JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. By means of this criminal petition filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. this court has been urged to invoke its inherent power for recalling the judgment and order dated 17.01.2015 (Annexure P/3) delivered by this court in Crl. Rev. Petn. No. 44 of 2012 affirming the conviction of the petitioner under Section 498A of the IPC. 2. According to the petitioner, the respondent No. 2 has expressed her willingness to amicably settle her matrimonial dispute. By filing an affidavit, Annexure P/4 to this petition, the respondent No. 2, the wife of the petitioner and at whose instance, Agartala Women P/S Case No. 57/2007 was registered and investigated, has stated inter-alia having regard to the said judgment dated 17.01.2015 as under: "7. After passing of the said Judgment & Order dated 17.01.2015, I had a detailed discussion with my husband. I state that my husband is the sole bread earner of the family, comprising of myself, my husband and my son. Taking into consideration, the welfare of the family, more particularly, the children, i.e. my son and my married daughter, I have decided to live peaceful conjugal life with my husband." In the Paras 8 & 9 of the said affidavit thereafter it has been further averred as under: "8. My husband has assured me that he would lead a peaceful conjugal life with me. .........This is true to my knowledge. 9. I have decided to seek appropriate permission to withdraw my allegations as recorded in the said Criminal case which has resulted in the aforesaid Criminal case. ..............This is true to my knowledge." 3. Based on the said affidavit, Annexure P/4 to this petition, it has been urged to recall the judgment and order dated 10.11.2010, judgment and order dated 20.04.2011 and the judgment and order dated 17.01.2015 respectively passed by the trial court, the appellate court and the revisional court [this high court] respectively. The judgment of conviction under Section 498A of the IPC as returned by the trial court has been affirmed substantively by the superior courts. 4. It can be noticed at the outset that in Ramphal and Others vs. State of M.P. (2000) 9 SCC 61 , the apex court has observed as under: "Neither before the original court, nor the High Court, any application for compounding had been filed. 4. It can be noticed at the outset that in Ramphal and Others vs. State of M.P. (2000) 9 SCC 61 , the apex court has observed as under: "Neither before the original court, nor the High Court, any application for compounding had been filed. But in this case an application for compounding has been filed and it has been brought to our notice that in the counter case, on an application for compounding having been filed, the Court has already granted permission and the matter has been compounded. The complainant/informant has endorsed in the application for compounding and the counsel appearing for them also states that the matter has been amicably settled. Taking into account the fact that the occurrence is of the year 1987 and the parties have compounded the matter amongst themselves, we think, in the interest of justice, to accord permission of such compounding. We, accordingly set aside the conviction and sentence and dispose of this appeal on the basis of compromise." In that case the conviction was under Sections 325/149, 322/149 and under Section 147 of the IPC. Section 325 of the IPC is no doubt an offence which can be compounded by the persons to whom hurt is caused. There is no dispute that for reconstruction of a family, the High Court may also in the appropriate cases allow the complainant to withdraw the allegations or to mitigate the same. But that has to be done during the pendency only. In Ramphal (supra), the apex court had permitted at the stage of appeal. Since the High Court has become functus officio after passing the judgment and order dated 17.01.2015 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 44 of 2011, the question that arises in this petition whether this court can grant permission for withdrawal of the allegations to the complainant or not. Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. provides as under: "362. Court not to alter judgment.-Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error." 5. Mr. Court not to alter judgment.-Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error." 5. Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the inherent power as conferred on this court is wide enough to allow the prayer made by the petitioner for the cause of justice. For purpose of reference, the provisions of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is reproduced hereunder: "482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 6. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has relied on a decision of the apex court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal vs. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706 , where the apex court had occasion to appreciate the ambit and scope of Section 561 of the Cr.P.C. 1898. That provisions of Section 568A is substantively identical to the provisions of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 1973. It has been observed in Mohan Singh Singh (supra) as under: "The earlier application which was rejected by the High Court was an application under Section 561a of the code of criminal procedure to quash the proceeding and the High Court rejected it on the ground that the evidence was yet to be led and it was not desirable to interfere with the proceeding at that stage. But, thereafter, the criminal case dragged on for a period of about one and half years without any progress at all and it was in these circumstances that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were constrained to make a fresh application to the High Court under Section 561A to quash the proceeding. It is difficult to see how in these circumstances it could ever be contended that what the High Court was being asked to do by making the subsequent application was to review or revise the Order made by it on the earlier application. It is difficult to see how in these circumstances it could ever be contended that what the High Court was being asked to do by making the subsequent application was to review or revise the Order made by it on the earlier application. Section 561A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such Orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked." (Emphasis added) 7. On the basis of such observation, it has been held by the apex court that the high court is perfectly entitled to do and if it is so done it cannot be said that there is any jurisdictional infirmity. Reliance has also been placed in Simrikhia vs. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and Another, (1990) 2 SCC 437 . The apex court in that case has appreciated the interplay between Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the following terms: "3. The learned counsel for the appellant contended before us that the second application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was not entertainable, the exercise of power under Section 482, on a second application by the same party on the same ground virtually amounts to the review of the earlier order and is contrary to the spirit of Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. and the High Court was, therefore, clearly in error in having quashed the proceedings by adopting that course. We find considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel. The inherent power under Section 482 is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and to secure ends of justice. Such power cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. If any consideration of the facts by way of review is not permissible under the Code and is expressly barred, it is not for the Court to exercise its inherent power to reconsider the matter and record a conflicting decision. Such power cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. If any consideration of the facts by way of review is not permissible under the Code and is expressly barred, it is not for the Court to exercise its inherent power to reconsider the matter and record a conflicting decision. If there had been change in the circumstances of the case, it would be in order for the High Court to exercise its inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. Where there is no such changed circumstances and the decision has to be arrived at on the facts that existed as on the date of the earlier order, the exercise of the power to reconsider the same materials to arrive at different conclusion is in effect a review, which is expressly barred under Section 362." (Emphasis added) 8. Based on this decision, Mr. Deb, learned counsel has submitted that now in this case a new circumstance has emerged which is completely different from the circumstances under which the judgment of conviction under Section 498A was passed against the petitioner. Therefore, in view of Simrikhia (supra) the court has the authority to allow the complainant or the victim to withdraw the allegations. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has placed reliance on Krishnan and Another vs. Krishnaveni and Another, (1997) 4 SCC 241 where the apex court has observed after appreciating the ratio of Simrikhia (supra) as under: "14. In view of the above discussion, we hold that though the revision before the High Court under Sub-section (1) of Section 397 is prohibited by Sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of the High Court under Section 483, the High Court is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and in setting aside the order of the Courts below. It remitted the case to the Magistrate for decision on merits after consideration of the evidence." 9. This decision does not have any relevance in the present context. Reliance has also been placed by Mr. It remitted the case to the Magistrate for decision on merits after consideration of the evidence." 9. This decision does not have any relevance in the present context. Reliance has also been placed by Mr. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner on R. Annapurna vs. Ramadugu Anantha Krishna Sastry and Others, (2002) 10 SCC 401 where the apex court in Para-5 has observed as under: "5. When the appellant came to know of the said order, she moved the High Court with a prayer to recall the said order, but that was dismissed on the premise that the High Court has no power to recall or review its own order." 10. The apex court in State Represented by DSP, SB CID, Chennai vs. K.V. Rajendran and Others, (2008) 8 SCC 673 has considered again the inter play of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. and it has been observed on revisiting the previous decisions such as Hari Singh Mann vs. Harabhajan Singh Bajwa and Others, (2001) 1 SCC 169 and Simrikhia (supra) that: "Keeping the principles, as laid down by the aforesaid decisions of this Court in mind, let us now look to Section 362 of the Code, which expressly provides that no court which has signed its judgment and final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct clerical or arithmetical error save as otherwise provided by the court. At this stage, the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code may be looked into." 11. In that premises, it has been held by the apex court in K.V. Rajendran (supra) that: "Section 482 enables the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers, however, are as much controlled by principle and precedent as are its express powers by statutes. If a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the court cannot give a goby to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction." (Emphasis added) 12. The inherent powers, however, are as much controlled by principle and precedent as are its express powers by statutes. If a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the court cannot give a goby to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction." (Emphasis added) 12. Thereafter having restated the law as enunciated in Smt. Sooraj Devi vs. Pyare Lal and Another, (1981) 1 SCC 500 it has been held that: "5...........that the inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code." To remove any ambiguity whatsoever the apex court reiterated the position of law as under: "25. As noted herein earlier, Section 362 of the Code prohibits a court from making altercation in a judgment after the final order or judgment was signed by the court disposing of the case finally except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors." (Emphasis added) 13. This court does place on record appreciation for Mr. Deb, learned counsel for assisting this court with expected rectitude by referring the decisions which are not even supporting his case. He has also referred another decision of the apex court in State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and Others with Sumedh Singh Saini vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and Others, (2011) 14 SCC 770 where the apex court has approved Simrikhia (supra). The apex court had however someway refurbished the law saying that the inherent powers of the court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. can be invoked where the order is required to be set aside to secure the ends of justice and in such a case where the proceeding is pending before a court and to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. In crux, such powers can be exercised by the High Court in a matter pending before a criminal court or where the power can be exercised by the court under the Cr.P.C. Inherent powers cannot be exercised assuming that the statute has conferred an unfettered and arbitrary jurisdiction, nor can the high court act at its whim or caprice. The statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. The statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. In this regard, the apex court has made reference to Kurukshetra University and Another vs. State of Haryana and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 451 and State of West Bengal and Others vs. Sujit Kr. Rana, (2004) 4 SCC 129 . 14. Having referred to the decision of the apex court in Vishnu Agarwal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2011) 14 SCC 813 , Mr. Deb, learned counsel has contended that Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be considered in a rigid and hyper technical manner to defeat the ends of justice. 15. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has also referred a decision of the apex court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 where the apex court has held that: "Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity. etc. cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. etc. cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above questions is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." (Emphasis added) 16. It is clear from the bare reading of the passages reproduced above that such power can been exercised only in a pending proceeding. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has referred to a decision contained in the judgment and order dated 18.11.2012 delivered in Criminal Petition No. 35 of 2013 [Sujit Saha @ Abu @ Debbarma and Another vs. State of Tripura] where the court has permitted to compound the offence in view of the decision in Gian Singh (supra). Mr. Deb, learned counsel has raised a pertinent question after referring that decision that such permission to withdraw allegations or to compound the offence in that context was granted after the criminal revision petition was disposed of by this court by the said judgment and order dated 17.07.2013. Mr. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has raised a pertinent question after referring that decision that such permission to withdraw allegations or to compound the offence in that context was granted after the criminal revision petition was disposed of by this court by the said judgment and order dated 17.07.2013. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has candidly submitted that it appears from the judgment that the fact of disposal or non-pendency was not brought to the notice of the court. But he has submitted that the said order also cannot be stated to be irregular as the said order passed by invoking the inherent powers of the court for securing substantive ends of justice. Thus, Mr. Deb, learned counsel has assertively submitted that this court may also take a similar view in this case. 17. From the other side Mr. A. Ghosh, learned public prosecutor appearing for the state has submitted that the decision in Sujit Saha (supra) cannot form a legal precedent as in that judgment, the fact of nonpendency was not brought to the notice of the court. However, Mr. Ghosh, has relied a few decisions to refute what Mr. Deb, learned counsel has advanced as the proposition of law. Having referred to a decision in Satya Narayan Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 8 SCC 607 , Mr. Ghosh, learned P.P. has submitted that Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide that the inherent power can be exercised notwithstanding any other express provision. Thus, if an enactment contains a specific bar then the jurisdiction under the inherent power cannot be exercised to get over that statutory bar as has been observed in the cases of Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 , Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 and Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India, (2000) 1 SCC 168 . Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel has also referred Sooraj Devi (supra) and State of Kerala vs. M.M. Manikantan Nair, AIR 2001 SC 2145 , where the apex court having restated the interpretation in Hari Singh Mann (supra) has held that: Section 362 of the Code mandates that no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or an arithmetical error. The section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis added) 18. For supplementing his argument, Mr. Ghosh, learned Public Prosecutor has also referred a decision of the Kerala High Court in Sudheer Kumar @ Sudheer vs. Manakkandi M.K. Kunhiraman, 2008 (1) KLJ 203 where it has been observed as under: 16. Section 362 of Cr.P.C. prohibits the court after it has signed its judgment and final order is passed from altering or reviewing the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. In Tanveer Aquil vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, considered the issue. In that case, in appeal, court confirmed the conviction. After judgment was pronounced, parties compromised the matter and filed a petition to compound the matter. It was dismissed as High Court cannot entertain such a petition in view of the bar under Section 362. Apex Court confirmed the same as once judgment is pronounced, High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for grant of permission to compound the offence. In such case proper case is to file appeal or SLP as the case may be and get necessary relief from the Supreme Court. In State of Kerala vs. M.M. Manikantan Nair, 2001 Cri. LJ 2346. Apex Court observed as follows: The Code of Criminal Procedure does not authorise the High Court to review its Judgment or Order passed either in exercise of its appellate, revisional or original jurisdiction. Section 362 of the Code prohibits the court after it has signed its judgment or Order except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. This prohibition is complete and no criminal court can review its own judgment or order after it is signed. By the first Order, dated 31st May, 2000, the High Court rejected the prayer of the respondent for quashing the criminal proceeding. This order attained its finality. By the impugned Order, the High Court reversed its earlier Order and quashed the criminal proceeding for want of proper sanction. By the first Order, dated 31st May, 2000, the High Court rejected the prayer of the respondent for quashing the criminal proceeding. This order attained its finality. By the impugned Order, the High Court reversed its earlier Order and quashed the criminal proceeding for want of proper sanction. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that by the impugned order the High Court only corrected any clerical or arithmetical error. In fact the impugned Order is an Order of review, as the earlier Order was reversed, which could not have been done as there is no such provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, but there is an interdict against it. This Court in Hari Singh Mann vs. Harabhajan Singh Bajwa and Others, (2001) 1 SCC 169 . held that Section 362of the Criminal Procedure Code mandates that no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final Order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or an arithmetical error and that this section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a Court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by the Court of competent jurisdiction. Once the order of conviction is confirmed in revision, the revisional court cannot review or alter the conviction in view of the specific bar under Section 362. The above statutory bar of review cannot be overreached by filing clarification petition, modification petition or a petition under Section 482 or by resorting to any other innovative methods. Mandate of Section 362 has to be obeyed in letter and spirit. 17. Can the High Court reverse, alter or modify the conviction which became final by its own order passed in a revision petition, by using power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. which ultimately may amount to cancellation of conviction and sentence taking note of subsequent events like compounding of the case? We are of the opinion that inherent powers cannot be used to defeat the specific procedure prescribed in Cr.P.C. It is not a divide to overcome the specific bar under Section 326. We are of the opinion that inherent powers cannot be used to defeat the specific procedure prescribed in Cr.P.C. It is not a divide to overcome the specific bar under Section 326. After analysing various case laws also Apex Court relied in Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Ravi Shankar Srivastave, IAS and Another, powers of the High Court under Section 482 as follows: Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognized and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist." Restored powers of the High Court under Section 482 as follows: The learned judge in Sabu George's case (supra) relied on an observation of the Supreme Court in Mostt. Simrikhia vs. Smt. Dolley Mukherjee alias Chhabi Mukherjee and Another, for holding that Section 482 can be used to review the effect of an order if there is change in circumstances. Facts of that case are described in paragraph 1 of the above Apex Court judgment is as follows: In a case instituted on a private complaint by the appellant for offences under Sections 452 and 323, IPC, the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patna, in exercise of power under Section 192(2), Cr.P.C. transferred the case for enquiry under Section 202 of the Code. The Court of the Second Class Magistrate, after examining witnesses, by order dated 22.3.1985 issued process to the two accused the respondents herein. The order of the Magistrate issuing process was challenged by the respondents under Section 482 before the High Court. The main ground urged before the High Court was that the First Class Magistrate had transferred the case without taking cognizance of the offence and the subsequent proceedings were, therefore, illegal. The High Court, by its order dated 20.8.1988, dismissed the petition. It was found that there was no such illegality. The respondents again made Crl. Misc. Petition No. 2314/89 under Section 482, Cr.P.C. before the High Court alleging, inter-alia, that the record of the proceedings on close scrutiny would indicate that the case had not been taken cognizance of before the transfer. The learned Single Judge accepted the case of the respondents and quashed the proceedings by the impugned order. The Apex Court considered the powers under Sections 482 and 362 and observed as follows: The inherent power under Section 482 is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and to secure ends of justice. The learned Single Judge accepted the case of the respondents and quashed the proceedings by the impugned order. The Apex Court considered the powers under Sections 482 and 362 and observed as follows: The inherent power under Section 482 is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and to secure ends of justice. Such power cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. If any consideration of the facts by way of review is not permissible under the Code and is expressly barred, it is not for the Court to exercise its inherent power to reconsider the matter and record a conflicting decision. Therefore it was further observed as follows: If there had been change in the circumstances of the case, it would be in order for the High Court to exercise its inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. Where there is no such changed circumstances and the decision has to be arrived at on the facts that existed as on the date of the earlier order, the exercise of the power to reconsider the same materials to arrive at different conclusion is in effect a review, which is expressly barred under Section 362. It is also observed as follows: If a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the court cannot give a goby to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction. Finally after discussions and verdict and ratio decidendi of the case is stated in paragraph 6 of the judgment which is as follows: 6. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override bar of review under Section 362. It is clearly stated in Sooraj Devi vs. Pyare Lal that the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar under other provisions of the Code. The Court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of inherent power. The law is therefore clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar under other provisions of the Code. The Court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of inherent power. We find that the impugned order in this case is in effect one reviewing the earlier order on a reconsideration of the same materials. The High Court has grievously erred in doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage. With the above findings appeal was allowed setting aside the order of the High Court. With great respect, we are of the opinion that a sentence in a judgment cannot be taken out from the context and used for laying down the preposition that if there is change in circumstances, by using inherent powers under Section 482 express bar under Section 362 can be got over. Learned Single Judge in Sabu George's case (supra) was of the' opinion that the above observations of the Supreme Court enable the High Court in effect, to set aside the conviction which is confirmed by its own order, taking note of subsequent compounding of the offence and it paragraph 26 it was observed as follows: 26. In the instant cases, when the revision petition was disposed of by this Court, this circumstance that the parties settled the dispute and the complainant compounded the offence was not there at all. It is a subsequent change in circumstance. The decision in Mostt. Simrikhia (supra) squarely applied. That was a case where an earlier application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed, but still the Supreme Court held that a change in circumstances is sufficient to justify the invocation of the powers afresh under Section 482 Cr.P.C. notwithstanding the bar under Section 362 Cr.P.C. In the instant case, the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have not been sought to be invoked earlier. Only the revisional powers were exercised. That is all the more the reason why under the changed circumstances the extra ordinary inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be invoked. In the light of the dictum in Mostt. Only the revisional powers were exercised. That is all the more the reason why under the changed circumstances the extra ordinary inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be invoked. In the light of the dictum in Mostt. Simrikhia earlier decisions rendered and subsequent decisions, which do not refer to the said decision specifically and in which the opinion is expressed that the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked after disposal of the revision in view of the bar under Section 362, cannot be held to lay down the law correctly. We are unable to accept the above view expressed in Sabu George's case, as in our opinion, no such conclusion can be made on relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Mostt. Simrikhia's case (supra). (Emphasis added) 19. Having regard to the law as expounded by the apex court, there is hardly any space for differently interpreting the ambit of inherent powers provided under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. or to provide a substantive alternative discourse. When a specific provision, such as Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. prohibits alteration or review after signing of the final order or the judgment, by exercising the inherent powers, the High Court cannot act differently and as such, this court does not have any authority in view of Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. to recall its order, inasmuch as, recalling of the order in the circumstances would mean altering or reviewing the judgment and order dated 17.01.2015. The decision of this court in Sujit Saha (supra), as rightly pointed by Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the state, can not constitute a precedent. The said order was made by this court without noticing the judgment and order dated 17.07.2013 delivered in Criminal Revision Petition No. 113 of 2004 whereby the said Criminal Revision Petition was finally disposed of. 20. Having held thus, this petition stands dismissed.