JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri K.M. Mishra, learned counsel for petitioner and perused the record. 2. Petitioner Shamsher Bahadur, working as an officer in Farrukhabad Gramin Bank (hereinafter referred to as ‘’Bank’) was placed under suspension vide order dated 4.5.1992 passed by Chairman of Bank in its capacity as Disciplinary Authority. A charge-sheet dated 28.10.1993 was served upon him containing allegations of certain irregularities alleged to be committed by him during period he worked as Manager, Kanpur Branch of Bank from 23.7.1987 to 27.1.1992. Two charges were levelled upon petitioner regarding misconduct under Regulation 19 and 30(1) of Farrukhabad Gramin Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as “Regulations 1981”). 3. Enquiry Officer submitted report dated 27.10.1996 and according to petitioner his information is that he was exonerated in both charges. Chairman/Disciplinary Authority however passed an order dated 30.12.2000 questioning enquiry proceedings conducted pursuant to the charge-sheet dated 28.10.1993 and directing to hold de-novo enquiry on the basis of fresh documentary/oral evidence which according to him were not placed before Enquiry Officer earlier. Fresh enquiry was conducted by one Gore Lal, appointed by Disciplinary Authority vide letter dated 19.1.2001 and he submitted report dated 28.6.2002. Enquiry Officer had held first charge as partly proved and in second charge there were five allegations out of which three were held proved and two unproved. Copy of enquiry report was furnished to petitioner requiring him to submit his representation, if any, which he submitted on 5.8.2002. 4. Disciplinary Authority ultimately passed order of punishment dated 20.1.2003 imposing punishment of withholding of three increments under Regulation 30(1)(e) and Removal under Regulation 30(1)(e). Petitioner preferred appeal but the same has also been rejected by Board of Director. Hence this writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner has assailed aforesaid order of punishment and appellate authority contending that; (I) Regulations 1981, do not permit de-novo enquiry hence de-novo enquiry culminating in impugned order of punishment is wholly illegal and void-ab-initio. Reliance is placed on K.R. Deb v. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, AIR 1971 SC 1447 . (ii) When Disciplinary Authority order for de-novo enquiry then it was incumbent to furnish fresh charge-sheet. Oral hearing could not have been conducted de-novo on the basis of old charge-sheet and this vitiates entire proceedings. Reliance is placed on K.R. Deb v. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, AIR 1971 SC 1447 . (ii) When Disciplinary Authority order for de-novo enquiry then it was incumbent to furnish fresh charge-sheet. Oral hearing could not have been conducted de-novo on the basis of old charge-sheet and this vitiates entire proceedings. (iii) Looking to the charges proved against petitioner and nature of seriousness as thereof, it cannot be said that petitioner has committed any serious misconduct and therefore punishment imposed upon him is grossly disproportionate, arbitrary, excessive and illegal. 6. Regulation 30 of 1981 Regulations deals with penalties which may be imposed upon staff of Bank. If he is found guilty of displaying negligence, inefficiency or indolence or commits breach of the Regulations or knowingly does anything detrimental to the interests of the Bank or in conflict with its instructions or commits breach of discipline or is guilty of misconduct. It also prescribes the procedure to be followed before imposing punishment and reads as under, Regulation 30 (1) (2) (3) relevant for our purpose are quoted hereunder : “30 (1)- Without prejudice to the provisions of other regulations, an officer or employee who commits a breach of these regulations or who displays negligence, inefficiency or indolence, or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interests of the Bank or in conflict with its instructions or who commits a breach of discipline or is guilty of any other act of misconduct, shall be liable to the following penalties- (a) reprimand; (b) delay or stoppage of increments or promotion; (c) degradation to a lower post or grade of to a lower stage in his incremental scale; (d) recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Bank by the officer or employee; (e) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment. (f) dismissal. (f) dismissal. “(2) No officer or employee shall be subjected to the penalties referred to in clause (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f) of sub-regulation (1) except by an order in writing signed by the Chairman and no such order shall be passed without the charge being formulated in writing and given to the said officer or employee so that he shall have reasonable opportunity to answer them in writing or in person, as he prefers and in the latter case his defence shall be taken down in writing and read to him. Provided that the requirements of this sub-regulation may be waived, if the facts on the basis of which action is to be taken have been established in a Court of law or Court martial, or where the officer or employee has absconded or where it is for any other reason impracticable to communicate with him or where there is difficulty in observing them and the requirements can be waived without injustice to him. In every case where all or any of the requirements of this sub-regulation are waived the reasons for so doing shall be recorded in writing. (3) The enquiry under this regulation and the procedure with the exception of the final order, may be delegated in case the person against whom proceedings are taken is an officer to any officer who is in grade higher than such officer and in the case of an employee to any officer. For purposes of the enquiry, the officer or employee may not engage a legal practitioner.” 7. Regulations as such do not contemplate anywhere as to the procedure followed by Disciplinary Authority after he receive enquiry report. It only contemplates that no order of punishment shall be passed by Disciplinary Authority without charges being formulated in writing or given to officer concerned and giving him a reasonable opportunity to answer them in writing or in person as he prefers and in case he answer in person his defence shall be taken down and read to him. 8. Regulation 30(3) permits Disciplinary Authority to delegate enquiry to any person who is in a higher grade than the delinquent officer. 9. Regulations nowhere contemplate a procedure to be followed by disciplinary authority when enquiry is delegated to any other authority and he submits report. In fact, the Regulations are silent on this aspect. 8. Regulation 30(3) permits Disciplinary Authority to delegate enquiry to any person who is in a higher grade than the delinquent officer. 9. Regulations nowhere contemplate a procedure to be followed by disciplinary authority when enquiry is delegated to any other authority and he submits report. In fact, the Regulations are silent on this aspect. In absence of any specific procedure prescribed in Regulation, general principles in our view would be applicable which says that enquiry report shall not be binding upon disciplinary authority and it is always open to disciplinary authority either to record its own findings on the basis of material already collected by Enquiry Officer and thereafter giving opportunity to the delinquent employee, pass a reasoned order. Disciplinary authority in alternative can also require Enquiry Officer to conduct further enquiry or de-novo enquiry as the case may be. 10. Learned counsel for petitioner further submitted that since Regulations did not permit disciplinary authority to reject enquiry report and direct for de-novo enquiry, hence disciplinary authority erred in law and acted without jurisdiction in directing de-novo enquiry and on the basis of de-novo enquiry order of punishment is also illegal and without jurisdiction and in this regard placed reliance on judgment of Supreme Court in K.R. Deb (supra). 11. We find that Regulation 30 (2) and (3) of Regulations 1981 which are applicable in the case in hand nowhere contemplates such restriction or limitation with regard to power to be exercised by disciplinary authority. If disciplinary authority finds a justified reason for holding a further enquiry or de-novo enquiry as the case may be, in absence of limitation under Regulations, we find it difficult to accept that an order for de-novo enquiry cannot be passed by disciplinary authority. It would not be appropriate to read the provisions dealing with disciplinary matters so as to curtail down powers of disciplinary authority when none has been prescribed under Regulations. The only occupying factor in our view, should be that delinquent employee before passing and order of punishment has been given due and effective opportunity of defence consistent with principles of natural justice. 12. In K.R. Deb (supra), we find that therein a specific Rule was considered by Court and interpreted in the manner as was evident from a bare reading of Rule. 12. In K.R. Deb (supra), we find that therein a specific Rule was considered by Court and interpreted in the manner as was evident from a bare reading of Rule. Therein order of punishment of dismissal of a Sub-Inspector of Central Excise, employed by Union of India, was under consideration in the light of provisions of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as “CCS (CCA) Rules 1957”). The argument was raised in the light of Rule 15 of CCS (CCA) Rules 1957 that it did not contemplate more than one enquiry. Rule 15(1) reads as under : “Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiry) Act, 1850, no order imposing on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in Clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 13 shall be passed except after an inquiry, held as far as may be, in the manner hereinafter provided.” 13. Construing Rule 15, Court said that on the face, Rule 15 contemplates only one enquiry. If in a particular case, Disciplinary Authority finds that some defect has crept into enquiry or some important witnesses were not available and not examined in the enquiry or for some other reasons, it may ask Enquiry Officer to record further evidence but there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous enquiry on the ground that report of Enquiry Officer does not appeal to Disciplinary Authority. Court said that under Rule 9, Disciplinary Authority has enough power to reconsider evidence itself and come to its own conclusion. 14. In the present case, in Regulations 1981, we do not find any such provision, parimateria to Rule 15 or Rule 9 of CCS Rules 1957, which were considered and interpreted in K.R. Deb (supra). Therefore, in our view, aforesaid judgment shall not help petitioner in advancing argument that de-novo oral enquiry could not have been ordered by Disciplinary Authority. 15. We find that this point was also raised in a subsequent decision in Union of India and others v. P. Thayagarajan, 1999 (1) SCC 733 , wherein a de-novo enquiry was ordered in purported exercise of power under Rule 27 (c) of Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “CRPF Rules 1955”). 15. We find that this point was also raised in a subsequent decision in Union of India and others v. P. Thayagarajan, 1999 (1) SCC 733 , wherein a de-novo enquiry was ordered in purported exercise of power under Rule 27 (c) of Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “CRPF Rules 1955”). Court distinguished the decision in K.R. Deb (supra) and said in para 8 of judgment as under : “A careful reading of this passage will make it clear that this Court notices that if in a particular case where there has been no proper enquiry because of some serious defect having crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence but that provision would not enable the Disciplinary Authority to set aside the previous enquiries on the ground that the report of the Enquiry Officer does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. In the present case the basis upon which the Disciplinary Authority set aside the enquiry is that the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer was contrary to the relevant rules and affects the rights of the parties and not that the report does not appeal to him. When important evidence, either to be relied upon by the department or by the delinquent official, is shut out, this would not result in any advancement of any justice but on the other hand result in a miscarriage thereof. Therefore we are of the view that Rule 27(c) enables the Disciplinary Authority to record his findings on the report and to pass an appropriate order including ordering a de novo enquiry in a case of present nature.” 16. A similar issue was raised again in Kanailal Bera v. Union of India and others, 2007 (11) SCC 517 . It was also a case arising from CRPF Rules 1955. Appellant Kanailal Bera was dismissed from the post of Constable in CRPF. He was unauthorisedly absent for a period of 167 days. On this charge he was sentenced to seven days confinement to Civil Lines. Thereagainst he made a representation. Authorities however ordered another enquiry in which charges were held partly proved and he was dismissed from service. Appellant Kanailal Bera was dismissed from the post of Constable in CRPF. He was unauthorisedly absent for a period of 167 days. On this charge he was sentenced to seven days confinement to Civil Lines. Thereagainst he made a representation. Authorities however ordered another enquiry in which charges were held partly proved and he was dismissed from service. Court held that a second enquiry after finding charges partly proved in an earlier enquiry was not permissible under Rule 27 of CRPF Rules 1955 and placed reliance K.R. Deb v. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong (supra). In para 5 of the judgment Court said : “The question as to whether a punishment of confinement to Civil Lines could have been directed or not should not detain us as we agree with the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant that the purported order dated 5.4.1995 of the disciplinary authority was unsustainable in law. Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules 1955, inter alia, lays down the procedure for conducting a departmental inquiry. Once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning thereby a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges levelled against him or not. In a given situation further evidences may be directed to be adduced but the same would not mean that despite holding a delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges levelled against him another inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the self same charges which could not be proved in the first inquiry.” 17. The facts in Kanailal Bera (supra) shows its difference inasmuch as therein on the earlier enquiry charge was particularly found proved and punishment of seven days confinement to Civil Lines was imposed. Thereagainst delinquent employee filed appeal/representation and thereupon another enquiry in respect to charge which was not found proved was directed and then another order of punishment of dismissal was passed. Once an enquiry had already completed and punishment was also imposed after finding delinquent employee guilty of some charge, while exonerating in another, then again in respect to charge which was found not proved another enquiry is not permitted on the appeal preferred by employee. It is also barred by the principle of double jeopardy. Once an enquiry had already completed and punishment was also imposed after finding delinquent employee guilty of some charge, while exonerating in another, then again in respect to charge which was found not proved another enquiry is not permitted on the appeal preferred by employee. It is also barred by the principle of double jeopardy. Regulation 27 also does not permit any such second enquiry after imposing punishment. Therefore, neither decision in K.R. Deb (supra) nor Kanailal Bera (supra) will help the petitioner in order to contend that no enquiry de-novo could have been directed by disciplinary authority. 18. In the present case, firstly, Regulations 1981 do not restrict power of disciplinary authority in directing for further or de-novo enquiry as the case may be, based upon facts and requirement in a particular case. Secondly, herein disciplinary authority found that there were some evidence, relevant in the matter, which could not be placed before Enquiry Officer though directly connected with charges leveled against delinquent employee. 19. It is in these facts and circumstances and in order to give full opportunity of defence to delinquent employee, disciplinary authority directed for a de-novo enquiry. In absence of any provision provided otherwise or curtailing power of disciplinary authority, we find no reason to restrict power of disciplinary authority in directing de-novo enquiry. Question No. 1 therefore, is answered against petitioner. 20. Then comes question No. 2, ‘’whether it was necessary for disciplinary authority to issue a fresh charge-sheet.” 21. Disciplinary authority while directing de-novo enquiry required oral enquiry to be conducted again. A charge-sheet is a part of departmental enquiry but oral enquiry commences after issue of a charge-sheet. It is well established that disciplinary proceedings commences with service of charge-sheet but it does not constitute integral part of oral enquiry inasmuch as oral enquiry would commence after service of charge-sheet and reply given by delinquent employee, or in a given case, when Enquiry Officer is appointed, the charge-sheet may be issued by Enquiry Officer himself and thereafter oral hearing may proceed. The fact remains that charge-sheet is an integral part of enquiry but an incident to precede oral enquiry, conducted by Enquiry Officer, fixing date of oral enquiry. The fact remains that charge-sheet is an integral part of enquiry but an incident to precede oral enquiry, conducted by Enquiry Officer, fixing date of oral enquiry. Oral enquiry includes date fixed for admission or denial of charges, by delinquent employee before Enquiry Officer, if it has not already submitted reply to the charge-sheet taking a particular stand, opportunity given to Presenting Officer to place its evidence in support of charge, opportunity afforded to delinquent employee to place its evidence in defence before Enquiry Officer and lastly enquiry report. 22. In the present case, it is true that disciplinary authority ordered for de-novo enquiry by Enquiry Officer but there was no necessity of directing for issue of fresh charge-sheet, for the reason that charge-sheet precedes commencement of oral enquiry for it is an integral part of departmental enquiry and an enquiry commences with issue of charge-sheet. The mere fact that after ordering for de-novo enquiry no fresh charge-sheet was issued to delinquent employee would not vitiate oral enquiry conducted pursuant to direction of disciplinary authority for de-novo enquiry. 23. We do not find any statutory provision or requirement that a fresh charge-sheet ought to have been given and non issue of fresh charge-sheet would vitiate enquiry proceedings. In absence of any statutory provision or law of precedence, we find no reason to accept the submission of learned counsel for petitioner and answer question No. 2 also against petitioner. 24. Then comes the third question, regarding quantum of punishment. Here charges levelled against petitioner relates to non compliance of Bank’s norms, non computation of proper interest payable by a person who has taken loan and causing loss to Bank. Petitioner was Manager in the Bank. He held office of trust and was custodian of public funds which normally form capital of Bank. He was expected to show a conduct which best serve Bank’s interest and not to cause loss to Bank or endanger Bank’s revenue. In such matters, once charges are found proved, disciplinary authority in its wisdom can impose a particular suitable and appropriate punishment. In absence of anything to show that punishment is patently illegal and excessive so as to shock the conscience, no interference is called for. In the matter of quantum of punishment, interference in judicial review is very limited. 25. In such matters, once charges are found proved, disciplinary authority in its wisdom can impose a particular suitable and appropriate punishment. In absence of anything to show that punishment is patently illegal and excessive so as to shock the conscience, no interference is called for. In the matter of quantum of punishment, interference in judicial review is very limited. 25. In Divisional Controller, N.E.K.R.T.C. v. H. Amaresh, 2006 SCC 187 , dealing with the question of quantum of punishment, Court held, “mis-appropriation of the funds by the delinquent employee was only Rs. 360.95 but it is not question of quantum of money misappropriated by delinquent employee but it is a question of loss of confidence and the basic aptitude of lack of integrity on the part of such person. Court said “This Court in a catena of judgments held that the loss of confidence as the primary factor and not the amount of money mis-appropriated and that the sympathy or generosity cannot be a factor which is impermissible in law. When an employee is found guilty of pilferage or of mis-appropriating a Corporation’s funds, there is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefore with the quantum of punishment.” (emphasis added) 26. In Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) v. A.T. Mane, (2005) 3 SCC 254 , the amount found to be in possession of unaccounted money was only Rs. 93/-, but dealing with the question of quantum of punishment, Court said; “............ question of quantum of punishment, one should bear in mind the fact that it is not the amount of money misappropriated that becomes a primary factor for awarding punishment, on the contrary, it is the loss of confidence which is the primary factor to be taken into consideration. In our opinion, when a person is found guilty of misappropriating corporation’s fund, there is nothing wrong in the corporation losing confidence or faith in such a person and awarding a punishment of dismissal.” (emphasis added) 27. In Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal and another v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 642 , Court in para 25 of judgment said; “In the present day scenario, corruption has been treated to have the potentiality of corroding the marrows of the economy. In Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal and another v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 642 , Court in para 25 of judgment said; “In the present day scenario, corruption has been treated to have the potentiality of corroding the marrows of the economy. There are cases where the amount is small and in certain cases, it is extremely high. The gravity of the offence in such a case, is not to be adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe. An attitude to abuse the official position to extend favour in lieu of benefit is a crime against the collective and an anathema to the basic tenet of democracy, for it erodes the faith of the people in the system. It creates an incurable concavity in the Rule of Law..........” (emphasis added) 28. In Rajasthan State TPT Corporation and another v. Bajrang Lal, (2014) 4 SCC 693 , Court said; “ in cases involving corruption-there cannot be any other punishment than dismissal. Any sympathy shown in such cases is totally uncalled for and opposed to public interest. The amount misappropriated may be small or large; it is the act of misappropriation that is relevant.” (emphasis added) 29. We do not propose to multiply the authorities on this aspect and suffice it to mention that dishonesty, lack of integrity on the part of an official of Bank, going to the extent of helping a scrupulous person to the extent that it may cause loss to Bank, of which the official is custodian and holding position in trust, is a very serious matter. It is the aptitude of a person which leans towards dishonesty and corruption or bad conduct, that needs punished. The circumstances or quantum of loss or amount of misappropriation or other things cannot be considered as a justification for such misconduct on the part of official concerned, so as to justify a lenient view on the issue of punishment. 30. A Bank official holds a position where public money is kept in trust and he is custodian thereof. If he causes any loss to public money on account of any lack of good conduct on his part, such person must be dealt with iron hands. There is no question of leniency or sympathy. 30. A Bank official holds a position where public money is kept in trust and he is custodian thereof. If he causes any loss to public money on account of any lack of good conduct on his part, such person must be dealt with iron hands. There is no question of leniency or sympathy. In fact any indulgence in such matter will make even Court a party to such dishonest action, which has to be avoided, prevented and is totally uncalled for, since Court cannot be a party to a misdeed of a person. On the contrary, once a person had indulged in misconduct, lack of integrity or honesty etc., adequate preventive punishment, which may be a lesson to others also, is need of the day. 31. In the present case, looking to seriousness of charges which have been found proved against petitioner, we have no hesitation in holding that the punishment, neither can be said to be excessive, nor unjust, nor otherwise arbitrary justifying any interference. Hence third question is also answered against petitioner. 32. No other point has been argued. 33. Writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.