in terms of Section 32G of the Act. 19. We need not dilate on the interpretation of the aforementioned provision as the same is now covered by a decision of this Court in Karnataka State Financial Corporation vs. N. Narasimahaiah and Others, AIR 2008 SC 1797 wherein it was held: 36. While interpreting the provisions of a statute, the court employs different principles or canons. To interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/author. While interpreting the provisions of a statute, the court employs different principles or canons. To interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/author. [See New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Nusli Neville Wadia and Another, AIR 2008 SC 876 ] Attempt on the part of the court while interpreting the provisions of a statute should, therefore, be to pose a question as to why one provision has been amended and the other was not? Why one terminology has been used while inserting a statutory provision and a different clause in another? It is well- known that casus omissus cannot be supplied. [See Ashok Lanka vs. Rishi Dixit, AIR 2005 SC 2821 and J. Srinivasa Rao vs. Govt. of A.P. and Another, 2006 (13) SCALE 27 and Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. vs. Electricity Inspector and E.T.I.O. and Others, AIR 2007 SC 1984 ] 37. The legislative intent, in our opinion, is manifest. The intention of the Parliament in enacting Sections 29 and 31 of the Act was not similar. Whereas Section 29 of the Act consists of the property of the industrial concern, Section 31 takes within its sweep both the property of the industrial concern and as that of the surety. None of the provisions control each other. The Parliament intended to provide an additional remedy for recovery of the amount in favour of the Corporation by proceeding against a surety only in terms of Section 31 of the Act and not under Section 29 thereof. This Court therein has also taken into consideration the interpretative process required to be undertaken for construing the Act keeping in view the fact that right to property is also a human right.” (Emphasis added) 15. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has fairly placed the dichotomy of interpretation in the various decisions of the apex court and attempt by it to find out a meeting point. In this regard, he has placed reliance on Punjab Financial Corporation vs. M/s. Surya Auto Industries, AIR 2010 SC 266 as under: “8. Section 29 of the Act has become subject-matter of consideration in several cases. In this regard, he has placed reliance on Punjab Financial Corporation vs. M/s. Surya Auto Industries, AIR 2010 SC 266 as under: “8. Section 29 of the Act has become subject-matter of consideration in several cases. In Mahesh Chandra vs. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation, (1993) 2 SCC 279 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered whether Respondent-corporation could take possession of the mortgaged property even before disbursement of the sanctioned loan and sell the same without giving opportunity to the borrower to pay off debts or bring a better offer and observed that the corporations deal with public money for public benefit and, therefore their approach has to be public oriented and helpful to the loanee. A helping attitude on the part of the corporation to constantly monitor the working of the industrial concern or units (it may even charge the overhead expenses on this account) would sub-serve the purpose of the loan, object of the Act, and the constitutional objective of economic justice to the needy. 9. The two-Judge Bench then adverted to the scope of Section 29 of the Act and observed: “Section 29 confers very wide power on the corporation to ensure prompt payment by arming it with effective measures to realise the arrears. But the simplicity of the language is not an index of the enormous power stored in it. From notice to pay the arrears, it extends to taking over management and even possession with a right to transfer it by sale.... Power under Section 29 of the Act to take possession of a defaulting unit and transfer it by sale requires the authority to act cautiously, honestly, fairly and reasonably. Default in payment of loan may attract Section 29. But that alone is insufficient either to assume possession or to sell the property. Neither should be resorted to unless it is imperative. Even though no rules appear to have been framed nor any guideline framed by the corporation was placed, yet the basic philosophy enshrined in Section 24 has to be kept in mind. Rationale of action and motive in exercise of it has to be judged in the light of it. Lack of reasonableness or even fairness at either of the two stages renders the take over and transfer invalid. Rationale of action and motive in exercise of it has to be judged in the light of it. Lack of reasonableness or even fairness at either of the two stages renders the take over and transfer invalid. Unfortunately the corporation was guilty of not acting in accordance with law either at the stage of take over or in transferring the unit. Admittedly the entire loan was not disbursed. Need of the capital in the last stages cannot be doubted. If the corporation refused to release the amount at a time when the unit is nearing completion or is ready to start functioning, then it falls short of capital and it is bound to land itself in trouble. This is what happened in this case. The partners did not cooperate and the corporation without any explanation refused to release the full amount. Result was that the Appellant stood pressed on one hand from absence of capital and on the other by recovery proceedings. The corporation, therefore, should honour their commitments of releasing entire loan timely except for very good reasons which should be intimated beforehand to enable the unit holder to comply with shortcomings if any. In its absence of its completion, the proceedings for recovery under Section 29 may not be justified. Similarly various situations may arise which may hamper start of the unit-delay in electric supply or delayed delivery of machinery vital for the functioning of the suit. Such difficulties do require rescheduling of payment of instalment because, if the unit, for reasons beyond the control of unit holder, could not start, then how will the amount be repaid. Endeavour should be to adjust and accommodate as business considerations require the unit to function for benefit, both, of the general public and the corporation. It is not mandatory, as a matter of law, to observe the process of taking over strictly. But if there is no option left and the unit is taken over then its transfer requires not only sincere effect but to act reasonably and fairly.” In paragraph 22 of the judgment, the Court laid down guidelines to be followed by the corporation while exercising power under Section 29 of the Act. 10. A substantially different view was expressed by another two-Judge Bench in U.P. Financial Corporation vs. Gem Cap (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1993) 2 SCC 299 : 1993 (2) AWC 1125 (SC). 10. A substantially different view was expressed by another two-Judge Bench in U.P. Financial Corporation vs. Gem Cap (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1993) 2 SCC 299 : 1993 (2) AWC 1125 (SC). While indicating that the corporation established under the 1951 Act is not like an ordinary money-lender or a bank which lends money and it is a lender with a purpose that is promoting the small and medium industries, the Court observed: “....At the same time, it is necessary to keep certain basic facts in view. The relationship between the corporation and the borrower is that of creditor and debtor. The corporation is not supposed to give loans once and go out of business. It has also to recover them so that it can give fresh loans to Ors. The corporation no doubt has to act within the four corners of the Act and in furtherance of the object underlying the Act. But this factor cannot be carried to the extent of obligating the corporation to revive and resurrect every sick industry irrespective of the cost involved. Promoting industrialisation at the cost of public funds does not serve the public interest; it merely amounts to transferring public money to private account. The fairness required of the corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it. While not insisting upon the borrower to honour the commitments undertaken by him, the corporation alone cannot be shackled hand and foot in the name of fairness. Fairness is not a one way street, more particularly in matters like the present one.... These corporations are not sitting on King Solomon's mines. They too borrow monies from Government or other financial corporations. They too have to pay interest thereon. The fairness required of it must be tempered - nay, determined, in the light of all these circumstances. Indeed, in a matter between the corporation and its debtor, a writ court has to say except in two situations: (1) there is a statutory violation on the part of the corporation or (2) where the corporation acts unfairly i.e. unreasonably. While the former does not present any difficulty, the latter needs a little reiteration of its precise meaning. What does acting unfairly or unreasonably mean? While the former does not present any difficulty, the latter needs a little reiteration of its precise meaning. What does acting unfairly or unreasonably mean? Does it mean that the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can sit as an appellate authority over the acts and deeds of the corporation and seek to correct them? Surely, it cannot be. That is not the function of the High Court under Article 226. Doctrine of fairness, evolved in administrative law was not supposed to convert the writ courts into appellate authorities over administrative authorities. The constraints - self-imposed undoubtedly-of writ jurisdiction still remain. Ignoring them would lead to confusion and uncertainty. The jurisdiction may become rudderless.” (Emphasis added) 16. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has reiterated the plea as raised in the writ petition and submitted that the petitioner did not receive the proper notice that their pledged property would be sold out by public auction through the tender. That apart, unless there is record to show that the mortgagee-corporation exhausted all the processes to realize the due from the borrower, the petitioners as the guarantor were not supposed to be proceeded for recovery of the due. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has also asserted that the mutation proceeding also suffers from illegality as the petitioner did not receive any notice from the revenue officer for purpose of mutation. Further reliance has been placed in respect of symbiotic relation of Sections 29 and 31 of the Act, on a decision of the apex court in Bihar State Financial Corporation vs. Chhotanagpur Minerals and Others, AIR 2009 SC 1471 . The relevant passages are extracted: “16. A mortgagee can have a right to sell a property even under the contract. The same must necessarily mean that the property to be sold is the one over which he has the right, title and interest. A sale without any right would be a nullity. 17. For proper construction of the provisions of the Act, we may notice the provisions of Section 31 thereof. It provides for an additional remedy. Whereas Section 29 confers a power to sale the property unilaterally, Section 31 provides inter-alia for the same power only through the intervention of the court.” 17. Mr. 17. For proper construction of the provisions of the Act, we may notice the provisions of Section 31 thereof. It provides for an additional remedy. Whereas Section 29 confers a power to sale the property unilaterally, Section 31 provides inter-alia for the same power only through the intervention of the court.” 17. Mr. D.R. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the corporation-respondent has emphatically submitted that the writ petition is bad for suppression of material facts inasmuch as it will be apparent from the notice dated 30.11.2009 and the courier receipts, Annexure-K series, that all the petitioners had been informed in unambiguous terms that the efforts made by the corporation to realize the dues from the borrowers and the petitioners are if met with no success, the corporation will have no alternative but to take recourse to the provision of the Act for recovery of dues. He has drawn notice of the court to the following part of the notice dated 30.11.2009. “You may kindly note that the aforesaid action may be proceeded by a notice in the local newspaper indicating the name of the firm, its owners etc. along with the action proposed to be taken.” Thus, Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel has contended that the writ petitioners have suppressed the very material fact that they had received due notice from the respondents No. 1 and 2. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel has further submitted that the borrower is the constituted attorney of the petitioners. Even the deed of mortgage pledging the properties was signed by the borrower as the attorney of the petitioners. The said power of attorney has never been recalled or revoked and as such service on the recognized agent amount to be substantive service. But as the abundant caution, the notice was directly issued on the petitioners on all occasions but they did not take any steps for making the repayment of the outstanding dues. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel has submitted that the sale of the pledged property has been carried out in terms of provisions of Section 29 of the Act and the respondent No. 3 has purchased the property and due letter of sale dated 15.07.2011 was issued in his favour. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel has submitted that the sale of the pledged property has been carried out in terms of provisions of Section 29 of the Act and the respondent No. 3 has purchased the property and due letter of sale dated 15.07.2011 was issued in his favour. Thus, there is no illegality when in place of the previous recorded owners namely Swarnamoyee Datta and Birendra Kishore Datta the respondents No. 3’s name has been entered as the title holder after the mutation proceeding. Under no law, the revenue officer is under any obligation to give notice to the petitioners as they were not shown as the recorded owners but as the permissive possessors. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel has relied a decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court as regards the object of Section 29 of the Act in Jasbir Kaur and Another vs. Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. Chandigarh and Another, AIR 2002 P&H 74 where it has been succinctly held as under: “22. On a perusal of Section 29 it is clear that no provision for the issue of a notice to either the industrial concern or any other person has been made. Still further, in the very nature of things, it appears that the omission to provide for notice etc. is intentional. The purpose is to ensure speedy recovery of public dues. The legislative intent is to secure public funds. The action has to be taken speedily. Loss of time can result in loss to the State Exchequer. Delay can defeat the desired objective. Thus, the Parliament has advisedly omitted to provide for any kind of opportunity. The exclusion of opportunity appears to be intentional. Thus, we desist from reading the principles of natural justice, into the provision. We apply the text literally to the context.” 18. He has asserted that the basic purpose of Section 29 is to ensure a speedy recovery of the public due in order to achieve this objective, the corporation has been given the power to takeover the industrial unit as well as the property which is pledged/mortgaged or hypothecated etc. The provisions are not restricted to the property belonging to the industrial concern. Any property which has been mortgaged or pledged can be taken over. The provisions are not restricted to the property belonging to the industrial concern. Any property which has been mortgaged or pledged can be taken over. Keeping in view the plain language and dominant purpose of the provision, it would be apparent that there is no reason why a restrictive meaning should be given. An interpretation which may defeat the object has to be avoided [See para 14 of Jasbir Kaur (supra)]. In Jasbir Kaur (supra) it has been held further that: “16. We are unable to accept this contention. Section 31 makes a provision for enforcement of claims. It is primarily procedural in nature. In any case, the power under Section 31 is "without prejudice to the provisions of Section 29 of the Act." Thus, the power under Section 29 is available irrespective of the mechanism provided under Section 11. Thus, the contention of the counsel cannot be accepted. 17. Mr. Chadha has relied upon the judgment of their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court in Munnnalal Gupta vs. Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation, AIR 1975 All 416 (FB). Reference has been made to the observations in paragraph 9. 18. On a perusal of the judgment, we find that even in this case it was held by their Lordships that "the right given to the Corporation under Section 29 will extend to the property of the surety also." Thus, the decision does not help the petitioners. Still further, we may notice that in Miss K.T. Sulochana Nair vs. Managing Director, Orissa State Financial Corporation, AIR 1992 Orissa 157, it was inter-alia observed that "there cannot be any fetter on the power of the Corporation under Section 29 to take possession of the property of the surety also." A similar view had also been taken by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Thressiamma Varghese vs. Kerala State Financial Corporation, AIR 1986 Ker 222. 19. Another fact that deserves mention is that petitioner No. 1 is the wife of the promoter and Director of the company. Petitioner No. 2 was one of the three promoters. Even if he is presumed to have withdrawn at a subsequent stage, he still remains the brother of the other two Directors. Everything is a part of the family. To exclude their property would not promote any public interest. 20. Thus, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is rejected. Even if he is presumed to have withdrawn at a subsequent stage, he still remains the brother of the other two Directors. Everything is a part of the family. To exclude their property would not promote any public interest. 20. Thus, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is rejected. It is held that the provisions of Section 29 can be invoked by a State Financial Corporation to take over the property of the industrial concern as well as that of the surety or a Guarantor. Since the petitioners had admittedly mortgaged their property, the action of the Corporation in ordering the taking over of the two houses was absolutely legal and valid.” 19. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel has also placed reliance on the decision of the Kerala High Court in Thressiamma Varghese vs. Kerala State Financial Corporation and Others, AIR 1986 Ker 222 where it has been held inter-alia that: “5. Section 29 lays down the rights of the Corporation in case of default. Sub-section (1) states that "where any industrial concern, which is under a liability to the Financial Corporation under an agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or in meeting its obligations in relation to any guarantee given by the corporation or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation, the Financial Corporation shall have the right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concern, as well as the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realise the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation." The other Sub-sections contain elucidations. Section 30 deals with power to call for repayment before the agreed period. The Corporation will have the power, by appropriate notice, to require the industrial concern, inter-alia, to discharge forthwith in full its liabilities to the Corporation, in cases contemplated in clauses (a) to (f). Section 30 deals with power to call for repayment before the agreed period. The Corporation will have the power, by appropriate notice, to require the industrial concern, inter-alia, to discharge forthwith in full its liabilities to the Corporation, in cases contemplated in clauses (a) to (f). Clause (d) deals with a case where the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Corporation as security for the loan or advance is not insured and kept insured by the industrial concern to the satisfaction of the Corporation or depreciates in value to such an extent that, in the opinion of the Board, further security to the satisfaction of the Board should be given and such security is not given. 6. Section 31 contains special provisions for enforcement of claims by the Financial Corporation, In the case of default of payment or compliance with the terms of agreement or demand under Section 30, without prejudice to the provisions of Section 29 of the Act and Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, any officer of the Corporation, generally or specially authorised by the Board in this behalf, may apply to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on the whole or a substantial part of its business for one or more of the reliefs contemplated in Clauses (a) to (c). Relief contemplated in Clause (a) is for an order for the sale of property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Corporation as security for the loan or advance. Relief in Clause (b) is for transferring the management of the industrial concern to the Corporation. Relief in Clause (c) is for an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plant or equipment from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the Board, where such removal is apprehended. Sub-section (2) states that "an application under Sub-section (1) shall state the nature and extent of the liability of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation, the ground on which it is made and such other particulars as may be prescribed." 19. Reading Sections 29, 31 and 32 together, we have no doubt in our mind that the property secured and not belonging to the industrial concern but belonging to a third party surety or guarantor also could be proceeded against thereunder. Reading Sections 29, 31 and 32 together, we have no doubt in our mind that the property secured and not belonging to the industrial concern but belonging to a third party surety or guarantor also could be proceeded against thereunder. Contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that if that be the legislative intent, the Legislature would have specifically contemplated issue of notice to the third party surety while providing for such notice under Sub-section (4) of Section 32. We have referred to the purpose of the statute and the scheme in Sections 29, 30, 31 and 32. There is nothing therein to indicate that while the Legislature wanted to enable the Corporation to have summary and expeditious remedy (of applying before the District Judge) against the industrial concern, the Legislature intended that in order to recover the amount due from the surety or the property mortgaged, the Corporation should be driven to the dilatory process of a civil suit Condition on accommodation contained in Section 25(2) is to protect the Corporation and thereby to protect public interest. Unless there be express, provision preventing the Corporation from proceeding against the mortgaged property or surety in an application before the District Judge, we are not prepared to read such a restriction on the power of the Corporation There is no such express provision we find nothing in the provisions of the Act from which such a restriction could be implied either. It is true that the section does not specifically lay down that notice should be issued to the guarantor or the surety. But that does not mean that the District Judge cannot issue notice. Ordinarily, District Judge will issue notice and where property not belonging to the industrial concern is to be proceeded against, necessarily notice has to be issued to the person concerned, as otherwise there would be infringement of the audi alteram rule. As observed in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 , the audi alteram rule is a highly effective rule devised by court to enable the statutory authority to arrive at a just decision and is calculated to act as a healthy check on abuse or misuse of power and it implies the duty to act fairly, though it can be excluded in appropriate cases. The audi alteram rule should be read by implication in the provision. 20. The audi alteram rule should be read by implication in the provision. 20. We are fortified in this conclusion by the observations made by the Supreme Court in Director of Industries, U.P. vs. Deep Chand, AIR 1980 SC 801 while repelling the challenge based on Article 14 of the Constitution against Section 3 of the U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1965. That provision enabled the State Government or the Corporation to recover the amount due as arrears of land revenue. The Supreme Court observed: "The loans are advanced from out of the funds of the State in which all the people of the State are vitally interested. Moneys advanced by the State Government have got to be recovered expeditiously so that fresh advances may be made to others who have not yet received financial assistance from the State Government. If the State Government should resort to a remedy by way of a suit on the mortgage deeds or bonds executed in its favour, the realization of the amounts due to the Government is bound to be delayed resulting in non-availability of sufficient funds in the hands of the State Government for advancing fresh loans. It is with the object of avoiding the usual delay involved in the disposal of suits in civil courts and providing for an expeditious remedy, the Act has been enacted." On this basis, the Supreme Court held that there was a reasonable basis for the classification made by the statute and the classification has a reasonable relation to the object of the statute.” 20. Mahesh Chandra vs. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation and Others, AIR 1993 SC 935 has been relied by Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel to show that the powers under Section 29 of the Act may be exercised in conformity to what has been observed by the apex court, which reads as under: “22. Keeping these various factors giving rise to conflicting interest the following directions are necessary to be issued to be observed by the Corporation while exercising power under Section 29: Every endeavour should be made, to make the unit viable and be put on working condition. If it becomes unworkable: (1) Sale of a unit should always be made by public auction. If it becomes unworkable: (1) Sale of a unit should always be made by public auction. (2) Valuation of a unit for purposes of determining adequacy of offer or for determining if bid offered was adequate, should always be intimated to the unit holder to enable him to file objection if any as he is vitally interested in getting the maximum price. (3) If tenders are invited then the highest price on which tender is to be accepted must be intimated to the unit holder. (4)(a) If unit holder is willing to offer the sale price, as the tenderer, then he should be offered same facility and unit should be transferred to him. And the arrears remaining thereafter should be rescheduled to be recovered in instalments with interest after the payment of last instalment fixed under the agreement entered into as a result of tendered amount. (b) If he brings third parties with higher offer it would be tested and may be accepted. (5) Sale by private negotiation should be permitted only in very large concerns where investment runs in very huge amount for which ordinary buyer may not be available or the industry itself may be or such nature that by normal buyers may not be available. But before taking such steps there should be advertisements not only in daily newspapers but business magazines and papers. (6) Request of the unit holder to release any part of the property on which the concern is not standing of which he is the owner should normally be granted on condition that sale proceeds shall be deposited in loan account. 21. Despite the constructive knowledge, neither the borrower nor the guarantors came forward to offer the price as was tendered by the respondent No. 3. Even in the writ petition, the respondent No. 4 did not raise such plea. The procedure for purpose of exercising the powers under Section 29 had scrupulously followed the respondents No. 1 and 2 in terms of Mahesh Chandra (supra). Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel in order to repel the submission made by Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has placed his reliance on Karnataka State Industrial Investment and Development Corporation Ltd. vs. S.K.K. Kulkarni and Others, 2009 AIR SCW 1255 where the apex court has dwelled on the interplay of Section 29 and 31 of the Act in the manner as under: “7. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has placed his reliance on Karnataka State Industrial Investment and Development Corporation Ltd. vs. S.K.K. Kulkarni and Others, 2009 AIR SCW 1255 where the apex court has dwelled on the interplay of Section 29 and 31 of the Act in the manner as under: “7. The right of a State Financial Corporation ("SFC" for short) recognized under Section 29 of the 1951 Act is different from the right which the SFC can enforce under Section 31. Section 31 enables SFC, without having recourse to the provisions of Section 29 of the 1951 Act or Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, to have its right emanating from the agreement, enforced by initiating proceedings contemplated thereunder, namely, applying to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on its business. Section 31 is one mode of recovery. Therefore, the power under Section 31 and Section 32 are in addition to the power of realization of money under the Transfer of Property Act or any other law. It is within the discretion of SFC to choose the forum under a particular Act. Once there is a default in the payment of loan, it is for the Corporation to decide as to whether it shall proceed under Section 29 for sale of the property mortgaged or whether it shall take any recourse under Section 31 of the 1951 Act. Section 31 of the Act had been enacted to enable the corporation to obtain quicker remedies from the highest Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction in the locality. Where the SFC takes recourse to the provisions of Section 31 of the Act and obtains an order from the Court, it shall ordinarily seek its enforcement in the manner provided for by Section 32 of the 1951 Act, which section is aimed to act in aid of the orders passed under Section 31 of the Act. Where the SFC takes recourse to Section 31 and obtains an order from the Court, it shall seek its enforcement in the manner provided for by Section 32 of the Act, therefore, Section 31 makes a provision for enforcement of claims. It is primarily procedural in nature. Where the SFC takes recourse to Section 31 and obtains an order from the Court, it shall seek its enforcement in the manner provided for by Section 32 of the Act, therefore, Section 31 makes a provision for enforcement of claims. It is primarily procedural in nature. The remedy provided for under Section 31 is not in derogation of any other mode of recovery which is available to the SFC under any other law for the enforcement of its claims. The remedy under Section 31 is not the sole or exclusive remedy available to the SFC. It is only an additional remedy which is conferred upon the SFC. The substantive relief in an application under Section 31(1) is not a plaint. This is clear from the form of the application, the nature of the relief, the compulsion to make interim order, the limited enquiry contemplated by Section 32(6), the nature of the relief that can be granted and the method of execution. The proceedings under Section 32 of the 1951 Act are, therefore, nothing but execution proceedings. A combined reading of Section 31 and Section 32 of the 1951 Act indicates that an investigation has to be made to find out the terms and conditions on which loan was given by SFC to the industrial concern and whether SFC was entitled to the relief under Section 31(1) on account of the breech of the terms of agreement. 8. Having discussed the nature of the proceedings under Section 31(1) of the 1951 Act we are of the view that Section 31 read with Section 32 constitutes a Code by itself. It is a special provision. It is a mode of recovery. It does not prevent or exclude the SFC from invoking any other remedy open to it in law. However, once the SFC invokes Section 31(1), it has to proceed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 32. Under Section 31(1), which is invoked by the SFC in this case, an application to obtain quicker remedy has to be made to the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the industrial concern is located. This is the mandate of Section 31(1). It is so mandated because wide powers are given to the District Judge under Sections 31 and 32 to attach, sell and recover outstanding dues of SFCs in the shortest possible time. This is the mandate of Section 31(1). It is so mandated because wide powers are given to the District Judge under Sections 31 and 32 to attach, sell and recover outstanding dues of SFCs in the shortest possible time. In fact, sub-section (aa) stood inserted in Section 31(1) for enforcing the liability of any surety. This sub-section is in addition to the power given to the District Judge to order sale of the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the SFC as security for loan or advance. An application under Section 31 can be filed even before the exercise of power under Section 29 of the 1951 Act or Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act.” (Emphasis added) 22. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 did not contest the position of facts that the pledged property belonged to the petitioners as the legal representative of Akshay Kr. Das since deceased who purchased that property from the recorded owners. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel has further submitted that the petitioners even did not make any statement in the writ petition that they would make repayment of the outstanding loan amount, even though they had been served with notice for making the repayment as the borrower was found to be defaulter in payment. As such, the petitioner did not approach this court with clean hands and hence this court may not exercise its jurisdiction on technical grounds on considering that the sale is completed on demarcation of the land and the possession has been handed over to the respondent No. 3 on 15.07.2011. 23. Mr. B.N. Majumder and Mr. R. Saha, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 4 have submitted that the real borrowers are the petitioners inasmuch as the said loan for purchasing the vehicle even though was obtained in the name of the respondent No. 4 for livelihood of the petitioner No. 1. Even the respondent No. 4 had been constituted as their attorney for purpose of this loan. As such, the pledged property has been mortgaged by the real borrower. That apart, Mr. Majumder and Mr. Saha, learned counsel have submitted that the said vehicle was sold out by the corporation and the sale proceeds has been adjusted against the outstanding. Mr. Even the respondent No. 4 had been constituted as their attorney for purpose of this loan. As such, the pledged property has been mortgaged by the real borrower. That apart, Mr. Majumder and Mr. Saha, learned counsel have submitted that the said vehicle was sold out by the corporation and the sale proceeds has been adjusted against the outstanding. Mr. Saha, learned counsel has also referred to S.K.K. Kulkarni (supra) to contend that the corporation can exercise its power in view of the agreement of the loan and the stipulations made therein under Section 31 of the Act without having recourse to the provisions of Section 29 of the Act or Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act. He has emphatically submitted that once there is default in the payment of loan it is for the corporation to decide as to whether it shall proceed under Section 29 for sale of the property mortgaged or whether it shall take any recourse under Section 31 of the Act. He has also submitted that the apex court in no unequivocal words has enunciated that sub-section (aa) stood inserted in Section 31(1) for enforcing the liability of any surety. According to the apex court, the word ‘may’ in Section 31(1) only indicates a particular mode of recovery in addition to any other mode available to the corporation in law. 24. Mr. K.K. Roy, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3, the purchaser, has submitted that there is no infirmity in the process and the respondent No. 3 has purchased the pledged property bona fide and he has participated in the auction sale by submitting the bid quoting his rate for purchasing the pledged property. Having been adjudged the most suitable bidder he was allowed to purchase the pledged property. Mr. K.K. Roy, learned counsel has further contended that Sections 29 and 31 of the Act provides two alternative modes to be adopted by the corporation at their auction. Mr. Roy, learned counsel almost revervated what Lord Dunedid spoke in Attorney General vs. Milne, 1914 All ER 1061 : 1914 AC 765. Mr. K.K. Roy, learned counsel has further contended that Sections 29 and 31 of the Act provides two alternative modes to be adopted by the corporation at their auction. Mr. Roy, learned counsel almost revervated what Lord Dunedid spoke in Attorney General vs. Milne, 1914 All ER 1061 : 1914 AC 765. For purpose of reference the relevant passage from Milne (supra) is reproduced herein-below: “Now, prima-facie one would expect that the scope of the two sets of provisions would be the same, i.e., in other words that the question must be answered as to those kinds of property which are swept in by Section 2, just as much as to those which fall under Section 1. Inasmuch, however, as this is a taxing statute, and the duty here is an additional duty, I consider that it must be shown that the words would clearly cover the individual case to which it is right to apply them.” 25. There is no dispute that the process adopted for sale of the pledged property was in exercise for powers under Section 29 of the Act. The apex court in Bihar State Financial Corporation vs. Chhotanagpur Minerals and Others, AIR 2009 SC 1471 has lucidly interpreted the extent and interplay of Section 29 and 30 of the Act in the passages as extracted hereunder: “16. Sections 29 and 30 of the Act read as under: 29. Rights of Financial Corporation in case of default - (1) Where any industrial concern, which is under a liability to the Financial Corporation under an agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or in meeting its obligations in relation to any guarantee given by the Corporation or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation, the Financial Corporation shall have the right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concern, as well as the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realise the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation. (2) Any transfer of property made by the Financial Corporation, in exercise of its powers under Sub-section (1), shall vest in the transferee all rights in or to the property transferred as if the transfer had been made by the owner of the property. (2) Any transfer of property made by the Financial Corporation, in exercise of its powers under Sub-section (1), shall vest in the transferee all rights in or to the property transferred as if the transfer had been made by the owner of the property. (3) The Financial Corporation shall have the same rights and powers with respect to goods manufactured or produced wholly or partly from goods forming part of the security held by it as it had with respect to the original goods. (4) Where any action has been taken against an industrial concern under the provisions of Sub-section (1), all costs, charges and expenses which in the opinion of the Financial Corporation have been properly incurred by it as incidental thereto shall be recoverable from the industrial concern and the money which is received by it shall, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, be held by it in trust to be applied firstly, in payment of such costs, charges, and expenses and, secondly, in discharge of the debt due to the Financial Corporation and the residue of the money so received shall be paid to the person entitled thereto. (5) Where the Financial Corporation has taken any action against an industrial concern under the provisions of Sub-section (1), the Financial Corporation shall be deemed to be the owner of such concern, for the purposes of suits by or against the concern, and shall sue and sued in the name of the concern. 30. Power to call for repayment before agreed period. 30. Power to call for repayment before agreed period. Notwithstanding anything in any agreement to the contrary, the Financial Corporation may, by notice in writing, require any industrial concern to which it has granted any loan or advance to discharge forthwith in full its liabilities to the Financial Corporation:- (a) if it appears to the Board that false or misleading information in any material particular was given by the industrial concern in its application for the loan or advance; (b) if the industrial concern has failed to comply with the terms of its contract with the Financial Corporation in the matter of the loan or advance; (c) if there is a reasonable apprehension that the industrial concern is unable to pay its debts or that proceedings for liquidation may be commenced in respect thereof; (d) if the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation as security for the loan or advance is not insured and kept insured by the industrial concern to the satisfaction of the Financial Corporation or depreciates in value to such an extent that, in the opinion of the Board, further security to the satisfaction of the Board should be given and such security is not given; (e) if, without the permission of the Board, any machinery, plant or other equipment, whether forming part of the security or otherwise, is removed from the premises of the industrial concern without being replaced; (f) if for any reason it is necessary to protect the interests of the Financial Corporation. 17. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions would clearly go to show that the statutory power vested in the Corporation must be exercised only in respect of the properties which were mortgaged. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Ormi Textiles and Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 2008 SC 2177 , holding: 15. For the purpose of invoking Section 29 of the Act, the borrower must have a liability to the Corporation under an agreement. It must make a default in repayment of any loan or advance, etc. The Corporation in such a situation shall inter-alia have the right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concerns. For the purpose of invoking Section 29 of the Act, the borrower must have a liability to the Corporation under an agreement. It must make a default in repayment of any loan or advance, etc. The Corporation in such a situation shall inter-alia have the right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concerns. This power is in addition to the power of the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realize the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Corporation. The right to transfer by way of lease or sale, however, is not an independent right. Only in case of default, such a right can be exercised. We must keep in mind that the powers contained in two parts of Section 29 of the Act are separate and distinct. The power to take over the management is ordinarily exercised when the concern is an ongoing one. But, when a power is conferred to sell the property unilaterally, the same must have a nexus with the mortgaged property. The power to sale cannot be read in isolation. It can also realize the mortgaged property which would mean that when a property had been sold, only the mortgaged property can be realized and not any other property which was not the subject matter of mortgage. What can be transferred by the mortgagee even in terms of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act is the property which was the subject matter of mortgage and not any other. A power to take over the management or possession is a statutory power. As and when the debt is realized, the Corporation would be bound to handover the management or possession of the property, as the case may be, back to the industrial establishment. 16. A mortgagee can have a right to sell a property even under the contract. The same must necessarily mean that the property to be sold is the one over which he has the right, title and interest. A sale without any right would be a nullity. 17. For proper construction of the provisions of the Act, we may notice the provisions of Section 31 thereof. It provides for an additional remedy. Whereas Section 29 confers a power to sale the property unilaterally, Section 31 provides inter-alia for the same power only through the intervention of the court. 18. 17. For proper construction of the provisions of the Act, we may notice the provisions of Section 31 thereof. It provides for an additional remedy. Whereas Section 29 confers a power to sale the property unilaterally, Section 31 provides inter-alia for the same power only through the intervention of the court. 18. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act categorically states that the jurisdiction of the District Judge can be invoked for order of sale of the mortgaged or assigned property in favour of the Corporation. Clause (b) thereof provides for transferring the management of the industrial concern. Clauses (aa) and (c) of Sub- section (1) of Section 31 of the Act provide for additional remedies. When an application is filed in terms of Section 31 of the Act, the procedures laid down in Sub-section (1A) of Section 32 of the Act are required to be followed. A further additional remedy has been provided to a Financial Corporation in terms of Section 32G of the Act.” 26. It is to be noted here that the corporation did not exercise its power against the borrower under Section 31 of the Act. They have exercised the power in respect of the properties which are mortgaged to liquidate the liability that emerged for default in making repayment of the loan. Such power has been invoked after sale of the hypothecated vehicle, for purchase of which the loan was obtained. The corporation being the mortgagee had right to sell the property under the contract. The preliminary ground of objection as raised by the petitioners is that they were not given notice and they were not afforded with any opportunity to respond appropriately and hence the entire action is arbitrary. On scrutiny of the records it has transpired that even before publication of the notice in the newspapers, the petitioners were given due notice on what and how the corporation would act if the outstanding due was not liquidated [see Annexure-K series to the additional affidavit filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2]. Thus, this objection does not hold any substance. The further objection that has been raised is that unless the properties of the borrower are liquidated, the pledged property cannot be sold out for purpose of realizing the due. In this case, two aspects cannot be oblivious of. Thus, this objection does not hold any substance. The further objection that has been raised is that unless the properties of the borrower are liquidated, the pledged property cannot be sold out for purpose of realizing the due. In this case, two aspects cannot be oblivious of. (1) The apex court has categorically held that in exercise of power under Section 29 of the Act the corporation only can take over the pledged property or its management and sell it out but they cannot act against any other property not pledged. (2) In this case, the vehicle which was hypothecated was sold first and thereafter power under Section 29 of the Act was invoked by the corporation. Hence, there is no apparent infirmity if Section 29 extends for sale of the pledged property of the industrial concern. But the contention that if the borrower’s properties are not attached or sold, the guarantors or surety’s properties cannot be acted upon is unsustainable in law. The law has been laid down by a Division Bench of this court in Binoy Bhattacharjee vs. State of Tripura and Others [judgment and order dated 29.04.2014 delivered in W.P. (C) No. 414 of 2013]. In that decision Amulya Lal Chowdhury (supra) has been held not to be a correct exposition of law. It has been held in Binoy Bhattacharjee (supra) as under: 15. Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 provides that, “The liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract.” Therefore, unless it has been demonstrated that the contract of the guarantee provides or embodies a clause to the effect that if the banks or the financial institutions fail to recover the outstanding loan amount from the borrower after selling the hypothecated and/or mortgaged property of the borrower then only the guarantor can be saddled with liability, the liability stands squarely co-extensive with that of the principal debtor. Even in Amulya Lal Chowdhury (supra) a distinction has been sought to be made between the surety and the guarantor in the following manner: “...there is also difference between surety and the guarantor as the surety is usually bound with its principal borrower by the same instrument, executed at the same time and on the same consideration and he is the original promisor and debtor from the beginning and is held ordinarily to every known default of his principal and the contract of guarantor is bound by his own separate undertaking, in which the borrower principal does not join and he is only liable as and when the borrower-principal who is primarily liable for repayment of the loan amount fails to comply his act of agreement....” This distinction is again, in the considered opinion of this court, contrary to the provisions of Sections 126 and 127 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 16. Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act provides that: “A contract or guarantee is a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called the ‘surety’ the person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given is called the ‘principal debtor’ and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the creditor. A guarantee may be either oral or written.” But, consideration for guarantee has been provided in Section 127 of the Indian Contract Act, which provides that: “Anything done, or any promise made, for the benefit of the principal debtor, may be a sufficient consideration to the surety for giving the guarantee.” 17. In Syndicate Bank vs. Vijay Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1066 , the apex court has enumerated the law as under: “It is well settled that bank guarantee is an autonomous contract. It is in common parlance that the issuance of guarantee is what a guarantor creates to discharge liability when the principal debtor fails in his duty and guarantee is in the nature of collateral agreement to answer for the debt.” 18. It is in common parlance that the issuance of guarantee is what a guarantor creates to discharge liability when the principal debtor fails in his duty and guarantee is in the nature of collateral agreement to answer for the debt.” 18. In Industrial Finance Corporation of India vs. Cannonore Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. (2002) 5 SCC 54 , the apex court has further held that: “Contract of guarantee does not provide any contra-note pertaining to the liability of the surety so as to create an exception within the meaning of section 128 of the Indian Contract Act.” 19. In view of this, we are in respectful disagreement to the law as enunciated by the Gauhati High Court in Amulya Lal Chowdhury (supra). According to us, this is not a correct position of law. The correct position of law is that the guarantors’/sureties’ liability is co-extensive and co-terminus with that of the principal debtor unless it is otherwise excepted by the contract. 20. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 20, paragraph 159 at page 87, it has been illustrated that “it is not necessary for the creditor, before proceeding against the surety, to request the principal debtor to pay, or to sue him, although solvent, unless this is expressly stipulated for.” 21. In Chitty on Contracts, 24th Edition, Volume 2 at page 1031, paragraph 4831, it has been observed that “Conditions precedent to liability of surety. Prima facie the surety may be proceeded against without demand against him, and without first proceeding against the principal debtor.” 22. The term “co-extensive” has been defined by Polock & Mulla in their celebrated book, ‘Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act’ Tenth Edition, at page 728 as under: “A surety's liability to pay the debt is not removed by reason of the creditor's omission to sue the principal debtor. The creditor is not bound to exhaust his remedy against the principal before suing the surety and a suit may be maintained against the surety though the principal has not been sued.” 23. The creditor is not bound to exhaust his remedy against the principal before suing the surety and a suit may be maintained against the surety though the principal has not been sued.” 23. In Bank of Bihar Ltd. vs. Damodar Prasad and Another, (1969) 1 SCR 620 , the apex court has referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Lachhman Joharimal vs. Bapu Khandu and Tukaram Khandoji, (1869) 6 Bombay High Court Reports 241, where it has been unequivocally held as under: “The court is of opinion that a creditor is not bound to exhaust his remedy against the principal debtor before suing the surety and that when a decree is obtained against a surety, it may be enforced in the same manner as a decree for any other debt.” The apex court has further held in Damodar Prasad (supra) that: “The very object of the guarantee is defeated if the creditor is asked to postpone his remedies against the surety. In the present case the creditor is a banking company. A guarantee is a collateral security usually taken by a banker. The security will become useless if his rights against the surety can be so easily cut down.” (Emphasis added) 24. In State Bank of India vs. M/s. Indexport Registered and Others, AIR 1992 SC 1740 , the apex court has held that, “the decree holder bank can execute the decree against the guarantor without proceeding against the principal borrower. Guarantor’s liability is coextensive with that of the principal debtor”. The apex court has further observed in M/s. Indexport Registered (supra) that, “the execution of the money decree is not made dependent on first applying for execution of the mortgage decree. The choice is left entirely with the decree holder. The question arises, whether a decree which is framed as a composite decree as a matter of law, must be executed against the mortgaged property first or can a money decree, which covers whole or part of the decretal amount covering mortgage decree can be executed earlier. There is nothing in law which provides such a composite decree to be first executed only against the principal debtor.” In M/s. Indexport Registered (supra) it has been further observed that “the liability of the surety is co-extensive with the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract.” 25. There is nothing in law which provides such a composite decree to be first executed only against the principal debtor.” In M/s. Indexport Registered (supra) it has been further observed that “the liability of the surety is co-extensive with the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract.” 25. In Ram Kishun and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2012) 11 SCC 511 , the apex court has re-enunciated the law. For purpose of appreciation, the relevant part of the judgment is reproduced hereunder: 10. There can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition of law that in view of the provisions of Section 128 of the Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter called “the Contract Act”), the liability of the guarantor/surety is coextensive with that of the debtor. Therefore, the creditor has a right to obtain a decree against the surety and the principal debtor. The surety has no right to restrain execution of the decree against him until the creditor has exhausted his remedy against the principal debtor for the reason that it is the business of the surety/guarantor to see whether the principal debtor has paid or not. The surety does not have a right to dictate terms to the creditor as to how he should make the recovery and pursue his remedies against the principal debtor at his instance. (Vide Bank of Bihar Ltd. vs. Damodar Prasad, AIR 1969 SC 297 , Maharashtra SEB vs. Official Liquidator, AIR 1982 SC 1497 , Union Bank of India vs. Manku Narayana, AIR 1987 SC 1078 and SBI vs. Messrs. Indexport Registered, AIR 1992 SC 1740 ). 11. In SBI vs. Saksaria Sugar Mills Ltd. (1986) 2 SCC 145 , this Court while considering the provisions of Section 128 of the Contract Act held that liability of a surety is immediate and is not deferred until the creditor exhausts his remedies against the principal debtor. (See also: Industrial Investment Bank of India Ltd. vs. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala, (2009) 9 SCC 478 and United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 . 12. Section 146 of the Contract Act provides that co-sureties are liable to contribute equally. Thus, in case there are more than one surety/guarantor, they have to share the liability equally unless the agreement of contract provides otherwise. (Emphasis added) 26. 12. Section 146 of the Contract Act provides that co-sureties are liable to contribute equally. Thus, in case there are more than one surety/guarantor, they have to share the liability equally unless the agreement of contract provides otherwise. (Emphasis added) 26. In view of the law as crystalised by the apex court, the liability of the guarantor is co-extensive with that of the debtor. Therefore, the creditor can realise the outstanding loan from the guarantor without exhausting the remedy against the principal debtor. As such we do not find any illegality or arbitrariness in the action of the Bank-respondents. As such, this writ petition merits no consideration at all. It is further held that this court should not exercise the jurisdiction as conferred on it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the nature of disputes as projected in this petition.” 27. The other objection as raised by the petitioners that mutation of record of rights by recording the respondent No. 3 as the holder of title without notice to the petitioners is unsustainable, as the admitted position is that the petitioners were never recorded in the record of rights as the holder of the title. When their names appeared as the permissive possessors and such entry was never challenged, the mutation order cannot be held irregular. If the petitioners had any grievance, they have their remedy under the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960. 28. Thus the substantial objection whether under Section 29 of the Act the pledged property of the surety can be sold out by the corporation, now calls for consideration of this court. 29. Section 2(c) has defined the industrial concern with wide magnitude and within its definition the service through ‘transport’ is also embraced. Two decisions of Kerala High Court and Punjab & Haryana High Court viz. Thressiamma Varghese (supra) and Jasbir Kaur (supra) have clearly held that the pledged property of the surety can be sold out invoking the powers as provided by Section 29 of the Act but the apex court in N. Narasimahaiah (supra) has clearly held that the legislative intent is manifest. The Parliament enacted Sections 29 and 31 of the Act for different purposes and those are not mutually exclusive. The Parliament enacted Sections 29 and 31 of the Act for different purposes and those are not mutually exclusive. It has been clearly held by the apex court in N. Narasimahaiah (supra) that Section 29 of the Act deals with the property of the industrial concern, whereas Section 31 takes within its sweep both the property of the industrial concern and of the surety. None of the provisions controls each other. Parliament intended to provide additional regional remedy for recovery of the amount in favour of the corporation. For proceeding against the surety only Section 31 of the Act can be invoked or pressed and not Section 29. Though the apex court in S.K.K. Kulkarni (supra) has impliedly advanced a different proposition but the proposition of N. Narasimahaiah (supra) has not been debased in any manner and as such this court is bound by the said proposition that the pledged property of the surety cannot be sold out in a process commenced under Section 29 of the Act and as such the sale of the pledged property was not in accordance with the due process of law. Hence, it is declared that the sale in pursuance to the sale notice dated 05.07.2010, Annexure-2 to the writ petition in respect of the land as described therein is set aside. But no consequential relief would follow right at this stage. The respondents No. 1 and 2 are given 8(eight) months time to take appropriate action in respect of the pledged property, meaning they may take action in terms of Section 31 of the said Act in the court of the competent jurisdiction within the said time. The status quo as on today shall be maintained in respect of the land by the petitioners and the respondent No. 3 till determination. It is further stated that if the court of the competent jurisdiction passed an order for sale of the pledged property the sale as declared unlawful would be restituted without any further process or execution in favour of the respondent No. 3. If for any reason the order of sale is not issued by the court of the competent jurisdiction under Section 31(1), the respondent No. 3 shall be entitled to interest @ 12% per annum over the consideration amount he deposited to the respondents No. 1 and 2 w.e.f. 15.07.2011 till realization. If for any reason the order of sale is not issued by the court of the competent jurisdiction under Section 31(1), the respondent No. 3 shall be entitled to interest @ 12% per annum over the consideration amount he deposited to the respondents No. 1 and 2 w.e.f. 15.07.2011 till realization. Moreover, in that event, the respondent No. 3 would be entitled to a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakh) from the respondent No. 2. The consequence of declaration as made hereunder would only follow after the proceeding under Section 31 of the Act is over or if the respondents No. 1 and 2 did not approach the competent court in view of the above observation. It is made further clear that if the respondents No. 1 and 2 do not approach the competent court under Section 31 of the Act, the respondent No. 3 would be entitled to refund of the entire consideration money with interest @ 12% per annum w.e.f. 15.07.2011 till realization and the said lump-sum compensation. If within the stipulated period the respondents No. 1 and 2 did not approach the competent court such payment shall be made in favour of the respondent No. 3 within three months from the day of expiry of the said 8(eight) months. The same timeframe of 3(three) months shall follow in case the respondents No. 1 and 2 failed to obtain the order of sale from the competent court the proceeding under Section 31 of the said Act. In that case, the date of final order would be the effective date for imposing the said timeframe. 30. With this observation and direction this writ petition is allowed to the extent as indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.