JUDGMENT : Abdul Rehim, J. Challenge in the above Mat.Appeal, filed under Section 19 (1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, is against an order passed by the Family Court, Irinjalakuda in IA No.1467/2015 in OP No.634/2015. The appellant herein is the respondent before the court below, both in the I.A. as well as in the original petition. The respondent herein is the petitioner before the Family Court. 2. Original Petition before the Family Court was instituted seeking declaration that the appellant is not the legally wedded wife of the deceased brother of the respondent, and also seeking consequential permanent prohibitory injunction with respect to the immovable property scheduled in the original petition. IA No.1467/2015 was filed by the respondent herein seeking a temporary injunction restraining the appellant from tresspassing into the scheduled properties and from committing any waste or damage therein, till the disposal of the original petition. Initially the Family Court had granted an ad-interim order of injunction. After the appellant filed detailed counter affidavit, the matter was heard by the court below. The order impugned herein was passed on 14-10-2015, confirming the temporary injunction based on a finding that, the question as to whether the appellant is the legally wedded wife of the deceased brother of the respondent, is a matter which need to be decided after taking evidence, and will then, considering the balance of convenience the court below has got a duty to preserve the scheduled properties pending disposal of the original petition. Therefore it is found that it is necessary to restrain the appellant from tresspassing into the scheduled properties and from committing any waste or damages therein. It is aggrieved by the said order of temporary injunction passed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure, the above appeal is filed. 3. The respondent herein entered appearance. A counter affidavit is filed, inter alia raising a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the appeal, contending that the impugned order being interlocutory in nature is not appealable under Section 19 (1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. In view of the above objection it is necessary for this court to decide the question of maintainability of the above Mat. Appeal. 4. In view of the above objection it is necessary for this court to decide the question of maintainability of the above Mat. Appeal. 4. Section 19 of the Family Courts Act provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in any other law, an appeal shall lie against every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court, both on facts and on law. Evidently the Act prohibits the appellate remedy against interlocutory orders of the Family Courts. Sub section (5) of Section 19 further provides that, except as provided under sub sections (1) to (4) no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court. 5. Therefore it is evident that the statute had banned or foreclosed the remedy of appeal and revision with respect to any judgment, order or decree passed by the Family Court, except as contemplated under Section 19 of the Act. Further, there is a ban against the appellate remedy in the case of interlocutory orders, under sub section (1) of Section 19. Therefore, question arise as to whether an order or interim injunction passed by the Family Court under Order XXXIX Rule 1 of CPC will come under the term 'interlocutory order' as provided under Section 19 (1) of the Act, in which an appeal is prohibited. 6. This court had occasion to consider the ambit and scope of the prohibition imposed by virtue of Section 19, against the appellate and revisional remedies, in the case of interlocutory orders passed by the Family Court. The oldest among the line of precedents seems to be a decision rendered by a learned Judge of this court in Radha V. Velayudhan ( 1994 (1) KLT 398 ). Referring to the prohibition contained under sub-section (5) of Section 19 it is held that, the provision will takes in any order passed by the Family Court within its scope and ambit. The term 'order' contained under sub section (5) of Section 19 is capable of taking in, not only the final orders, but also the interlocutory order. Referring to the prohibition contained under sub-section (5) of Section 19 it is held that, the provision will takes in any order passed by the Family Court within its scope and ambit. The term 'order' contained under sub section (5) of Section 19 is capable of taking in, not only the final orders, but also the interlocutory order. The learned Judge observed that, the effect of the provision has to be understood with due regard to the object of the legislation that the Family Courts Act is enacted for establishment of family courts which comes with a view to promote conciliation and to secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and matters connected therewith. A speedy settlement of the dispute, thus is the object of the Act. The very scheme of the Act would show that the dispute relating to the marriage, family affairs and matters connected therewith are brought under a particular forum armed with necessary provisions to ensure speedy settlement of such disputes. It is consistent with the said object that the restrictions are imposed in the matter of appeals and revisions, limiting the right of the appeal and revision as one of the method to accelerate speedy settlement of disputes. Therefore the literal and natural meaning of any 'order' in sub-Section (5) will takes in all interlocutory orders also, is the finding. Therefore it is held that no revision will lie from an interlocutory order of the Family Court. 7. A Division Bench of this court in K.D. Thankkappan Nair V. B.A. Prasanna Kumari (1995 (2) KLJ 216) observed that, while considering the amplitude of the expression 'interlocutory order' contained in Section 19 of the Act, we should bear in mind that what is banned is not only appeals against interlocutory orders, but even the revisional jurisdiction is also foreclosed in its sweep. The court observed that, it is unusual that in a statute wherein the appellate jurisdiction is closed then the revisional jurisdiction is also closed in respect of the same category of orders. What would have been the legislative intent in providing such a ban? The parties in a family courts very often include destituted and orphaned wives and/or the children and perhaps poor widows. What would have been the legislative intent in providing such a ban? The parties in a family courts very often include destituted and orphaned wives and/or the children and perhaps poor widows. If appeal or revision is provided against interlocutory orders the proceedings in the Family Courts could successfully be scuttled by rich and contumacious opposite parties, by taking all the matters to the High Court against any order passed during interlocutory stages. Legislature would have intended to prevent it. In that perspective it can be construed that the interlocutory order envisaged in Chapter V of the Act is an order other than final order. Hence the meaning of interlocutory order in Section 19 shall be understood as an order which is not a final order, is the contention. 8. In the decision in K.A. Abdul Jaleel V. T.A. Sahida ( 1997 (1) KLJ 457 ), another Division Bench of this court observed that, an appeal may not lie against an interlocutory order which does not affect rights of the parties. The expression 'interlocutory order' has to be understood in the context and meaning of the expression, 'case decided' contained in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure. Referring to another decision of this court in Union of India V. India Cements Ltd. ( 1996 (1) KLT 40 ), it is observed that, where during pendency of a proceedings some order is passed, which adjudicates for the purpose of the suit some rights or obligations of the parties in controversy it can be construed as a case decided. An interlocutory order, which do not adjudicate upon or determine any question relating to the right of the parties, does not amount to a 'case decided'. The expression 'case decided' is not limited in its import to the entirety of the matter in dispute or in an action. Case includes a part of the case. The expression 'case' does not always mean the whole suit. It is held that, a question of jurisdiction which was considered as a preliminary issue and held against the appellant is a 'case decided', in contra distinction with the ordinary meaning of the expression interlocutory in legal parlance. Case includes a part of the case. The expression 'case' does not always mean the whole suit. It is held that, a question of jurisdiction which was considered as a preliminary issue and held against the appellant is a 'case decided', in contra distinction with the ordinary meaning of the expression interlocutory in legal parlance. The court observed that, in the course of a judicial proceedings before a court for judicially deciding main dispute brought to the court for its resolution, a number of situations may arise when that court goes on dispensing of ancillary disputes raised by the parties to the proceedings by making orders. Unless the order finally disposes a proceedings in a court, all such orders during the course of a trial would be broadly designated as interlocutory orders. Such interlocutory orders are steps taken to final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceedings. But an order dismissing the suit as not maintainable is not an order passed like that. 9. Question arise as to what are the parameters to be followed for deciding the nature of an order, whether it is interlocutory or not? The hon'ble Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye V. State of Maharastra ( 1977 (4) SCC 551 ) observed that, ordinarily and generally the expression 'interlocutory order' has been understood and taken to mean as a converse to the term, 'final order'. In Webster's Third International Dictionary (Vol.II, Page 1179) the expression ' interlocutory order' has been defined thus: "not final or definitive : made or done during the progress of an action: intermediate, provisional" in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition Vol.3, Page 1410) defines the 'interlocutory order' thus: "Interlocutory order was not confined to an order made between the writ and final judgment, but means an order other than final judgment. In Halsbury's Laws of England - (Third Edition Vol.22 pages 743-744) describes an interlocutory order thus; "Interlocutory judgment or order : An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed 'interlocutory'. An 'interlocutory order', though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals". At page 743 of the same volume of Black-stone says thus: "Final judgments are such as at once put an end to the action by declaring that the plaintiff has either entitled himself, or has not, to recover the remedy he sues for. Four different tests for ascertaining the finality of a judgment or order have been suggested. (i) Was the order made upon an application such that a decision in favour of either party would determine the main dispute ? (ii) Was it made upon an application upon which the main dispute could not have been decided ? (iii) Does the order, as made, determine the dispute? (iv) If the order in question is reversed, would the action have to go on." 10. Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol.49 page 35) defines interlocutory order thus: "A final judgment is one which disposes the cause, both as the subject matter and the parties as far as the court has power to dispose of it, while interlocutory judgment is one which reserves or leaves some further question or direction for future determination". Generally, however, a final judgment is one which disposes of the cause both as to the subject matter and the parties as far as the court has power to dispose of it, while an interlocutory judgment is one which does not so dispose of the cause, but reserves or leaves some further question or direction for future determination. The word 'interlocutory' as applied to the rulings and orders by the trial court, has been variously defined. It refers to all orders, rulings and decisions made by the trial court from the inception of an action to its final determination. It means not that which decides the cause, but that which only settles some intervening matters relating to the cause. An interlocutory order is an order entered pending a cause, deciding some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit and collateral to the issues formed by the pleadings and not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order has been defined as one made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. An intermediate order has been defined as one made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. The hon'ble apex court has summed up the discussions stating that the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought, but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. The conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decide the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial, but which does not however conclude the trial. This would be the result if the term interlocutory order is interpreted in its natural and logical sense and if construes interlocutory order in ordinary parlance it would indicate the attributes mentioned above, and this is what the term interlocutory order means. 11. In a comparatively recent decision of the hon'ble apex court in Shiv Sakthi Co-operative Housing Society, Nagpur V. Swaraj Developers ( AIR 2003 SC 2434 ) it is held that the orders that are not appealable generally speaking, are thus which are procussual i.e. interlocutory or incidental orders regulating proceedings but not deciding any of the matter in controversy in the suit. Referring to Section 104 and order 43 of the CPC it is observed that, an order which amounts to a decree within Section 2 (2) of the Code will not fall with Section 104 and the only applicable Section is Section 96. It is observed that, a plain reading of Section 115 it makes clear that a stress on the question whether the order in favour of the party applying for revision would have given finality to the suit or to any other proceedings. If the answer is "Yes" then revision is maintainable. But on the contrary, if the answer is "No" then the revision is not maintainable. 12. If the answer is "Yes" then revision is maintainable. But on the contrary, if the answer is "No" then the revision is not maintainable. 12. The principle evolving from the foregoing legal precedents is that, no appeal will lie under Section 19 (1) of the Family Courts Act from an interlocutory order and the parameters for deciding as to whether the order is interlocutory or not is mainly enumerated based on the nature of the order. The main criteria which would be borne in mind is as to whether the order is deciding the cause itself or whether it only settles some intervening matters relating to the cause. If the order does not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the right of the parties, it is only an interlocutory order. If it decides only a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceedings of the suit or trial, but which does not conclude trial, it cannot be termed as interlocutory order. The order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties and which gives no final decision on the matters on the dispute in the suit, merely governing the matters of procedure, it is termed as interlocutory. An interlocutory order may not be conclusive of the main dispute, but which may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter which it deals with, but merely because such conclusions are arrived as to the subordinate matters, it will not be taken beyond the scope of interlocutory order. It is an order which does not rendered a decision in favour of either party in determining the main dispute, it is not an order which is made upon an application upon which the main dispute could have been decided. Even if the order is reversed, the main action in the proceedings has to go on or in other words, despite such an order some further question or direction is left for future determination. Therefore the interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the cause and leaves or reserves further questions for future determination. 13. In the case at hand, the order impugned is one passed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 of CPC. It does not finally decide the rights and obligations of the parties. Therefore the interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the cause and leaves or reserves further questions for future determination. 13. In the case at hand, the order impugned is one passed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 of CPC. It does not finally decide the rights and obligations of the parties. As observed in the order itself, it is only intended to preserve the subject matter of the lis, which is procedural in nature, rather than substantive in deciding the issue involved in the case. Therefore we are of the considered opinion that merely because it restrain one of the parties from dealing with the subject matter of the cause pendente lite that by itself will not take the order from the ambit and scope of the term interlocutory order. Taking note of the legislative intent involved in Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, as enumerated in the judicial precedents discussed above, we are not at all persuaded to widen the scope of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by the statute by way of any sort of interpretation, which is also not at all warranted. 14. Resultantly, it is to be held that an appeal is banned under Section 19 (1) against the order impugned herein. Hence the appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed. 15. However, right if any available to the appellant to challenge the order impugned in any other proceedings, if permissible under law, will stand reserved.