JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Pradeep Kumar Pandey, Advocate for petitioners and Sri Harish Chandra Mishra, Advocate for respondents. 2. This writ petition has been filed by Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (hereinafter referred to as the “BSNL”) and its authorities, assailing an interim order dated 12.8.2016 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the “Tribunal”) in Original Application (hereinafter referred to as the “O.A.”) No. 1053 of 2016. 3. Respondent-1, Sri Adesh Kumar Gupta, is an Officer of Indian Telecom Services (hereinafter referred to as the “ITS”) and came to be posted in BSNL after its creation in 2001. It is said that he remained posted at NOIDA from time to time, i.e., 1.5.2001 to 30.11.2001, 1.4.2003 to 31.1.2004, 3.12.2006 to 29.6.2008, 1.4.2009 to 14.9.2009 and lastly from 8.11.2013 to 16.5.2016. The name of Respondent-1 was included in Agreed List 2015, prepared, of the officers likely to be transferred. It was circulated by BSNL Head Quarters to Senior General Manager (Personnel), New Delhi vide letter dated 24.4.2015. On 24.7.2015, an order of transfer was issued transferring Respondent-1 from NOIDA, U.P. West Circle to Meerut, U.P. West Circle. 4. The aforesaid order was challenged by Respondent-1 in O.A. No. 330/00994/2015 under Section 19 of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1985”) and by order dated 31.7.2015, Tribunal found that against existing policy of transferring persons after four years, Respondent-1 was sought to be transferred within a period of less than two years and consequently stayed the same. 5. Petitioners put in appearance and filed counter-affidavit alongwith stay vacation application. Tribunal, from pleadings, found that Respondent-1 had also made out a case that impugned transfer was to accommodate one Arun Kumar who was impleaded as Respondent-3 in aforesaid O.A. as also against the policy of Government that there shall not be any punitive transfer unless there is sufficient material or conclusion that an officer is lacking integrity. By order dated 21.8.2015, Tribunal rejected stay vacation application and confirmed interim order dated 31.7.2015. Petitioners thereafter without having final adjudication on the validity of transfer order dated 24.7.2015,, on their own, cancelled order of transfer vide order dated 10.5.2016 and thereafter, simultaneously passed another order within a gap of two days i.e. on 12.5.2016 transferring Respondent-1 to Dehradun and retaining Arun Kumar in place of Respondent-1. 6. Petitioners thereafter without having final adjudication on the validity of transfer order dated 24.7.2015,, on their own, cancelled order of transfer vide order dated 10.5.2016 and thereafter, simultaneously passed another order within a gap of two days i.e. on 12.5.2016 transferring Respondent-1 to Dehradun and retaining Arun Kumar in place of Respondent-1. 6. Respondent-1 moved a miscellaneous application before Tribunal challenging order dated 12.5.2016 and this order of transfer was also stayed by Tribunal. Petitioners challenged this order of stay before this Court in Writ Petition No. 26022 of 2016 on the ground that O.A., whereby transfer order dated 24.7.2015 was challenged, rendered infructuous when transfer order was cancelled on 10.5.2016, hence it was not permissible for Tribunal to subsequently entertain miscellaneous application assailing subsequent transfer order dated 12.5.2016. This Court vide order dated 30.5.2016 disposed of the writ petition by directing Tribunal to take a final decision in O.A. as well as miscellaneous application, on the next date fixed which was 31.5.2016. Tribunal looked into the matter and found that there was an attempt on the part of BSNL and its authorities to play hide and seek by withdrawing transfer order dated 24.5.2015, which was stayed by Tribunal, so as to technically render O.A. infructuous and simultaneously passing a new order of transfer on 12.5.2016. Tribunal found that both these orders are interconnected, hence O.A. could have been amended challenging subsequent orders and granted opportunity to Respondent-1 to do needful and fixed matter on 7.7.2016 extending interim order to continue. 7. Again BSNL and its authorities came to this Court in Writ Petition No. 28675 of 2016. Learned counsel for the parties were heard on 6.7.2016 and this Court recorded statement of counsel for Respondent-1 that, by order dated 10.5.2016, whereby transfer order dated 24.7.2016 has been revoked, O.A. has rendered infructuous, then Respondent-1 is entitled to file fresh O.A. against subsequent order dated 12.5.2016 and he may do so by filing a fresh case to challenge subsequent order dated 12.5.2016. Writ Petition to this limited extent was allowed vide judgment dated 6.7.2016. 8. In these facts and circumstances, Respondent-1 filed O.A. No. 330/1053/2016 challenging second transfer order dated 12.5.2016 which was passed after withdrawing earlier transfer order dated 24.7.2015 vide order dated 10.5.2016. 9. Writ Petition to this limited extent was allowed vide judgment dated 6.7.2016. 8. In these facts and circumstances, Respondent-1 filed O.A. No. 330/1053/2016 challenging second transfer order dated 12.5.2016 which was passed after withdrawing earlier transfer order dated 24.7.2015 vide order dated 10.5.2016. 9. In the meantime, though interim order of Tribunal was continuing, since this Court decided second writ petition, i.e., Writ Petition No. 28675 of 2016 filed by petitioners-BSNL on 6.7.2016 still BSNL Authorities passed order on 16.5.2016 declaring that Respondent-1 stands relieved and struck off from the strength of U.P. West Telecom Circle with instruction to report to Chief General Manager (Telecom), Dehradun. 10. Tribunal in second O.A. filed by Respondent-1, in the above facts and circumstances, found that by rendering earlier O.A. infructuous by withdrawing earlier order of transfer which was stayed by Tribunal, whereby Respondent-1 was transferred from NOIDA to Meerut and passing almost simultaneous another order on 12.5.2016, transferring Respondent-1 from NOIDA to Dehradun, but continued to accommodate Arun Kumar at NOIDA, this time also, it seems to be a case of clever and tactical move on the part of BSNL and its authorities and having said so, Tribunal stayed transfer order dated 12.5.2016 as well as relieving order dated 16.5.2016. This interim order dated 12.8.2016 passed by Tribunal has been challenged in this writ petition by BSNL and its authorities. 11. Learned counsel for petitioners contended that transfer is an incidence of service. Respondent-1 was in Agreed List 2015 which used to be prepared in the light of guidelines issued by BSNL Corporate Office. Under the instructions of Vigilance Head of BSNL, posts have been identified as sensitive and non-sensitive. NOIDA has been classified as sensitive where Respondent-1 was posted. He was to be transferred and shifted to a “non-sensitive post” for the reason that his name appeared in Agreed List 2015 which is prepared in respect of officers supposed to be transferred on non-sensitive posts. It is contended that in the matter of transfer, Tribunal ought not to have interfered and interim order passed by Tribunal is patently illegal. Reliance is placed on this Court’s decision in Dr. Krishna Chandra Dubey v. Union of India, 2005 (6) AWC 6017. 12. Learned counsel appearing for Respondent-1, however, contended that transfer of Respondent-1 is malicious in law and patently illegal. Reliance is placed on this Court’s decision in Dr. Krishna Chandra Dubey v. Union of India, 2005 (6) AWC 6017. 12. Learned counsel appearing for Respondent-1, however, contended that transfer of Respondent-1 is malicious in law and patently illegal. He also submitted that petitioners have not come to this Court with clean hands inasmuch as Respondent-1 was wrongly placed in Agreed List and for dropping his name in Agreed list, Chief General Manager (Telecom), U.P. West Circle has already suggested long back. No discreet inquiry was conducted as contemplated in Office Memorandum of Ministry of Home Affairs dated 5.5.1966 with regard to integrity of Respondent-1. During his tenure revenue of department has increased largely and it is only to malign his reputation and to harass him on incorrect facts, petitioners in a clandestine manner are proceeding to shift him and for that purpose are going to any extent including the mode of hide and seek before Court. 13. From para 13 of the writ petition we find that new Agreed List was published on 5.5.2016 by the office of Chief Vigilance Officer for the Year 2016-17 communicated to BSNL and therein name of Respondent-1 was not included and this shows that the very basis of transfer of Respondent-1 disappeared. Therefore, to suggest that Respondent-1 was sought to be transferred on account of some questionable integrity etc. is admittedly not existing in view of averments made in para 13 of writ petition by petitioners themselves. 14. So far as issue on merits is concerned, whether action of transfer of BSNL and its authorities of Respondent-1 from NOIDA to anywhere else, is a matter yet to be adjudicated by Tribunal, therefore, we do not propose to make any observation or discuss matter on merits, touching validity of transfer order. However, facts discussed above makes it clear that petitioners on their own did not allow Tribunal to decide correctness of transfer order and instead played a vicious role in the matter by endeavoring to render adjudication of earlier O.A. infructuous, in which transfer order dated 24.7.2015 was challenged, by withdrawing same, without taking Tribunal into confidence or without seeking any leave of Tribunal though not only transfer order was stayed by Tribunal but even stay vacation application was rejected. BSNL and its authorities on their own took upon themselves authority to withdraw transfer order without assigning any reason as to why said order was withdrawn and thereafter contended that O.A. in which transfer order was stayed and stay order was confirmed, has rendered infructuous. 15. Lack of bona fide and arbitrariness on the part of present petitioners, i.e., BSNL and its authorities is further writ large from the fact that order withdrawing transfer order dated 24.7.2015 was passed on 10.5.2016 and within two days, i.e., on 12.5.2016, they passed another order transferring Respondent-1, to another place, i.e., instead of Meerut to Dehradun. Justification for withdrawal of transfer order dated 24.7.2015 was not shown to be placed either before Tribunal or even before this Court. 16. In the entire Writ Petition virtually nothing has been said as to why transfer order dated 24.7.2015, which was yet to be adjudicated by Tribunal, was withdrawn. The only reason we can cull out from aforesaid facts is that there was a deliberate and intentional attempt to frustrate adjudication process initiated by Respondent-1, by availing remedy of filing O.A. under Section 19 of Act, 1985 before Tribunal wherein matter was under consideration and with regard to interim order Tribunal, after hearing both parties had confirmed the same. The hurried exercise undertaken by petitioners in passing almost simultaneously fresh order of transfer fortifies above inference and we find at least no reason pleaded in the present writ petition to draw another inference except that it was a very considered, mischievous and tactical approach on the part of BSNL to wriggle out of the question of adjudication of correctness of earlier transfer order and also to wriggle out of the consequences of interim orders passed by Tribunal which was confirmed and not interfered even by this Court in first writ petition filed by petitioners, i.e., Writ Petition No. 26022 of 2016. 17. Transfer is an incident of service and there is no doubt but still judicial review in respect of an order of transfer is permissible for well known reasons, namely, (i) if it is by way of mala fide which includes malice in law; (ii) if it is without jurisdiction; and, (iii) if it is in contravention of statutory provisions. 18. In the present case, if not mala fide in fact, still malice in law on the part of petitioners is apparent. 18. In the present case, if not mala fide in fact, still malice in law on the part of petitioners is apparent. Order of transfer passed on 12.5.2016 is clearly an offshoot of such malicious act on the part of petitioners so as to render adjudicatory process pending before Tribunal ineffective, inoperative and infructuous and to some extent, petitioners succeeded also when this Court in Writ Petition No. 28675 of 2016 agreed to the contention of petitioners-BSNL that after withdrawal of transfer order dated 24.7.2015, vide order dated 10.5.2016, O.A. already pending before Tribunal rendered infructuous and now subsequent order dated 12.5.2016 could have been challenged in a fresh O.A. 19. Tribunal passed impugned interim order dated 12.8.2016 prima facie observing that it is a case of clever and tactical move on the part of petitioners and it also prima facie shows that they are adamant to transfer Respondent-1 and adjust Arun Kumar in his place at NOIDA and are displaying a high degree of obduracy and vindictiveness. We prima facie find substance therein. In the backdrop of facts, interim order has been passed by Tribunal and we find apparently nothing manifestly illegal therein. 20. When called upon, learned counsel for the petitioners could not tell as to why petitioners did not await adjudication of O.A. No. 330/00994/2015 and withdrew earlier order of transfer dated 24.7.2015. It also could not explain why another order within two days was passed. 21. In these facts and circumstances, we have no manner of doubt but to draw an inference at this level also that the only reason was to render adjudicatory process pending before Tribunal infructuous and redundant and to wriggle out of the interim order operating against petitioners-BSNL. If that be so, petitioners are clearly guilty of malice in law and the action of subsequent transfer is malicious in law. 22. Malice in law does not mean malice in fact. Court has summarised “malice in law” in (Smt.) S.R. Venkatraman v. Union of India and another, AIR 1979 SC 49 , as under: “It is equally true that there will be an error of fact when a public body is prompted by a mistaken belief in the existence of a non-existing fact or circumstance. Court has summarised “malice in law” in (Smt.) S.R. Venkatraman v. Union of India and another, AIR 1979 SC 49 , as under: “It is equally true that there will be an error of fact when a public body is prompted by a mistaken belief in the existence of a non-existing fact or circumstance. This is so clearly unreasonable that what is done under such a mistaken belief might almost be said to have been done in bad faith; and in actual experience, and as things go, these may well be said to run into one another.” (Para 8) (emphasis added) 23. Court, further in para 9 of the judgment in S.R. Venkatraman (supra), has observed: “9. The influence of extraneous matters will be undoubted where the authority making the order has admitted their influence. It will therefore be a gross abuse of legal power to punish a person or destroy her service career in a manner not warranted by law by putting a rule which makes a useful provision for the premature retirement of Government servants only in the ‘’public interest’, to a purpose wholly unwarranted by it, and to arrive at quite a contradictory result. An administrative order which is based on reasons of fact which do not exist must, therefore, be held to be infected with an abuse of power.” 24. In Mukesh Kumar Agrawal v. State of U.P. and others, JT 2009 (13) SC 643, Court said : “We also intend to emphasize that the distinction between a malice of fact and malice in law must be borne out from records; whereas in a case involving malice in law which if established may lead to an inference that the statutory authorities had acted without jurisdiction while exercising its jurisdiction, malice of fact must be pleaded and proved.” 25. In Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India and others, 2009 (2) SCC 592 , dealing with the question of validity of an order of transfer on the ground of malice in law, Court, in para 16 of the judgment, observed as under: “16. .... Mala fide is of two kinds—one malice in fact and the second malice in law. In Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India and others, 2009 (2) SCC 592 , dealing with the question of validity of an order of transfer on the ground of malice in law, Court, in para 16 of the judgment, observed as under: “16. .... Mala fide is of two kinds—one malice in fact and the second malice in law. The order in question would attract the principle of malice in law as it was not based on any factor germane for passing an order of transfer and based on an irrelevant ground i.e on the allegations made against the appellant in the anonymous complaint. It is one thing to say that the employer is entitled to pass an order of transfer in administrative exigencies but it is another thing to say that the order of transfer is passed by way of or in lieu of punishment. When an order of transfer is passed in lieu of punishment, the same is liable to be set aside being wholly illegal.” (emphasis added) 26. In HMT Ltd. and another v. Mudappa and others, JT 2007(3) SC 112, Court in paras 18 and 19, defined malice in law by referring to “Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 3rd Edn., London Butterworths, 1989” as under: “The legal meaning of malice is “ill-will or spite towards a party and any indirect or improper motive in taking an action”. This is sometimes described as “malice in fact”. “Legal malice” or “malice in law” means ‘something done without lawful excuse’. In other words, ‘’it is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite’. It is a deliberate act in disregard of the rights of others.” “19. It was observed that where malice was attributed to the State, it could not be a case of malice in fact, or personal ill-will or spite on the part of the State. It could only be malice in law, i.e legal mala fide. The State, if it wishes to acquire land, could exercise its power bona fide for statutory purpose and for none other. It was observed that it was only because of the decree passed in favour of the owner that the proceedings for acquisition were necessary and hence, notification was issued. Such an action could not be held mala fide.” (emphasis added) 27. It was observed that it was only because of the decree passed in favour of the owner that the proceedings for acquisition were necessary and hence, notification was issued. Such an action could not be held mala fide.” (emphasis added) 27. In brief “malice in law” can be said to exist when a power is exercised for an unauthorized purpose or on a fact which is claimed to exist but in fact, is non-est or for the purpose for which it is not meant though apparently it is shown that the same is being exercised for the purpose the power is supposed to be exercised. [See Manager Government Branch Press and another v. D.B. Belliappa, AIR 1979 SC 429 ; Punjab Electricity Board v. Zora Singh and others, AIR 2006 SC 182; K.K. Bhalla v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 2006 SC 898 ; P. Mohanan Pillai v. State of Kerala and others, (2007) 9 SCC 497 ; M.P. State Corporation Diary Federation Ltd. and another v. Rajneesh Kumar Zamindar and others, (2009) 6 SCALE 17 ; Swarn Singh Chand v. Punjab State Electricity Board and others, (2009) 7 SCALE 622 and Sri Yemeni Raja Ram Chandar v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, JT (2009) 12 SC 198]. 28. We also enquired from learned counsel for petitioners as to why petitioners did not request Tribunal to decide O.A. at the earliest and instead have rushed to this Court by filing this writ petition particularly when in similar circumstances, an attempt on the part of State to assail an interim order passed by Tribunal, was not approved by Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sunanda Prasad, (1999) 6 SCC 34 and it was held that High Court should not have interfered against an interim order passed by Tribunal when matter on merits is yet to be decided by Tribunal. In paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of judgment, Court said: “3. Though ordinarily this Court does not interfere with an interim order passed by the High Court, but in the case in hand the High Court having entertained a writ petition while the grievance of the respondents is still pending before the Central Administrative Tribunal and having passed an interim order annulling the order of the Tribunal, we think it appropriate to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court. 4. 4. We have no doubt in our mind that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining a writ application when the legality of the order; of transfer is a subject-matter of a pending proceeding before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal has passed an order of status quo. If the appellant authority has violated any interim direction of the Tribunal, the appropriate remedy is to file an application for contempt and we are told that such application has been filed, which is pending before the Tribunal. The Tribunal has also fixed up the hearing of the matter on 16-7-1999. 5. In the aforesaid circumstances, the impugned order of the High Court stands quashed. The writ petition is also dismissed. The Tribunal is requested to dispose of the matter on the date on which the matter has already been fixed for hearing.” 29. Learned counsel for the petitioners could not reply except arguing that in transfer matters, Court should not have interfered. In our view, aforesaid observations are squarely applicable in the case in hand. Thus, in chain it is the third writ petition filed by the petitioners-BSNL against interim orders passed by Tribunal and it appears that petitioners are not interested in final disposal and adjudication of issue by Tribunal. 30. In our view, Tribunal has rightly passed interim order observing that here is a case of clever and tactical approach adopted by BSNL and its authorities and their action lacks bona fide. Undeterred by the conduct, which has been commented otherwise by Tribunal, petitioners have shown audacity of continuing with avoidable litigation which shows that they have taken it as a fight for ego and not to show a fair, impartial and justified attitude with its officers and employees. In chain this is petitioners’ third writ petition and we find that this writ petition is nothing but a sheer abuse of process of law and could have been avoided by petitioners. Instead they could have approached Tribunal requesting for an early hearing of matter, which, it appears, Tribunal was already doing, still petitioners have chosen to continue litigation by filing writ petition before this Court also. No attempt has been made by petitioners to request Tribunal to decide O.A. expeditiously finally and adjudicate issue in question once and for all. Instead they could have approached Tribunal requesting for an early hearing of matter, which, it appears, Tribunal was already doing, still petitioners have chosen to continue litigation by filing writ petition before this Court also. No attempt has been made by petitioners to request Tribunal to decide O.A. expeditiously finally and adjudicate issue in question once and for all. On the contrary, entire attempt is to somehow or other ensure transfer and joining of Respondent-1 at any other place except NOIDA so that person, whom petitioners wanted to accommodate at NOIDA, may not get disturbed. This also suggests that ground taken by petitioners that NOIDA authorities and BSNL are also favouring an individual officer to accommodate at NOIDA, has some force. 31. Be that as it may, to our mind, from entire facts of the case we are satisfied prima facie that this is a thoroughly ill-advised and misconceived writ petition. This approach and attitude on the part of petitioners can neither be appreciated nor expected from en employer, i.e., a Government Company, who is expected to work as a model employer. Time and again Courts have always reminded authorities and litigants not to come and file frivolous cases. 32. This Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that it is already reeling under extreme pressure of extra ordinary pendency of cases, for one or the other reasons, causing huge delay in disposal of cases. Everyday, on various platforms, people cry of denial of justice. They are frequently reminding us that “justice delayed is justice denied” but on account of massive litigation exodus, Courts are under mounting pressure of huge number of cases, pending. Lack of infrastructure and other supporting establishment, is another hurdle in speedy disposal of cases. It is virtually a day dream to think of an early disposal of a case, yet a few litigants, assisted by officers of this Court, do not hesitate in filing frivolous cases adding to mounting arrears. This is high time when such frivolous and uncalled for litigation must be endeavoured to be curtailed by taking hard steps. This Court should not show its misplaced sympathy to such persons, who indulge in filing frivolous cases before this Court so as to consume a sufficient time in those matters, depriving Court’s precious time to be utilized in other substantial issues. 33. This Court should not show its misplaced sympathy to such persons, who indulge in filing frivolous cases before this Court so as to consume a sufficient time in those matters, depriving Court’s precious time to be utilized in other substantial issues. 33. Stressing upon the ways to discourage filing of vexatious and frivolous cases against all kinds of orders or at every stage of proceedings, irrespective of the fact whether application like the present one would be permissible in law or not, Apex Court in the context of practice of filing SLPs against all kinds of orders of High Court or other authorities, came heavily in Mathai @ Joby v. George and another, 2010 (4) SCC 358 and said that if all such sundry kinds of cases are allowed, the Court will soon be flooded with a huge amount of backlog and it will not be able to deal with important questions relating to the Constitution or the law or where grave injustice has been done. The Court has limited time at its disposal and the Judges are struggling with unbearable burden with zeal to dispense justice to whom it is highly needed yet being obstructed by such frivolous and vexatious matters, a trend is developing to bring all kinds of trivial and flimsy matters to Court causing wastage of not only public money, but also precious time of the Court, which can be used for other substantial matters. 34. The Apex Court in Phool Chandra and another v. State of U.P., 2014(3) RCR (Criminal) 30, observed: “..the time of the Court which is becoming acutely precious because of the piling arrears has to be wasted on hearing such matters. There is an urgent need to put a check on such frivolous litigation. Perhaps many such cases can be avoided if learned Counsel who are officers of the Court and who are expected to assist the Court tender proper advice to their clients. The Bar has to realise that the great burden upon the Bench of dispensing justice imposes a simultaneous duty upon them to share this burden and it is their duty to see that the burden should not needlessly be made unbearable. The Judges of this Nation are struggling bravely against the odds to tackle the problem of dispensing quick justice. But, without the cooperation of the gentlemen of the Bar, nothing can be done.” 35. The Judges of this Nation are struggling bravely against the odds to tackle the problem of dispensing quick justice. But, without the cooperation of the gentlemen of the Bar, nothing can be done.” 35. The Court in Phool Chandra and another (supra) referring to earlier decisions in Varinderpal Singh v. Hon’ble Justice M.R. Sharma and others, 1986 Supp SCC 719; Ramrameshwari Devi and others v. Nirmala Devi and others, (2011) 8 SCC 249 ; and Gurgaon Gramin Bank v. Khazani and another, AIR 2012 SC 2881 , has said: “It is high time that the Courts should come down heavily upon such frivolous litigation and unless we ensure that the wrongdoers are denied profit or undue benefit from the frivolous litigation, it would be difficult to control frivolous and uncalled for litigation. In order to curb such kind of litigation, the Courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive which can be ensured by imposing exemplary costs upon the parties as well as on learned Counsel who act in an irresponsible manner.” 36. We may also repeat hereat observation made by the Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, JT 2005 (6) SC 486, stating that award of costs must be treated generally as mandatory. It is the liberal attitude of the Courts in not awarding costs which has led to frivolous points or litigation before the Courts. Costs should invariably follow the event and reasons must be assigned for not awarding costs. 37. In the present case, exercise and attempt on the part of petitioners is nothing but a gross abuse of process of law and looking to the entire facts as discussed above, we find it justified that petitioners herein have not approached this Court consistent with principle that one who seek equity must do equity and come with clean hands. It is a clear misuse and gross abuse of process of law and hence it is a fit case where writ petition deserves to be dismissed with exemplary cost. 38. We, therefore, dismiss this writ petition with cost of Rs. 5 lacs. 39. It is a clear misuse and gross abuse of process of law and hence it is a fit case where writ petition deserves to be dismissed with exemplary cost. 38. We, therefore, dismiss this writ petition with cost of Rs. 5 lacs. 39. However, we make it clear that any observation made by us in this judgment shall not be construed as an expression or opinion on merits of issue which is pending for adjudication by Tribunal, and, would be confined only for the purpose of considering present writ petition before this Court. Tribunal shall proceed to decide matter on merits independently on the basis of material available before it.