JUDGMENT Hon’ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J.—Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri S.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Ahok Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, assisted by Sri Rajesh Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Sri Santosh Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 4 to 6. 2. Sri Khare submits that after the notification dated 23.4.2010 issued by the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred under Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, the petitioners claimed for regularisation. They filed Writ - A No. 34027 of 2013, Satish Kumar and 49 others v. Food Corporation of India and 3 others, in which an interim order dated 19.6.2013 was passed as under: “Sri P.K.Singh learned counsel has received notice on behalf of Food Corporation of India. He prays for and is granted six weeks time to file counter-affidavit. Rejoinder, if any, within ten days thereafter. List accordingly. From the record it appears that that respondents have constituted a Committee. A copy of the report of the Committee has been brought on the record as Annexure-9 to the writ petition. From the perusal of the report it appears that there are documents which indicate that 222 labours had worked. However, in the impugned order it is mentioned that no record is available. This reasoning given in the impugned order is contrary to the report of the Committee dated 19.11.2012. In view of the said fact the reason given in the impugned order does not appear to be prima facie correct. The petitioners are at liberty to file a representation within a week before the competent authority and if the work is available the petitioners shall be engaged on the same status on which they were working on the date when the impunged order was passed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the order of the Division Bench of this Court in PIL No. 57992 of 2013. The competent authority shall keep regard of the said order also.” 3. In Public Interest Litigation (PIL) No. 7992 of 2012, FCI Mazdoor Union and another v. Union of India and others Thru. Lab Sec and others, an interim order was passed as under: “Mr. Aditya Pandey, learned Advocate, has appeared on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The competent authority shall keep regard of the said order also.” 3. In Public Interest Litigation (PIL) No. 7992 of 2012, FCI Mazdoor Union and another v. Union of India and others Thru. Lab Sec and others, an interim order was passed as under: “Mr. Aditya Pandey, learned Advocate, has appeared on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The instructions placed before us be kept with the record. Strictly as an interim measure and without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties and subject to scrutiny, the Labourers, who are contractually appointed, will not be treated to be removed till further order/s to be passed by this Court. Passing of this order will in no way affect the authorities concerned to pass an order in compliance of the Division Bench order dated 8.12.2009 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 64808 of 2009 (F.C.I. Mazdoor Union, U.P. Lucknow and another v. Union of India and others). The benefits, if any, to be given to the petitioners, will be considered by the appropriate Bench on the next date of hearing. Let counter-affidavit be filed within six weeks. Rejoinder, if any, will be filed within two weeks thereafter. The matter will appear eight weeks hence.” 4. It is stated by learned counsel for the petitioners that the aforesaid Writ Petition as well as P.I.L. both are pending. 5. Sri Khare states that in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 136 of 2016 filed by the FCI workers Union challenging the judgment of Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court the date is fixed for 16.9.2016 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He states that now the Government of India has issued the impugned Notification No. S.O. 2327(E) dated 6.7.2016 (Ministry of Labour and Employee) which would adversely effect the petitioners. A prayer has been made to quash the aforesaid Notification. 6. Sri Ashok Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General has placed before this Court the aforesaid judgment in P.I.L. No. 84 of 2014 dated 20.11.2015, the concluding part of which has already been quoted above. He also produced the order dated 8.1.2016 passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Special Leave to Appeal (c) 136 of 2016 filed by the F.C.I. workers Union of India which is reproduced below: “Mr. He also produced the order dated 8.1.2016 passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Special Leave to Appeal (c) 136 of 2016 filed by the F.C.I. workers Union of India which is reproduced below: “Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned SG is requested to take instructions from the Government of India, in the meantime, as to the steps they have taken in terms of the impugned order passed by the High Court.” 7. Sri Ashok Mehta submits that neither the relief for quashing the Notification can be granted in a writ petition nor the writ petition is maintainable inasmuch as their claim for regularisation was rejected and against which according to the petitioners they have filed a Writ - A No. 34027 of 2013 which is pending. 8. He further submits that neither the legislative competence to issue the impugned Notification has been questioned nor the impugned Notification violates any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners nor it is in conflict with the provision of the Rules and as such the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 9. I have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties. 10. It appears that the impugned Notification dated 6.7.2016 has been issued after an order dated 20.11.2015 was passed by the Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court in P.I.L. No. 84 of 2014, (Court On Its Own Motion v. Union of India and others). 11. It appears that a Division Bench of Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court suo motu took up a P.I.L. No. 84 of 2014 based on News Paper item in the daily “The Times of India” and issued certain directions as under : 30. In that view of the matter, we dispose of the present Public Interest Litigation by passing the following order. (i) The Government of India is directed to decide the representation made by the Food Corporation of India for grant of exemption under the provisions of Section 31 of the said Act within a period of one month from today, in the light of observations made by us hereinabove within a period of one month from today. (i) The Government of India is directed to decide the representation made by the Food Corporation of India for grant of exemption under the provisions of Section 31 of the said Act within a period of one month from today, in the light of observations made by us hereinabove within a period of one month from today. (ii) The Government of India shall decide the issue regarding de-notification of the depots of the Food Corporation of India, in respect of which notification is issued under Section 10 of the said Act, within a period of six months from today, in the light of observations made by us hereinabove and the report of M/s.Deloitt Consultancy and the report of High Level Committee appointed by the Government of India itself. (iii) We clarify that the respondent/Food Corporation of India would be entitled to transfer the services of departmental labourers from one depot to another subject to protecting their salary and all other service conditions. (iv) We also clarify that the respondent/Corporation would be at liberty to implement its policy of change in the Scheme of incentives. (v) The Government of India shall also take a decision regarding abolition of system of departmental labourers in a phased manner or absorbing their services in other establishments as recommended by the High Level Committee. 12. It further appears that the aforesaid judgment of Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court was challenged in S.L.P. No(s) (C)136 of 2016, (C.C.) No. 913 of 2016 and 11465 of 2016 in which Hon’ble Supreme Court on 8.1.2016 directed the Solicitor General to take instructions from the Government of India regarding the steps taken in terms of the judgment passed by the Nagpur Bench. 13. From the order dated 17.8.2016 passed by a learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 26628 to 26630 of 2016 and other connected writ petitions it appears that after the aforesaid order of Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 8.1.2016, the impugned Notification dated 6.7.2016 under Section 31 of the Act was issued by the Government of India exempting the godowns, depots and railheads of Food Corporation of India from the applicability of certain notifications including the Notification dated 23.4.2010 under Section 10 of the Act. 14. 14. In the aforesaid order dated 17.8.2016 the Madras High Court, observed that the petitioners before it were originally employed as Contract Labourers by the F.C.I. They raised dispute before the Industrial Tribunal, Madras which directed the F.C.I. to reguarise their services vide award dated 29.7.1998 and 19.2.1997 which was challenged by the F.C.I. Chennai before the Madras High Court in writ petitions which were dismissed by the learned Single Judge by order dated 14.8.2003. Against the dismissal of the writ petitions by learned Single Judge, Writ Appeals were preferred before the Division Bench which were also dismissed on 13.12.2006 against which Special Leave Petitions were preferred by the F.C.I. before the Hon’ble Supreme Court which are pending and no stay order has been obtained by the F.C.I. The Madras High Court further noted the orders passed by the Division Bench of Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court in P.I.L. No. 84 of 2014. After noticing these facts the Madras High Court observed in paragraph 8 that the issue of regularisation of the petitioners are pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It recorded the assurance given by learned Additional Solicitor General. 15. Undisputedly, Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 136 of 2016, Food Corporation of India Workers Union v. Union of India and others, was preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in which by order dated 8.1.2016, the Hon’ble Supreme Court permitted the learned Solicitor General to take instructions from the Government of India as to the steps taken in terms of the impugned order passed by the Nagapur Bench of Bombay High Court. Sri Khare states that in the aforesaid Special Leave to Appeal, validity of the impugned notification dated 6.7.2016 has also been challenged. The matter is still pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in which admittedly no interim order has been passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. The petitioners have filed the present writ petition for the following relief: “A. Issue writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the notification dated 6.7.2016. B. Issue writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to take any whereby the service conditions of petitioners may be effected.” 17. The impugned Notification dated 6.7.2016 has been issued by the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred under Section 31 of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. 18. B. Issue writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to take any whereby the service conditions of petitioners may be effected.” 17. The impugned Notification dated 6.7.2016 has been issued by the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred under Section 31 of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. 18. In the case of Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P., 1984 (4) SCC 255 (para 31 to 34 and 36 to 38) Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “31. A writ of certiorari can never be issued to call for the record or papers and proceedings of an Act or Ordinance and for quashing such Act or ordinance. The writ of certiorari and the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto were known in English common law as “prerogative writs”. “Prerogative writs,’ are to be distinguished from “writs of right” also known as “writs of course”. Writs issued as part of the public administration of justice are called “writs of right” or “writs of course” because the Crown is bound by Magna Carta of 1215 to issue them., as for instance, a writ to commence an action at common law. Prerogative writs are (or rather, were) so called because they are issued by virtue of the Crown’s prerogative, not as a matter of right but only on some probable cause being shown to the satisfaction of the Court why the extraordinary power of the Crown should be invoked to render assistance to the party. The common law regards the Sovereign as the source or fountain of justice, and certain ancient remedial processes of an extraordinary nature, known as prerogative writs, have from the earliest times issued from the Court of King’s Bench in which the Sovereign was always present in contemplation of law. (See Jowitt’s “Dictionary of Law” vol.2, p. 1885, and Halsbury’s “Laws of England”, fourth Edition,., vol. 11, para. 1451, f.n.3). 32. We are concerned here with the writ of certiorari. “Certiorari’ is a Late Latin word being the passive form of the word “certiorare” meaning `inform’ and occurred in the original Latin words of the writ which translated read “we being desirous for certain reasons, that the said record should by you be certified to us’’. 11, para. 1451, f.n.3). 32. We are concerned here with the writ of certiorari. “Certiorari’ is a Late Latin word being the passive form of the word “certiorare” meaning `inform’ and occurred in the original Latin words of the writ which translated read “we being desirous for certain reasons, that the said record should by you be certified to us’’. Certiorari was essentially a royal demand for information; the king, wishing to be certified of some matter, orders that the necessary information be provided for him. We find in De Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action, fourth Edition, page 587, some interesting instances where writs of certiorori were so issued. Thus, these writs were addressed to the escheator or the sheriff to make inquisitions; the earliest being for the year 1260. Similarly, when Parliament granted Edward II one foot-soldier for every township, the writ addressed to the sheriffs to send in returns of their townships to the Exchequer was a writ of certiorari. Very soon after its first appearance this writ was used to remove to the King’s Court at Westminster the proceedings of inferior Courts of record; for instance, in 1271 the proceeding in an assize of darrein presentment were transferred to Westminster because of their dilatoriness. This power was also assumed by the Court of Chancery and in the Tudor an early Stuart periods a writ of certiorari was frequently issued to bring the proceedings of inferior Courts of common law before the Chancellor. Later, however, the Chancery confied its supervisory functions to inferior Courts of equity. In A New Abridgement of the Law, seventh edition, volume II at pages 9 and 10, Matthew Bacon has described a writ of certiorari in these words: A certiorari is an original writ issuing out of Chancery, or the King’s Bench, directed in the King’s name, to the judges or officers of inferior Courts, commanding them to return the records of a cause pending before them, to the end the party may have the more sure and speedy justice before him, or such other justice as he shall assign to determine the cause. 33. By the time of King Charles II, however, applications for certiorari as also for habeas corpus and prohibition came to be made usually in the Court of King’s Bench. 34. 33. By the time of King Charles II, however, applications for certiorari as also for habeas corpus and prohibition came to be made usually in the Court of King’s Bench. 34. The different functions of the prerogative writs of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus have been thus described in Halsbury’s Laws of England, fourth edition, volume I, in para 80: Historically, prohibition was a writ whereby the royal Courts of common law prohibited other Courts from entertaining matters falling within the jurisdiction of the common law Courts; certiorari was issued to bring the record of an inferior Court into the King’s Bench for review or to remove indictments for trial in that Court, mandamus was directed to inferior Courts and tribunals, and to public officers and bodies, to order the performance of a public duty. All three were called prerogative writs...During the seventeenth century certiorari evolved as a general remedy to quash the proceedings of inferior tribunals and was used largely to supervise justices of the peace in the performance of their criminal and administrative functions under various statutes. In 1700 [in R. v. Glamorganshire (Inhabitants) (1700) 1 Ld Raym 580 and Groennevt v. Burwell, (1700) 1 Ld Raym 580] it was held that the Court of King’s Bench would examine the proceedings of all jurisdictions erected by Act of Parliament, and that, if under pretence of such an Act they proceeded to arrogate jurisdiction to themselves greater than the Act warranted, the Court would send a certiorari to them to have their proceedings returned to the Court, so that the Court might restrain them from exceeding that jurisdiction. If bodies exercising such jurisdiction did not perform their duty, the King’s Bench would grant a mandamus. Prohibition would issue if anything remained to prohibit. The ambit of certiorari and prohibition was not limited to the supervision of functions that would ordinarily be regarded as strictly judicial, and in the nineteenth century the writs came to be used to control the exercise of certain administrative functions by local and central Government authorities which did not necessarily act under judicial forms.” 36. The ambit of certiorari and prohibition was not limited to the supervision of functions that would ordinarily be regarded as strictly judicial, and in the nineteenth century the writs came to be used to control the exercise of certain administrative functions by local and central Government authorities which did not necessarily act under judicial forms.” 36. In India, prior to the Constitution, the power to issue prerogative writs was vested only in three High Courts, that is, the High Courts established by Letters Patent issued by Queen Victoria under authority given by the Indian High Courts Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict c. 104) for the establishment of the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal and at Madras and at Bombay for these three Presidencies, namely, the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. Hence this Act is generally called the Charter Act and the High Courts established thereunder the Chartered High Courts. These High Courts were the successors so far as their original jurisdictions were concerned of the Supreme Courts which were established in these three Presidency-towns and inherited from those Courts the powers of the Court of King’s Bench which included the power to issue prerogative writs, Apart from these three High Courts none of the other High Courts in India possessed this power. The position was changed when the Constitution of India came into force. Article 225 continues the jurisdiction of existing High Courts. Article 226, however, confers upon every High Court the power to issue to any person or authority, including in proper cases, any Government, within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, “directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them, for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose”. It may be mentioned that under Article 32 of the Constitution, the same power as has been conferred upon the High Courts is conferred upon this Court without any restriction as to territorial jurisdiction but, unlike the High Court, restricted only to the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, namely, the Fundamental Rights. It may be mentioned that under Article 32 of the Constitution, the same power as has been conferred upon the High Courts is conferred upon this Court without any restriction as to territorial jurisdiction but, unlike the High Court, restricted only to the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, namely, the Fundamental Rights. Referring to Article 226, this Court in Dwarka nath, Hindu Undivided Family v. I.T.O., (1965)3 SCR 536 , said: This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression ‘’nature’’, for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the high Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government into a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure, such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this article. Some limitations are implicit in the article and others may be evolved to direct the article through the defined channels. (Emphasis supplied) 37. The fact that the High Courts and a fortiori this Court have power to mould the reliefs to meet the requirements of each case does not mean that the draftsman of a writ petition should not apply his mind to the proper relief which should be asked for and throw the entire burden of it upon the Court. The fact that the High Courts and a fortiori this Court have power to mould the reliefs to meet the requirements of each case does not mean that the draftsman of a writ petition should not apply his mind to the proper relief which should be asked for and throw the entire burden of it upon the Court. An Advocate owes a duty to his client as well as to the Court - a duty to his client to give of his best to the case which he has undertaken to conduct for his client and a duty to assist the Court to the utmost of his skill and ability in the proper and satisfactory administration of justice. In our system of administration of justice the Courts have a right to receive assistance from the Bar and it is the duty of the advocate who drafts a writ petition or any other pleading to ask for appropriate reliefs. The true nature of a writ of certiorari has been pointed out this by Court In several decisions. We need refer to only one of them, namely, Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, 1963 Supp 1 SCR 676. In that case Subba Rao. J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, said: Certiorari lies to remove for the purpose of quashing the proceedings of inferior Courts of record or other persons or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to notice the distinction between a writ of certiorari and a writ in the nature of certiorari: in either case the High Court directs an inferior tribunal or authority to transmit to itself the record of proceedings pending there for scrutiny and, if necessary, for quashing the same. 38. A writ in the nature of certiorari is thus a wholly inappropriate relief to ask for when the constitutional validity of a legislative measure is challenged and it is surprising to find that in spite of repeated pronouncements of this Court as to the true nature of this writ it should have been asked for in the Sangh’s petition. As pointed out in Dwarkanath case (1965) 3 SCR 536 , under Article 226 the High Courts have the power to issue directions, orders and writs, including prerogative writs. As pointed out in Dwarkanath case (1965) 3 SCR 536 , under Article 226 the High Courts have the power to issue directions, orders and writs, including prerogative writs. This power includes the giving of declarations as also consequential reliefs including relief by way of injunction. The proper relief for the petitioners in the Sangh’s petition to have asked was a declaration that U.P. Ordinance 22 of 1978 was unconstitutional and void and, if a consequential relief was thought necessary, a writ of mandamus or writ in the nature of mandamus or a direction, order or injunction restraining the State and its officers from enforcing or giving effect to the provisions of that ordinance. The High Court granted the proper relief by declaring that Ordinance to be void but it should have, before proceeding to hear the writ petition, insisted that the petitioners should set their house in order by amending the petition and praying for proper reliefs. The High Court was too indulgent in this matter. After all, it was not a petition from a Prisoner languishing in jail or from a bonded labourer or a party in person or by a public-spirited citizen seeking to bring a gross injustice to the notice of the Court. Here, the High Court had before it as the main petitioner a union which had taken collective action to enforce its demands and had defied the Government by flouting its orders and an Ordinance promulgated by the Governor, namely, U.P. Ordinance 25 of 1977, and had by reason of its collective might ultimately made the Government come to terms with it. The petitioners were represented by well-known counsel, one of them practising in this Court. It is true that neither this Court nor any High Court should dismiss a writ petition on a mere technicality or just because a proper relief is not asked for; but from this it does not follow that it should condone every kind of laxity. We would not have dwelt upon this aspect of the case but for the fact that we find that laxity in drafting all types of pleadings is becoming the rule and a well-drafted pleading, an exception. We would not have dwelt upon this aspect of the case but for the fact that we find that laxity in drafting all types of pleadings is becoming the rule and a well-drafted pleading, an exception. An ill-drafted pleading is an offspring of the union of carelessness with imprecise thinking and its brothers are slipshod preparation of the case and rambling and irrelevant arguments leading to waste of time which the Courts can ill afford by reason of their overcrowded dockets.” 19. There is no dispute as to the legislative competence of the Central Government to enact the impugned Notification. According to the petitioners their matters for regularisation is still pending before this Court in Writ - A No. 34027 of 2013. The petitioners have completely failed to point out infringement of their fundamental rights guaranteed under part III of the Constitution of India, by the impugned Notification. It is settled principles of law that there is always presumption in favour of constitutional validity of a legislation. 20. As per their own case the petitioners claimed regularisation after the employment of contract labour was prohibited by the Government of India by issuing Notification No. S.O. 947(E) dated 23.4.2010. Their claim for regularisation as per averments made in paragraph 10 of the writ petition was rejected by the respondent No. 6 by order dated 9.4.2013 on the ground that no records were available. This order was challenged by the petitioners and others by filing Writ A No. 34027 of 2013 which is pending. 21. Considering the facts and circumstances as noted above as well as the judgment of Nagapur Bench of Bombay High Court in P.I.L. No. 84 of 2014 and the order of Hon’ble Supreme Court as noted above, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned Notification. Writ petition No. 34027 of 2013 filed by the petitioners for regularisation is also admittedly pending. 22. Writ petition lacks merit and is consequently dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.