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2016 DIGILAW 317 (GAU)

Dilip Kumar Ray v. Gita Ray

2016-04-25

MANOJIT BHUYAN

body2016
ORDER : 1. This revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the judgment and decree dated 21.3.2007 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Dhubri in Money Appeal No. 2/2005, thereby allowing the appeal preferred by the respondents/plaintiffs and reversing the judgment and decree dated 13.6.2005 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Jr. Division No.1, Dhubri in Money Suit No. 1/1998. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 has been invoked in view of the subject matter of the original suit and the embargo placed by Section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Money Suit 1/1998 was instituted by the respondents/plaintiffs basically claiming 2/3rd share of the monthly rent amounting to Rs. 14,000/- covering a period from 1.3.1995 to 31.1.1998, which the petitioner no.1 has been collecting from his tenant i.e. the petitioner no.2. The material facts pleaded in the plaint is that the respondents/ plaintiffs are the co-owners along with the petitioner no.1 herein in respect of the land and houses covered by Dag No. 67, Patta No. 184 in Dhubri Town under Dhubri Circle in the District of Dhubri. The said property devolved upon them by right of inheritance. According to the respondents/plaintiffs they are entitled to get 2/3rd share of the property whereas the defendant no.1 along with the proforma defendants are entitled to only 1/3rd share of the said property. The issues raised was in respect of two rooms of a building within the said property which has been under the occupation of the petitioner no.2/defendant no.2 as tenant since the year 1986 of which rent was collected exclusively by the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1. According to the respondents/plaintiffs the monthly rent of the tenanted rooms stood at Rs.600/- per month and since they are entitled to 2/3rd share of the said amount, as such, Rs.400/- per month is due to them as rent. Claim was laid for the arrear rent covering the period from 1.3.1995 to 31.1.1998 standing at Rs.14,000/- by foregoing the rent for the earlier period as the same was barred by time. 3. In the written statement filed by the petitioner no.2/defendant no.2 it was pleaded that consequent upon the demise of Dr. S. R. Ray under whom the tenancy was created, rent was paid to the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 in his capacity as the landlord. 3. In the written statement filed by the petitioner no.2/defendant no.2 it was pleaded that consequent upon the demise of Dr. S. R. Ray under whom the tenancy was created, rent was paid to the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 in his capacity as the landlord. In the written statement filed by Dilip Kumar Ray i.e. petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 it was stated that the land in question had been recorded in the name of the predecessors of the plaintiffs and the defendants. However, the land and houses in Dag No. 67 was under the possession of Dr. S.R. Ray and upon his death the said property came under the possession of Dilip Kumar Ray and other heirs of Dr. S.R. Ray. The plaintiffs’ ownership over the land was denied stating that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any rent from the tenanted premises. 4. Judgment and decree in the said money suit was passed on 13.6.2005. The Trial Court while deciding the suit framed as many as 8 issues which are as follows: “(1) Is the suit maintainable in its present form? (2) Is there any cause of action for the suit? (3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to 2/3rd share of rent? (4) Whether the suit is barred by the principles of stopped, waiver and acquiescence? (5) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of parties? (6) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree as prayed for? (7) To what relief, if may the plaintiff may be entitled? Additional Issue : (8) Whether the property wherein the tenanted rooms are situated exclusively belonged to Dr. S.R. Roy, the father of defendant No.1?” Both sides examined one witness respectively. 5. The Issue No.8 was first taken up for consideration and having regard to the deposition of the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 as well as the Ext. 4 Jamabandi, the Trial Court held that the property in question was not exclusively owned by Dr. S. R. Ray i.e. the father of petitioner no.1/defendant no.1. In so far as Issue No.1 is concerned, the learned Trial Court held that the suit for rent against the petitioner no.2/defendant no.2 is not maintainable, inasmuch as, since the said defendant has been paying rent to the landlord, he cannot be held to be a defaulter. Additionally, in view of the Apex Court’s decision in the case of Sk. Sattar Mohd. Additionally, in view of the Apex Court’s decision in the case of Sk. Sattar Mohd. Choudhari vs. Gundappa Ambadas Bukate, reported in AIR 1997 SC 998 , wherein it has been held that a co-sharer cannot initiate action for eviction of tenant from the portion of tenanted accommodation nor can be sued for his part of land and the tenancy cannot be split up either in estate or in rent by the unilateral act of one of the co-owners, the said Issue No.1 was answered in the negative and against the respondents/plaintiffs. In view of the finding and decision on Issue No.1, the Issue No.3 was also answered in the negative holding that the respondents/plaintiffs are not entailed to get 2/3rd share of the rent. Primarily, in view of the finding on Issue No.1 the money suit was dismissed on contest granting no relief to the respondents/plaintiffs. Decree was prepared accordingly. 6. The said judgment and decree of the Trial Court was carried on appeal in Money Appeal No. 2/2005. The Appellate Court while distinguishing the Apex Court’s judgment as not applicable in the case in hand, relied upon the admission made by the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 in his cross-examination to the effect that the petitioner no.2/defendant no.2 is the tenant of both the plaintiffs and the defendant no.1 and that the respondents/plaintiffs are the owners of 2/3rd share of the suit property. In view of the fact that the learned Trial Court did not discuss the evidence of the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1, as such, it was held that an erroneous finding was arrived at while deciding the Issue No.3. The Appellate Court held that a co-owner can recover his share of rent from the tenant and in the instant case Dilip Kumar Ray, i.e. the defendant no.1 had himself admitted in his cross-examination that the defendant no.2/petitioner no.2 is the tenant of both the plaintiffs and the defendant no.1 and, further, the plaintiffs are entitled to get the arrears of rent as claimed by them. Accordingly, the Appellate Court was of the view that the Issue Nos. 6 and 7 ought to have been decided in favour of the plaintiffs. The appeal was allowed on contest and the judgment and the decree of the Trial Court was accordingly set aside. 7. Assailing the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court, Mr. Accordingly, the Appellate Court was of the view that the Issue Nos. 6 and 7 ought to have been decided in favour of the plaintiffs. The appeal was allowed on contest and the judgment and the decree of the Trial Court was accordingly set aside. 7. Assailing the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court, Mr. A. D. Choudhury, learned counsel representing the petitioners submits that title had been impliedly declared in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs to the extent of 2/3rd share of the property, whereas the suit was only for arrear rent of Rs.14,000/-. Mr. Choudhury also submits that no evidence whatsoever was laid by the respondents/plaintiffs substantiating their right and interest over 2/3rd share of the property and/or 2/3rd share of the monthly rent. The burden being on the plaintiffs to make out and establish a clear case for granting the relief sought for not having been discharged, as such, the plaintiffs cannot succeed on the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants. To this end, Mr. Choudhury relies upon the provisions under Section 101 and 103 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Reliance is also placed under Order 7 Rule 7 & 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure to say that the claim for 2/3rd share of the monthly rent had not been separately and distinctly claimed in the suit. On the question that burden is always on the plaintiffs to establish its case irrespective of whether the defendants proved their case or not, reliance is placed in the case of Union of India and others vs. Vasavi Co-operative Housing Society Limited, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 269 . Referring to the case of Sk Sattar Mohd. Choudhari (supra) the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that although it is open to the owners to apportion the rent inter se, however, if no such apportionment is made, the obligation of the tenant remains single and in that situation the lessor will not be allowed to split the tenancy by recovering the rent of a part only. Mr. Choudhury submits that in the absence of any partition of the land amongst the co-owners and in the absence of any agreement or consent given towards apportionment of rent amongst the co-owners, the plaintiffs as co-owners cannot be allowed to split the tenancy by recovering a part of the monthly rent. Mr. Choudhury submits that in the absence of any partition of the land amongst the co-owners and in the absence of any agreement or consent given towards apportionment of rent amongst the co-owners, the plaintiffs as co-owners cannot be allowed to split the tenancy by recovering a part of the monthly rent. In other words, it is submitted that the tenancy cannot be split up either in estate or in rent or any other obligation by the unilateral act of one of the co-owner. The exception is that if all the co-owners agree among themselves and split by partition the demised property by metes and bounds and come to have definite, positive and identifiable share in that property, they would be separate individual owner of each severed portion and can deal with that portion as also the tenant thereof as individual owner/lessor. In that situation, the right of joint lessors contemplated by Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act comes to be possessed by each of them separately and independently. According to Mr. Choudhury there is neither any split of the demised property by way of partition nor there is any agreement of apportionment among the co-owners. By virtue of the law laid down by the Apex Court, Mr. Choudhury submits that the respondents/plaintiffs could not have been granted any relief by the Appellate Court. In the line of the ratio laid down in Sk Sattar Mohd. Choudhari (supra), reliance is also placed in Messrs Karta Ram Rameshwar Dass vs. Ram Bilas and others, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 125 . On the scope of Article 227, reliance is placed in the case of Surya Dev Roy vs. Ram Chander Rai and others, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675 . 8. Mr.S.K.Ghosh, learned counsel representing the respondents/plaintiffs submits that the prayer in the plaint was for realisation for Rs. 14,000/- from the petitioners/defendants, being the amount equivalent to 2/3rd share of the monthly rent of the rooms covering the period from 1.3.1995 to 31.1.1998. It is submitted that material facts justifying the amount quantified at Rs.14,000/- has been categorically laid in the plaint. Reference is made to paragraphs 8, 12 and 13 of the plaint to say that claim had been laid for 2/3rd share of the rented room equivalent to Rs. 400/- per month for the period from 1.3.1995 to 31.1.1998. Mr. It is submitted that material facts justifying the amount quantified at Rs.14,000/- has been categorically laid in the plaint. Reference is made to paragraphs 8, 12 and 13 of the plaint to say that claim had been laid for 2/3rd share of the rented room equivalent to Rs. 400/- per month for the period from 1.3.1995 to 31.1.1998. Mr. Ghosh also submits that the Issue No.1 relating to maintainability of the suit has been improperly decided by the Trial Court against the respondents/plaintiffs, inasmuch as, the finding in respect of Issue No.1 was confined to the suit not being maintainable only against the petitioner no.2/defendant no.2. Additionally, the primary Issue No.3 as to the entitlement to the plaintiffs to 2/3rd share of the rent had not been discussed at all and the same was answered in the negative simply on the finding arrived at Issue No.1. Reference is also made to the findings and decisions on Issue No.8 to say that the Trial Court even being satisfied that the suit property was the joint property of the predecessors of the plaintiffs and the proforma defendants and that the property was not exclusively owned by Dr. S.R. Ray i.e. the father of petitioner no.1/defendant no.1, the suit was dismissed. According to the Mr. Ghosh the fact that the property in question was co-owned among the plaintiffs and the defendants by right of inheritance stands proved from Ext.4 Jamabandi. As regards the entitlement of the respondents/plaintiffs to 2/3rd share of the suit property, Mr. Ghosh submits that the same has been admitted to by the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 in his cross-examination. Referring to Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, Mr. Ghosh submits that the admission made by the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 entitles the plaintiffs being granted the relief sought for without any further proof. To this end, reliance is placed in the case of Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin and another, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 148 to say that admission for purposes for trial may dispense with proof of a particular fact. Admission made during trial are judicial admission or stipulation dispensed with proof and although the admissions may not be conclusive proof but the same may operate as estoppel against the maker. In the same breath, reliance is also placed in the case of Gautam Sarup vs. Leela Jetly and others, reported in (2008) 7 SCC 85 . Admission made during trial are judicial admission or stipulation dispensed with proof and although the admissions may not be conclusive proof but the same may operate as estoppel against the maker. In the same breath, reliance is also placed in the case of Gautam Sarup vs. Leela Jetly and others, reported in (2008) 7 SCC 85 . 9. Referring to the appellate judgment and decree, Mr. Ghosh submits that the evidence of the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 had been appreciated in its correct perspective which, unfortunately, did not fall for consideration in the trial proceedings. There being no infirmity whatsoever, it is submitted that the judgment and decree rendered in the appeal do not warrant any interference. 10. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have perused the entire material on records. The point for decision is as to whether or not the respondents/plaintiffs are entitled to the amount of Rs.14,000/- being the arrear rent equivalent to 2/3rd share of the monthly rent which had been exclusively collected by the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1. Ext.4, which is the Jambabandi, records the names of the predecessors of both the plaintiffs and the defendants as co-owners of the property in question covered by Dag No.67. Ext.5 is an order dated 26.11.1996 of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dhubri in M.A. Case No.1/96-97, whereby the land measuring 1 Kathas 8 lechas covered by Dag No. 67 was held to be in the names of the predecessors of both the plaintiffs and the defendants. By the said order interference was made with another order dated 6.6.1996 passed by the Circle Officer, Dhubri whereby mutation was granted over the entire land in favour of the heirs of late Satya Ranjan Ray, including the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1. 11. Claim in the suit was laid only in respect of 2/3rd share of the monthly rent of the tenanted premises. On this aspect, the evidence of the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 assumes great significance. For a better appreciation the evidence of the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 on cross-examination is reproduced hereunder: “There has been no partition between us in respect of the suit properties. Ext.-4 is the Jamabandi of Patta No.184 (New) which stands jointly in the name of Smt Swarnalata Ray and other co-owners. My father’s name is Satyaranjan Ray and my uncle is Sarada Nandan Ray. Swarnalata Ray was our grand-mother. I claimed the share of my father. Ext.-4 is the Jamabandi of Patta No.184 (New) which stands jointly in the name of Smt Swarnalata Ray and other co-owners. My father’s name is Satyaranjan Ray and my uncle is Sarada Nandan Ray. Swarnalata Ray was our grand-mother. I claimed the share of my father. It is not a fact that the plaintiffs are not entitled to 2/3rd share in the suit property. The defendant no.2 has taken one room in rent. There is another room. The monthly rent of the suit room is Rs.750/800. I am alone realizing the monthly rent. Plaintiff requested me to give a part of rent but I declined. I have heard that my father purchased the suit property and I have not submitted any document to that effect. I have not submitted any document to show that my father constructed the suit house. The construction was in 1951. My father told me he had made construction. I have no necessity to produce the documents. It is not a fact that the suit house was constructed with joint fund of the predecessors of both sides. Due to old age, recently Jyotsna Roy could not come. But she came but I can not say in details. I have not seen Sagat Roy coming to look after the suit property. The plaintiffs are in one part of the joint property. It is not a fact that I am not exclusively possessing the suit property. It is not a fact that the defendant no.2 is not the tenant of both the plaintiffs and the defendant no.1. It is not a fact that the plaintiffs are using latrine bathroom urinal jointly with us. It is not a fact that I am not entitled to collect the rent alone. It is not a fact that the plaintiffs are entitled to get decree.” From the above evidence of the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 it is clear that the property in question is a joint property and the respondents/plaintiffs are entitled to 2/3rd share thereof. Admission is also made to the effect that the petitioner no.2/defendant no.2 is also the tenant of both the plaintiffs and the defendant no.1. 12. The case of the respondents/plaintiffs is not one for splitting up the tenancy by their unilateral act. Admission is also made to the effect that the petitioner no.2/defendant no.2 is also the tenant of both the plaintiffs and the defendant no.1. 12. The case of the respondents/plaintiffs is not one for splitting up the tenancy by their unilateral act. The entitlement to part of the rent was by virtue of having 2/3rd share of the suit property, which stood admitted by the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 himself. This aspect of the matter brings in the applicability of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. On the very admission of the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 to the entitlement of the plaintiffs to the extent of 2/3rd share of the property is good for granting relief to the respondents/plaintiffs and do not require further proof. Although such admission may not operate as conclusive proof but will at least operate as estoppel against the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 from resiling from the admission so made. The evidence of petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 on cross-examination was a vital piece of evidence which had been totally ignored from consideration by the Trial Court. This aspect of the matter was rightly interpreted by the Appellate Court to hold that the respondents/plaintiffs are the owners of 2/3rd share of the suit property and are entitled to recover their share of the rent from the tenant. The Appellate Court rightly concluded that the Trial Court ought to have held that the respondents/plaintiffs are entitled to get the arrear rent as claimed by them and should have decided the Issue No.6 in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs. 13. The order for realisation of Rs.14,000/- as arrear rent from the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1, equivalent to 2/3rd share of the monthly rent of the tenanted premises, cannot be held that the learned Appellate Court had exceeded its jurisdiction while declaring ownership of 2/3rd share of the monthly rent in a Money Suit notwithstanding any definite prayer made to that effect. No fault can be attributed to the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court for the obvious reason that the entitlement of the respondents/plaintiffs is a fact which had been duly admitted to by the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 himself. This admission operates as an estoppel against the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 and he cannot be allowed to resile for it. 14. As regards the submission of Mr. This admission operates as an estoppel against the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 and he cannot be allowed to resile for it. 14. As regards the submission of Mr. Choudhury that the Appellate Court could not have impliedly declared title in a Money Suit, the same finds no basis in the face of the admission made by the petitioner no.1/defendant no.1 himself as regards the entitlement of the respondents/plaintiffs to the extent of 2/3rd share of the suit property. 15. In view of the above, the instant petition being devoid of merit, stands accordingly dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 21.3.2007 passed in Money Appeal No. 2/2005 by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Dhubri is accordingly upheld. Having regard to the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. The petition stands dismissed. Registry to send down the Lower Court Records forthwith.