ORDER Rusia, J. -- 1. Petitioners No.1 to 6 have filed the present petition through power of attorney holder Shri Ramanlal and Aakesh Jain. Petitioners being residents of House No.1 are claiming ownership of the property situated at Khidwadkar Marg, Ujjain known as Premchaya Parisar. In the first round of litigation, the petitioners approached this Court by way of Writ Petition No.4401/2011 challenging action of the respondent Municipal Corporation, Ujjain by which widening of road was proposed by demolishing their house. In the said writ petition notices were issued and interim protection was granted in the nature of maintaining status quo till the next date of hearing. During pendency of the said writ petition, notification under section 4(1) read with section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 was issued which was published in the gazette notification dated 2.11.2012 by which some portion of house and land of Premchaya Parisar and Mastram Akhara were proposed to acquire for construction of new and widening of road for public purpose. Being aggrieved by the notification under sections 4(1) and 17(1) of the Act of 1894, petitioners have filed the present writ petition. Vide order dated 6.3.2013 notices were issued to the respondents and thereafter vide order dated 4.4.2014 respondents were restrained not to carry out any demolition activities. 2. That since the present petition was filed and in which the interim relief was granted by this Court the writ petition earlier filed i.e. Writ Petition No.4401/2011 was disposed of vide order dated 14.8.2013 because the respondents No.1 and 2 have already initiated proceedings for taking possession of the land as per the Land Acquition Act, 1894. By way of interim protection, respondents were directed not to dispossess the petitioners without following the prescribed procedure under the Land Acquisition Act. 3. Petitioners have filed the present petition challenging the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act mainly on the ground of mala fides and availability of alternative roads in the relevant areas. The contention of the petitioners is that respondents wanted to vacate the premises of Mastram Akhada which is occupied by the tenants, hence the present road has been proposed for construction. Petitioners have also contended that the urgency clause under section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act has wrongly been invoked as there is no urgency arises in the present facts and circumstances. 4. Petitioners have also contended that the urgency clause under section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act has wrongly been invoked as there is no urgency arises in the present facts and circumstances. 4. That after notice respondents No.1 and 2 have filed detailed return in which the ownership of the petitioners was denied and disputed. It is contended that the Municipal Corporation, Ujjain has passed a resolution for acquisition of the land for construction of road and request was sent to the Government vide letter dated 17.4.2012 for initiating the proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act. On the basis of the proposal sent by the Municipal Corporation, Ujjain, the Land Acquisition Officer has registered a case as 4397/LandAcquisition, 2013. The notification under sections 4(1) and 6 has been published and notified in the gazette notification. Thereafter permission has been obtained to initiate proceedings under sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. The Municipal Corporation, Ujjain has already deposited an amount of Rs.3,21,40,361/- in the office of Land Acquisition Officer for payment of compensation after award. The allegation of mala fide was specifically denied by the respondents. It was submitted that the new road is proposed from Chamunda Temple to New Road through Prem Chhaya premises and Bhatgali and for the said purpose an amount of Rs.575 lacs have already been sanctioned. The said land is also proposed in the Ujjain Development Plan 2011 and 2021 in anticipation of expecting crowd in the upcoming Sinhasta, 2016. There is a public purpose behind the construction of the new road and the acquisition proceedings. 5. The Municipal Corporation, Ujjain has also filed an independent return denying the allegation made in the writ petition and in para-b has specifically stated that the house of the petitioner is situated at survey No.1977 area 2.749 hectares which is “Abadi land” and the construction comes under the category of illegal construction. Despite that the Executive Engineer, PWD, Municipal Corporation, Ujjain has assessed the compensation of Rs.7,80,840/- payable to the petitioners. It is further contended that during pendency of the writ petition Land Acquisition Officer has passed the final award dated 6.1.2015 which is filed as Annexure R-3/2. In the award the Land Acquisition Officer in para7 has mentioned the status of the land claimed by the petitioners. It is further contended that during pendency of the writ petition Land Acquisition Officer has passed the final award dated 6.1.2015 which is filed as Annexure R-3/2. In the award the Land Acquisition Officer in para7 has mentioned the status of the land claimed by the petitioners. Para7 of the award reads as under:- ^^izdj.k dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA izdj.k esa izLrqr [kljk o"kZ 1971&72 ,oa 1972&73 esa losZ Øekad 1977 jdck 2-749 dkWye uacj 2 esa vkcknh utwy vafdr gS vkSj dkWye uacj 12 esa 'kk-izk-fo-] 'kk-ek-fo-] 'kk-m-ek-fo- nkSyrxat dk banzkt gSA blh izdkj losZ Øekad 1978 jdck 0-240 gsDVj vkcknh utwy dh Hkwfe gksus dk mYys[k dkWye uacj 2 esa ik;k x;kA blh izdkj losZ Øekad 1977 [kljk o"kZ 2008&09 esa vkcknh uxjikfydk fuxe ,oa dkWye uacj 12 esa 'kk-izk-fo-] 'kk-ek-fo-] 'kk-m-ek-fo- nkSyrxat mTtSu gSA dyDVj dk;kZy; utwy ftyk mTtSu ds i= Øekad jhMj@utwy@2012@14226 fnukad 1-5-2012 ds vuqlkj losZ Øekad 1977 jdck 2-749 gsDVj vkcknh uxjikfydk fuxe ntZ gS ,oa dkWye uacj 12 dSfQ;r esa Hkh 'kk-izk-fo-] 'kk-ek-fo-] 'kk-m-ek-fo- nkSyrxat mTtSu gSA mDr fLFkfr ls Li"V gS fd Hkw&vtZu esa vf/kxzfgr gksus okyh Hkwfe LokfeRo dh Hkwfe ugha gSA ,slh n'kk es vius LokfeRo dh Hkwfe ds [kljk izfr bR;kfn nLrkost izLrqr djus gsrq fgrc} i{kdkjks dk lquokbZ gsrq vkgqr djuk vko';d izrhr gqvkA** 6. The Land Acquisition Officer has issued notice to the petitioners with the direction to submit documents relating to the title. In para 8 which has specifically mentioned that despite notice they have failed to produce any documents relating to the title. As per the revenue records, the land which was proposed to be acquired was Government land, hence the payment of compensation was denied but on the basis of the report of the Executive Engineer the amount of Rs.7,80,840/- was directed to be paid subject to the outcome of the Writ Petition No.2390/2013. In view of the above, the respondent No.3 prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. Along with the return an application for urgent hearing and vacation of stay was filed on the ground that except the land in possessions of the petitioners the remaining road has already been constructed by the respondents. 7. That with the consent of the parties, the writ petition was heard finally today looking to the urgency in the matter at motion hearing stage. 8. That Mr. 7. That with the consent of the parties, the writ petition was heard finally today looking to the urgency in the matter at motion hearing stage. 8. That Mr. M.K. Jain, counsel for the petitioners have contended that they are the owner of the land and they cannot be dispossessed without payment of adequate compensation. Petitioners have also contended that there was no reasons to initiate urgency clause under sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act as there was no urgency in the matter. The respondents ought to have initiated proceedings under sections 4, 6 and 9 and thereafter 12 of the Land Acquisition Act before passing the final award. The petitioners are also aggrieved by the less amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. In support of the contentions the counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance of judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Darshan Lal Nagpal (dead) by LRs v. Government of NCT of Delhi and others, reported in AIR 2012 SC 412 . Para14 of the judgment reads as under : “14.What needs to be emphasized is that although in exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State can acquire the private property for public purpose, it must be remembered that compulsory acquisition of the property belonging to a private individual is a serious matter and has grave repercussions on his Constitutional right of not being deprived of his property without the sanction of law – Article 300A and the legal rights. Therefore, the State must exercise this power with great care and circumspection. At times, compulsory acquisition of land is likely to make the owner landless. The degree of care required to be taken by the State is greater when the power of compulsory acquisition of private land is exercised by invoking the provisions like the one contained in section 17 of the Act because that results in depriving the owner of his property without being afforded an opportunity of hearing.” 9. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of Devendra Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, reported in AIR 2011 SC 2582 . Para 9 of the judgment reads as under : 9. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of Devendra Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, reported in AIR 2011 SC 2582 . Para 9 of the judgment reads as under : 9. In view of the above it is well settled that acquisition of the land for public purpose by itself shall not justify the exercise of power of eliminating enquiry under section 5A in terms of sections 17(1) and section 17(4) of the Act. The Court should take judicial notice of the fact that certain public purpose such as development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas by their intrinsic nature and character contemplates planning, execution and implementation of the schemes which generally takes time of few years. Therefore, the land acquisition for said public purpose does not justify the invoking of urgency provisions under the Act. In Radhey Shyam [(2011)5 SCC 559], (supra), this Court, whilst considering the conduct or attitude of the State Government vis-a-vis urgency for acquisition of the land for the public purpose of planned industrial development in District Gautam Budh Nagar has observed : “In this case, the Development Authority sent the proposal sometime in 2006. The authorities up to the level of the Commissioner completed the exercise of survey and preparation of documents by the end of December 2006 but it took one year and almost three months for the State Government to issue notification under section 4 read with sections 17(1) and 17(4). If this much time was consumed between the receipt of proposal for the acquisition of land and issue of notification, it is not possible to accept the argument that four to five weeks within which the objections could be filed under sub-section (1) of section 5A and the time spent by the Collector in making enquiry under sub-section (2) of section 5A would have defeated the object of the acquisition.” 10. Counsel for the petitioners have also argued on the point of mala fides but the allegations are very vague in nature and are not supported by any material. 11. Per contra, Shri Sunil Jain, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents has argued that Government has rightly exercised the urgency clause looking to the upcoming Simhastha, 2016 at Ujjain. Counsel for the petitioners have also argued on the point of mala fides but the allegations are very vague in nature and are not supported by any material. 11. Per contra, Shri Sunil Jain, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents has argued that Government has rightly exercised the urgency clause looking to the upcoming Simhastha, 2016 at Ujjain. There is no mala fides behind the construction of new road and in a land acquisition proceeding the scope of judicial review is very limited and interference in the policy matter without illegality is impermissible. He has placed reliance over the judgment passed by the Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Siyaram and others v. State of M.P and others, reported in 1999(2) JLJ 361 = 1999(2) MPLJ 714 . Paras 33 and 37 of the judgment reads as under : “33. So far as the question relating to vagueness of the notification is concerned, suffice it to say that in the case of an acquisition of a large area of land comprising several plots belonging to different persons, the specification of the purpose can only be with reference to the acquisition of the whole area. Unlike in the cases of a small area, it may be practically difficult to specify the particular public purpose for which each and every item of land comprised in the area is needed. As observed by the apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Tamil Nadu and others v. L.Krishnan and others, reported in (1996)1 SCC 250 , it is not appropriate to insist upon the Government particularising the use of each and every bit of the land so notified would be put to. 37. In fact, as clarified by the apex Court in its decision in the case of Ramniklal N.Bhutta and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in (1997)1 SCC 134 , the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary. It has to be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point and in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. It has to be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point and in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 of the constitution and it is open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lump sum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. It was made amply clear that there are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong. The quashing of the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress and it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests.” 12. He has also relied judgment of Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in (1997)1 SCC 134 , on the point that the Court should keep its public interest in mind while exercising its powers and while granting stay/injunction in the matter of land acquisition. Para10 of the judgment reads as under : “10. Before parting with this case, we think it necessary to make a few observations relevant to land acquisition proceedings. Our country is now launched upon an ambitious programme of all-round economic advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. We are anxious to attract foreign direct investment to the maximum extent. We propose to compete with China economically. We wish to attain the pace of progress achieved by some of the Asian countries, referred to as “Asian tigers”. e.g., South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. It is, however, recognized on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country. The means of transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial improvement, expansion and modernisation. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the acquisition proceedings in Courts. These challenges are generally in the shape of writ petitions filed in High Courts. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the acquisition proceedings in Courts. These challenges are generally in the shape of writ petitions filed in High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is asked for and in some cases, orders by way of stay or injunction are also made. Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the Courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under Article 226 us discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 – indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the high Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lump sum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the Courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings.” 13. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the Courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings.” 13. He has also placed reliance over the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sooraram Pratap Reddy and others v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District and others, reported in (2008)9 SCC 552 , and para 5 of the judgment in the matter of First Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli and another, reported in (2002) 4 SCC 160 , on the point of scope of judicial review in the matter of land acquisition. Para 5 reads as under : 5. The question of urgency of an acquisition under sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and ordinarily it is not open to the court to make a scrutiny of the propriety of that satisfaction on an objective appraisal of facts. In this view of the matter when the Government takes a decision, taking all relevant considerations into account and is satisfied that there exists emergency for invoking powers under sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act, and issues notification accordingly, the same should not be interfered with by the Court unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind to the relevant factors or that the decision has been taken by the appropriate authority mala fide. Whether in a given situation there existed urgency or not is left to the discretion and decision of the authorities concerned. If an order invoking power under section 17(4) is assailed, the courts may enquire whether the appropriate authority had all the relevant materials before it or whether the order has been passed by non-application of mind. Any post notification delay subsequent to the decision of the State Government dispensing with an enquiry under section 5A by invoking powers under section 17(1) of the Act would not invalidate the decision itself specially when no mala fides on the part of the Government or its officers are alleged. Any post notification delay subsequent to the decision of the State Government dispensing with an enquiry under section 5A by invoking powers under section 17(1) of the Act would not invalidate the decision itself specially when no mala fides on the part of the Government or its officers are alleged. Opinion of the State Government can be challenged in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that action of the State Government is mala fide. Though the satisfaction under section 17(4) is a subjective one and is not open to challenge before a court of law, except for the grounds already indicated but the said satisfaction must be as to the existence of an urgency. The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency, even though cannot be conclusive, but is entitled to great weight, as has been held by this Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana. Even a mere allegation that power was exercised mala fide would not be enough and in support of such allegation specific materials should be placed before the Court. The burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the persons who alleges it. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, if the circumstances of the case in hand are examined it would appear that the premises in question were required for the students of National Medical College, Calcutta and notification issued in December 1982 had been quashed by the Court and the subsequent notification issued on 25.2.1994 also had been quashed by the Court. It is only thereafter the notification was issued under sections 4(1) and 17(4) of the Act on 29.11.1994, which came up for consideration before the High Court. Apart from the fact that there had already been considerable delay in acquiring the premises in question on account of the intervention by Courts, the premises were badly needed for the occupation by the students of National Medical College Calcutta. Thus, existence of urgency was writ large on the facts of the case and therefore, the said exercise of power in the case in hand, cannot be interfered with by a Court of law on a conclusion that there did not exist any emergency. The conclusion of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, therefore, is unsustainable.” 14. Mr. Thus, existence of urgency was writ large on the facts of the case and therefore, the said exercise of power in the case in hand, cannot be interfered with by a Court of law on a conclusion that there did not exist any emergency. The conclusion of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, therefore, is unsustainable.” 14. Mr. Anil Ozjha, counsel for the intervener has supported and adopted the argument of Additional Advocate General and submitted that entire road has already been constructed except the part occupied by the petitioners due to the interim order and public at large is suffering because of the jam in the traffic. 15. Petitioner has challenged the acquisition on the ground that there is no public purpose behind the acquisition of their property is liable to be rejected solely on the ground that whether acquisition is for public purpose or not is the discretion of the Government. The word “public purpose” is defined under clause (f) of section 2 of the Act which has very wide amplitude. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the public purpose in the case of Sooraram Pratap Reddy and others v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District and others, reported in (2008)9 SCC 552 , and has held that an appropriate government may acquite land for any public purpose and in para 119 it has further held that government is the best judge to decide whether acquisition is for public purpose and in such matter a writ Court will not interfere by substituting its judgment against the judgment of Government. In view of the above, the argument of the counsel for the petitioners is liable to be rejected that there is no public purpose behind the acquisition. The reasons are already mentioned in the notification that the land is being acquired for construction of the public road which definitely comes under the category of public purpose. 16. In view of above submission of parties, we are of the opinion that in the present case though the petitioners are claiming ownership of the land over which the road is being constructed but the respondents are denying the ownership. Whether petitioners are owners of the land or it is a Government land is serious disputed question of fact which cannot be decided in the present writ petition. Whether petitioners are owners of the land or it is a Government land is serious disputed question of fact which cannot be decided in the present writ petition. Even the Land Acquisition Officer gave a liberty to the petitioners to place the material relating to the ownership. The petitioners have failed to produce or did not produce any material before the Land Acquisition Officer. On the basis of the revenue records as reproduced in para 7 of the award the Land Acquisition Officer has passed the final award dated 5.1.2015 during pendency of the present petition. The petitioners have a remedy under section 18 seeking reference for challenging the award if they are aggrieved by the quantum and the finding recorded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The reasons best known to the petitioners have not challenged the award so far. Since the disputed question of facts are involved the same cannot be decided in the writ petition and especially when the final award has already been passed and as per the contention of the respondents major work of the construction of the road has already been completed, therefore, we have no option but to dismiss the present writ petition with liberty to the petitioners to challenge the award and ownership of the land in question in accordance with law before the appropriate forum. 17. Petition is accordingly dismissed.