JUDGMENT Order on Delay Condonation Application No. 270436 of 2016 The delay of 1 day in filing the special appeal is condoned since sufficient cause has been shown in the Affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay. The application stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Order on Appeal: Heard Rajesh Nath Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ramanand Pandey, learned Standing Counsel. The original petitioner has preferred this appeal aggrieved by the dismissal of his writ petition by the learned Single Judge on the ground of it having been incorrectly preferred before this Court. According to the learned Single Judge, the appellant was a resident of District Ambedakar Nagar which fell under the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench of this Court. The learned Single Judge further noted that the order dated 31 March 2016 turning down the claim of the appellant for grant of compassionate appointment had been passed by the Principal Secretary (Home) at Lucknow. Noting the above two facts the learned Single Judge formed the opinion that the writ petition preferred was liable to be presented before the Lucknow Bench of this Court and accordingly dismissed it as not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge however left it open to the appellant to approach the Lucknow Bench of this Court. From a perusal of the material on record as well as the writ petition preferred by the appellant, we find that apart from questioning the correctness of the order dated 31 March 2016 passed by the first respondent the appellant had also sought the issuance of an appropriate writ commanding the respondents to provide her appointment on the post of Sub Inspector on compassionate grounds. Admittedly, the said direction, if the claim of the appellant were to be found to be justified and warranting consideration, would have to issue to the second respondent who was the appointing authority. The learned Single Judge does not dispute the fact that the Police Head Quarters are situate at Allahabad and that the appointing authority, namely, the Deputy Inspector General of Police also holds office at Allahabad. The fact that the appellant was a resident of District Ambedkar Nagar was in our opinion irrelevant inasmuch as the territorial jurisdiction of a Court is not dependent upon the residence of the petitioner.
The fact that the appellant was a resident of District Ambedkar Nagar was in our opinion irrelevant inasmuch as the territorial jurisdiction of a Court is not dependent upon the residence of the petitioner. The territorial jurisdiction of a Court is liable to be tested based upon the cause of action arising within the territorial limits of the Court and the residence of the respondents. For the aforesaid reasons, we find ourselves unable to sustain the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Learned counsel for the parties thereafter sought leave to address us on the merits of the claim of the appellant itself and with their consent the writ petition itself was taken on board. The claim of the appellant for being accorded appointment on compassionate ground is based on the fact that his father was employed in the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) of the State. He is stated to have been dismissed from service on 19 June 1973 for having participated in what is described as the "PAC Revolt Incident". He died on 8 January 2003. Learned counsel for the appellant has however referred to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Court on 5 October 2010 upon Special Appeal No. 406 of 2010 to contend that on 7 September 1998 and 13 November 1998 the State-respondents had taken a policy decision to reinstate all those police personnel whose services stood terminated for having participated in the said revolt. The Division Bench taking note of the said policy decision had proceeded to direct the State to consequently reinstate the respondent in the said appeal. A writ petition preferred by the mother of the appellant seeking the retiral dues and other benefits came to be disposed of on 9 September 2011 by a learned Single Judge holding that she would be entitled to benefits in terms of the order passed in Special Appeal No. 406 of 2010. On the basis of this order the retiral dues and other benefits payable to the father of the appellant were released by an order dated 27 January 2012. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that in light of the judgment rendered by the Court on 9 September 2011, the appellant was entitled to be considered for the grant of compassionate appointment. We are unable to accept the said submission for more than one reason.
Learned counsel for the appellant contends that in light of the judgment rendered by the Court on 9 September 2011, the appellant was entitled to be considered for the grant of compassionate appointment. We are unable to accept the said submission for more than one reason. Admittedly, the father of the appellant died on 8 January 2003. He was neither reinstated nor did he discharge any duties between 19 June 1973 (the date of termination) and 8 January 2003 (the date of death). We may note that the phrase "deceased government servant" is defined under the U.P. Recruitment of Dependent of Government Servant Dying-in-Harness Rules, 19741 to mean a government servant who dies while in service. As the facts noted above would establish the father of the appellant was not in service on the date of death. Additionally, we note that the judgment upon the writ petition of the mother of the appellant came to be rendered of on 9 September 2011, by which time the father of the appellant was not alive and consequently was only accorded the benefits of pension and other retiral dues. More fundamentally, we may note that the appellant submitted a claim for appointment on compassionate ground only in January 2013 through his mother whereas his father had died in 2003. A claim for compassionate appointment as has been consistently held is only to enable the surviving members of the deceased employee to overcome the immediate financial crisis. It is not a right which can be permitted to be exercised at any point of time and does not constitute a reservation of a post in favour of a member of the family. This was so held by a Full Bench in Shiv Kumar Dubey Vs. State of U.P. And Others2. Today, therefore, we find no legal justification for issuance of a direction to the respondents to consider the claim of the appellant. The view taken by the Principal Secretary in the order impugned in the writ petition to similar effect, therefore does not commend any interference. We accordingly allow this Special Appeal and while set aside the judgment rendered by the learned Single Juge on 29 July 2016, find no merit in the writ petition itself and consequently Writ Petition No. 19366 of 2016 shall stand dismissed. Let a copy of this order be placed on the record of Writ Petition No. 19366 of 2016.