JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ritu Raj Awasthi, J.—Heard Mr.R.U.Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr.I.D.Shukla, learned counsel for the respondent 1/1 and Mr. Abhinandan Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2/2. No one has put in appearance on behalf of respondent No. 2/1. 2. This second appeal has been filed under Section 100 C.P.C. by the appellant/defendant against the judgment and decree dated 22.1.1986 passed by the Special/Additional District Judge, Sultanpur, allowing the Civil Appeal No. 148/84 filed by the respondent No. 1 against the judgment and decree dated 29.8.1984 passed by the Munsif (North), Sultanpur by means of which the Suit No. 427 of 1981 filed by the respondent No. 1 for specific performance of contract was dismissed. 3. As per the facts in brief, allegedly an agreement for sale dated 24.1.1979 was entered between the appellant (first party) and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (second party) for executing a sale-deed in respect of part of land bearing Plot Nos. 1280 and 1281 situated in Village Manauli, Pargana Musafir Khana, District Sultanpur and a sum of Rs. 2000/- was paid by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 (purchaser) to the appellant (seller) and the sale-deed was to be executed within two years after necessary correction is got made in the revenue records. The respondent No. 2/Smt. Shivkala was also impleaded as one of the defendant alongwith the appellant in the suit filed by the respondent No. 1. 4. As per the case of respondents in the plaint the appellant wanted to execute a sale-deed of half his share in Plot No. 1280, however he failed to execute the sale-deed despite necessary notices given to him on 25.8.1981 and 23.10.1981, with the result a suit for specific performance was filed by the respondent/plaintiff. It was also pleaded that the respondent/plaintiff was always willing to perform his part of contract. It was alleged in the plaint that correction in the revenue papers regarding Plot No. 1281 has not been made hence the plot No. 1281 was not included in the suit. 5. The suit was contested by the appellant/defendant by filing written statement. He had denied to have executed the agreement for sale. It was pleaded that the plaintiff had obtained his thumb impression by practicing fraud and he had no knowledge of the same. 5. The suit was contested by the appellant/defendant by filing written statement. He had denied to have executed the agreement for sale. It was pleaded that the plaintiff had obtained his thumb impression by practicing fraud and he had no knowledge of the same. He used to work as Halwaha with the plaintiff and taking advantage of appellant/defendant’s illiteracy and by misusing his influence the respondent No. 1 by playing fraud had allegedly got the said agreement for sale registered, hence the same is not binding on him. It was also pleaded that the suit is liable to abate due to the fact that the notification under Section 4 of U.P.C.H. Act has taken place in the village where the land in dispute exists and no permission under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of U.P.C.H. Act, which was operative at that time, was obtained. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court had framed seven issues in the suit, translation of which is reproduced below : “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the sale-deed executed of disputed Araji (property) to defendant No. 2 on the basis of the agreement mentioned at the end of the plaint. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get Rs. 2000/- from defendant No. 2, as alleged in the plaint. 3. Whether the suit is time barred? 4. Whether the plaint is liable to be abated under Section 5(2) of Uttar Pradesh Consolidation Act. 5. Whether the suit has been under valued and less Court fee has been paid? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get any relief. 7. Whether the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 had entered into an agreement for sale of the land in dispute on 24.1.1979, as alleged in the plaint.” 7. The learned trial Court in its findings has decided the issue No. 3, which relates to the plea of suit being barred by time in negative. The issue No. 4 relating to abatement of the suit under Section 5(2), U.P.C.H. Act, has also been decided in negative. Issue No. 5, relating to valuation and payment of Court fee, was also decided in the negative. Issue No. 7 relates to execution of agreement for sale dated 24.1.1979 which has been decided in the affirmative. The issue No. 4 relating to abatement of the suit under Section 5(2), U.P.C.H. Act, has also been decided in negative. Issue No. 5, relating to valuation and payment of Court fee, was also decided in the negative. Issue No. 7 relates to execution of agreement for sale dated 24.1.1979 which has been decided in the affirmative. Issue No. 1 relates to the fact whether the plaintiff was entitled to get the sale-deed executed in his favour and Issue No. 2 relates to the fact as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to receive back Rs. 2000/- from the appellant/defendant and Issue No. 6 relates to the relief. 8. The learned trial Court found on issue Nos. 1 and 2 that since the part of holdings is sought to be sold in the absence of any permission under Section 5(1)(c)(ii), U.P.C.H. Act, which was necessary, the execution for sale-deed is not enforceable and held that respondent/plaintiff is entitled to get back Rs. 2000/- within one month, failing which simple interest at the rate of 6% shall be payable. 9. The first appellate Court while considering the appeal filed by the respondent No. 1, had framed certain points for consideration, such as; whether the appellant/defendant has executed the agreement for sale dated 24.1.1979 and whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the sale-deed executed from the present appellant. In the cross-objection, the appellant/respondents had taken the plea that finding on Issue No. 7 which relates to the execution of agreement for sale is not correct. 10. The learned first appellate Court in its findings has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has examined himself as P.W.-1 and Mr. Arjun Prasad as P.W.-2, who is a marginal witness of the agreement for sale and Mr. M. Makkar, Hand writing and fingerprint expert as P.W.-3. Since there was no inconsistency in the statements of P.W. 1 and P.W.2 and they have stated that agreement for sale dated 24.1.1979 was executed by the appellant/Nankau with full understanding, the plea of appellant/respondent about the fraud in execution of the document is not sustainable. It was also held that the appellant has not been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the commission of fraud by the respondent No. 1. It was also held that the appellant has not been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the commission of fraud by the respondent No. 1. It has also recorded that another marginal witness, Sukhram who is said to be the Samdhi of appellant/Nankau was not examined by the appellant in the case. The first appellate Court came to the conclusion that the trial Court has rightly held that Nankau had executed the agreement for sale on 24.1.1979 in favour of plaintiffs, namely; Sami Ullah and Smt. Sheokala, respondent Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The cross objection filed by the appellant/respondent was accordingly rejected. 11. There is no doubt that the allegations of fraud are like any other criminal offence whether made in civil or criminal proceedings. which must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The suspicion alone cannot take the place of proof. The appellant has failed to prove commission of fraud in the execution of agreement for sale dated 24.1.1979 and the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court have rightly come to the conclusion that the alleged agreement dated 24.1.1979 was executed between the present appellant and respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In the alleged agreement for sale, it is mentioned that the appellant/Nankau would execute the sale-deed within two years and in this regard will take all necessary steps. The learned trial Court has come to the conclusion that the land in question is situated in the village where consolidation operations were going on and a notification under Section 4 of U.P.C.H. Act was in force. 12. The learned trial Court after coming to the conclusion that the permission under Section 5 (1) (c) (ii) of U.P.C.H. Act for execution of the sale-deed was necessary, held that since no such permission was obtained, therefore, the sale-deed was inexecutable. The learned trial Court, therefore, partly allowed the suit and allowed the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 2000/- which was paid by him to the appellant at the time of entering into the agreement for sale and directed the appellant to pay the same within one month, failing which the interest at the rate of 6% (simple interest) shall be chargeable. 13. The first appellate Court considering the evidence on record has recorded in its findings that Paper No. 15-C in appeal is the document relating to Form C.H.-2. 13. The first appellate Court considering the evidence on record has recorded in its findings that Paper No. 15-C in appeal is the document relating to Form C.H.-2. This document shows that plot No. 1280 is ‘chak out’ land. It is not in dispute that the appellant/Nankau is owner of the plot in suit. He had agreed to take all steps for executing the sale-deed in pursuance of the agreement for sale. There was no difficulty for him to obtain permission from the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, which in the present case, could have been easily obtained because the land at Plot No. 1280 was a ‘chak out’ land. 14. The first appellate Court, however, did not agree with the contention of the respondent No. 1 (appellant before the appellate Court) that no permission from the Settlement Officer of Consolidation was needed. The first appellate Court reversed the findings of the trial Court on this issue and did not agree with the findings of the trial Court that the respondent cannot get the sale-deed executed in pursuance of the agreement for sale. 15. It has been contended by learned counsel for the appellant that finding of the first appellate Court is not sustainable in the eye of law. The permission under Section 5 (1) (c) (ii) of U.P.C.H. Act was fully applicable in the present case and in the absence of such permission, the sale-deed for the land in question could not be executed. 16. It is also contended that the first appellate Court while reversing the findings in this regard has not recorded its reasons and in the absence of the same the said finding is not sustainable in the eye of law. It is also submitted that notification under Section 4 of U.P.C.H. Act was issued with respect to the village where the land in question was situated and the land in question was under consolidation proceedings at the time of agreement for sale. Section 5(1)(c) (ii) of U.P. C.H. Act clearly stipulates permission from the Settlement Officer of Consolidation in case a tenure holder transfers any part of his holdings by way of sale. It is submitted that Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of U.P.C.H. Act, at the relevant time, was in vogue and has been subsequently deleted by the amendment vide U.P. Act No. 30 of 1991 (w.e.f. 19.2.1991). 17. It is submitted that Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of U.P.C.H. Act, at the relevant time, was in vogue and has been subsequently deleted by the amendment vide U.P. Act No. 30 of 1991 (w.e.f. 19.2.1991). 17. Learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the suit was barred by Section 168-A of U.P.Z.A.& L.R Act, which prohibits transfer by sale, gift or exchange any fragment situated in consolidated area. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, on the other hand, vehemently argued that since the land in question was recorded as ‘chak out’ in the consolidation proceedings, no permission under Section 5(1) (c) (ii) of U.P. C.H. Act was required. It is also submitted that in any case the provision under Section 5(1) (c) (ii) of U.P.C.H. Act has been omitted during pendency of the second appeal and the Court shall take into consideration the necessary development in law during continuation of the proceedings initiated since filing of the suit by the respondent/plaintiff, as such, it shall be presumed that no such permission was required. 19. It is also submitted that once no permission from the Settlement Officer of Consolidation was required for execution of the sale-deed of the land in question, the learned first appellate Court has rightly allowed the suit for specific performance of contract filed by the respondent/plaintiff and has rightly directed the present appellant to execute the sale-deed in favour of the respondent No. 1, failing which the sale-deed shall be executed by the Court. It is further submitted that the change in law shall be applied and since at present no permission from Settlement Officer of Consolidation is required with respect to the sale of land in question, as such there is no legal impediment in the execution of the sale-deed for the land in question in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. 20. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent 1/1 has relied on the following judgments. 1. Ambika Prasad v. D.D.C. and others; 1987 RD 403. 2. United Bank of India, Calcutta v. Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others; (2000) 7 SCC 357 . 3. Sudhir G. Angur and others v. M. Sanjeev and others; (2006) 1 SCC141. 4. Km. Prema Devi and others v. Raja Ram; 2014(9) ADJ 754 (LB). 5. Raj Kumar and others v. Ashok Kumar Chaurasia and others; 2016(2) ADJ 672 (LB). 21. Pvt. Ltd. and others; (2000) 7 SCC 357 . 3. Sudhir G. Angur and others v. M. Sanjeev and others; (2006) 1 SCC141. 4. Km. Prema Devi and others v. Raja Ram; 2014(9) ADJ 754 (LB). 5. Raj Kumar and others v. Ashok Kumar Chaurasia and others; 2016(2) ADJ 672 (LB). 21. I have considered the submissions made by the parties’ counsel and gone through the records. 22. While admitting the second appeal the Court, as an interim measure, has provided that till further orders the appellant shall not be required to execute the sale-deed. 23. At the time of hearing the appeal following substantial questions of law have been framed for consideration: “(a) Whether the suit for specific performance of contract filed by respondent No. 1 could be decided without complying with the provisions of Section 16 (c) and without proving that the plaintiff is still ready and willing to perform his part of the contract? (b) Whether the suit for specific performance of contract could be decreed by the first appellate Court without giving any finding as to plaintiff’s the readiness and willing to perform his part of the contract on the part of the plaintiff? (c) Whether the learned first appellate Court could decree the suit for specific performance of contract without giving any finding that the agreement to sell was executed by the free will of the appellant when the respondent No. 1 was in a position to dominate the will of appellant and the fact taken undue advantage of his position? (d) Whether the learned first appellate Court not committed illegality in decreeing the suit for specific performance of contract without giving any finding about the possibility of performance when on the fact it was not capable of being performed. (e) Whether the suit for specific performance of contract could be decreed for a portion of plot which is not ascertainable nor identifiable?” 24. As per the findings recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the first appellate Court, a suit for specific performance was filed by the respondent No. 1/plaintiff within the period of limitation. Both the Courts below have also come to the conclusion that the alleged agreement for sale dated 24.1.1979 was entered into between the appellant being the seller and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as purchasers. Both the Courts below have also come to the conclusion that the alleged agreement for sale dated 24.1.1979 was entered into between the appellant being the seller and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as purchasers. The Courts below appreciating the evidence on record have categorically recorded in their findings that the plea of fraud could not be established by the appellant and there is sufficient evidence to come to the conclusion that the said sale agreement for sale was executed between the parties and got registered before the Sub Registrar. 25. I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the findings recorded by both the Courts below in this regard. 26. It is not in dispute that the land in question was under consolidation proceedings as notification under Section 4 of U.P.C.H. Act was issued for the village concerned and the land in question was under the consolidation proceedings at the time of execution of agreement for sale dated 24.1.1979 and till decision by the impugned judgment and decree, no notification under Section 52, U.P.C.H. Act for de-notification of the village or under Section 6(1), U.P.C.H. Act was issued. 27. As per the agreement for sale dated 24.1.1979, a portion of Plot No. 1280 was agreed to be sold, hence it was a sale of a portion of a consolidated plot. At the time of execution of the agreement for sale as well as at the time of filing of the suit, Section 5 (1) (c) (ii) of U.P.C.H. Act, was fully operational. Section 5(1) (c) (ii) of U.P.C.H. Act for convenience is reproduced below: 5. Effect of Declarations—Upon the publication of the notification under Section 4 in the Official Gazette, the consequences, as hereinafter set forth, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified thereunder till the publication of notification under Section 52 or sub-section (1) of Section 6, as the case may be, ensue in the area to which the declaration relates, namely: (a)...... (b)...... (c) notwithstanding anything contained in the U.P.Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, no tenure-holder, except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, previously obtained shall- (i)........ (b)...... (c) notwithstanding anything contained in the U.P.Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, no tenure-holder, except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, previously obtained shall- (i)........ (ii) transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange any part of his holding in the consolidation area : Provided that a tenure-holder may continue to use his holding, or any part thereof, for any purpose for which it was in use prior to the date specified in the notification issued under Section 4.” 28. A bare reading of the aforesaid Section clearly indicates that no tenure-holder except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, previously obtained, shall transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange any part of his holding in the consolidation area. The term ‘consolidation area’ has been defined in Section 3 (11-A) of U.P.C.H. Act and it means the ‘area’ in respect of which a notification under Section 4 of U.P.C.H. Act has been issued. The provision of Section 5, U.P.C.H. Act, as mentioned above, requires the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation when a tenure-holder transfers any part of his holding by way of sale and sub-section (2) of Section 5 (c) of the Act permits the sale of any part of his holding by a tenure-holder;meaning thereby that for execution of a sale-deed of the land in question permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation was necessary and without previously obtaining the said permission the sale-deed was inexecutable. 29. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that since Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of U.P.C.H. Act, has been deleted during pendency of the instant appeal and as such the Court has to apply the change in law and since no permission from Settlement Officer of Consolidation at present is required as such the finding recorded by the first appellate Court does not require any interference and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed is concerned, I am of the considered view that the legal position, as existing at the time of filing of the suit is required to be taken into consideration to find out as to whether any permission under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of U.P.C.H. Act, was required for the purpose of execution of sale-deed of the land in question or not. 30. In this regard, my view is supported by the following catena of decisions. 31. 30. In this regard, my view is supported by the following catena of decisions. 31. In the case of Dayawati and another v. Inderjit and others, AIR 1966 SC 1423 , the Apex Court has held that ordinarily a Court of appeal cannot take into account a new law, brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been rendered because the rights of the litigants in an appeal are determined under the law in force at the date of the suit. The relevant paragraph 10, on reproduction reads as under: “10. Now as a general proposition, it may be admitted that ordinarily a Court of appeal cannot take into account a new law, brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been rendered, because the rights of the litigants in an appeal are determined under the law in force at the date of the suit. Even before the days of Coke, whose maxim-a new law ought to be prospective,not retrospective in its operation-is oft-quoted, Courts have looked with disfavour upon laws which take away vested rights or affect pending cases. Matters of procedure are, however, different and the law affecting procedure is always retrospective’. But it does not mean that there is an absolute rule of inviolability of substantive rights. If the new law speaks in language, which, expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the Court of trial as well as the Court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the Court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the Court of first instance. The distinction between laws affecting procedure and those affecting vested rights does not matter when the Court is invited by law to take away from a successful plaintiff, what he has obtained under judgment. See Quilter v. Mapleson, (1882) 9 QBD 672 and Stovin v. Fairbrass, (1919) SS LJKB 1004, which are instances of new laws being applied. In the former the vested rights of the landlord to recover possession and in the latter the vested right of the statutory tenant to remain in possession were taken away after judgment. See also Maxwell Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edn.) pp. 211 and 213, and K.C. Mukerjee v. Mst. In the former the vested rights of the landlord to recover possession and in the latter the vested right of the statutory tenant to remain in possession were taken away after judgment. See also Maxwell Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edn.) pp. 211 and 213, and K.C. Mukerjee v. Mst. Ramaraton Kuer, 65 Ind App 47 ( AIR 1936 PC 49 ) where no saving in respect of pending suits was implied when Section 26(N) and (0) of the Bihar Tenancy Act (as amended by Bihar Tenancy Amendment Act, 1934) were clearly applicable’ to all cases without exception.” 32. In the case of Carona Ltd. v. Parvathy Swaminathan & Sons, (2007) 8 SCC 559 , in paragraph 42, the Court has come to the conclusion that the basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit. Para 42 of the judgment on reproduction reads as under: “42. In our judgment, the law is fairly settled. The basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit. Thus, if the plaintiff has no cause of action on the date of the filing of the suit, ordinarily, he will not be allowed to take advantage of the cause of the action arising subsequent to the filing of the suit. Conversely, no relief will normally be denied to the plaintiff by reason of any subsequent event it at the date of the institution of the suit, he has a substantive right to claim such relief.” 33. In the case of Raj Kumar v. Director of Education and others, (2016) 6 SCC 541 , the Apex Court has held that the rights and liabilities of the parties to the suit must be considered in accordance with the law as on the date of institution of the suit. Paragraph 53 of the judgment on reproduction reads as under: “53. Furthermore, the decision in the case of Kathuria Public School (supra) does not come to the aid of the respondents for one more reason. Undisputedly, the notice of retrenchment was served on the appellant on 7.1.2003 and he was retrenched from service on 25.7.2003. Paragraph 53 of the judgment on reproduction reads as under: “53. Furthermore, the decision in the case of Kathuria Public School (supra) does not come to the aid of the respondents for one more reason. Undisputedly, the notice of retrenchment was served on the appellant on 7.1.2003 and he was retrenched from service on 25.7.2003. The decision in the case of Kathuria Public School (supra), striking down Section 8(2) of the DSE Act was rendered almost exactly two years later, i.e. on 22.7.2005. Surely, the respondents could not have foreseen that the requirement of prior approval of the order of termination passed against the appellant from Director would be struck down later and hence decided to not comply with it. Section 8(2) of the DSE Act was very much a valid provision of the statute as on the date of the retrenchment of the appellant, and there is absolutely no reason why it should not have been complied with. The rights and liabilities of the parties to the suit must be considered in accordance with the law as on the date of the institution of the suit. This is a fairly well-settled principle of law. In the case of Dayawati v. Inderjit[12], a three judge bench of this Court held as under: (AIR p.1426, para 10).” “10. Now as a general proposition, it may be admitted that ordinarily a Court of appeal cannot take into account a new law, brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been rendered, because the rights of the litigants in an appeal are determined under the law in force at the date of the suit.” 34. On the other hand, the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondents in this regard do not support the case of the respondents. 35. On the other hand, the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondents in this regard do not support the case of the respondents. 35. In this regard, in the case of Ambika Prasad v. D.D.C. and others, 1987 RD 403, this Court while considering the question as to whether the sale-deed executed by the Court itself is void as no permission to make transfer in favour of the petitioner was obtained by him from the Settlement Officer of Consolidation under Section 5(1) (c) (ii) of U.P.C.H. Act, the Court came to the conclusion that the restrictions imposed by Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of U.P.C.H. Act, relates to transfers made by the tenure-holder voluntarily and it cannot be construed to relate to transfer made by the Court in pursuance of a decree passed in a suit for specific performance of a contract on the refusal of the judgment-debtor/tenure holder to execute the sale-deed in pursuance of the decree passed against him. The said provision cannot be construed to cast a duty upon the Court to apply for and seek permission of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation under Section 5(1) (c) (ii) of U.P.C.H. Act to execute the sale-deed. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment on reproduction read as under: “The first question which crops up for consideration in this writ petition is whether the sale-deed dated October 14, 1977 executed by Additional Munsif, Bahraich, is void as no permission to make transfer in favour of the petitioner was obtained by him from the Settlement Officer, Consolidation under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the Act or not. It was urged by the learned counsel Dr. L.P.Misra that no distinction can be drawn between the transfers made by private parties and the transfers made by Court in execution of decree for specific performance of contract passed in favour of the vendee on behalf of the defendant -judgment debtors. It was urged that upon publication of notification under sub-section (2) of Section 4 the consequence provided in the Act shall follow where the tenure holder without the permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation previously obtained makes transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange, of his holding or any part thereof in the consolidation area. It was urged that upon publication of notification under sub-section (2) of Section 4 the consequence provided in the Act shall follow where the tenure holder without the permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation previously obtained makes transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange, of his holding or any part thereof in the consolidation area. It was urged that if a transfer is made in contravention of the provisions of Section 5(1) (c) (ii) of the Act, the same shall not be valid or recognized notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being enforced to the contrary as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 45-A of the Act. There should be no distinction made between transfer made by a tenure holder on his own accord and a sale-deed executed by Court in execution of a decree for specific performance of contract or in execution of a money decree. Learned counsel, thus, contended that since in the present case the Additional Munsif had admittedly not obtained prior permission for executing the sale-deed in favour of the petitioner in respect of the land in dispute as was required under Section 5(1)(c) (ii) and, as such, the sale-deed is not valid and the petitioner cannot be said to have acquired Bhumidhari rights on its basis. At the first flash the argument appears to be attractive, but on careful scrutiny I find no merit in it. The restrictions imposed by Section 5(1)(c) (ii), in my opinion, relate to transfers made by the tenure holder voluntarily and it cannot be construed to relate to transfer made by Court in pursuance of a decree passed in a suit for specific performance of contract on the refusal of the judgment-debtor/tenure holder to execute sale-deed in pursuance of the decree passed against him. The said provision cannot be construed to cast a duty upon the Court to apply for and seek permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation under Section 5(1) (c) (ii) of the Act to execute sale-deed and there appears to be no such restriction in the matter relating to compulsory sales in execution of the decree of the Court passed in favour of decree holder. Similar question cropped up for consideration in Smt. Bhagwati v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others (1) wherin K.P. J. held: “If the tenure holder refuses to execute sale-deed in pursuance of an agreement to sell and the Civil Court is called upon to execute necessary sale-deed in favour of the decree holder, it would be too much to expect that the Civil Court should seek permission of the Settlement Officer of Consolidation for executing the necessary sale-deed in favour of the decree holder. If the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner are accepted, there are chances that the decree passed by the Civil Court would become ineffective if the Settlement Officer of Consolidation refused to grant permission. The provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act do not apply to suits for specific performance of a contract to sell as is evident from several decisions of this Court. If the bar contained in Section 5(c) (ii) is imposed upon the Civil Court, the net result would be that an unwilling tenure holder can get an opportunity to thwart the Civil Court decree in an undesirable manner.” I respectfully agree with the view expressed above and in my opinion the bar contained in Section 5(c) (ii) of the Act is only applicable to voluntary transfer made by tenure holder and it cannot be stretched to sale-deeds executed by Civil Court against the will of the tenure holder in execution of a decree for specific performance of contract in favour of decree holder. If the Civil Court executes a sale-deed against the will of the tenure holder judgment debtor, it would not at all be necessary for the Civil Court to seek permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation under Section 5(1) (c) (ii) of the Act. Similar view was expressed by S.D.Agarwal, J. in Ram Saran v. The Ist Additional District Judge, Rampur and others, wherein the vendee had purchased land in execution of a decree for sale of the land belonging to a Scheduled Caste. It was urged by the judgment-debtor that since the land could not be purchased by the auction purchaser in view of the provisions contained in the mandatory provisions of Section 157-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and, as such, the auction purchaser would not get any right in the land purchased in the auction sale in execution of Civil Court decree. This contention was repelled and it was held : “Section 157-A of the Act in terms only prohibits a Bhumidhar who is of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe from transferring by way of sale, gift or mortgage or lease any land to a person not belonging to the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe except with the previous approval of the Collector. It applied to voluntary sales. This prohibition has been made so far as the Bhumidhar is one who either belongs to the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled tribe. The prohibition is against such a Bhumidhar. It is only when a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe Bhumidhar wants to sell or transfer any land then only the previous approval of the Collector is required and not in other cases. In the instant case, the petitioner who is admittedly the Bhumidhar and belongs to a Scheduled Caste is not transferring the land to any person and as such this provision does not apply to the present case at all. In the instant case the Court would be executing a sale-deed in execution of a decree passed against the Scheduled Tribe Bhumidhar. In my opinion, therefore, the prohibition contained in Section 157-A of the Act does not prohibit in any manner the attachment and sale of the property belonging to the Scheduled Caste.” 36. In the case of United Bank of India, Calcutta v. Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others, (2000) 7 SCC 357 , the observations made in paragraphs 20, 24 and 25, have been relied. The Court in that case has come to the conclusion that it is the duty of a Court whether it is trying original proceedings or hearing an appeal to take notice of the change in law affecting pending actions and to give effect to the same. “20.Now, it is well-settled that it is the duty of a Court, whether it is trying original proceedings or hearing an appeal, to take notice of the change in law affecting pending actions and to give effect to the same. (See G.P.Singh, Interpretation of Statutes, 7th Ed.p.406). “20.Now, it is well-settled that it is the duty of a Court, whether it is trying original proceedings or hearing an appeal, to take notice of the change in law affecting pending actions and to give effect to the same. (See G.P.Singh, Interpretation of Statutes, 7th Ed.p.406). If, while a suit is pending, a law like the 1993 Act that the Civil Court shall not decide the suit, is passed, the Civil Court is bound to take judicial notice of the statute and hold that the suit - even after its remand - cannot be disposed of by it.” “24. The above result is also reached by the application of the principle of purposive construction. 25. In regard to purposive interpretation, Justice Frankfurter observed as follows: “Legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief,to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of Government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evidenced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose (“Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes) 47 Columbia LR 527 at 538) (1947)” 37. There is no dispute to the aforesaid legal proposition. The Court has to take into consideration the change in law which has occurred during pendency of the original proceedings or hearing an appeal, however where the change in law has taken place which goes to the very root of the matter and determines the rights of the parties, the Court has to take into consideration the legal position as existing at the time of filing of suit. 38. In the case of Sudhir G.Angur and others v. M. Sanjeev and others; (Supra), reliance has been placed in paragraph 11 wherein the Apex Court has observed that all procedural laws are retrospective unless the legislature expressly states to the contrary. Paragraph 11 of the judgment is reproduced below: “11. In our view, Mr. G.L. Sanghi is also right in submitting that it is the law on the date of trial of the suit which is to be applied. In support of this submission, Mr. Paragraph 11 of the judgment is reproduced below: “11. In our view, Mr. G.L. Sanghi is also right in submitting that it is the law on the date of trial of the suit which is to be applied. In support of this submission, Mr. Sanghi relied upon the judgment in Shiv Bhagwan Moti Ram Saraoji v. Onkarmal Ishar Dass; AIR 1952 Bom 365 , wherein it has been held that no party has a vested right to a particular proceeding or to a particular forum. It has been held that it is well-settled that all procedural laws are retrospective unless the legislature expressly states to the contrary. It has been held that the procedural laws in force must be applied at the date when the suit or proceeding comes on for trial or disposal. It has been held that a Court is bound to take notice of the change in the law and is bound to administer the law as it was when the suit came up for hearing. It has been held that if a Court has jurisdiction to try the suit, when it comes on for disposal, it then cannot refuse to assume jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it at the date when it was instituted. We are in complete agreement with these observations. As stated above, the Mysore Act now stands repealed. It could not be denied that now the Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit.” 39. There is no dispute to the aforesaid legal proposition, however, in the present case, at the time of institution of the suit as well as at the time of hearing, Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of U.P.C.H. Act was fully operational and the trial Court was right in taking into consideration the said provision while deciding the suit. 40. So far as the judgments of this Court in the case of Km. 40. So far as the judgments of this Court in the case of Km. Prema Devi and others v. Raja Ram (Supra) and Raj Kumar and others v. Ashok Kumar Chaurasia and others (Supra) are concerned, the Court was considering the affect of removal of bar created under Section 23 of Hindu Succession Act and had come to the conclusion that after the amendment in Hindu Succession Act, a female heir can also seek partition, although the bar of Section 23 was very much there when the suit was filed, however during pendency of the appeal Section 23, Hindu Succession Act was omitted, as such the benefit of amending Act should be available to the appellants. 41. In view of the above, the judgments relied by the counsel for the respondents are of no help to him. 42. As such, as discussed above, I am of the considered view that permission under Section 5 (1)(c)(ii) of U.P.C.H. Act was required to be obtained for execution of the sale-deed of the land in dispute and in absence of such permission the sale-deed was inexecutable. The learned trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that since the sale-deed of the land in question was inexecutable, as such the respondent is entitled to get back the amount of Rs. 2000/- which he had paid at the time of entering into the agreement for sale and has rightly directed the appellant to pay the amount of Rs. 2000/-, failing which simple interest at the rate of 6% shall be payable by him to the respondent/plaintiff. 43. It is to be noted that the learned first appellate Court while reversing the findings recorded by the trial Court in this regard has although come to the conclusion that the contention of respondent/plaintiff that no permission from the Settlement Officer of Consolidation needed, is not acceptable, however has not given any reason to reverse the findings of the trial Court in this regard. 44. It is needless to observe that in case the appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the findings recorded by the trial Court are perverse or are not acceptable in the eye of law and need to be reversed, it is required to first set aside the findings recorded by the trial Court and thereafter reverse the same by giving reasons. 45. 45. This Court in the case of Sri Jasmel Singh v. Sri Rajendra Prasad Saxena and others, 1998 (16) LCD 228, has held that the decree passed by the trial Court could not be reversed in the appeal on the basis of single evidence without setting aside the findings recorded by the trial Court on material on record and substantiated by weighty reasons. The relevant paragraphs 8, 9 and 12, on reproduction read as under: “8. The Supreme Court in Smt. Sawarni v. Smt. Inder Kaur and others; AIR 1996 SC 2823 , held that where the conclusion of the trial Court was based on material on record and substantiated by weighty reasons and where the appellate Court did not set aside the findings of the trial Court the lower appellate Court could not reverse the decree of the trial Court merely on the basis of mutation entry in favour of the defendant. It follows from the judgment that on the basis of single evidence the lower appellate Court could not have reversed the findings of the trial Court. 9. In J.B. Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, AIR 1988 SC 703 , it was held that where the appellate Court while recording the finding acted on an assumption not supported by any evidence and further failed to consider the entire document on the basis of which the finding was recorded, the High Court was justified in setting aside the finding of the lower appellate Court. On the basis of this case it can be said that since there was assumption by the lower appellate Court the reversal of finding in this second appeal is justified. 12. Again in S.V.R.Mudaliar v. Mrs.Rajabu F.Buhari, AIR 1995 SC 1607 , it was laid down that appellate Court has to bear in mind reasons ascribed by the trial Court for its finding and the same should be considered before setting aside the judgment.” 46. Again in the case of M/s. Jeevan Ram Ram Lakhan v. State of U.P., 1998 (16) LCD 1070, the Court emphasized the requirement of reasons needed to be recorded by the appellate Court while reversing the findings recorded by the trial Court. Paragraph 29 of the judgment on reproduction reads as under: “29. The finding recorded by the trial Court is based on reasons derived from th evidence on record and its correct interpretation. Paragraph 29 of the judgment on reproduction reads as under: “29. The finding recorded by the trial Court is based on reasons derived from th evidence on record and its correct interpretation. The appellate Court committed error in reversing the finding without considering all the reasons given by the learned Civil Judge. His finding of fact is the result of superficial and wrong approach. The appellate Court was bound to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and then to draw interference on its basis. He committed error in procedure by reversing the finding without considering the entire evidence and all the reasons given by the trial Court. The trial Court’s conclusions were based on material on record and substantiated with reasons.” 47. In the present case, the first appellate Court has reversed the finding without setting aside the finding recorded by the trial Court and has reversed the finding on issue No. 1 without assigning any reason which is not sustainable in the eye of law hence liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside. 48. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that during the consolidation proceedings in the village where the land in question is situated, the land in question was taken as ‘chak out’ and no permission was required is concerned, I am of the view that the notification under Section 4 of U.P.C.H. Act is issued with respect to the initiation of the consolidation proceedings in consolidated area which is defined under Section 3 of U.P.C.H. Act and it means the area in respect of which a notification has been issued. In case during consolidation proceedings any part of any land or any plot is declared as ‘chak out’ which is situated in that area, it does not mean that it is not part of the consolidation proceedings and no permission under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of U.P.C.H. Act is required. Even for the area which has been declared as ‘chak out’ the permission for sale of any part of such area was required under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of U.P.C.H. Act, as was applicable at the time of filing of the suit by the plaintiff. Hence, the contention raised in this regard has no force. 49. Even for the area which has been declared as ‘chak out’ the permission for sale of any part of such area was required under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of U.P.C.H. Act, as was applicable at the time of filing of the suit by the plaintiff. Hence, the contention raised in this regard has no force. 49. In the case of Chandrabhan v. Jagdesh Prasad Chauhan, 2004 SCC On Line Uttrakhand 84; (2005) 98 RD 114, Hon Prafulla C. Pant,J. as his Lordship then was had occasion to consider the import of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of U.P.C.H. Act and while considering the same his Lordship came to the conclusion that the bar to transfer a land during consolidation operations was contained in sub-clause (ii) of Clause (C) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The said provision was repealed and omitted vide U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991 (U.P. Act 30 of 1991) and after its omission, the permission of consolidation authorities was not required before transfer of land. The relevant paras 9 and 10, are reproduced hereunder: “9. Lastly, it is argued on behalf of the appellant that no permission of consolidation authorities was obtained prior to the execution of the sale-deed, as such the learned Courts below have erred in law by dismissing the suit and appeal. Learned Counsel failed to show me the provisions of law in U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 by which the permission of the consolidation authorities was necessary after the year 1991 before transfer of the land. 10. In fact, the bar to transfer a land during consolidation operations was contained in sub-clause (ii) of Clause (C) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. However, said provision was repealed and omitted vide U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991 (U.P. Act 30 of 1991). Therefore, there is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the permission of the consolidation authorities was required before transfer of land, as the impugned documents are of the year 1995 and 1996.” 50. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Rajeshwari v. D.D.C. Lucknow Camp Mirzapur and others, 1971 RD 130, was required to consider the question as to whether the sale-deed in that case infringe the provisions of Section 5(c)(ii) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act? A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Rajeshwari v. D.D.C. Lucknow Camp Mirzapur and others, 1971 RD 130, was required to consider the question as to whether the sale-deed in that case infringe the provisions of Section 5(c)(ii) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act? The Full Bench has answered the question in the following manner, which on reproduction reads as under: “The sale-deeds were executed after the statement of proposals had been confirmed and chaks had been allotted. The vendor sold the entire chak to the vendee. The facts of these cases are similar to the facts of Smt. Asharfunisa Begum v. Deputy Director of Consolidation; 1970 RD 532, Smt. Asharfunisa Begum’s case is a recent Full Bench decision. The Full Bench had held that Section 5(c)(ii) requires the permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation in the case of sale of a part of a holding and not in the case of sale of the entire holding. We are in full agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench. Accordingly we answer the question referred to us in the negative.” 51. In the case of Smt. Asharfunisa Begum v. Dy. Director of Consolidation Camp at Hardoi and others, AIR 1971 Allahabad 87, the Full Bench has held as under: (relevant paragraph 9 is reproduced). “9. Accordingly if the whole holding is transferred that will not disturb the progress of the consolidation proceedings. The scheme of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is to treat a person as a Bhumidhar tenure-holder or Sirdar tenure-holder and not to have separate holdings under the same tenure. This is apparent in the instant case from the documents filed in which all plots of land held by the deceased Bushir Mohammad as Bhumidhar are grouped together and corresponding chak or chaks were allotted together in lieu of that land and similarly all plots of land held as Sirdar was grouped together for allotting a chak or chaks in lieu thereof as constituting one holding. We are accordingly of the view that it will be only part of a holding under one tenure, if transferred by a tenure holder during consolidation operations, that would create complications and the object of speedy consolidation would be thwarted, but if the whole holding is transferred that position will not arise. We are accordingly of the view that it will be only part of a holding under one tenure, if transferred by a tenure holder during consolidation operations, that would create complications and the object of speedy consolidation would be thwarted, but if the whole holding is transferred that position will not arise. The Legislature must be presumed not to have intended to place more restrictions than were necessary or to have intended to make an invalid provision hit by Article 13 read with Article 19 (f) of the Constitution. We are accordingly of the opinion that with the meaning of ‘holding’ as clarified above, sub-clause (ii) of Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 restricts only the transfer of any part only of the holding of a tenure holder and not the whole holding and to our view the Division Bench case referred to above was correctly decided on the basis of a similar interpretation placed on sub-clause (ii) of Clause (c) of sub-section (I) of Section 5 of the Act.” 52. In the present case, it is the admitted case of the parties that as per the agreement for sale dated 24.1.1979, a portion of Plot No. 1280 was required to be sold to the respondent/plaintiff and for that appellant was to execute a sale-deed within two years from the date of agreement for sale after completing legal necessities, as such the requirement of permission from Settlement Officer, Consolidation under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of U.P.C.H.Act, which was fully attracted. However, in the absence of the same, the sale-deed as per the terms of the agreement for sale was not executable. 53. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the execution for sale-deed was barred under Section 168-A of U.P.Z.A.&L.R. Act is concerned, it is to be observed that the import of Section 168-A of U.P.Z.A.&L.R. relates to transfer of fragment of a land in a consolidated area, it bars fragmentation of land, however in the present case since the village where the land in question situated was under consolidation operations and at the time of passing of the impugned judgment and decree the de-notification under Section 52, U.P.C.H. Act was not done hence Section 168-A, U.P.Z.A.&L.R. Act would not be attracted. 54. 54. The question as to whether the respondent/plaintiff had complied the provisions of Section 16-C, Specific Performance Act and whether the respondent/plaintiff has proved his readiness and willing to perform his part of contract is concerned, since the appellant/defendant had not contested the said issue before the trial Court and the first appellate Court and has not made any categorical denial in this regard, as such the Courts below were right in presuming the readiness and willingness of the respondent/plaintiff on the basis of statements of the witnesses and the evidence on record. 55. So far as the question as to whether the first appellate Court decreed the suit for specific performance of contract without giving any findings that the agreement for sale was executed by the freewill of the appellant when the respondent No. 1 was in a position to dominate the will of the appellant and he had taken undue advantage of his position is concerned, it is to be noted that as per the given facts, the appellant/respondent was working as Halwaha with respondent No. 1/plaintiff and the appellant/respondent was illiterate and taking advantage of the dominating position respondent/plaintiff could have got the alleged agreement for sale executed in his favour, however the learned trial Court has not taken due diligence in appreciating the evidence in this regard while writing its finding on this issue. There was possibility that the respondent/plaintiff could have taken undue advantage of his position being in dominating position. The learned first appellate Court has committed an illegality in decreeing the suit for specific performance of contract without giving any finding in this regard. 56. In view of above, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and order dated 22.1.1986 passed by the Special/Additional Judge in Civil Appeal No. 148 of 1984, is not sustainable in the eye of law. 57. The second appeal is allowed. 58. The judgment and decree dated 22.1.1986 passed by the Special/Additional District Judge, Sultanpur, is hereby set aside and the judgment and decree dated 29.8.1984 passed by the Munsif (North) Sultanpur in Suit No. 427 of 1981, is upheld. The plaintiff/respondent shall be entitled to get an amount of Rs. 2000/- alongwith the interest, as directed by the trial Court.