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2016 DIGILAW 308 (KER)

EDWIN ANDREW MINIHAN v. UNION OF INDIA

2016-03-17

K.P.JYOTHINDRANATH, K.T.SANKARAN

body2016
JUDGMENT : K.T. Sankaran, J. Edwin Andrew Minihan, an Irish national who came to India on 13.7.2015 from Dubai, is undergoing preventive detention in execution of Ext.P2 order of detention dated 3.9.2015 issued under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the COFEPOSA Act'). Ext.P2 order of detention is under challenge in this Writ Petition. 2. The facts in a nutshell are the following: The petitioner arrived at Nedumbassery International Airport by Emirates Flight EK 534 from Dubai on 13.7.2015. The officers of the Commissionerate of Customs, Kochi had received information that frequent passengers arriving from sensitive destinations were involved in smuggling gold into India and, therefore, a vigil on such passengers arriving from Dubai was made. The petitioner stated when asked that he was not carrying any dutiable/contraband goods. On a search of the body of the petitioner, ten gold bars totally weighing 10 kilograms were found in his waist coat, overcoat and pockets. A statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act was recorded from the petitioner on 13.7.2015 and on 14.7.2015. The petitioner was arrested on 14.7.2015. The petitioner revealed in his statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act that the gold was provided to him at Dubai by Tharique Akbar Mohamed. The petitioner was expected to bring the gold to India and deliver the same to one Nibu Mathew Varghese, who was known to the petitioner earlier. In the statement, the petitioner stated that he had came to India on several occasions earlier carrying gold, that he was staying at various hotels on those occasions and that the gold was being collected from him by Nibu Mathew Varghese, who was engaged by Tharique Akbar Mohamed. It was revealed that the CCTV footages at various hotels would disclose the identity of Nibu Mathew Varghese. The grounds of detention states as follows: "16. An examination of the CCTV footages pertaining to the days of stay of Shri Edwin Andrew Minihan and Alina Hrisca Carmen in Cochin, received from the hotels M/s.Quality Airport Hotels and M/s.Courtyard Marriott vide letters dated 17.07.2015 and 21.07.2015 respectively and further investigation conducted in this regard revealed that the person to whom you handed over the gold was one Shri Nibu Mathew Varghese who owns a black colour Logan car bearing Reg. No.KL-07-BJ-5455; that Shri Nibu Mathew Varghese had often come in this car to the hotels to visit you; that the mobile number of Shri Nibu Mathew Varghese is 9846899666. It was also learnt that you had also travelled in a black colour BMW car owned by Shri Akbar, father of Tharique Akbar Mohamed with smuggled gold and that this vehicle has been parked at Flora Airport Hotel, Nedumbassery, Cochin. ..." 3. It was alleged that the petitioner identified the photographs of Tharique Akbar Mohamed and Nibu Mathew Varghese. On an examination of the laptop belonging to the petitioner, various statements indicating the profit sharing out of the smuggling of gold were taken. These profit sharing statements would indicate that the petitioner had brought to India a total quantity of 113.39 kg of gold. It is alleged that the petitioner visited India on 21 occasions during the period from 27.6.2014 to 13.7.2015 and those visits were for the purpose of smuggling of gold. 4. In execution of the order of detention dated 3.9.2015, the petitioner was arrested on 4.9.2015 and he was detained. The order of detention was confirmed on 23.11.2015. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner raised various points which will be discussed below. The learned counsel submitted that the CCTV footages were supplied to the detenu in the form of two compact discs on 4.9.2015, but the compact discs were played before the detenu only on 12.9.2015 and thereby, the valuable right of the detenu to make an effective representation at the earliest opportunity was lost. It was also alleged that there was infringement of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act. The learned counsel relied on the decisions in Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India ( AIR 1980 SC 1983 ) and Kamla Kanhaiyalal Khushalani v. State of Maharashtra and another ( AIR 1981 SC 814 = 1981 KHC 524) in support of his submissions. In fact, the contentions raised in the Writ Petition on this aspect was the following: "The petitioner was supplied with copy of the compact disc allegedly contain the CCTV footages of the Hotals' receptions wherein the petitioner was stayed. The compact discs are not playable, hence it cannot be produced." This contention was answered in paragraph 29 of the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent thus: "29. The compact discs are not playable, hence it cannot be produced." This contention was answered in paragraph 29 of the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent thus: "29. The averment in paragraph 5 of the writ petition that the compact discs are not playable and that the petitioner was not shown the CCTV footage copied in the CD is absolutely false and hence denied. The petitioner was shown the concerned CDs in the presence of the Joint Superintendent of Central Prison, Thiruvananthapuram under proper acknowledgment in the petitioner's own handwriting on 12.09.2015 and the same CD was handed over to him. The Joint Superintendent, Central Prison has countersigned the acknowledgment. A true copy of the said acknowledgment dated 12.09.2015 is produced herewith and marked as Exhibit R-2(c). ...." 6. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent submitted that the CCTV footages relate only to the stay of the detenu at various hotels and his interaction with Nibu Mathew Varghese. The CCTV footagse were relied on only for the purpose of identification of Nibu Mathew Varghese with the detenu. The learned counsel submitted that the CCTV footages were shown to the detenu on 12.9.2015 and still he submitted his representation on 30.9.2015. This itself would show that no prejudice was caused to the detenu by the time lag between 4.9.2015 and 12.9.2015. The learned counsel for the first respondent relied on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another ( (1991) 1 SCC 128 ). 7. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India provides that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest possible opportunity of making a representation against the order. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act provides that the grounds of detention shall be communicated as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days from the date of detention. 8. In Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India ( AIR 1980 SC 1983 ), the Supreme Court held thus: "6. ...... 8. In Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India ( AIR 1980 SC 1983 ), the Supreme Court held thus: "6. ...... Now it is obvious that when clause (5) of Article 22 and sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act provide that the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, what is meant is that the grounds of detention in their entirety must be furnished to the detenu. If there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu, because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. ......" 9. In Kamla Kanhaiyalal Khushalani v. State of Maharashtra and another ( AIR 1981 SC 814 = 1981 KHC 524), the Supreme Court held that the documents and materials relied upon in the order of detention form an integral part of the grounds and must be supplied to the detenu pari passu the grounds of detention. 10. In the case on hand, the CCTV footages are referred to in the grounds of detention for the purpose of ensuring that what the detenu said in his statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act that he stayed in various hotels and he had dealings with Nibu Mathew Varghese is true. The CCTV footages do not as such relate to the incident which took place on 13.7.2015, which is the subject matter of the order of detention. The details in the CCTV footages were supplied to the detenu in the form of two compact discs, on the date of his arrest itself. It is true that the compact discs should be played before the detenu so that he gets an opportunity to know the contents in the CD. That was complied with on 12.9.2015, within fifteen days as provided under Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, there is no case for the petitioner in the Writ Petition that the compact discs were played on any date and that there was unexplainable delay. What is stated in the Writ Petition is that the compact discs could not be played at all. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, there is no case for the petitioner in the Writ Petition that the compact discs were played on any date and that there was unexplainable delay. What is stated in the Writ Petition is that the compact discs could not be played at all. Only in the counter affidavit it was revealed that the compact discs were played in front of the detenu on 12.9.2015, as evidenced by Ext.R2(c) receipt signed by the detenu. It is only at that juncture the learned counsel for the petitioner raised a contention at the belated stage and that too without any pleadings in support of the same that the delay is not explained. The learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that as there was no pleading in the Writ Petition, that point was not answered in the counter affidavit. We are of the view that there was compliance of the requirement of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act, since the compact discs were supplied to the detenu on the date of his arrest and they were played in front of him within a period of fifteen days. It is also relevant to note that the detenu submitted a representation only on 30.9.2015, eighteen days after the CDs were played. In Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another ( (1991) 1 SCC 128 ), the Supreme Court held thus: "14. ........ Demand of any or every document, however irrelevant it may be for the concerned detenu, merely on the ground that there is a reference thereto in the grounds of detention, cannot vitiate an otherwise legal detention order. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this behalf but what is essential is that the detenu must show that the failure to supply the documents before the meeting of the Advisory Board had impaired or prejudiced his right, however slight or insignificant it may be. In the present case, except stating that the documents were not supplied before the meeting of the Advisory Board, there is no pleading that it had resulted in the impairment of his right nor could counsel for the petitioners point out any such prejudice. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the Bombay High Court in this behalf is unassailable." 11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the Bombay High Court in this behalf is unassailable." 11. We are not inclined to accept the contention raised by the petitioner that Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act were infringed in the case. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a laptop was seized from the petitioner and the laptop as such was not produced before the detaining authority. The pleading in respect of this is contained in paragraph 6 (a) and 6(b) of the writ petition, which reads as follows : " 6(a). The petitioner used to save all his personal data in his laptop. He is a business man and a frequent traveller. His entire business accounts are kept in his laptop. The customs authority took a print of some of the pages, without giving any room for explanation concluded that these accounts are related to the smuggling activities. The laptop was not produced before the detaining authority. The entire documents contained in the laptop or laptop itself must be produced before the detaining authority. Had the entire documents been produced, the detaining authority would have reached a different conclusion. (b) The petitioner is entitled to get the entire copy of the documents kept in laptop. Without getting the entire documents it is not possible for the petitioner to make an effective representation." 13. The contention raised by the petitioner as stated above was replied by the first respondent in paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit thus : "The petitioner in his statement dated 13.07.2015, given u/s 108 of the Customs Act stated voluntarily that the petitioner carried undeclared gold from 27.06.2014 on various occasions and printed out the excel statements showing the gross profit, expenses, net profit and the profits shared for each Trip, which was saved in his laptop. Only the above save documents, saved in the said laptop are relevant to the case at hand. The laptop might contain photos, music, movies etc. All that is not relevant in the proceedings initiated against the petitioner. It is submitted that all the relied upon documents in this case were served on the petitioner with his proper acknowledgment." 14. Only the above save documents, saved in the said laptop are relevant to the case at hand. The laptop might contain photos, music, movies etc. All that is not relevant in the proceedings initiated against the petitioner. It is submitted that all the relied upon documents in this case were served on the petitioner with his proper acknowledgment." 14. We do not find any substance in the contention raised by the petitioner that the laptop as such should have been produced by the sponsoring authority before the detaining authority and that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority without perusing the entire contents in the laptop is vitiated. The laptop in question may contain several details unconnected with the case. The sponsoring authority has no duty to produce irrelevant materials before the detaining authority. The detaining authority is not required to refer to or rely upon irrelevant materials. Sometimes certain facts or materials may have to be referred to by the detaining authority. But he need not rely upon the same for arriving at the subjective satisfaction. The requirement of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act would be satisfied if copies of the relied upon documents are furnished to the detenu. All the contents in the laptop were not produced by the sponsoring authority before the detaining authority since they were not necessary. The court cannot sit in judgment over the discretion exercised by the sponsoring authority in respect of the same. It is stated in the grounds of detention that the laptop was seized from the possession of the petitioner. That was for the purpose of narration of facts and to focus attention on the relevant contents available in the laptop which were relied upon by the detaining authority. 15. In J. Abdul Hakeem v. State of T.N. And Others ( AIR 2005 SC 3677 = 2005 KHC 1362), the Supreme Court held thus : "The principle of supply of the material documents to the detenu was considered by this Court in the matter of Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran Vs. State of T.N. (2000) 9 S.C.C. 170 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1198). In Para 8, this Court has said: "8. We make it clear that there is no legal requirement that a copy of every document mentioned in the order shall invariably be supplied to the detenu. State of T.N. (2000) 9 S.C.C. 170 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1198). In Para 8, this Court has said: "8. We make it clear that there is no legal requirement that a copy of every document mentioned in the order shall invariably be supplied to the detenu. What is important is that copies of only such of those documents as have been relied on by the detaining authority for reaching the satisfaction that preventive detention of the detenu is necessary shall be supplied to him." From the aforesaid authorities it is clear that the detenu has a right to be supplied with the material documents on which the reliance is placed by the detaining authority for passing the detention order but the detention order will not be vitiated if the document although referred to in the order is not supplied which is not relied upon by the detaining authority for forming of its opinion or was made basis for passing the order of detention. Crux of the matter lies in whether the detenu's right to make a representation against the order of detention, is hampered by non-supply of the particular document." 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a statement purportedly under Section 108 was taken from the petitioner on 25.7.2015 after getting his custody on 24.07.2015. As per Ext.P6 order dated 24.07.2015, the learned Magistrate directed custody of the petitioner to be given to the Superintendent of Customs, Special Intelligence and Investigation Branch, Cochin. The petitioner submits that the statement dated 25.07.2015 cannot be a statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act since the petitioner/detenu was not summoned by the customs officer, but the petitioner was in his custody. The learned counsel also submitted that the statement dated 25.07.2015 is hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that since the statement dated 25.07.2015 is not admissible and since it was relied upon by the detaining authority, the order of detention is vitiated. The further submission is that Ext.P5 profit sharing account was taken from the laptop on the information gathered while the statement of the petitioner was recorded on 25.07.2015 and therefore Ext.P5 also should not have been relied on by the detaining authority. 17. The further submission is that Ext.P5 profit sharing account was taken from the laptop on the information gathered while the statement of the petitioner was recorded on 25.07.2015 and therefore Ext.P5 also should not have been relied on by the detaining authority. 17. The aforesaid contention raised by the petitioner is dealt with by the first respondent in his counter, wherein the first respondent denies that Ext.P5 profit sharing account was taken while the petitioner was in judicial custody. The first respondent contended that the statement dated 25.07.2015 was given by the petitioner under Section 108 of the Customs Act and the said statement was a voluntary statement. The petitioner voluntarily disclosed that he had brought undeclared gold to India on various occasions from 27.06.2014 and the details regarding gross profit/expenses/net profit and the profits shared with respect to each trip were saved in his laptop. 18. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the statement dated 25.07.2015 given by the petitioner was under Section 108 of the Customs Act and it is not hit by Section 20(3) of the Constitution of India. In Veera Ibrahim v. The State of Maharashtra ( (1976) 2 SCC 302 ), the Supreme Court considered a similar contention. The appellant in that case was prosecuted for the offences under Section 135(a) and 135(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 and Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. The question which was raised before the Supreme Court in Veera Ibrahim's case was whether Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 is ultravires the provisions of Clause 3 of Article 20 of the Constitution of India. Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India provides that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The Supreme Court held, relying upon the Constitution Bench decision in Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1970 SC 940 ) thus : "9. The abovementioned observations are a complete answer to the contention of the appellant. In the light of these principles, it is clear that when the statement of the appellant was recorded by the customs officer under Section 108, the appellant was not a person "accused of any offence" under the Customs Act, 1962. The abovementioned observations are a complete answer to the contention of the appellant. In the light of these principles, it is clear that when the statement of the appellant was recorded by the customs officer under Section 108, the appellant was not a person "accused of any offence" under the Customs Act, 1962. An accusation which would stamp him with the character of such a person was levelled only when the complaint was filed against him, by the Assistant Collector of Customs complaining of the commission of offences under Section 135(a) and Section 135(b) of the Customs Act." 19. The Supreme Court held in Veera Ibraim's case that it is well settled that only a person against whom a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled, which in the normal course may result in his prosecution, would fall within the ambit of the expression " a person accused of an offence" under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. 20. In Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1970 SC 940 ), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that a person arrested by a customs officer because he is found in possession of smuggled goods or on suspicion that he is concerned in smuggling is not a person accused of an offence within the meaning of Section 20(3) of the Constitution of India, when that person is called upon by the customs officer to make a statement or to produce document or thing. In Illias v. The Collector of Customs, Madras ( AIR 1970 SC 1065 ), the question which came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was whether the statements of the appellant and other accused persons recorded by the customs authorities under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 were admissible in evidence at their trial for the offences under Section 120 B of IPC read with Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 and Section 23 (1A) and Section 23 B of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The statements of the accused persons were recorded by the Inspector of Customs and other customs authorities before the complaint was filed. The statements of the accused persons were recorded by the Inspector of Customs and other customs authorities before the complaint was filed. The Constitution Bench held that though under the Customs Act, 1962, a customs officer has been vested with many powers, which were not to be found in the provisions of the old Act, he cannot be regarded as a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. 21. In Percy Rustomji Basta v. State of Maharastra ( (1971) 1 SCC 847 ), the question which arose for consideration was whether Section 24 of the Evidence Act is a bar to the admissibility in evidence of the statement given by the appellant therein to the customs officers on a summons issued to him under Section 108 of the Customs Act. The Supreme Court held that a customs officer conducting an enquiry under Section 107 or 108 of the Customs Act is not a police officer and the person against whom the enquiry is made is not an accused and the statement made by such a person in that enquiry is not a statement made by the person accused of an offence. 22. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court mentioned above, there can be no doubt that the statement dated 25.07.2015 recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act is not hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. The contention that the petitioner was not summoned before taking the statement dated 25.07.2015 is not correct, since he was summoned as per Ext.P7 notice dated 24.07.2015 issued under Section 108 of the Customs Act. The further contention raised by the petitioner that Ext.P5 profit sharing account taken from the laptop pursuant to the statement dated 25.07.2015 should not have been relied upon by the detaining authority on the ground that the petitioner was under detention, is also without substance. 23. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Ext.P5 profit sharing account was not certified as provided under Section 65 B (4) of the Indian Evidence Act and therefore it should not have been relied on by the detaining authority. Section 1 of the Evidence Act, 1872 states that it extends to the whole of India (except the State of Jammu and Kashmir) and applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any Court, including Courts-martial. Section 1 of the Evidence Act, 1872 states that it extends to the whole of India (except the State of Jammu and Kashmir) and applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any Court, including Courts-martial. The proceedings under the COFEPOSA Act are not proceedings before a court and therefore Section 65-B (4) of the Indian Evidence Act would not apply. 24. However, it is to be noted that Section 138 C of the Customs Act deals with admissibility of micro films, facsimile copies of documents and computer print outs as evidence. Sub Section 4 of Section 138-C provides that in any proceedings under the Act and the Rules made thereunder, where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of the section, a certificate containing the matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) and signed by a person mentioned therein shall be evidence of the matter stated in the certificate. Section 138-C of the Customs Act is in Chapter XVI under the heading 'offences and prosecutions'. In the present case, the document in question, namely Ext.P5, was made available before the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority. The proceeding before the detaining authority is not a proceeding under the Customs Act. The proceeding before the detaining authority is a proceeding under the COFEPOSA Act. Therefore, neither Section 65-B of the Evidence Act nor Sections 138-C of the Customs Act would be applicable to the proceedings before the detaining authority for the purpose of arriving at the subjective satisfaction and in passing an order of detention. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any ground to hold that the order of detention against the petitioner is vitiated or the continued detention of the petitioner is illegal. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.