JUDGMENT : This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated July 5, 2011, passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge, dismissing Writ Petition No. 21863 of 2011, principally, on the ground of delay of laches. 2. The writ petition arose out of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for the sake of brevity ‘the said Act of 1894’). 3. The recorded kathedars in relation to the land in question were Gangamma and N. Ramaiah. A registered document showing that the property was conveyed in favour of the writ petitioner, Nanjamma, on October 9, 1974, has been filed. Gangamma and N. Ramaiah have not come forward to challenge the title of Nanjamma. Moreover, the name of Nanjamma has been recorded in the index of land against the land-in-question. 4. The Government of Karnataka, by issuing a notification under subsection (1) of Section 4 of the said Act of 1894, on January 4, 1985, proposed to acquire 0.24 guntas of land in Survey No. 66/2B. On September 25, 1986, the final notification under subsection (1) of Section 6 of the said Act of 1894, was published. The acquisition was for the benefit of a House Building Cooperative Society. 5. Our attention is drawn to the proceedings under subsection (2) of Section 16 of the said Act of 1894, that the Collector had taken possession of the land-in-question. 6. Mr. D. Nagaraj, learned additional government advocate, produced the records and submits that compensation has not been paid either to the recorded kathedars or to the subsequent purchaser, nor deposited with the Court to which reference under Section 18 of the said Act of 1894, could be made. However, Mr. Nagaraj submits that the amount declared in the general award is lying with the Treasury. 7. Mr. K.G. Raghavan, learned senior advocate appearing with Mr. Deshraj, learned advocate for the appellant, argues that the appellant is entitled to succeed on a short point. He submits that in view of the provisions of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, (for the sake of brevity ‘the said Act of 2013’), the entire land acquisition proceedings stood lapsed. Admittedly, the award has been passed on January 28, 1989. Thus, the award was passed more than five years prior to the commencement of the said Act of 2013. 8. Mr. Admittedly, the award has been passed on January 28, 1989. Thus, the award was passed more than five years prior to the commencement of the said Act of 2013. 8. Mr. Raghavan, further, submits that although the appellant disputes and states that physical possession is with her, the proceedings under sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the said Act of 1894, shows that possession has been taken by the Collector. He, however, submits that as, admittedly, the compensation has not been paid to the appellant or deposited with the Court, the entire proceedings under the said Act of 1894, stood lapsed. 9. Mr. D.L.N. Rao, learned senior advocate, appears for the Society. He submits that the proceedings could not be lapsed as possession has been taken. He submits that in order to get advantage of subsection (2) of Section 24 of the said Act of 2013, two contingencies must be fulfilled, that is, possession must not be taken and compensation is not paid. Only when these two contingencies are satisfied, the proceedings shall be lapsed. He submits that though the award has been passed much prior to the commencement of the said Act of 2013, but as the possession has been taken, the proceedings cannot be lapsed. He, further, submits, with reference to sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the said Act of 2013, that unless both the aforesaid contingencies are satisfied, the proceedings cannot be lapsed. He refers to the proviso of Section 24 of the said Act of 2013, and submits that, at best, the landowners are entitled to compensation under the said Act of 2013, as compensation in respect of majority of the landholdings has not been deposited. 10. It is profitable to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and another versus Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and others reported in (2014) 3 SCC 183 . The Supreme Court of India, in our understanding, interpreted the provision of subsection (2) of Section 24 of the said Act of 2013, that if either of the two contingencies were not satisfied, the proceedings would lapse. 11. A general award has been passed. There is no indication that the amount payable to the landowners has been deposited in the Court, to which a reference could be made under Section 18 of the said Act of 1894. 12. 11. A general award has been passed. There is no indication that the amount payable to the landowners has been deposited in the Court, to which a reference could be made under Section 18 of the said Act of 1894. 12. We, therefore, hold that, in this case, the award having been passed on January 28, 1989, and possession having been taken on November 4, 1992, but as the compensation has not been paid or deposited with the Court, to which a reference under Section 18 of the said Act of 1894, could be made, the entire acquisition proceedings stood lapsed. 13. On this short point, we feel that the appeal deserves to be allowed. 14. We, therefore, allow this writ appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the Hon'ble Single Judge and declare that the entire acquisition proceeding stood lapsed insofar as the appellant is concerned. 15. Before we part with, we must record a submission of Mr. Rao, learned senior advocate appearing for the Society. Our attention was drawn to an order dated July 5, 2013, when the appeals were entertained, as to what extent the conduct of the appellant on delay, definitely, affects the examination of the writ petition. 16. We are at the final hearing of the writ appeal. It is not that the question of law cannot be considered at the final hearing. As it is only necessary to put the respondents on notice, sufficient notice was given to them, the matter was urged and submissions were advanced, and we have decided the matter in terms of the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 24 of the said Act of 2013, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). 17. We, further, record that as we have decided the writ appeal on the short question of law, no other question is required to be gone into. 18. We make no order as to costs.