JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. M.I. Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned PP appearing for the respondent. 2. This application filed under section 482 of the Cr.P.C is directed against the judgment and order dated 16.03.2013 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Manipur West in Cril. Appeal No.1 of 2012 whereby and whereunder the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the CJM, Thoubal in Cril.(P) Case No.05 of 2006 dated 19.03.2010 arising out of FIR No.16(7)2000 VPS registered U/s 420/468/471 of the IPC was affirmed. 3. It is the case of the Vigilance that the petitioner, Smt. Y. Kumari Devi, daughter of Y. Babu Singh, joined the Lilong Higher Secondary Madrassa as Asst. Graduate Teacher on 6.5.1999 on the basis of a fake transfer order bearing No.9/16/87-ED(S) dated 16.04.1999(Ext.A/15) said to have been issued by the Director of Educations, Manipur and fake relieving/ releasing order No.6/4/98 BHS dated 3.5.1999 (Ext.-P/2) of the Headmaster, Buangmun High School, Churachandpur. Further, case is that the petitioner did posses fake appointment order No.3/134/87-ED(H) dated 6.10.1989 (Ext.- B/1) as a substitute Asst. Graduate teacher at Lenglong Govt. High School, Tamenglong and regularization order No.45/3/87-ED(S) dated 04.03.1992(Ext.B/6) of the Director of Educations, Manipur as on verification it was found that those orders the appointment order (Ext.B/1) and regularization order (Ext.B/6) had never been issued by those authorities. 4. On verification of the said orders, it was found that on the basis of fake transfer order, relieving/releasing order as well as regularization order, she had joined the School and drew salaries. 5. On the said allegations, a case was registered as FIR No. 16(7)2000 VPS U/s 420/468/471 of the IPC. The Vigilance having investigated upon the case submitted charge sheet upon which cognizance of the offence punishable U/s 420/468/471 of IPC was taken. In due course when the petitioner was put on trial, the prosecution examined its witnesses. On closure of the case, the petitioner was questioned under section 313 of the Cr.PC over the incriminating material appearing against her to which she denied. In due course when the petitioner was put on trial, the prosecution examined its witnesses. On closure of the case, the petitioner was questioned under section 313 of the Cr.PC over the incriminating material appearing against her to which she denied. Thereupon the trial court on the basis of the evidences adduced did find the petitioner guilty for the offence punishable u/s 420 and 471 of the IPC and sentenced the petitioner to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and further to pay a fine of Rs.8,000/- for each of the offence and in default to undergo imprisonment for 15 days. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence was challenged before the appellate court vide Cril. Appeal No.1 of 2012. The learned Appellate court having found appeal being devoid of any merit dismissed the appeal. 6. Having aggrieved with that order, this application under section 482 of the Cr.PC has been filed though revision should have been filed in terms of sections 397 and 401 Cr.PC wherein that part of sentence whereby the court did pass an order to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days on default of making payment has been challenged. 7. Mr. M.I. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner by referring to the provisions as contained in section 65 of the IPC as well as section 30 of the Cr.PC submitted that since the petitioner was inflicted with the sentence till rising of the court i.e. for one day, the court should not have passed order for undergoing simple imprisonment for 15 days in default of making payment of the fine amount as it is in contravention of the aforesaid provisions of IPC and Cr.PC whereby the court is competent to inflict only one 1/4th of the period of the sentence imposed in case of default of payment of fine amount. In other words it was submitted that the court should have inflicted sentence of one-fourth of a day which was the substantive sentence imposed. 8. The submission which was advanced on behalf of the petitioner is devoid of any merit as it is never in consonance with the provisions as contained in section 65 of the IPC as well as section 30 of the Cr.P.C. Section 65 of IPC reads as follows: “65. 8. The submission which was advanced on behalf of the petitioner is devoid of any merit as it is never in consonance with the provisions as contained in section 65 of the IPC as well as section 30 of the Cr.P.C. Section 65 of IPC reads as follows: “65. Limit to imprisonment for nonpayment of fine, when imprisonment and fine awardable – The term for which the Court directs the offender to be imprisoned in default of payment of a fine shall not exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment which is the maximum fixed for the offence, if the offence be punishable with imprisonment as well as fine.” 8.1. From perusal of the provision it does appear that the period of sentence for default in making payment of the fine amount is not to exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment which is maximum fixed for the offence. In other words, sentence of one-fourth period is referable to sentence prescribed for the offence for which one has been convicted. It never refers to one-fourth term of the period of sentence imposed. The aforesaid proposition also gets emerged from the provisions as contained in Section 30 of Cr.PC, which reads as follows: “30. Sentence of imprisonment in default of fine- (1) The Court of a Magistrate may award such term of imprisonment in default of payment of fine as is authorized by law: Provided that the term – (a) is not in excess of the powers of the Magistrate under section 29; (b) shall not, where imprisonment has been awarded as part of the substantive sentence, exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment which the Magistrate is competent to inflict as punishment for the offence otherwise than as imprisonment in default of payment of the fine. (2) The imprisonment awarded under this section may be in addition to a substantive sentence of imprisonment for the maximum term awardable by the Magistrate under section 29.” 8.2. On perusal of the said provision, one would find that it stipulates the same proposition as stated here-in-above. It also speaks that sentence should not exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment which the Magistrate is competent to inflict as punishment. It makes it clear in explicit term that it refers to the punishment prescribed for the offence and not the period of sentence for which one is inflicted with. It also speaks that sentence should not exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment which the Magistrate is competent to inflict as punishment. It makes it clear in explicit term that it refers to the punishment prescribed for the offence and not the period of sentence for which one is inflicted with. The aforesaid proposition has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chhajulal –vrs. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1972 SC 1809 wherein it has been observed in para-6 & 11 as under: “6. It is clear that Section 65 only fixes a maximum period of imprisonment which can be awarded for default of payment of fine whenever any court convicts. One the other hand, Section 33 Criminal Procedure Code governs specifically the powers of 1st Class Magistrate on this matter. Section 33 Cr.PC also contains the principle embodied in Section 65 Indian Penal Code in its application to Magistrates. Just as a 1st class Magistrate trying an offence punishable under section 406 Indian Penal Code cannot impose the maximum amount of imprisonment prescribed by this section, because his powers of awarding imprisonment are specifically limited to those conferred by Section 32 Criminal Procedure Code, so also he cannot, by resorting to Section 65 Indian Penal Code, award a period of imprisonment in default of payment of fine on the erroneous assumption that he has the power to award the maximum sentence prescribed by Section 406 Indian Penal Code.” “11. As the sentence of one year’s rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of fine passed by the Munsif Magistrate was in excess of his powers, we allow this appeal to the extent that we reduce only the sentence of one year’s rigorous imprisonment awarded in default of payment of fine to six months’ rigorous imprisonment. The rest of the sentence, which is quite legal, must stand. We may observe here that it would have been better if this obvious illegality and excess of power could have been corrected by the High Court when the matter was brought to its notice by means of an application under section 561A Criminal Procedure Code.” 9. Said proposition has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shantilal –vs- State of M.P., reported in (2008) 1 SCC(Cri) 1 wherein the Apex Court observed in para-30 as under: “30. Said proposition has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shantilal –vs- State of M.P., reported in (2008) 1 SCC(Cri) 1 wherein the Apex Court observed in para-30 as under: “30. Though Section 25 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 was not referred to in Bashiruddin Ashraf reported in AIR 1957 SC 645 : 1957 SCR 1032 , in our opinion, bare reading of the said provision also makes it explicitly clear and leaves no room for doubt that Sections 63 to 70 IPC and the provisions of Cr.PC relating to award of imprisonment in default of payment of fine would apply to all cases wherein fines have been imposed on an offender unless “the Act, regulation, rule or bye-law contains an express provision to the contrary”. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the bald contention of the appellant that in absence of specific provision to order imprisonment in default of payment of fine in a statute, a court of law has no power to order imprisonment of an offender who fails to pay fine and such action would be illegal or without authority of law. In our judgment, in absence of a provision to the contrary viz. that no order of imprisonment can be passed in default of payment of fine, such power is explicit and can always be exercised by a court subject to the relevant provisions of IPC and Cr.PC.” 10. Under the facts and circumstances, I do not find any illegality with that part of the order of sentence whereby the Court has inflicted sentence in default of making fine. Accordingly this application being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed.