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2016 DIGILAW 3066 (PNJ)

Satnam Singh v. State of Haryana

2016-10-27

SUDIP AHLUWALIA, SURYA KANT

body2016
JUDGMENT Mr. Surya Kant, J.: - This common order shall dispose of the above-captioned Misc. Applications alongwith the main cases as the solitary question raised at the time of final hearing revolves around the applicability of Section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short ‘the 2013 Act’). 2. It may be noticed at the outset that initially the writ petitions were filed challenging the Notifications dated 03.03.2003 and 02.03.2004 issued under Sections 4 & 6, respectively, of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the 1894 Act’), as well as Award dated 20.12.2006 in respect of acquisition of about 22 acres of land situated within the revenue estate of villages Badshahpur, Ghasola, Adampur, Tigra and Tikri, Tehsil and District Gurgaon, which was acquired for the development of Residential, Commercial and Institutional Sectors 49 and 50 at Gurgaon. Besides questioning the acquisition, the petitioners/land-owners also seek a direction to grant them Licence for setting up Cyber Parks, for which they have applied in collaboration with the private-builder-cum-developer who has also joined them as a co-petitioner. 3. These writ petitions were dismissed by this Court on 22.12.2009. The matter was taken up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court and vide order dated 10.12.2013, it has been remanded back to this Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The order of status-quo passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with respect to possession has also been allowed to operate till the decision of these writ petitions. After the matter was remanded, the petitioners have filed their respective applications purportedly under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 151 CPC to decide their main cases in terms of the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, as according to them, the impugned acquisition proceedings are deemed to have lapsed. 4. It would be useful to briefly refer the factual matrix for the correct appreciation of the petitioners’ claim that the acquisition of their lands is deemed to have lapsed by virtue of legal fiction created under Section 24(2) of the 2013 At. 5. CWP No.17464 of 2007 (Lead Case) The petitioners have moved Civil Misc. No.3399 of 2014 seeking declaration that the acquisition qua their land is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. 5. CWP No.17464 of 2007 (Lead Case) The petitioners have moved Civil Misc. No.3399 of 2014 seeking declaration that the acquisition qua their land is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. As per the averments made in para Nos.9, 10 & 11, (i) the physical possession of the land has been concededly not taken by the Government; (ii) the Award was passed more than five years prior to coming into force of 2013 Act; and (iii) neither the compensation amount has been paid to the petitioners nor the Land Acquisition Collector deposited the same in the Court to which reference under Section 18 of 1894 Act may be made. 6. The Land Acquisition Collector, Urban Estates, Haryana, Gurgaon, has filed his reply-affidavit dated 25.05.2015 disputing the claim of petitioners as according to him, (i) “physical possession of the acquired land was taken vide Rapat No.225 dated 20.12.2006 and handed-over to the representative of Estate Officer, HUDA, Gurgaon. The Estate Officer-II, HUDA, Gurgaon is still in possession of the acquired land till today….”; (ii) the compensation amount of Rs.48,26,854./-in Award No.35 dated 20.12.2006 and of Rs.07,42,500/- in Award No.15 dated 21.07.2003 of the petitioners which they did not accept, has been deposited in the bank account of the Land Acquisition Collector and is thus, available for payment immediately on demand of land-owners…; (iii) now in view of further amendment in 2013 Act, whereby second proviso to Section 24(2) has been added on 31.12.2014, the proceedings would not lapse if the compensation was lying deposited in the account of Land Acquisition Collector; (iv) the petitioners’ land was acquired for the bonafide public purpose of development of Sectors 49 & 50, Urban Estate, Gurgaon and if their lands are left out, it will completely jeopardize the regulated development of the urban area, besides affecting various public amenities. 7. 7. In the connected cases also, the petitioners have applied for the grant of benefit of Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act as per the following details:- (i) CM No.3393 of 2014 in CWP No.17465 of 2007; (ii) CM No.3388 of 2014 in CWP No.17466 of 2016; (iii) CM No.3397 of 2014 in CWP No.17467 of 2016; (iv) CM No.3396 of 2014 in CWP No.17468 of 2016; (v) CM No.3392 of 2014 in CWP No.17469 of 2016; (vi) CM No.3390 of 2014 in CWP No.17470 of 2016 and (vii) CM No.3391 of 2014 in CWP No.17471 of 2016. In all these applications, the averments made are identical to those contained in the application moved in the lead case. Similarly, the Land Acquisition Collector has also filed his reply-affidavit to each application reiterating his stand taken in the reply filed by him in the first case. For this precise reason, we do not deem it necessary to repeat the averments made in each application or reply thereto. COMMON PLEADINGS: 8. The petitioners have filed rejoinders to the replies of Land Acquisition Collector, reiterating their physical possession on the acquired lands. According to them, only ‘paper possession’ was given by the Land Acquisition Collector to the Estate Officer, HUDA at the time announcement of award. They have explained that when the writ petitions came up for preliminary hearing on 17.11.2007, this Court while issuing notice to the respondents ordered that “it is expected that the State would not take possession of the land in dispute till the next date of hearing”. On December 06, 2007, it was further directed that “the observations of the Court on dispossession made in the order dated 17.11.2007 shall have effect till the next date of hearing”. Those interim directions continued to operate till the writ petitions were dismissed. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court granted ad-interim stay directing the parties to maintain status-quo re: possession and while remanding the cases back to this Court, the order of status-quo has been kept operative till the decision of writ petitions. It is further explained that at no point of time the respondents claimed that ‘physical possession’ of the acquired land was taken by them on December 20, 2006 when Award was announced or thereafter. 9. It is further explained that at no point of time the respondents claimed that ‘physical possession’ of the acquired land was taken by them on December 20, 2006 when Award was announced or thereafter. 9. In the light of the above-noticed, partly disputed and partly admitted facts, the question that falls for determination is whether the impugned acquisition qua the land of petitioners is liable to be declared to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act? BRIEF REFERENCE TO RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF OLD AND NEW ACTS:- 10. Section 31 of 1894 Act obligated that on making an Award under Section 11 of the Act, the Collector shall tender payment of compensation to the persons entitled thereto as per the said Award and if such persons do not consent to receive the compensation amount or if there be no person to receive the same or there is any dispute with regard to the title of acquired property, the Collector shall deposit the amount of compensation “in the Court to which Reference under Section 18 of the Act would be submitted…” The 1894 Act thus contemplated only two modes of payment of compensation amount, namely, where the affected land-owner agrees to receive it, the Collector shall make payment to him but if such land-owner does not agree to receive the compensation amount, the same was required to be deposited in the Court where Reference under Section 18 of the Act was maintainable. 11. The 1894 Act has since been repealed w.e.f. 01.01.2014 and stands replaced by 2013 Act, which has been brought into force with the object to introduce a humane, participative, informed and transparent process for land acquisition..... with an ultimate goal “for ensuring that the cumulative outcome of compulsory acquisition should be that affected persons become partners in development leading to an improvement in their post-acquisition social and economic status…..” 12. Section 24 of 2013 Act deals with eventualities where land acquisition process initiated under the 1894 Act shall be deemed to have lapsed. with an ultimate goal “for ensuring that the cumulative outcome of compulsory acquisition should be that affected persons become partners in development leading to an improvement in their post-acquisition social and economic status…..” 12. Section 24 of 2013 Act deals with eventualities where land acquisition process initiated under the 1894 Act shall be deemed to have lapsed. Its sub-section (1) says that notwithstanding anything contained in the new Act, the land acquisition proceedings initiated under 1894 Act where no Award under Section 11 of the said Act was made, shall be dealt with under the new Act so far as the same relates to determination of compensation but if the Award has been made under Section 11 of 1894 Act, in that event, such proceedings shall continue under the old Act on the premise that the said Act has not been repealed. 13. Sub-section (2) is an exception to sub-section (1) of Section 24 and it reads as follows: “...24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases: (1) xx xx xx xx (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with this Act...” 14. The plain reading of sub-section (2) of Section 24 unveils that the acquisition made under the provisions of 1894 Act “shall be deemed to have lapsed” (i) where the Award under that Act was made five years or more before the commencement of the new Act but physical possession of the acquired land has not been taken; (ii) or no compensation has been paid for a period of five years before the New Act came into force. 15. 15. There would thus be two categories of cases seeking declaration that the acquisition shall be deemed to have lapsed, namely, (i) where the State or its agencies have not taken “physical possession” of the acquired property though the Award was passed five years or more prior to the commencement of new Act w.e.f. 01.01.2014 or (ii) the compensation amount has not been ‘paid’ to the expropriated owners or persons interested within such stipulated period. Both these expressions embedded in Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act have been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. 16. The first land-mark is Pune Municipal Corporation and another versus Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and others, (2014) 3 SCC, 183 and it explains the expression “compensation has not been paid”. The word ‘Paid’ has been interpreted “with reference to Section 31 of 1894 Act”, to hold that “Section 31(1) enjoys upon the Collector, on making Award under Section 11, to tender payment of compensation to the persons interested/entitled thereto according to the Award or if there is any contingency illustrated in sub-section (2) thereof, then the Collector is required to deposit the compensation amount in the Court to which Reference under Section 18 of 1894 Act may be made..” There being no other mode of payment of compensation prescribed under Section 31 of 1894 Act, the deposit of compensation amount in the Government Treasury cannot be equivalent to the payment of compensation to the landowners/ persons interested and thus the deposit in Government Treasury has been held to be of no avail in the context of applicability of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. 17. In Union of India and others versus Shiv Raj and others, (2014)6 SCC 564 , the compensation amount was deposited with the Revenue Department instead of the Court before whom Reference under Section 18 of 1894 Act was maintainable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “deposit of the said amount may not be a deemed payment within the meaning of Section 31 of 1894 Act, hence the acquisition proceedings must be deemed to have lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act”. 18. In Bimla Devi and others versus State of Haryana and another, (2014) 6 SCC 586 , the land was acquired vide Award dated 18.11.1995 but neither the compensation was ‘paid’ till 31.01.2014 nor the physical possession of acquired property was taken. 18. In Bimla Devi and others versus State of Haryana and another, (2014) 6 SCC 586 , the land was acquired vide Award dated 18.11.1995 but neither the compensation was ‘paid’ till 31.01.2014 nor the physical possession of acquired property was taken. The Apex Court invoked Section 24(2) of the New Act and declared that the acquisition shall be deemed to have lapsed. 19. In Sita Ram versus State of Haryana and another, (2015) 3 SCC 595, it was brought to the notice of Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Award was announced by the Land Acquisition Collector on 08.10.2003 whereas the compensation was deposited in the Court on 09.04.2014, i.e., after the commencement of the new Act and more than five years after the Award was passed. In view of the undisputed facts, the acquisition proceedings were declared to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. To the same effect are the decisions in (i) Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others versus Jagjit Singh and others, (2015) 8 SCC 544 ; (ii) Rattan Singh versus Union of India and another, 2015 SCC Online SC 1287 and; (iii) Vijay Latka and another versus State of Haryana and others, 2 016 SCC Online SC 503. 20. Hon’ble Supreme Court has recently re-visited its decision in Pune Municipal Corporation’s case (supra) in Civil Appeal No.5811 of 2015 (Delhi Development Authority versus Sukhbir Singh and others), d ecided on 09.09.2016, 2016 AIR (SC) 4275 . Having found it as a matter of fact that the Delhi Development Authority for whom the land was acquired, handed-over compensation amount to the Land Acquisition Collector five years after the Award was pronounced and such amount was never paid to the expropriated owners, the Apex Court re-enforced the principles it laid down in Pune Municipal Corporation’s case (supra) and has summed up saying that:- “....14. The picture that therefore emerges on a reading of Section 24(2) is that the State has no business to expropriate from a citizen his property if an award has bee made and the necessary steps to complete acquisition have not been taken for a period of five years or more. There steps include the taking of physical possession of land and payment of compensation. There steps include the taking of physical possession of land and payment of compensation. What the legislature is in effect telling the executive is that they ought to have put their house in order and completed the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time after pronouncement of award. Not having done so even after a leeway of five years is given, would cross the limits of legislative tolerance, after which the whole proceeding would be deemed to have lapsed. It is important to notice that the Section gets attracted if the acquisition proceeding is not completed within five years after pronouncement of the award. This may happen either because physical possession of the land has not been taken or because compensation has not been paid, within the said period of five years. A faint submission to the effect that ‘or’ should be read as ‘and’ must be turned down for two reasons. The plain natural meaning of the sub-section does not lead to any absurdity for us to replace language advisedly used by the Legislature. Secondly, the object of the Act and Section 24 in particular, is that in case an award has been made for five years or more, possession ought to have been taken within this period, or else it is statutorily presumed that the balance between the citizen’s right to retain his own property and the right of the State to expropriate it for a public purpose gets so disturbed as to make the acquisition proceedings lapse. Alternatively, if compensation has not been paid within this period, it is also statutorily presumed that the aforesaid balance gets disturbed so as to free such property from acquisition...” (emphasis applied) 21. On the second issue, namely, where physical possession of the acquired land has not been taken within a period of five years after passing of the Award and before the new Act came into force, it appears that such like matters can be broadly classified in the following three groups:- (1) Where the acquired property is a building/structure like residential house, commercial or industrial premises etc. and the State authorities have made no efforts to dispossess the person interested/expropriated owners after acquiring such properties; (2) Where the acquired property comprises vacant and open land and only ‘paper possession’ was taken but ‘physical possession’ continued with the land-losers; and (3) Where the State could not dispossess the person interested/expropriated owner from the acquired building/structure or the vacant open land due to stay against dispossession granted by the Court of law. There might be yet another category of cases where there is a serious dispute between the parties on facts whether or not physical possession has been taken by the State or its agencies. We, however, do not propose to express any views on this possible fourth category, for such a controversy has not arisen in the cases so far heard by us. 22. Category No.(1) As regard to the first group of cases, it is by now well settled that wherever State authorities have failed to act upon and allowed the affected owners/occupiers to retain possession of the acquired property for a period of five years or more from the date of passing the Award and before the new Act came into force, such acquisition shall be deemed to have lapsed. We may, in this regard, rely upon the decisions in (i) Bharat Kumar versus State of Haryana and others, (2014) 6 SCC 586 , where acquisition was declared to have lapsed on both counts, namely, physical possession of the land was not taken and the compensation amount was also not paid to the affected owners; (ii) Union of India and others versus Shiv Raj and others, (2014) 6 SCC 564 where physical possession of the acquired property continued with the expropriated owners for the period as contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act. 23. There are several other decisions passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as different High Courts reiterating these very principles which are not being cited to avoid multiplicity. 24. In view of the settled position, there is no difficulty in answering the question re: first category of cases and to hold that wherever the person interested/land-owner has been allowed to retain possession of the acquired property for a period of five years or more before commencement of 2013 Act, all such acquisitions shall be deemed to have lapsed. 25. In view of the settled position, there is no difficulty in answering the question re: first category of cases and to hold that wherever the person interested/land-owner has been allowed to retain possession of the acquired property for a period of five years or more before commencement of 2013 Act, all such acquisitions shall be deemed to have lapsed. 25. Category No.(2) For attracting Section 24(2) of 2013 Act qua the acquisition of vacant and open land, the parameters laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court firstly in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat versus State of Haryana and others, (2012) 1 SCC 792 and again re-iterated recently in Delhi Development Authority’s case (supra), will have to be meticulously observed. In Raghbir Singh Sehrawat’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that : “(i) no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land. (ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State authority concerned to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking of possession. (iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/ structure exists, mere going on the spot by the authority concerned will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the authority concerned will have to give notice to the occupier of the building/structure or the person who has cultivated the land and take possession in the presence of independent witnesses and get their signatures on the panchnama. Of course, refusal of the owner of the land or building/ structure may not lead to an inference that the possession of the acquired land has not been taken. (iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such document. (iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such document. (v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/ instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3-A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilized in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the Court may reasonably presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken....” 26. Somewhat similar and/or additional guidelines have been set out in the decisions in (i) Velaxan Kumar versus Union of India and o thers, 2015 (1) RCR (Civil) 404 ; (ii) M/s Magnum Promoters Pvt. Ltd. versus Union of India and others, (2015) 3 SCC 327 and; Banda Development Authority versus Moti Lal Agarwal, 2011 (3) RCR (Civil) 5 30 , laying down that even if possession is said to have been taken by way of ‘Panchnama’, it must have been attested by independent witnesses and that ‘symbolic possession’ is not equivalent to ‘physical possession’ of the acquired property. 27. Each case of vacant and open land has to be thus dealt within the periphery of cited guidelines. These principles of course are inconsequential and not attracted in a case where the property under acquisition though is vacant and open land but the compensation amount was not deposited in accordance with Section 31(2) in the Court where Reference under Section 18 of 1894 Act was maintainable, for in those cases the acquisition would lapse on the very basis of non-payment of compensation. What is the Legal Effect of 2 n d Proviso Added to Section 24(2) of the New Act? 28. In all fairness, the plea taken by the Collector that with the addition of 2nd proviso to Section 24(2) of 2013 Act w.e.f. 31.12.2014, the compensation amount lying deposited in the account maintained by his office would be sufficient and valid compliance of Section 31(2) of 1894 Act may also be dealt with at this stage. 28. In all fairness, the plea taken by the Collector that with the addition of 2nd proviso to Section 24(2) of 2013 Act w.e.f. 31.12.2014, the compensation amount lying deposited in the account maintained by his office would be sufficient and valid compliance of Section 31(2) of 1894 Act may also be dealt with at this stage. The Ordinance No.9 of 2014, published in Gazette on 31.08.2014, led to the addition of following proviso after the existing proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act:- “Provided further that in computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or period during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction issued by any Court or the period specified in the award of a Tribunal for taking possession of such period where possession has been taken but the compensation lying deposited in a court or in any account maintained for this purpose shall be excluded....” 29. Clause [1](2) of the Ordinance nevertheless expressly says that “it shall come into force at once”. The Legislature has thus very consciously introduced the above reproduced 2nd proviso prospectively only and it does not alter the legal position as on 01.01.2014 when the new Act came into force and the legal fiction created by its Section 24(2) became operative at once. 30. The controversy on this aspect has also been set at rest. In R.Radhakrishnan and others versus The Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu and others, (2015) 1 SCALE 590. The Apex Court has held that right conferred to land-owners under Section 24(2) is a statutory right and it cannot be taken away by inserting ‘proviso’ in the said sub-section through an Ordinance without giving retrospective effect to the same. M/s Radiance Fincap (P) Ltd. & others versus Union of India and others, 2015 (6) RCR (Civil) 60 re-iterates the same principle. In Karnail Kaur and others versus State of Punjab and others, 2015 SCC Online SC 59 also re-enforce the same view and hold that the Ordinance would not be applicable to the cases which were pending much prior thereto and also the applications under Section 24(2) had been filed prior to the addition in Section 24(2) as the Ordinance is prospective in operation. The defence taken by the Land Acquisition Collector on the strength of the added proviso thus has not merit and is rejected. 31. Category No.(3) Adverting to the cases which fall in Category No.(3), it is true that the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 12.01.2016 passed in Yogesh Neema and others versus State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (2016) 6 SCC 387 has referred the matter to a Larger Bench to re-consider the legal effect of the absence of any specific exclusion of the period covered by an interim order of the Court, in the context of Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act. Such a reconsideration is required to be made, as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, keeping in view the maxim of ‘Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit’. 32. Learned counsel for the petitioners nonetheless relied upon the decisions in (i) Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association versus State of Tamil Nadu and others, (2015) 3 SCC 353 ; (ii) Rajiv Chowdhrie HUF v ersus Union of India and others, 2014 SCC Online 990 ; (iii) Sharma A gro Industries versus State of Haryana and others, (2015) 3 SCC 341 ; and (iv) Yogesh Neema and others versus State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (2016) 6 SCC 387 to urge that the period of Court-stay or injunction need not to be excluded while computing the period of 5 years within the meaning of Section 24(2) of the Act and that in a case where physical possession of the land could not be taken by the State due to interim stay granted by the Court, there also the acquisition shall be deemed to have lapsed. 33. This Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that as of now the above cited decisions explicitly hold that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act will apply with full force even if the expropriated owner/occupier retained the possession for relevant period under the stay order passed by a Court. These are binding precedents. 34. State of Maharashtra and another versus Sarva Shramik Sangh, Sangli and others (2013) 16 SCC 16 , unequivocally holds that where the Supreme Court has doubted the correctness of its own judgment and referred the matter before a Larger Bench, the earlier judgment on a point of law has to be followed and it will have the binding force within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. We are thus of the view that until the Hon’ble Supreme Court lays down otherwise, the decisions cited in para No.32 of this order are binding on this Court on the interpretation of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act on the question of ‘exclusion’ or ‘inclusion’ of the period of stay or injunction against dispossession granted by a Court. 35. We may now determine the fate of the cases in hand in the light of the discussion held above. It is an admitted fact that the petitioners neither consented to receive nor they actually received the compensation amount. It is also not in dispute that the compensation amount was never deposited in the Court before whom reference under Section 18 was maintainable, within the meaning of Section 31(2) of 1894 Act. It is also a matter of record that such amount remained lying with the Land Acquisition Collector and thus fell far short of the expression “paid” as interpreted in Pune Municipal Corporation and another’s case (supra). 36. The Award in these cases was admittedly passed on 20.12.2006. The period of five years or more lapsed much before 01.01.2014 when the new Act came into force. No amount of compensation was deposited in accordance with Section 31(2) of 1894 Act with the Court concerned before 01.01.2014. The newly added 2nd proviso to Section 24(2) does not rescue the respondents, for it cannot take away a right which accrued well before such provision came into existence. Consequently, it is held that wherever the compensation amount has not been deposited for a period of five years or more after the date of passing of Award and before 01.01.2014, the acquisition shall be deemed to have lapsed irrespective of the fact whether the case falls in category no.(1) or (2) above. 37. For the reasons afore-stated, the applications filed by the petitioners to declare that the acquisition of their land/properties shall be deemed to have lapsed on the ground that the compensation amount has not been paid to them in accordance with Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act, as interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pune Municipal Corporation and Delhi Development Authority’s cases (supra), are allowed and it is declared that acquisition of their lands made vide notifications dated 03.03.2003 and 02.03.2004 and Award dated 20.12.2006 is deemed to have lapsed. 38. 38. Having held so, we are surely of the view that since Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act itself, in so many words, contemplates the possibility of reacquisition of the land/property in respect whereof the previous acquisition has lapsed, it is necessary to direct the petitioners to maintain status quo re: creation of third party rights; to keep the land/property free from all types of incumbrances and not to change the nature of land/property for a period of one year so that meanwhile the respondent-State may, if such property is needed for a “public purpose”, again acquire it. Such a direction is necessitated also for the reason that in numerous cases State or its agencies have taken possession in part and development works have been executed except over that land/property in litigation. Those development works ought to be completed in public interest and the only consequence of lapsing of previous acquisition, mostly due to fault of the Government Officers/ Officials, would be that the owners of such land/property will be entitled to compensation and other benefits admissible under the 2013 Act. 39. The prayer of the petitioners to direct the State of Haryana to consider or grant them License(s) under the provisions of Haryana Urban Development Act, 1975, to develop the land in dispute has to be rejected at this stage being pre-mature. Ordered accordingly. 40. Subject to the directions given in para [38] above, the writ petitions are allowed and the impugned acquisition is declared to have lapsed.