JUDGMENT : Ram Mohan Reddy, J. Insurer of the offending motorcycle, aggrieved by the judgment and award dated 17th November, 2011 in MVC 568/2009 of the District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Shivamogga, (for short 'MACT'), has presented this appeal. 2. Facts briefly stated are: (i) First respondent instituted claim petition invoking Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (for short 'Act') seeking Rs.13,15,000/- as compensation for injuries sustained in the road traffic accident that allegedly occurred on 07.04.2009 while riding his TVS XL bearing certificate of registration KA-14/K-9726 from his house towards flour mill near petrol bunk, N.T. Road, whence, the 2nd respondent/Habibulla Khan, allegedly riding a Hero Honda Splendour motor cycle bearing certificate of registration KA-14 W-8664 at a high speed and in a rash and negligent manner from the side of Sandesh Motors dashed against TVS moped, by reason of which the 1st respondent fell off from the vehicle, sustained injuries and was admitted to Mc. Gann Hospital, Shivamogga, where after wards, he was shifted to Nanjappa Hospital and from there to KMC Hospital, Manipal, where he was extended treatment for one month and on discharge, followed up treatment. (ii) First respondent/claimant aged 50 on the date of accident claiming to be owner of a plastic industry earning Rs.25,000/- per month and due to permanent disability, allegedly lost his earning capacity and was unable to manage the industry. In addition, it was asserted that he was the only earning member in his family. (iii) Respondent No.3 arraigned as 2nd respondent in the claim petition was said to be the owner of the offending motor cycle while appellant/insurer was arraigned as the 3rd respondent. (iv) The rider and owner of the offending motor cycle, though served with notice in the claim petition, remained absent and were unrepresented, hence placed ex-parte, while appellant resisted the claim by filing statement of objections, inter alia, denying the accident, while admitted the issue of a policy of insurance, which was in force on the date and time of accident. (v) In defence, it was stated that the alleged accident occurred due to rash and negligent act of the claimant, who did not possess a valid and effective driving licence and caused the accident. (v) In defence, it was stated that the alleged accident occurred due to rash and negligent act of the claimant, who did not possess a valid and effective driving licence and caused the accident. (vi) It was alleged that owner/insured did not comply with Section 134(c) of the 'Act' and that 2nd respondent/insured in collusion with other respondents and police officials filed a false case by changing the name of the rider in active collusion with the rider/first respondent for wrongful gain. (vii) It was further alleged that 2nd respondent/owner insured was the rider at the time of accident, without a valid driving licence a breach of the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance. 3. In the premise of pleadings of parties, MACT, framed the following issues: (i) Whether the petitioner proves that on the relevant date, time and place the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of motor cycle bearing Regn. No. KA-14AV-8664 by the 1st respondent? (ii) Whether the petitioner proves that in the accident he sustained injuries? (iii) Whether the 3rd respondent proves that on the date of accident driver was not having valid driving licence? (iv) Whether 3rd respondent proves that accident was caused due to negligence of petitioner? (v) Whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation? If so, for what amount and from whom? (vi) What award or order? 4. The claimant/injured was examined as P.W. 1 and the Doctor as PW. 2 and 46 documents were introduced in evidence and marked as Exs. P. 1 to P.46 while for the appellant/insurer, its officer was examined as R.W. 1 and marked three documents as Exs. R. 1 to R. 3. The MACT returned the following findings. Point No. 1: In the partly affirmative Point No. 2: In the affirmative Point No. 3: In the negative Point No. 4: In the negative Point No. 5: In the partly affirmative Point No. 6: As per final order. 5. The MACT, having regard to the material on record and evidence, both oral and documentary, held that rider of the motor cycle was not Habibulla Khan (1st respondent before MACT) while it was the owner/insured who was riding the motor cycle and answered issue No. 1 party in the affirmative, attributing actionable negligence to the owner/rider. 5. The MACT, having regard to the material on record and evidence, both oral and documentary, held that rider of the motor cycle was not Habibulla Khan (1st respondent before MACT) while it was the owner/insured who was riding the motor cycle and answered issue No. 1 party in the affirmative, attributing actionable negligence to the owner/rider. MACT awarded Rs.93.500/- as compensation with interest at 6% per annum, while fastening liability to pay compensation on the appellant on the premise that allegation of false implication by the owner insured that rider of the motorcycle was Habibulla Khan by itself and nothing more was not a legal ground to exonerate the appellant from liability to pay compensation, while rejecting the allegation of the appellant that owner/insured of the offending motor vehicle violated the terms and conditions of the policy for failure to establish the same, by the judgment and award impugned. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant/insurer advances the following submissions: (i) That the MACT having observed the owner/insured was riding the motor cycle and caused the accident due to his negligent act and Habibulla Khan was not the rider; although in the criminal proceeding for commission of cognisable offences, Habibulla Khan pleaded guilty of rash and negligent riding of the motor cycle in question; (ii) The testimony of R.W. 1, officer of the insurer was proof of the contents of the Medico Legal Case registers. Exs. R. 1 and R. 2 recording that the claimant and the owner insured suffered injuries in the accident involving the motor vehicles: (iii) That the insured did not respond to the notice issued by the insurer to furnish material particulars of the rider of the motor cycle and was placed ex-parte before the MACT; 7. According to the Learned Counsel, in the teeth of the aforesaid facts, an adverse inference was required to be drawn by the MACT that since the owner/insured did not possess a valid and effective driving licence to ride the motor cycle and having caused the accident, in collusion with Habibulla Khan and the police, implicated the said Habibulla Khan as the rider, a fraud played on the insurer, hence a breach of the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance hence dis entitled to the indemnity under the policy of insurance, and as a consequence, the appellant was not liable to pay the compensation. 8. 8. Learned Counsel places reliance upon decision of the Apex Court in United India Insurance Company Limited v. Rajesh Singh And Others, AIR 2000 SC 1165 , and National Insurance Company Limited v. Nicoletta Rohtagi And Others, AIR 2002 SC 3350 , in support of the plea that claimant/injured colluded with the owner/insured who did not contest the claim coupled with the finding on issue No. 1 that it was the 2nd respondent owner insured who was riding the motor cycle and caused the accident and not first respondent/Habibulla Khan, a fraud having been played vitiated the proceeding before the MACT. 9. Learned Counsel points to Sections 165 and 175 of the 'Act', relating to constitution of the claims tribunal and bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court respectively, to submit that insurer/appellant is dis entitled to invoke the Civil Court's jurisdiction over breach of terms and conditions of the indemnity under the Contract Act, as against the owner/ insured. 10. Having heard the Learned Counsel for the appellant, perused the pleadings, examined the judgment and award and the evidence, both oral and documentary, the only question for decision making is: "Whether, in the facts, circumstances and evidence on record, the MACT was justified in fastening liability on the appellant/insurer to pay the compensation?" 11. There is no dispute that in the claim petition it was asserted that the rider of the motor cycle was one Habibulla Khan while the owner insured was the 2nd respondent therein and the insurer was 3rd respondent' appellant of the said motor cycle. In the statement of objections of the appellant/insurer, it was contended that the owner insured/2nd respondent therein colluded with other respondents arraigned in the claim petition i.e.. Habibulla Khan, and police officials to file a false ease by changing the name of the rider as Habibulla Khan, to make wrongful gain, although, it was the 2nd respondent/owner/ insured who was riding the motor cycle, and caused the accident, without possessing a valid driving licence in breach of terms and conditions of the policy of insurance. 12. In the cross-examination of P.W.1, claimant, it was elicited that the owner/insured was riding the offending motor cycle at the time and date of accident. 12. In the cross-examination of P.W.1, claimant, it was elicited that the owner/insured was riding the offending motor cycle at the time and date of accident. In the teeth of the admission, the MACT was justified in recording a finding that the 2nd respondent owner/insured was the rider of the motor cycle and due to his negligent act caused the accident, to answer issue No. 1 attributing actionable negligence. The MACT was justified in observing that Habibulla Khan was not the rider of the motor cycle on the fateful day. 13. The fact that Habibulla Khan/1st respondent when accused of commission of cognisable offences under the Indian Penal Code, admitted his guilty before the Criminal Court. If Habibulla Khan was implicated as the rider of the motor cycle, since in the FIR, Ex.P. 2 no name is mentioned as the rider, then that is for the Criminal Court to consider and can hardly make any significant impact in the proceeding for compensation, assuming the respondents had colluded. 14. It may be that the 2nd respondent, owner insured was injured and had taken treatment in Mc. Gann Hospital on the same day as the claimant, but in the absence of the testimony of the author of Exs. R. 1 and R. 2 the MLC extracts, the oral testimony of R.W. 1 officer of the appellant is not in the direction of proving the contents of the said exhibits. 15. The facts, circumstances and evidence supra, does not prove the allegation that the 151 respondent Habibulla Khan along with the second respondent owner/insured and police authorities colluded to make unlawful gain by enabling the claimant to secure compensation from the appellant by enforcing the indemnity clause in the policy of insurance. 16. MACT observed that the testimony of R.W. 1 was not in the direction of establishing the allegation that the owner/insured did not possess a valid and effective driving licence to ride the motor cycle on the date and time of accident. Testimony of R. W. 1 the officer of the appellant/Insurance Company had no personal knowledge as to whether the owner/insured did or did not possess a valid and effective driving licence as on the date and time of accident. Testimony of R. W. 1 the officer of the appellant/Insurance Company had no personal knowledge as to whether the owner/insured did or did not possess a valid and effective driving licence as on the date and time of accident. In the absence of testimony of officers of the Road Transport Department or any other substantial legal evidence, the MACT justifiably did not draw an inference adverse to the interest of the owner/insured for not responding to the alleged notice of the appellant calling upon the owner/insured to furnish material particulars of the rider of the motor cycle. Merely because respondents 1 and 2 did not respond to the notice on I.A. filed by the appellant before the MACT to furnish material particulars of the rider of the motor vehicle as also over the driving licence, by itself and nothing more, it cannot be said that an adverse inference ought to be drawn that the owner/insured did not possess a valid and effective driving licence to ride the motor cycle on the date and time of the accident. It is elsewhere said that essentials may be inferred when the facts proved justify the inference. On one hand must not surmise, conjecture, or guess on the other hand may draw an inference from the proved facts, so long as it is a legitimate inference. 17. The entries in the MLC registers, Exs. R.1 and R. 2 spoken to by R.W.1 when not proved by examining the author, by itself does not establish the general allegation of 'fraud', bereft of material particulars. In fact, neither fraud nor misrepresentation is made out. Police authorities are not parties to the claim petition so as to record a finding that they were involved in the alleged 'fraud'. 18. In the case of fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence and coercion, the Apex Court in Bishundeo Narain And Another v. Seogeni Rai And Others, AIR 1951 SC 280 , observed thus: "25. It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is bettor established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. Now if there is one rule which is bettor established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice, however strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. See Order 6, Rule 4 of CPC" 19. The said principles were followed by later decision of the Apex Court in Varanasaya Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya And Another v. Dr. Rajkishore Tripathi And Another, AIR 1977 SC 615 . In Subhas Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushiband Others, AIR 1967 SC 878 , while examining plea of undue influence, it was held thus: "10. Before, however a Court is called upon to examine whether undue influence was exercised or not, it must scrutinise the pleadings to find out that such a case has been made out and that full particulars of undue influence have been given as in the case of fraud See Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This aspect of the pleading was also given great stress in the case of Ladli Prashad Jaiswal v. The Karnol Distillery Company Limited, Karnul and others, AIR 1963 SC 1279 : (1963) 33 Comp. Cas. 593 (SC), above referred to. In that case it was observed (at p.295) (of SCR): (at p. 1288 of AIR): "A vague or general plea can never serve this purpose; the party pleading must therefore be required to plead the precise nature of the influence exercised, the manner of use of the influence and the unfair advantage obtained by the other." 20. In Afsar Shaikh And Another v. Soleman Bibi And Others, AIR 1976 SC 163 , considering the fact of Order 6, Rule 4 of the CPC with reference to the allegation of fraud, etc, it is observed thus: "15. While it is true that 'undue influence'. 'fraud, 'misrepresentation' are cognate vices and may, in part, overlap in some cases, they are in law distinct categories, and are in view of Order 6. Rule 4. read with Order 6. While it is true that 'undue influence'. 'fraud, 'misrepresentation' are cognate vices and may, in part, overlap in some cases, they are in law distinct categories, and are in view of Order 6. Rule 4. read with Order 6. Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, required to be separately pleaded, with specificity, particularity and precision. A general allegation in the plaint, that the plaintiff was a simple old man of ninety who had reposed great confidence in the defendant, was much too insufficient to amount to an averment of undue influence of which the High Court could take notice, particularly when no issue was claimed and no contention was raised on that point at any stage in the Trial Court, or, in the first round, even before the First Appellate Court. 21. In Ladli Prashad Jaiswal v. The Karnol Distillery Company Limited, Karnul And Others, AIR 1963 SC 1279 , it is held that the object of a pleading is to bring the parties to a trial by concentrating their attention on the matter in dispute, so as to narrow the controversy to precise issues, and to give notice to the parties of the nature of testimony required on either side in support of their case. A vague or general plea cannot serve this purpose; the party pleading must therefore be required to plead the precise nature of fraud, the manner of use, and the unfair advantage obtained. This rule has been evolved with a view to narrow the issue and protect the party charged with improper conduct from being taken by surprise. 22. It is useful to extract the observations of Lord Selborne in Wellingford v. Mutual Fund Society, (1818) 5 AC 685. "With regard to fraud, if there be any principle which is perfectly well-settled it is that general allegations however strong may be the words in which they are stated are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice." 23. In A.C. Ananthaswamy And Others v. Boraiah (Deceased) By Lrs, 2004(8) SCC 588 . it was observed thus: "Fraud is to be pleaded and proved. To prove fraud, it must be proved that the representation made was false to the knowledge of the party making such representation or that the party could have no reasonable belief that it was true. In A.C. Ananthaswamy And Others v. Boraiah (Deceased) By Lrs, 2004(8) SCC 588 . it was observed thus: "Fraud is to be pleaded and proved. To prove fraud, it must be proved that the representation made was false to the knowledge of the party making such representation or that the party could have no reasonable belief that it was true. The level of proof required in such cases is extremely higher." 24. A Division Bench of this Court in Kenchawwa v. Amogonda And Others, AIR 2003 Kant. 434 (DB), held that "the party pleading fraud or misrepresentation will have to not only plead the details, but will have to lead evidence in support of such allegations. In the words of Learned Judge "Fact a Probanda" and "Facta Probantia" go hand in hand and Court of law cannot afford to spell out a case in favour of such a litigant either merely acting upon "Facta Probanda" or "Facta Probantia". Sarkar on Evidence, 13th edition, at page 933, states thus: "A person who charges another with fraud must himself prove the fraud, and he is not relieved from this obligation because the defendant has told an untrue story." 25. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of this case, except for the use of the word "fraud", in the statement of objections appellant has not pleaded with specificity, particularity and precision, therefore, mere use of word "fraud" or "collusion" cannot serve as a foundation for the plea. Such expressions, undoubtedly, are quite ineffective to form a legal basis when denuded of particular statement of facts which alone can furnish the requisite basis for the action the averments in the statement of objections do not set out with reasonable precision, the particulars, so as to constitute allegations of fraud, misrepresentation and collusion by the owner/insured, along with Habibulla Khan and the police officials, as alleged. 26. Viewed in that light, MACT was justified in not framing an issue on the said plea of fraud, collusion and misrepresentation. 27. In the circumstances, the faint effort of the Learned Counsel for appellant to contend that Section 165 read with Section 175 of the 'Act' denudes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a claim for breach of terms of contract of indemnity on the basis of fraud as defined under Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872, is without merit. Section 175 by itself and nothing more does not either expressly or impliedly bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit as between insurer and insured in the matter of fraud, undue influence or collusion either while entering into the contract of indemnity or breach of terms of the said contract. 28. In Rajesh Singh's case as well as Nicoletta Rohtagi's case (supra), the Apex Court did not in express terms deny right of the parties to the contract to institute a suit over breach of terms and conditions of the contract of indemnity before a competent Civil Court. 29. In Rajendra Singh's case, the Apex Court observed that "it had no doubt that remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree cannot be foreclosed and no Court or Tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim. (emphasis supplied) 30. In Nicoletta Rohtagi's case, the Apex Court observed that "in a situation where there is a collusion between the claimants and the insured or the insured docs not contest the claim and, further, the Tribunal does not implead the Insurance Company to contest the claim in such cases, it is open to an insurer to seek permission of the Tribunal to contest the claim on the ground available to the insured or to a person against whom a claim has been made". 31. Regard being had to the aforesaid two opinions of the Apex Court, it is needless to state that on facts of this case there is not a titre of evidence to establish that the claimant colluded with first respondent/Habibulla Khan or the owner/insured of the offending motor cycle and the police officials to institute the claim petition for compensation with intent to fasten the liability on the appellant/insurer and recover compensation. In the absence of relevant material constituting substantial legal evidence of such allegation against claimant, a third party, the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the appellant must necessarily fail. 32. In the absence of relevant material constituting substantial legal evidence of such allegation against claimant, a third party, the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the appellant must necessarily fail. 32. On a fair consideration of the material on record, the judgment and award impugned is well merited fully justified and is neither shown to suffer any infirmities in law nor substantiated to be based on no evidence or vitiated on account of any perversity of approach to call for a different conclusion and interfere with the verdict. 33. In the circumstances, the equation formulated supra is Answered in the affirmative and against the appellant. 34. This Appeal by the Insurance Company knowing fully well tat there is no case made out against claimant/injured either on fraud, misrepresentation or collusion, nevertheless, in the absence of the police as a party to the proceeding against whom the aforesaid allegations are targeted, with an intention to frustrate the claimant from securing compensation, although the 'Act' is a beneficial legislation aimed at quick redressal of victims of accident arising out of motor vehicles, smacks of an attitude which is a cavalier manner. Hence, while deprecating such practise and dismissing the appeal, there is a need to impose cost as observed by the Apex Court in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Kiran Singh And Others, AIR 2004 SC 3884 . 35. Appeal dismissed. Cost quantified at Rs.10,000/- to be deposited with the Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru. The amount in deposit is directed to be transmitted to the MACT forthwith. Miscellaneous First Appeal is Dismissed with Costs.