JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. N. Adhikari, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S.B. Debnath, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. B.C. Das, learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents No. 1-2 and Mr. B. Saha, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3. 2. This petition has been filed by the petitioner in sequel to their earlier writ petition, expressing their serious grievance for absence of substantive compliance of the judgment dated 08.05.2015 delivered in the earlier writ petition being WP (C) No. 401 of 2004 [M/s Peerless Tea and Industry Ltd. vs. State of Tripura and Others] by this Court. The direction that was given in the said judgment may be had from the following passages: “21. But nothing has happened. By this writ petition, the petitioner has virtually challenged the mode of computing the compensation that has to be paid to them. This court has already struck down the Notification, which declared the basis of calculating the compensation. In this regard this court would further lay down that the compensation has to be computed irrespective of the profit and loss account of the Tea Estate. The compensation has to be computed for the assets of Fatikcherra Tea Estate which remained suspended from use for taking over of the said unit w.e.f. 10.11.1986. For determination of the compensation, the value of the assets in use by the State Government has to be determined by the Assessor. When the value of such estate has been determined at Rs. 1.00, it really exposes the pre-mediation over the matter. The Government is under obligation to decide the compensation justly as in the manner as provided by the statute. The State has deprived the petitioner from their properties for a considerable period. In Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , the apex court has decided that: “9. The right to property is now considered to be, not only a constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human right. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment etc. Now however, human rights are gaining an even greater multi faceted dimension. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment etc. Now however, human rights are gaining an even greater multi faceted dimension. The right to property is considered, very much to be a part of such new dimension. (Vide Lachhman Dass vs. Jagat Ram, (2007) 10 SCC 448 , Amarjit Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2010) 10 SCC 43 , State of M.P. vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639 , State of Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. vs. State of U.P. (2011) 9 SCC 354 ). 10. In the case at hand, there has been no acquisition. The question that emerges for consideration is whether, in a democratic body polity, which is supposedly governed by the Rule of Law, the State should be allowed to deprive a citizen of his property, without adhering to the law. The matter would have been different had the State pleaded that it has right, title and interest over the said land. It however, concedes to the right, title and interest of the appellants over such land and pleads the doctrine of delay and laches as grounds for the dismissal of the petition/appeal. 11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a true and concrete distinction, between the principle of "eminent domain" and "police power" of the State. Under certain circumstances, the police power of the State may be used temporarily, to take possession of property but the present case clearly shows that neither of the said powers have been exercised. A question then arises with respect to the authority or power under which the State entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts to encroachment, in exercise of "absolute power" which in common parlance is also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. To further clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities have treated the land owner as a “subject” of medieval India, but not as a “citizen” under our constitution. 12. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. 22. Having regard to the law as enunciated in Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others, the state cannot arrogate itself to the status that is one beyond provided by the Constitution. 22. Having regard to the law as enunciated in Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others, the state cannot arrogate itself to the status that is one beyond provided by the Constitution. By way of suspension, the petitioner had been put to disability to use their property and hence they are entitled to compensation as provided by the statute, denial of such would amount to denying their legal right to have compensation. The state in exercise of its eminent domain has deprived the petitioner so far. This court is inclined to interfere with such action of the state. The other question that has flowed for consideration of this court is that in view of the ex-parte decree that has been passed, whether any direction can be passed in this case. 23. Having regard to the decision of the Govt. of Tripura as reflected in the communication dated 12.08.2014 (Annexure P/2), it appears that, now the Government has determined the compensation at Rs. 6.00, meaning the previous amount as determined by the Committee, is no more insisted on. However, since the said ex-parte decree appears to be in existence, this court would not pass any further observation as regards its executability on face of the said development. 24. Having regard to the discussion as made above, this court, however, is not inclined to take over the responsibility of computing the compensation in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction, rather it would pass some directions for purpose of computing the just compensation to be awarded to the petitioner in terms of Section 3 and Section 5 of the said Act. It is directed that within 2(two) months from the day when the petitioner sall furnish a copy of this order, the State Govt. either shall appoint a reputed chartered valuer else they would appoint SBA Associates, having their office at 27, Mirza Ghalib Street, 5th Floor, Kolkata-700016, for purpose of making assessment for determining the annual compensation. In the event of the engagement of the SBA Associates, they will be entitled to get Rs. 50,000 (rupees fifty thousand) excluding the actual cost of travel and lodging. In the event of the engagement of the SBA Associates, they will be entitled to get Rs. 50,000 (rupees fifty thousand) excluding the actual cost of travel and lodging. If the Government fails to engage a chartered valuer within 2(two) months as stipulated, within a fortnight thereafter, they shall issue the letter of appointment or engagement of SBA Associates with the terms and reference, for computing the compensation, in full compliance with the provision of Sections 3 and 5 of the said Act with further direction that such survey shall be completed within 2(two) months from the date of issue. The chartered valuer shall, following the scientific method, determine the annual compensation. Both the petitioner, the State Govt. and the custodian of the State Govt., the TTDC shall extend all sorts of cooperation to the chartered valuer who are under obligation to complete the survey or assessment within two months from the date of their engagement. The petitioner, State Government and the Custodian shall produce all necessary documents for the survey, whenever they are so asked without delay. 25. It is again made clear that, the profit and loss account during the period of suspension of the management will have no impact on determining the compensation as stated. On the basis of the assessment that would be made, the State Government shall pay the compensation within 3(three) months thereafter. If such payment is not paid within three months as stipulated, they shall have to pay interest @ 18% in terms of the order dated 28.01.2000 delivered in Civil Rule No. 142 of 1986 by the Gauhati High Court.” (Emphasis added) 3. The petitioner has approached this Court again to lay the post judgment facts that the State has not engaged any chartered valuer as directed by this Court. However, in the reply filed by the State respondents, this Court has come across the report of the Contemporary Brokers Pvt. Ltd. Dated 05.12.2015, which is a part of Annexure-2 to the reply. The said agency as engaged by the State to ascertain the compensation that might be paid to the petitioner-company, M/s. Peerless Tea & Industry Ltd., Fatikcherra Tea Estate in discharge of the statutory obligation. From the said reply, the following has appeared before this Court: “We have also considered the capital investment made of Rs. The said agency as engaged by the State to ascertain the compensation that might be paid to the petitioner-company, M/s. Peerless Tea & Industry Ltd., Fatikcherra Tea Estate in discharge of the statutory obligation. From the said reply, the following has appeared before this Court: “We have also considered the capital investment made of Rs. 14,27,696/- made in planting 62.75 acres of young tea (14,00,967 plants and infilling tea (18,372 plants) at an expenditure of Rs. 28,477/- which totals Rs. 14,56,173/- (Rupees fourteen lakhs fifty-six thousand one hundred and seventy-three) and added the average interest rate prevailing at the time. The valuation of the property stands at Rs. 20,97,300/-. This is arrived at, by taking the valuation which is Rs. 28,64,400 plus interest Rs. 40,51,439. Less 14,56,173 plus interest Rs. 17,88,388, amounting to Rs. 22,63,051/-. Therefore, as per Tripura Tea Companies (Taking Over of management of Certain Tea Units) Act, 1986. Chapter II 3/3 and 4/5 the compensation payable to M/s Peerless is Rs. 22,63,051/- (Rupees twenty-two lakhs sixty-three thousand and fifty-one only).” (Emphasis added by the Court) 4. Having perused the report, it has surfaced that the petitioner would be paid only Rs. 22,63,051/-. having noticed the said report, this Court has passed the followed order on 08.09.2016 as follows: “As Mr. B.C. Das, learned Advocate General has stated that in respect of deduction as made on account of the investment made for the new plantation which is available at Page-64 of this writ petition, he required some instruction, let the matter be listed for continuation of hearing on 14.09.2016 as part heard.” 5. Mr. B.C. Das, learned A.G. has fairly submitted that the deduction that has been made by the said agency to the extent of Rs. 14,56,173/- with interest at the prevailing rate is wholly unreasonable unjustified and this cannot be permitted within the ambit of Tripura Tea Companies (Taking Over of management of Certain Tea Units) Act, 1986. 6. Having this statement taken into notice, this Court is of the view that the said deduction is unsustainable and accordingly the petitioner shall be entitled to compensation for the said period when this Tea Estate was under the management of the respondent No. 3 to the extent of Rs. 40,51,439/-. 6. Having this statement taken into notice, this Court is of the view that the said deduction is unsustainable and accordingly the petitioner shall be entitled to compensation for the said period when this Tea Estate was under the management of the respondent No. 3 to the extent of Rs. 40,51,439/-. If the said amount is not paid within 3 months from the day of receipt of a copy of the judgment from the petitioner, the said amount shall carry interest @ 18% till the payment is made. 7. In view of the observations made above, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner is not liable to pay any further sum to the respondents. The petitioner may utilize this observation in their defence in the execution proceeding as reportedly set in terms of the judgment and decree passed in Money Suit No. 27 of 2006. 8. With these observations and direction, this writ petition stands allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.