JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This civil revision is directed against the order dated 11-3-2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Jr. Division, Belonia, South Tripura in Execution (Title) Suit No. 3 of 2013 rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for directing survey of her lands for “demarcating it and pegging pillars” and appoint Survey Commissioner there for. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts giving rise to this revision are that the respondent, who is the decree holder, instituted T.S. No. 36 of 2011 before the trial court. According to the petitioner, who was the defendant in the suit, the suit was not properly defended by her lawyer; she could not pursue the suit as she was suffering from various diseases with the result that the suit was decreed against her ex parte. According to the petitioner, she came to know about the ex-parte decree only when the respondent made an attempt to occupy the said land. She claims that on getting this information, she rushed to Belonia and found on enquiry that the respondent had obtained the ex-parte judgment and decree dated 28-8-2012 and 4-9-2012 respectively by suppressing material facts. At the time of execution of the ex-parte decree, the Survey Commissioner identified the decretal land but included 0.1 decimal of land purchased by and belonging to her whereupon she put resistance and filed an application under Section 47, CPC by pointing out the said two plots in two maps. The Executing Court, however, took the view that as there had been no objection during the trial, such objection could not be entertained during the execution proceedings. The petitioner, as judgment debtor, also filed an application under Order 21, Rule 98 CPC before the Executing Court for determination of her title over the said land, but no order has been passed rejecting or accepting the application. It may be noted that the Executing Court had observed that during the execution proceedings, the boundary of the suit land had been corrected without any objection from the judgment-debtor/petitioner herein. The Executing Court, therefore, held as follows: “It is settled law that an executing Court can’t go behind the decree. This court being an executing court, it cannot determine the validity of the decree. The Executing Court, therefore, held as follows: “It is settled law that an executing Court can’t go behind the decree. This court being an executing court, it cannot determine the validity of the decree. Further, for the sake of identification the decretal land, at this stage, in my considered opinion, there is no necessity for demarcation of the land belonging to the present JD. As such the application is not maintainable and thus the same is rejected. Previously appointed Survey Commissioner Shri P. Majumder is directed to identify the decretal land and to submit report on the next date positively without fail. Bailiff is directed to hand over the possession of the decretal land to the D.H. upon identification by the S.C. …” 3. Assailing the impugned order, Mr. Amitava Dasgupta, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that Section 47, CPC precludes the petitioner from filing a separate suit with respect to her right, title and interest over those entire 0.11 decimals of land, and the learned Civil Judge in not entertaining her application has improperly exercised her jurisdiction thereby causing prejudice to her case; this amounts to perpetuating illegality. He further contends that the learned Civil Judge has completely overlooked the provisions of Order 21, Rule 101, CPC which categorically declares that all questions including the right, title or interests in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Order 21, Rules 97 or 99 or their representatives and relevant to the adjudication of the application shall be determined by the executing court, for which no separate suit could be filed. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the suit was decreed ex-parte and the respondent fraudulently got the boundary of the suit land described in the Schedule to the plaint corrected after he filed an application for execution of the decree. According to the learned counsel, such unilateral correction made only at the time of filing the execution petition amounts to fraud and can be challenged even in a collateral proceeding. He places heavy reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and others, (1994) 1 SCC 1 to fortify his submission. According to the learned counsel, such unilateral correction made only at the time of filing the execution petition amounts to fraud and can be challenged even in a collateral proceeding. He places heavy reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and others, (1994) 1 SCC 1 to fortify his submission. He, therefore, contends that inasmuch as the learned Civil Judge has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in her by law or, at any rate, has acted with material irregularity, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law and is, therefore, liable to set aside. 4. On other hand, Mr. B.N. Majumder, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the impugned order has been passed by the executing court after considering all aspects of the matter and does not call for the interference of this Court. According to the learned counsel, the correction of the boundary of the suit land was made as the petitioner did not raise any objection as evident from the observation of the executing court in the impugned order, and no fraud, therefore, was played by the respondent when the suit boundary was corrected. He also contends that the application filed by the petitioner under Section 47, CPC is not maintainable inasmuch as the grievance raised by the petitioner has nothing to do with the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. He also maintains that the provisions of Order 21 Rule 97 or 99 CPC are equally not applicable inasmuch as the scheme of Order 21, Rule 97 to 101 does not contemplate the filing of an application by the judgment-debtor, and complaint of resistance or obstruction to obtaining possession of the suit property can be made only by the decree-holder. He therefore, strenuously urges this Court to dismiss the revision petition which has no merit. 5. Section 47, CPC enacts that the court executing the decree shall determine all questions arising between the parties to the suit or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and not by a separate suit. The provisions of Section 47, CPC read thus: “47. 5. Section 47, CPC enacts that the court executing the decree shall determine all questions arising between the parties to the suit or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and not by a separate suit. The provisions of Section 47, CPC read thus: “47. Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree.—(1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. (2) * * * (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court. Explanation I.—For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit. Explanation II.—(a) For the purposes of this section, a purchaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree is passed; and (b) all questions relating to the delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser or his representative shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of this section. In order that this section may apply, the following conditions must be fulfilled: (a) the question must be one arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree is passed, or their representatives; and (b) it must relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.” 6. The aforesaid two conditions must be satisfied cumulatively. The expression “relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree” has not been defined in the Code. It is, nevertheless, comprehensive enough to include any question which furthers, hinders or in any manner affects the execution of the decree. Each and every question raised by a party to the suit cannot be considered by the executing court even if it may relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. It is, nevertheless, comprehensive enough to include any question which furthers, hinders or in any manner affects the execution of the decree. Each and every question raised by a party to the suit cannot be considered by the executing court even if it may relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Such questions must arise in the course of execution and must relate to the enforcement of obligations created by the decree and should be referable to matters arising subsequent to the passing of the decree. In other words, the questions contemplated by Section 47 are those questions which were not raised at the trial and not decided by the court. If a question was raised before the court and was decided at the trial, it is not open to the parties to raise it again at the stage of execution. Likewise, a question cannot be raised before the executing court if such question ought to have been raised by a party before the trial court but he omits to raise it.- See Jai Narain v. Kedar Nath, AIR 1956 SC 359 ; Shreevastava v. Veena, AIR 1967 SC 1193 ; Union of India v. All 225 and Hanifa v. Salima, AIR 1992 Mad 111 . 7. In the instant case, the issue regarding the correction of the boundary of the suit land was already decided by the executing court in the same execution proceeding in the presence of the learned counsel for both the parties as evident from the observation of the executing court, which recorded that “the boundary of the suit land was corrected without any objection from the present J.D. At that stage, no objection was raised by the JD”. As for the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the boundary of the suit land was fraudulently changed without her knowledge, fraud vitiates the decree, which cannot be executed, there can be no quarrel with the proposition of law that any decree obtained by fraud is a nullity and can be questioned even in a collateral proceeding. However, the law is also equally settled that a decree obtained by fraud can be ignored if such fraud is extrinsic. However, the law is also equally settled that a decree obtained by fraud can be ignored if such fraud is extrinsic. In other words, if by reasonable exercise of diligence, the fraud could be detected even during the pendency of the proceedings, it cannot be said that there was extrinsic fraud and the decree cannot be avoided on the ground of fraud. As already noticed, the petitioner did not raise any objection when the boundary of the suit land was corrected/changed by the executing court itself and cannot, therefore, subsequently question the propriety or legality of such correction; there is thus no fraud as claimed by the petitioner. It is a settled law that the correctness of facts recorded by a court of law in a judicial proceeding is sacrosanct and cannot be questioned at a belated stage. In my opinion, the correct legal position is, with due respect, propounded by Black, J, in Baker v. Wads Worth, (1989) 67 LJQB 301, [quoted in Code of Civil Procedure by CK Thakker, First Edn., pp.750], in the following manner: “To entitle a party to have a judgment vacated, he must show a sufficient reason why he did not assert and enforce his right at the proper time and in regular manner and that his whole conduct throughout has been from fraud or in turpitude and he must free himself from all imputation of laches for the judgment will not be disturbed if it appears to have been entertained as a result of his own needlessness or sloth or lack of diligence in protecting his own interest.” 8. Coming now to Order 21, Rule 97, CPC, this provision enables the decree holder or auction-purchaser to apply to the executing court if he is resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession of such property by “any person‘. The term “any person” admittedly includes a judgment-debtor. The court on receipt of such application proceeds to adjudicate it. Rule 101 requires the court to make full-fledged inquiry and determine all questions relating to right, title and interest in the property arising between the parties to the proceeding or their representatives. The court will then pass an order upon such adjudication. The legal position is summed up by the Apex Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhury v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, (1997) 3 SCC 694 in the following manner: “8. The court will then pass an order upon such adjudication. The legal position is summed up by the Apex Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhury v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, (1997) 3 SCC 694 in the following manner: “8. A conjoint reading of Order 21, Rules 97, 98, 99 and 101 projects the following picture: (1) If a decree-holder is resisted or obstructed in execution of the decree for possession with the result that the decree for possession could not be executed in the normal manner by obtaining warrant for possession under Order 21, Rule 35 then the decree-holder has to move an application under Order 21, Rule 97 for removal of such obstruction and after hearing the decree-holder and the obstructionist the court can pass appropriate orders after adjudicating upon the controversy between the parties as enjoined by Order 21, Rule 97, sub-rule (2) read with Order 21, Rule 98. It is obvious that after such adjudication if it is found that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without a just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf then such obstruction or resistance would be removed as per Order 21, Rule 98, sub-rule (2) and the decree-holder would be permitted to be put in possession. Even in such an eventuality the order passed would be treated as a decree under Order 21, Rule 101 and no separate suit would lie against such order meaning thereby the only remedy would be to prefer an appeal before the appropriate appellate court against such deemed decree. (2) * * *” 9. It must not be overlooked that Order 21, Rules 97 to 103 as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 must be liberally construed and broadly bearing in mind the intention of Parliament that the amendments have been affected to enable decree-holders to realize the fruits of the decrees passed in their favor as early as possible. In the case at hand, it has been found that the petitioner has absolutely no lawful basis for resisting or obstructing the taking over of possession of the suit land in accordance with the decree passed by the trial court. In the case at hand, it has been found that the petitioner has absolutely no lawful basis for resisting or obstructing the taking over of possession of the suit land in accordance with the decree passed by the trial court. The kind of application filed by the petitioner to prevent the petitioner from taking possession of the suit land, which he has obtained by a decree lawfully passed by a competent court of jurisdiction, which has not been disturbed by a higher court, has the effect of depriving him of the fruits of his litigation. If such type of application is encouraged, the faith of the public in the judicial process to seek judicial remedies will be shaken, as some of them already had; there is speedy implementation of the decree of courts should be the objective of an executing court. This case reminds me of the observations of the Apex Court in Shreenath and another v. Rajesh and others, (1998) 4 SCC 543 , which read thus: “The seeker of justice many a time has to take long circuitous routes, both on account of hierarchy of courts and the procedural law. Such persons are and can be dragged till the last ladder of the said hierarchy for receiving justice but even here he only breathes fear of receiving the fruits of that justice for which he has been aspiring to receive. The reach to this stage is in itself an achievement and satisfaction as he, by then has passed through a long arduous journey of the procedural law with many hurdles replica of mountain terrain with ridges and furrows. When he is ready to take the bite of that fruit, he has to pass through the same terrain of the procedural law in the execution proceedings the morose is writ large on his face. What looked inevitable to him to receive it at his hands distance is deluded back into the horizon. The creation of the hierarchy of courts was for a reasonable objective for conferring greater satisfaction to the parties that errors, if any, by any of the lower courts under the scrutiny of a higher court be rectified and long procedural laws also with good intention to exclude and filter out all unwanted who may be the cause of obstruction to such seeker in his journey to justice. But this obviously is one of the causes of delay in justice. Of course, under this pattern the party wrongfully gaining within permissible limits also stretches the litigation as much as possible. Thus this has been the cause of anxiety and concern of various authorities, legislators and courts. How to eliminate such a long consuming justice? We must confess that we have still to go a long way before true satisfaction in this regard is received. Even after one reaches the stage of final decree, he has to undergo a long distance by passing through the ordained procedure in the execution proceedings before he receives the bowl of justice.” 10. Need I say more? There is, therefore, no merit in this revision petition, which is hereby dismissed. The executing court is directed to speed up the execution process and complete the same without further delay. The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. Transmit the L.C. record forthwith.