JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. This Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the original accused No. 1 and is directed against the judgment and order dated 8.9.2006 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Surendranagar in Sessions Case No. 27 of 2005. 2. By the said judgment and order, which is impugned in present appeal, learned Court has acquitted the original accused No. 2 from the charge of offence punishable under Sections 306, 498-A of Indian Penal Code and the learned Court has recorded conviction against original accused No. 1 (i.e. present appellant) for commission of offence punishable under Sections 306 and 498-A of Indian Penal Code. For the offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC the learned Court has sentenced the appellant to undergo RI for 5 years and to pay fine in sum of Rs. 2500/- and in default to undergo RI for 6 months. For offence punishable under Section 498(A) the learned Court has also sentenced the appellant to undergo RI for 3 years and for the said offence he is also ordered to pay fine in sum of Rs. 2000/- and in event of default he is ordered to undergo RI for 6 months. 3. Bereft of other details, the case put up by the prosecution is that a complaint came to be filed on 31.8.2004 by the mother of the deceased wherein the complainant alleged that her 24 years old daughter and the appellant got married about 15/18 months before the date of the incident. 3.1 The complainant mentioned that since the victim's father has been undergoing treatment against cancer her daughter used to visit them frequently and during her visit at her parental house she would inform her (i.e. the mother) that her husband used to physical abuse her and resorted to beating her and her husband and her mother-in-law as well as her husband's elder brother used to mentally torture her by always taunting her that she is of a poor family and has not brought any dowry. According to the complainant, during her visit the victim also told her that her mother-in-law and her husband were demanding dowry and would make insulting comments stating that she was from beggar's family. According to the complainant, during her visit the victim also told her that her mother-in-law and her husband were demanding dowry and would make insulting comments stating that she was from beggar's family. The complainant also mentioned that though her daughter used to complain about ill-treatment, she used to pacify her daughter and used to tell her that things will improve and she should try to improve the relation. The complainant also claimed that after midnight (at around at around 12.30 a.m.) on 3.7.2004 the husband of the victim informed that while preparing tea his sister received burn injuries and she was taken to the hospital at Limbdi and since the doctor at Limbdi advised him to shift her to hospital at Ahmedabad, he was taking her to hospital at Ahmedabad and that he may reach to V.S. Hospital at Ahmedabad. The complainant further claimed that her daughter had informed the police that she was preparing tea when stole (dupatta) of her dress accidentally caught fire however, subsequently her daughter told her that she had set herself ablaze to commit suicide because she got tired of the harassment and torture for dowry demand by her husband and her mother-in-law. 3.2 According to the complaint the incident occurred on 3.7.2004. From 3.7.2004 the victim remained under treatment however on 20.8.2004 she succumbed to the burn injuries and died. After the rituals and cremation etc. were completed the mother of the victim filed complaint on 31.8.2004. 3.3 After the said complaint was lodged investigation was undertaken. According to prosecution sufficient material to institute proceedings was available during investigation and therefore chargesheet came to be filed against the husband (accused No. 1) of the victim - deceased and the mother in law (accused No. 2). 3.4 The case being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, it was committed to the Court of Sessions and was registered as Sessions Case No. 27 of 2005. On 22.3.2006 learned Court framed charge at exhibit 4 against accused No. 1 and accused No. 2 for commission of offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 114 of Indian Penal Code, Section 498-A read with Section 114 of Indian Penal Code. Thereafter the statement of the accused were recorded. The accused pleaded no guilty and claimed to be tried. Thereafter the statement of the accused were recorded. The accused pleaded no guilty and claimed to be tried. 3.5 So as to bring home his guilt and to prove the charge against the accused person the prosecution examined 15 witnesses and placed on record 19 documents. 3.6 After the stage of evidence was concluded, the further statement of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of the Code. Both the accused declined to examine any witness in their defence. However, subsequently, the accused No. 1 submitted an application seeking permission to lead evidence in his defence. Learned Court allowed the application and granted permission. Thereafter the deposition of the accused No. 1 was recorded. The accused No. 1 and/or accused No. 2 did not examine any other witness. 3.7 After considering oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record and after hearing learned AGP and learned advocate for the accused, learned Court by judgment and order dated 8.9.2006 which is impugned in present appeal reached to the conclusion that the charge against accused No. 2 are not proved and that therefore learned court acquitted accused No. 2 i.e. mother in law of the victim - deceased. Learned Court also reached to the conclusion that charge against accused No. 1 are proved and held him guilty for commission of offence punishable under Section 306 and section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and that therefore passed the order of sentence as mentioned above. 4. Feeling aggrieved by said judgment and order original accused No. 1 has taken out present appeal. 5. Mr. Anandjiwala, learned Senior Counsel instructed by Nanavati Associates learned advocate for the present appellant submitted, inter alia, that learned Court has committed error in holding the accused No. 1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 306 and 498-A. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial Court failed to consider and appreciate the dying declaration. He also submitted that the Court erred in holding that the victim had given the statement before the Magistrate and/or doctor (dying declaration) because of her circumstances and the charge cannot be dismissed on the basis of said statement. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant further submitted that so far as the charge under Section 498-A is concerned, the allegations even if taken at face value, do not fall within the meaning of the term cruelty. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant further submitted that so far as the charge under Section 498-A is concerned, the allegations even if taken at face value, do not fall within the meaning of the term cruelty. He also submitted that there was no harassment and the allegations do not even suggests that there was any specific demand for particular amount or particular thing and thus, it could not have been held that there was demand for dowry. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Court failed to appreciate that there was no smell of Kerosene at the place of incident. He further submitted that the learned Court ought not have rejected that the explanation by the accused that it was accidental death and in absence of any evidence about smell of kerosene at the place of incident the prosecution's case of suicide could not have been believed and accepted. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that for holding the accused guilty for offence under Sections 498-A and 306, the ingredients of abetment had to be established whereas in present case there is no evidence to establish the ingredients of abetment. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the dying declaration by the victim completely ruled out the prosecution case for offence under Section 306. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Court committed error in relying on exhibit 29, 10th March and the learned Court failed to appreciate that the application (exh. 30) was submitted to the DSP before filing FIR. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant repeatedly and vehemently emphasized the delay in filing the complaint. He submitted that the incident occurred on 3.7.2004 and the victim died on 20.8.2004 whereas the complaint came to be filed on 31.8.2004 i.e. after delay of about 45-50 days and the said delay could not have been and should not have been ignored more particularly in view of the dying declaration. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that there are omissions in the statement given by the complainant before she lodged the complaint on 31.8.2014 as compared to her deposition and that the complaint was filed after delay of more than 40 days as an afterthought. 6. Learned APP supported the judgment and submitted that the learned Court has not committed any error in holding that victim died by way of suicide. 6. Learned APP supported the judgment and submitted that the learned Court has not committed any error in holding that victim died by way of suicide. Learned APP submitted that the short span of marriage i.e. 15/18 months before the date of incident needs to be taken into account. He further submitted that the evidence on record supports the conclusion that the victim was harassed and pressurized for dowry. Learned APP submitted that merely because the victim did not mention any particular item or amount demanded by her mother in law and/or husband and her brother in law but said that her husband and his relative always tell her that she has not brought any dowry, the fact that the victim was being harassed and was pressurized for not having brought any dowry and that therefore provision under Section 498-A is applicable in present case and the ingredients to establish offence under Section 498-A are proved by the evidence on record. Learned APP submitted that the deposition by the complainant and the complaint filed by her as well as by father of the victim establishes the fact that victim was physically abused. Learned APP submitted that even the evidence by prosecution witness No. 10 i.e. Nidhi a child witness supports and establishes the fact that the victim's mother in law and brother in law used to beat her i.e. physically abused her and that because such physical abuse once victim had to be taken to the hospital and the husband of the victim had told her (i.e. child witness P.W. No. 10) to not tell anything about said incident to the parents of the victim. Learned APP submitted that narration of the said incident by child witness and her deposition cannot be ignored and the said evidence supports the case that the victim was harassed and physically abused and that therefore the contention that ingredients of cruelty or harassment do not exist in present case, is not justified and/or correct. Learned APP also submitted that the delay caused in filing complaint/FIR is explained and in the facts of the case it is justified and the said delay does not affect the case of the prosecution and merely on account of delay caused in filing the complaint it cannot be said that the complaint came to be filed as an afterthought. Learned APP also submitted that the delay caused in filing complaint/FIR is explained and in the facts of the case it is justified and the said delay does not affect the case of the prosecution and merely on account of delay caused in filing the complaint it cannot be said that the complaint came to be filed as an afterthought. Learned APP submitted that the death of the victim is not an accidental death and the circumstances in which dying declaration was made by the victim, which fact is brought out by evidence of victim's mother (i.e. complainant) and victim's brother, is explained and clarified and the said evidence establishes that the victim had given such statement because the victim apprehended that if she mentioned true and complete facts related to the incident then her husband and her mother in law will discontinue her treatment, whereas her parent did not have means to support her treatment on account of financial burden due to her father's illness. According to learned APP the victim, therefore, mentioned before the Executive Magistrate (who recorded dying declaration) that she got the burns injuries because her stole (dupatta) accidentally caught fire from the flames of the stove. Learned APP submitted that in this view of the matter, the statement by the victim before the Executive Magistrate and/or doctor (i.e. dying declaration) does not deserve to be taken as conclusive or satisfactory evidence, in absence of any corroborative evidence which would support the facts mentioned in the dying declaration. Learned APP submitted that the ingredients necessary for attracting Section 107 are present and they are even established in present case. Learned APP submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and learned APP for the State. I have considered the impugned judgment and the evidence available on record and I have also considered the rival submissions. 8. It is relevant to also mention that while assailing the judgment the appellant has heavily relied on the statement by the victim before the Magistrate (which was recorded on 3.7.2004 about 3 hours after the incident). The victim died almost 1 1/2 months thereafter (i.e. on 20.8.2004). On strength of said statement it is claimed that the incident occurred when victim's dupatta accidentally caught fire when the victim was preparing tea and she received burn injuries. The victim died almost 1 1/2 months thereafter (i.e. on 20.8.2004). On strength of said statement it is claimed that the incident occurred when victim's dupatta accidentally caught fire when the victim was preparing tea and she received burn injuries. The appellant wants the Court to believe that the fatal incident is a case of accident and not a case of suicide. 8.1 However, after closely and carefully examining the evidence on record and the circumstances in which the victim gave the statement before the Magistrate (and mentioned the history before the doctor) the learned Sessions Court has reached to the conclusion that the statement by the victim was not voluntary but it was given on account of other circumstances. 9. In this view of the matter it is appropriate to examine the evidence on record and in that light to consider the contentions by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and learned APP. 9.1 The evidence comprise deposition of 15 witnesses and 19 documents. The prosecution examined the medical officer at Limbdi Government Hospital (where the victim was taken after the incident) as P.W. No. 1. His deposition is recorded as exhibit 8. The P.W. No. 1 in his deposition mentioned that the victim was brought to the hospital at about 10:30 p.m. (i.e. about 1 hour after the incident occurred) on 3.7.2004. It is pertinent that the P.W. No. 1 mentioned that she was brought to the hospital without police yadi. 9.2 The P.W. No. 1 has also mentioned in his deposition that he had asked the victim about the history of the incident and she informed that while she was preparing tea on stove her stole (dupatta) caught fire from the flame of the stove and she received burns injury. P.W. No. 1 also mentioned that the condition of the victim was serious and critical and therefore it was necessary that her dying declaration should be recorded therefore intimation to the Limbdi police station was given. He also mentioned that the Executive Magistrate and/or doctor at Limbdi recorded dying declaration at midnight. P.W. No. 1 also mentioned that the condition of the victim was serious and critical and therefore it was necessary that her dying declaration should be recorded therefore intimation to the Limbdi police station was given. He also mentioned that the Executive Magistrate and/or doctor at Limbdi recorded dying declaration at midnight. In the MLC case paper prepared by P.W. No. 1 the victim's injuries are described thus:- Superficial to deep burns over (1) whole face (2) front of neck (3) both whole upper limb except both hand including back of thumb (4) whole front of chest (breast) and lateral part of chest including (lf) Axila (5) whole abdomen, front side (6) (It) side back of chest and abdomen (7) (It) back of abdomen (8) front of left thigh (9) back of left thigh (10) left buttocks (11) skin pilled off. 9.3 Prosecution witness No. 1 also prepared certificate of injuries wherein he certified the injuries similar to the injuries mentioned in MLC case papers. The victim died on 20.8.2004. The prosecution also examined the doctor who conducted postmortem as P.W. No. 2. In postmortem report it is certified that:- "Rigor mortise present, developing stage. Postmortem lividity present on back of the body of unburnt areas and it is not fixed. Eyes semi open. Mouth semi open. Tongue within the oral cavity." In column No. 7 five injuries are described: "(1) 2 to 3 burns found on head and neck excluding forehead and back of neck. (2) 2 to 3 burns found on front of chest and abdomen excluding external genital region. (3) 2 to 3 burns found on back of the body of left side. (4) 2 to 3 burns found on both upper limbs excluding both hands. (5) 2 to 3 burns found on front of left thigh anteromedial aspect of upper 2 2/3rd of right thigh and medical aspect of right knee." 9.4 In column No. 23 with regard to the opinion as to the cause or probable cause of death the postmortem report mentioned that "shock as a result of burns and its complications." 9.5 The prosecution examined the Executive Magistrate who recorded dying declaration on 3.7.2004. He mentioned that he recorded the victim's statement (dying declaration) in question and answer form that he had recorded statement as given by the victim that he also obtained signature of the victim and that she was conscious when the statement (dying declaration) was recorded. The dying declaration was placed on record at exhibit 19 before the Court. 9.6 In her statement before the Executive Magistrate and/or doctor the victim said that her age was 24 years and that she had no children and that she stayed with her husband and that the incident occurred at about 9.30 p.m. and at the time of incident only two of them i.e. she and her husband were at home. According to statement (dying declaration), in reply to the question by executive magistrate to the effect that "what happened to you", the victim replied that her stole (dupatta) caught fire when she was preparing tea on Ashok stove and she accidentally received burn injuries. In reply to the question that who was present at that time she mentioned that only her husband was present who tried to put off the fire and brought her to the hospital. 9.7 The prosecution examined the complainant i.e. mother of the victim as p.w. No. 7 and her evidence is recorded at exhibit 28. In her evidence/deposition the complainant - mother of the victim mentioned that the victim got married to the accused No. 1 about 15/18 months before the date of incident. She also mentioned that her daughter i.e. victim had eloped with the accused No. 1 and they had got their marriage registered in the Court. She also mentioned that subsequently the grievance between the families were reconciled and both side had accepted the marriage and thereafter her daughter had started visiting her parental house to meet her father and her. The complainant also mentioned that the victim often come to the parental house to meet her father because since past some time he has been suffering with cancer. The complainant also mentioned that the victim often come to the parental house to meet her father because since past some time he has been suffering with cancer. The complainant also mentioned that when the victim visited them she used to tell her as well as her husband i.e. father of the victim that she had made mistake in marrying the accused No. 1 and that her husband and mother in law i.e. victim's mother in law and victim's brother in law had started demanding dowry and they continuously caused mental torture by repeatedly taunting her that she had not brought any dowry and that she came from beggar family and that on the date of incident also the victim had called and informed that her (i.e. victim's) husband had again picked-up quarrel and she would be coming to her parental house. The complainant mentioned that since they had gone to the hospital for session of chemotherapy which was to be administered to the victim's father, she (i.e. complainant) had told the victim to come after they reached home. The complainant also mentioned in her evidence that on the date of the incident the accused No. 1 had made 3 phone calls at their house however, until 12.30 he had not informed anything about the incident. She also mentioned that at the time of first call the appellant had inquired as to whether victim's father had returned from the hospital after completing chemotherapy session then he inquired by what time they would return and then at the time when he called at around 12.30 he informed the victim's brother that the victim received burns injuries and he was taking the victim to the hospital at Ahmedabad. When the accused No. 1 informed the victim's brother about the incident he did not inform the victim's brother about the opinion of the doctor at Limbdi about victim's condition. 9.8 The complainant also mentioned in her deposition that immediately thereafter her son i.e. victim's brother left to reach Limbdi with complainant's brother. She also mentioned that in early morning at around 4 a.m. her son i.e. victim's brother informed her that the victim was shifted to V.S. Hospital at Ahmedabad and that on receiving such message she and her other daughter rushed to Ahmedabad. She also mentioned that in early morning at around 4 a.m. her son i.e. victim's brother informed her that the victim was shifted to V.S. Hospital at Ahmedabad and that on receiving such message she and her other daughter rushed to Ahmedabad. The complainant mentioned in her deposition that when she asked her daughter i.e. victim as to how the incident occurred, initially her daughter - victim maintained that it was an accident however, the victim had told her that she had put herself ablaze to commit suicide because of mental and physical torture and harassment and demand for dowry. The complainant also mentioned that the victim told her that she has maintained and continued with story of accident because victim apprehended that her husband and her mother in law will not incur any expenses for her treatment and because of her father's illness, they (i.e. victim's parents) would not be able to bear the cost of the treatment. In her evidence the complainant also mentioned that since the police did not take any action after the victim died on 20.8.2004, she filed the complaint on 31.8.2004 and at that time she also handed over the letter (exh. 29) which the victim had written. During her cross examination the complainant accepted that until about 10 days after the victim died she had not filed any complaint. She explained that since the treatment of the victim was going on she thought that it would not be proper to file any complaint during the period of the treatment and until the recovery of the victim and after her daughter's death they all were in shock and her husband's health was also not good, so she could not file the complaint immediately. During her cross examination she also accepted that in her statement which was recorded by I.O. or in the complaint she had not mentioned some of the details (including the fact about letter written by the victim) narrated by her during deposition before the Court. 9.9 The prosecution also examined the father of the victim as P.W. No. 8 and his deposition is recorded at exhibit 34. 9.9 The prosecution also examined the father of the victim as P.W. No. 8 and his deposition is recorded at exhibit 34. So far as the aspects related to harassment and demand of dowry by victim's mother in law and brother in law and her husband is concerned and also with regard to the phone calls by accused No. 1 informing them about incident, are concerned the evidence of the victim's father is on the same lime as that of victim's mother i.e. the complainant. 9.10 Thereafter the prosecution examined victim's brother as P.W. No. 9 and his evidence recorded at exhibit 35. In his deposition the P.W. No. 9 i.e. victim's brother mentioned that on 30.6.2004 they had taken his father for chemotherapy session at Ahmedabad from where they were returning on 3.7.2004 and while they were on way he had received 2 to 3 calls from accused No. 1 however accused No. 1 had not mentioned about incident but when they reached their house, the accused No. 1 called on phone at the residence (landline) at around 12.30 a.m. and informed about the incident. In his deposition he also mentioned in his deposition that when he had asked the victim as to how the incident occurred, initially she had maintained that the incident had occurred accidentally, however when he again inquired with the sister she said that she attempted suicide because she was suffering on account of physical and mental harassment and it was unbearable. In his cross examination the P.W. No. 9 accepted that during his statement before the I.O. he had not mentioned what his sister i.e. victim had told him in privacy while undergoing the treatment. 9.11 The prosecution thereafter examined the child witness (niece of the victim) as P.W. No. 10. Before granting permission to examine the victim's niece as child witness, learned Court had put certain initial question to said P.W. No. 10 to ascertain her fitness and credibility as witness. Upon being satisfied about her fitness and capacity to depose as witness her evidence was recorded. In her deposition P.W. No. 10 said that she was studying in standard 8 and that the victim was her aunt (mother's sister) and that her maternal grand father is suffering from cancer and that her aunt was staying at Limbdi. Upon being satisfied about her fitness and capacity to depose as witness her evidence was recorded. In her deposition P.W. No. 10 said that she was studying in standard 8 and that the victim was her aunt (mother's sister) and that her maternal grand father is suffering from cancer and that her aunt was staying at Limbdi. She also said that during summer vacation she used to visit her aunt at Limbdi and stay with her aunt. 9.12 In her deposition the said P.W. No. 10 also said that while she stayed with her aunt during summer vacation she saw that the victim's mother in law would frequently tell the victim that she did not bring any dowry and she came from poor family and when victim's husband would come from his shop he also used to tell her aunt that she had come from beggar family and he also used to beat her aunt. The said P.W. No. 10 narrated an incident during her deposition. 9.13 She said that one day her uncle i.e. victim's husband beat her aunt so severely that she was injured and she starting bleeding from nose and she had to be taken to hospital where she was admitted for one day and was discharged in late evening. She also mentioned that her uncle (i.e. victim's husband) thereafter told her that she should not tell anybody about said incident. In her cross examination she accepted that when her statement was recorded by IO she had not mentioned that her uncle i.e. victim's husband used to tell her aunt that she was from beggar family and she had also not mentioned about the incident that her aunt was admitted to the hospital. She denied the suggestion by defence that what she said about physical abuse by victim's husband was incorrect and she also denied the suggestion that she had never gone to Limbdi to stay with her aunt at her house. She also denied the suggestion that she was giving incorrect evidence at the instance of her grand mother. 10. The complainant i.e. victim's mother had, after having filed the complaint on 31.8.2004, submitted an application dated 13.8.2004 (13.9.2004) in the office of Dy. SP. By said application the complainant made grievance that any progress in investigation was not made after her complaint dated 31.8.2004. In that context the PSI was examined as P.W. No. 15. 10. The complainant i.e. victim's mother had, after having filed the complaint on 31.8.2004, submitted an application dated 13.8.2004 (13.9.2004) in the office of Dy. SP. By said application the complainant made grievance that any progress in investigation was not made after her complaint dated 31.8.2004. In that context the PSI was examined as P.W. No. 15. In his deposition he referred to the complainant's said complaint dated 13.8.2004. He also mentioned in his deposition (exh. 45) that the complainant had also submitted a letter written by the victim (exh. 29). In his cross-examination he denied the suggestion of the appellant that he recorded the statement in a manner which would suit the complaint. 11. Since the appellant has mainly and heavily relied on - and based his challenge against the judgment on the strength of the victim's statement (dying declaration) and since learned Sessions Court found that the statement was made under influence of circumstances it is appropriate to take into account certain features and aspects attached to and arising from the victim's statement before the Magistrate/the doctor. 11.1 The incident occurred at 9.30 p.m. The victim was taken to the hospital after about 1 hour - at about 10.30 p.m. 11.2 She was taken to the hospital without intimation to the police (i.e. without police yadi). 11.3 Further the appellant did not call for the ambulance and the victim - who had suffered burn injuries - was taken to the hospital in a rickshaw (victim's statement to the police on 3.7.2004). 11.4 There is no explanation as to why (a) police was not informed (b) why ambulance was not called and the victim was taken to the hospital in a rickshaw. 11.5 The victim was taken to the hospital about 1 hour after the incident occurred (i.e. at around 10:30 p.m.). The history of the incident was recorded by the Doctor at about 10.45 p.m. on 3.7.2004 and the victim's statement before the Executive Magistrate was recorded by midnight (about 11:55 p.m.) on 3.7.2004. Whereas the victim succumbed to the burns injuries and died on 20.8.2004 i.e. after almost 1 1/2 months. 11.6 In her statement before the Magistrate/the doctor on 3.7.2004 (dying declaration) the victim mentioned that at the time of incident she had worn a dress and the dupatta of her dress caught fire from the flames of the stove. Whereas the victim succumbed to the burns injuries and died on 20.8.2004 i.e. after almost 1 1/2 months. 11.6 In her statement before the Magistrate/the doctor on 3.7.2004 (dying declaration) the victim mentioned that at the time of incident she had worn a dress and the dupatta of her dress caught fire from the flames of the stove. Whereas in the panchnama of the place of incident it is mentioned that a half burnt "gown" was found on the floor of the kitchen. The presence of half burnt gown (at the place of incident) does not match with the victim's statement and/or with the claim that dupatta of the dress "accidentally" caught fire. The victim had not worn a "gown" but she had worn dress with dupatta. On this count - about the gown - there is no explanation by the applicant. Further, the description of the place of the incident does not match with natural, ordinary and normal conduct of a person whose dress accidentally caught fire. 11.7 When a person's clothes accidentally and suddenly catch fire (without his knowledge or without his own action) then in ordinary situation and circumstances the person would be frightened and his normal and natural and instinctive conduct would be frantic movements and the person would make all efforts to put-off the fire. Such would be instinctive act on part of the person who suddenly notices that his or her dress has accidentally caught fire. If the victim's dupatta had accidentally caught fire the victim would have acted instinctively to save herself and to extinguish the fire. She would have made frantic movements which would tumbled and scattered utensils/articles in the kitchen, or she would have immediately rushed out of the kitchen. However, in present case it does not come out from the statement of the victim or from the deposition by the appellant that the victim, upon noticing that her dupatta accidentally caught fire screamed and called for help or she had made efforts to extinguish fire. 11.8 Further, if the victim had "suddenly" noticed that the dupatta had "accidentally" caught fire then as natural and normal conduct and instinctively the victim would have instinctively first thrown - off the dupatta which caught fire and the dupatta (in burnt or half burnt condition - atleast something of the dupatta) would have been found at the place of incident. However, according to the panchnama and her own statement the victim did not even go out of the kitchen and she did not even scream or call for help. There is no evidence on record which would establish that after the victim's dupatta caught fire either she screamed or shouted or called for help or she had rushed out from the kitchen or she herself made any attempt to put off the fire. Even the victim has not mentioned in her statement before the Magistrate and/or the doctor that when she saw that her dupatta had caught fire she had screamed and/or that she had immediately called her husband and/or that she had rushed out of the kitchen and/or that she had tried to extinguish the fire on her dupatta. Everything was in proper order in the kitchen as if nothing had happened. Even the dupatta was not seen at the place of incident when panchnama was drawn. The only thing out of place in the kitchen was the mattress (which did not have any sign or mark) and the gown. The victim's statement (treated as dying declaration) does not match with normal and natural conduct of a person who "suddenly" noticed that dupatta of her dress had "accidentally" caught fire. 11.9 Another relevant aspect is that the victim's husband claimed that he extinguished the fire by throwing/putting mattress (thick mattress made of cotton and used for sleeping). If the fire was extinguished with a mattress then there would atleast be some sign/burn mark on the mattress however in present case any burn marks or signs were not found on the mattress which was in the kitchen/at the place of incident and the panchnama does not mention mattress was burnt at any place or that it had any sign or burn mark which would be ordinarily seen on a mattress (made of cotton) which is used for putting off fire would have. 11.10 Further it is necessary to take note of a relevant and vital fact. According to the description in the panchnama of the place of incident it is also mentioned that there was an earthen jar/barrel for storing water (kothi) used in the kitchen for cooking and for cleaning the vessels/utensils and for other household purposes. 11.10 Further it is necessary to take note of a relevant and vital fact. According to the description in the panchnama of the place of incident it is also mentioned that there was an earthen jar/barrel for storing water (kothi) used in the kitchen for cooking and for cleaning the vessels/utensils and for other household purposes. In the event the victim had "suddenly" noticed that her dupatta had "accidentally" caught fire then, as normal and natural conduct the victim would have instinctively and immediately rushed to the said earthen jar/barrel of water and would have poured water on her body to extinguish the fire or her husband would have done that but in such critical event which allegedly happened "accidentally", neither the victim would wait passively and without making any attempt until the fire spreads and engulfs her body nor the husband would hardly go to some other place and get the mattress to extinguish the fire, more so when the barrel/jar of water was available right there in the kitchen itself. It is pertinent that panchnama of the place of incident does not mention anything to suggest that either the victim or her husband had tried to pour water to extinguish the fire. The victim's statement before the magistrate/the doctor (treated as dying declaration) do not match with the facts and the situation emerging from the panchnama and/or natural and normal conduct of a person. 11.11 It is also relevant that the accused No. 1 did not inform the police about the accident immediately after the accident (though the marriage span was only about 15 months) but it was the hospital authority (doctor) or the staff who informed the police. 11.12 It is pertinent that the conduct of the victim, which emerges from the absence of such evidence, is not normal and natural conduct of a person whose dress had "accidentally" caught fire but her conduct is such which would, ordinarily, emanate from a person who voluntarily or consciously allows the fire to continue. 12. Besides above mentioned aspects related to and arising from the said panchnama and the victim's statement before the Magistrate/the doctor there are some other aspects which also need to be taken into account. 12. Besides above mentioned aspects related to and arising from the said panchnama and the victim's statement before the Magistrate/the doctor there are some other aspects which also need to be taken into account. 12.1 Though the Magistrate and/or doctor recorded the statement of the victim in question and answer form, (where she is said to have put her signature though her both limbs had received burn injuries) the magistrate did not ask the victim as to whether she had attempted to commit suicide or as to whether she was making the statement to protect someone or under any fear or apprehension or under any influence or threat or pressure or some compelling circumstances. 12.2 It is also relevant to note that the injury certificate and MLC case papers prepared by the medical officer at Limbdi contained description that the palm of the victim's hand had no burn injuries or even burn marks. In present case, the victim, likewise, would have made similar attempt (when she "suddenly" noticed that her dupatta had "accidentally" caught fire) and in such process her palm would bear atleast some burn marks or injury or some sign indicating her attempt and effort to put-off the fire. 13. It is also relevant to note the conduct or role of the appellant inasmuch as (a) though the incident occurred at 9.30 p.m. the victim was taken to the hospital at Limbdi at around 10.30 p.m., and (b) from 9.30 p.m. until about 12.30 a.m. the appellant did not inform the police and/or did not inform the victim's mother and/or victim's brother about the incident for almost 3 hours, more particularly until the process of recording the statement (dying declaration) before the magistrate was concluded and he informed the victim's brother about the incident only after the statement before the Executive Magistrate was recorded (i.e. about 3 hours after the incident had occurred) and (c) his deposition the appellant - accused No. 1 has not explained anything as to why he had not immediately informed police about the incident and why it took about 1 hour for him to reach the hospital after the accident occurred, and that too in a small town/village like Limbdi and why ambulance was not called for and the victim was taken to the hospital in a rickshaw. 13.1 Further, the fact that sometime after their marriage the victim and her husband had separated from the family and both of them had started staying in a house taken on rent does not support or justify the appellant's claim that there was no harassment to the victim and/or that there was no disturbance in the family or that the relation in the family and amongst family members were good and the victim had no problem in the family. 14. In this view of the matter, when the statement given by the victim before Magistrate/the doctor is considered in light of above discussed aspects related to the victim's statement (which is treated as dying declaration) and the aspects related to the conduct and/or role of the appellant it emerges and becomes clear that (i) the said statement (which is treated as dying declaration) does not match with the situation at the place of incident (recorded in the panchnama) and/or with natural and normal and instinctive conduct of a person who "suddenly" noticed that the dupatta of her dress had "accidentally" caught fire (ii) that the said statement by the victim does not inspire confidence; and it does not appear to be voluntary and free of any other influence and it creates doubt about its voluntary characteristic and it also emerges that the said statement does not give correct and complete narration of the event and circumstances and the statement emerges as a statement influenced by circumstances which the victim considered compelling. 15. In light of above discussed aspects and in light of the evidence on record it emerges that any fault cannot be found with the findings recorded by the learned Sessions Court with regard to the victim's statement (dying declaration) and the conclusion by the learned Court's decision holding that on the basis of said statement of the victim the accused cannot be held "not guilty", also cannot be faulted. 16. In light of above discussed aspects it is not possible to hold and accept, on the basis of victim's statement, that (a) the victim's statement is voluntary and it gives true and complete narration of the facts and events; and/or that (b) the incident occurred accidentally and in light of such facts (c) it is also not possible to reject and dismiss, on the basis of the victim's said statement, the prosecution's case. When above mentioned facts and aspects are established then said established facts would lead to the conclusion that appellant's claim, which is based on the victim's statement, that the incident occurred accidentally would fall since its base - platform is not found credible. 17. In this view of the matter and in light of said facts it is also relevant to note that evidence on record and above mentioned aspects have brought on surface that: (a) at the time of incident the victim was 24 years old; and (b) the victim died on account of burn injuries; (c) she died at her matrimonial house; (d) she died on account of burn injuries within 2 years (about 15/18 months) after her marriage with the appellant; (e) the incident occurred in the confines of the matrimonial house; (f) only victim and her husband were present in the house when the incident occurred and she received burns injuries (on account of which she died); (g) she died in "other than normal circumstances and due to other than natural cause"; (h) before her death the victim faced and suffered maltreatment, harassment and taunting for not bringing any dowry and she faced and suffered pressure of continuous demand for dowry. 17.1 Having regard to the fact that the evidence available on record in present case has brought out and established above mentioned aspects related to the death of the victim it is appropriate to take into account observation by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Sher Singh vs. State of Haryana (2015) 3 SCC 724 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed, in paragraphs No. 7 and 8 of the said decision that:- "7..... By this legislation Chapter XX-A was introduced into the Penal Code (IPC) containing the solitary Section 498-A, in order to "deal effectively not only with case of dowry deaths, but also cases of cruelty to married women by their in-laws at all. Conspicuously, this section does not employ the word "dowry" at all. In essence, the amendment makes matrimonial cruelty to the wife punishable......" 8....It is noteworthy that whilst Section 113-A of the Evidence Act reposes discretion in the Court to draw a presumption so far as the husband's abetment in his wife's suicide, Parliament has mandated the Court to draw at least an adverse inference under Section 113-B in the event of a dowry death. It seems to us that where a wife is driven to the extreme step of suicide it would be reasonable to assume an active role of her husband, rather than leaving it to the discretion of the Court. 17.2 In light of above discussed aspects and the facts which have emerged from evidence available on record and in light of above quoted observations by Hon'ble Apex Court, it becomes clear that in present case it is just and proper as well as necessary to draw presumption contemplated under Section 113-A of Evidence Act and to consider and examine the matter and the judgment in that light and backdrop. 17.3 In the same decision in case of Sher Singh (supra) Hon'ble Apex Court further observed in paragraph No. 9 of the judgment that:- 9. The legal regime pertaining to the death of a woman within seven years of her marriage thus has numerous features, inter alia: (i) ......... (ii) (iii) If death is a result of burns or bodily injury, or otherwise than under normal circumstances, and it occurs within seven years of the marriage and, it is 'shown' in contradistinction to 'proved' that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives, and the cruelty or harassment is connected with a demand of dowry, it shall be a dowry death, and the husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. (iv) ..... (v) ...... (vi) once the elements itemised in (iii) above are shown to exist the husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. (vii) the consequences and ramifications of this 'deeming' will be that the prosecution does not have to prove anything more, and it is on the husband or his concerned relative that the burden of proof shifts as adumbrated in Section 113-B, which finds place in Chapter VII of the Evidence Act. This Chapter first covers 'burden of proof' and then "presumption", both being constant bed-fellows. In the present context the deeming or presumption of responsibility of death are synonymous. This Chapter first covers 'burden of proof' and then "presumption", both being constant bed-fellows. In the present context the deeming or presumption of responsibility of death are synonymous. Thereafter in paragraph No. 10 of the said decision Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:- "10......Justifiably, the suicidal death of a married woman who was meted out with cruelty by her husband, where her demise occurred within seven years of marriage in connection with a dowry demand should lead to prosecution and punishment under Sections 304-B and/or 306 of the IPC......" Thereafter in paragraph No. 16 of the said decision Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:- 16.....It is after deep cogitation that we consider it imperative to construe the word 'shown' in Section 304-B of the IPC as to, in fact, connote 'prove'. In other words, it is for the prosecution to prove that a 'dowry death' has occurred, namely, (i) that the death of a woman has been caused in abnormal circumstances by her having been burned or having been bodily injured, (ii) within seven years of a marriage, (iii) and that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, (iv) in connection with any demand for dowry and (v) that the cruelty or harassment meted out to her continued to have a causal connection or a live link with the demand of dowry. ......Once the presence of these concomitants are established or shown or proved by the prosecution, even by preponderance of possibility, the initial presumption of innocence is replaced by an assumption of guilt of the accused, thereupon transferring the heavy burden of proof upon him and requiring him to produce evidence dislodging his guilt, beyond reasonable doubt....." The features or concomitants related to the incident and arising from facts of present case, which are enumerated hereinabove in the preceding paragraph and above quoted observations by Hon'ble Apex Court justifies Court's discretion of drawing presumption as contemplated under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. In this context it is appropriate to refer to the observations by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph No. 15 of the decision in case of V.K. Mishra vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 9 SCC 588 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:- "28......It is to be noted that in a case where demand of dowry is alleged such demands are confined within the four walls of the house and known only to the members of both sides of the family. In such cases, independent and direct evidence with regard to the occurrences is ordinarily not available. That is why the Legislature has introduced Sections 113-A and 113-B in the Evidence Act by permitting presumption to be raised in certain circumstances...." 17.4 The features related to the incident and arising from the panchnama of place of incident (which are enumerated in the preceding paragraph) more particularly the features that the victim died on account of burn injuries in the close confines of her matrimonial house within period of two years after marriage and at the time of the incident only victim and her husband were present in the house coupled with above mentioned aspects related to and connected with or emerging from the appellant's conduct cast heavy burden on the appellant to explain the circumstances under which unnatural death of the victim occurred. 17.5 However, on examination of the evidence available on record of present case, including the deposition by the appellant, it has emerged that the appellant has failed to offer any convincing and legally sustainable explanation in respect of any of the circumstances and except raising contention on the ground that there was no smell of kerosene and/or on the ground of delay caused in filing complaint and except relying on the victim's statement (which is treated as dying declaration) the appellant has not offered any explanation in respect of the circumstances and aspects mentioned above. On the other hand, while above mentioned features and presumption contemplated under Section 113-A of the Act continue to stare in face of the appellant, other evidence available on record demonstrate that the prosecution has established its case that the "incident" was not, and cannot be treated as, "accidental" and the evidence available on record, more particularly the panchnama of the place of incident and above mentioned aspects which arise when the panchnama of place of incident and the victim's statement (treated as dying declaration") establish the prosecution's case that the case on hand is not a case of accidental death but of suicide The conduct of the victim-which emerges from her statement and the panchnama and even from appellant's deposition, is not normal, natural and instinctive conduct in situation where the person "suddenly" noticed that her dupatta had "accidentally" caught fire. 17.6 In this context it is appropriate to recall the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph No. 16 of the judgment in case of Sher Singh (supra) wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that:- 16.....Once the presence of these concomitants are established or shown or proved by the prosecution, even by preponderance of possibility, the initial presumption of innocence is replaced by an assumption of guilt of the accused, thereupon transferring the heavy burden of proof upon him and requiring him to produce evidence dislodging his guilt, beyond reasonable doubt..... Thus, in present case Court has to examine and find out whether the concomitants enumerated by Hon'ble Apex Court are established by the prosecution by preponderance of possibility. On examination of the evidence on record it comes out that in present case prosecution has established said features/concomitants. On this count it is appropriate to recall above quoted observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of V.K. Mishra (supra). In this context it would be appropriate to recall and consider the evidence available on record. 18. It is appropriate to recall and take into account that the victim's mother has said in her deposition that her daughter (victim) had told her that due to mental and physical harassment for dowry demand she had set herself ablaze to commit suicide because she was aware that on account of the financial constraints it was not possible for her parents to meet the demand for dowry. The evidence by victim's brother also gives out same fact and his deposition supports and corroborates the deposition of victim's mother. 18.1 Alongwith the said 2 depositions it would also be appropriate to take into account the contents of the letter dated 1.10.2003 (Exh. 29). The said letter was given to the Inquiry Officer by the victim's mother. The learned trial Court has considered the said letter Exh. 29. It was written few months before the date of incident and it narrates the mental and physical harassment caused to her for dowry demand. The said letter lends support to what victim's mother and her brother said in their evidence about the demand for dowry and the harassment to the victim which led her to the incident. 19. Besides this, even if the said exh. 29 is not considered there is an additional material viz. deposition of the child witness who also deposed that the victim's husband and her mother in law used to harass the victim for dowry and once the victim's husband had beaten her in such a way that her nose started to bleed and she had to be admitted to the hospital. 20. In light of the evidence on record the learned Sessions Court has reached to the conclusion that the prosecution has established that the accused No. 1 has committed offence under Section 306. Thus, the Court has not believed that the incident occurred "accidentally". 20.1 In light of the facts and circumstances of the case and aspects discussed herein above earlier and in light of evidence obtaining on record it cannot be said that the learned Sessions Court has committed error or that the findings and the conclusions and the decision by the learned Sessions Court are not correct or that they deserve to be set aside. 20.2 When the evidence is considered in its totality then it emerges that there is no reason, no justification, and no evidence on record to upturn and set aside the conclusion and final decision by the learned Sessions Court. Learned Sessions Court has also recorded the conclusion that the charge and offence under Section 498-A and 306 are established. 20.2 When the evidence is considered in its totality then it emerges that there is no reason, no justification, and no evidence on record to upturn and set aside the conclusion and final decision by the learned Sessions Court. Learned Sessions Court has also recorded the conclusion that the charge and offence under Section 498-A and 306 are established. In this context it is appropriate to refer to the observation by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Pawankumar vs. State of Haryana ( AIR 1998 SC 958 ) wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed that cruelty or harassment need not be physical. Even mental torture in a given case would amount to cruelty and harassment within the meaning of Sections 304-B and 498-A, IPC and when the husband starts taunting for not bringing dowry such conduct would amount to harassment or cruelty. Further, the acts and conduct by victim's husband and her mother in law which the victim mentioned to her mother (complainant) and also mentioned in exhibit 29, establish harassment. The acts and conduct of the victim's husband and victim's mother in law fall within the purview of the explanation of the term "harassment" under Section 498-A of the Code. In this view of the matter, the said conclusion by the learned trial Court cannot be faulted. 21. The appellant has heavily relied on the victim's statement (dying declaration) and on the contention that there was no smell of kerosene at the place of incident. 21.1 So far as the aspects related to the victim's statement are concerned, the same are discussed herein above. 21.2 Now, so far as the contention based on the ground that there was no smell of kerosene at the place of incident is concerned it is relevant to mention that in this regard it cannot be overlooked that the panchnama of the place of incident was not recorded immediately after the incident but it was recorded on the next day, on 4.7.2004 at about 9 p.m. i.e. after almost 12 hours. In this view of the matter, more particularly when the panchnama is drawn about 12 hours after the incident, then the prosecution's case and the evidence by victim's mother, her father and her brother and the child witness cannot be rejected or discarded only on the ground that the panchnama does not record anything about smell of kerosene. In this view of the matter, more particularly when the panchnama is drawn about 12 hours after the incident, then the prosecution's case and the evidence by victim's mother, her father and her brother and the child witness cannot be rejected or discarded only on the ground that the panchnama does not record anything about smell of kerosene. Further merely because mention about smell of kerosene is not made in the panchnama of place of incident, the submission with regard to the claim that the incident occurred accidentally cannot be accepted since other substantive evidence does not support - rather militates against - the said claim, more so when the dying declaration is not found voluntary and when it does not match with normal and natural conduct of a person whose dupatta accidentally caught fire. 21.3 The other contention urged by the appellant is on ground of delay in filing the complaint and that the complaint is afterthought. So far as the said contentions is concerned is relevant to note that the complainant has explained the reason and circumstances on account of which she did not and she could not file the complaint earlier. The complainant has explained that since the treatment of the victim was going on she thought that it would not be proper to file any complaint during the period of the treatment and until the recovery of the victim and after her daughter's death they all were in shock and her husband's health was also not good, so she could not file the complaint immediately. Further in light of the facts of this case and the fact that during his deposition the appellant has failed to explain his conduct and the aspects related to the incident, the delay in filing complaint does not weaken the prosecution's case to the extent of rejecting it, more so when the complainant has offered explanation. Thus, the contention should fail. 21.4 Further, it is relevant to note that except making bald allegation, the appellant has not made out and/or has not offered any reason on account of which the complainant would lodge the complaint merely as an afterthought. It is relevant to note that in the evidence by the accused No. 1 it is mentioned that his shop/business was not in good financial condition and according to his claim he had availed loan for the treatment expenses. It is relevant to note that in the evidence by the accused No. 1 it is mentioned that his shop/business was not in good financial condition and according to his claim he had availed loan for the treatment expenses. Thus, considering the financial position of the appellant and his family there could not be any intention or mala fides to extract money by making out false case against the accused. There is nothing on record - not even appellant's allegation that anyone from victim's family had demanded any money for not lodging the complaint and/or for settlement. Therefore, more particularly in absence of any evidence the allegation that the case is made out as an afterthought is ill founded and any reason for making out false case by complaint is not established. The said submission is, therefore not sustainable. 22. The accused No. 1, in his deposition, emphasized the fact that he incurred the expenses for the treatment. By emphasizing said aspect the appellant - accused No. 1 urged that the said fact would establish that his relations with his wife were normal and good and there was no disturbance in their relation and that there was no substance in the allegations about demand for dowry and there was no substance in the allegation that because of his or his relative's behavior/acts the victim committed suicide. However, except emphasizing the said aspect the appellant - accused No. 1 has not been able to place any evidence on record to establish that the victim was not subjected to any harassment for dowry. Merely because the appellant incurred the expense for treatment does not make out a ground to accept that there was no demand and harassment for dowry. Other evidence on record including the evidence by child witness and victim's parents and her brother outweigh said aspect. 23. The evidence on record and the foregoing discussion have brought and established that the victim's statement (dying declaration) is not voluntary and it is not free from other influence and it does not inspire confidence and it cannot be accepted and relied on, more particularly in absence of any corroborating evidence which can establish that victim's dress had "accidentally" caught fire, to accept the contention of the appellant and/or to reject the case of the prosecution. The surrounding facts and circumstances cast shadow of doubt on the trustworthiness of the victim's statement (dying declaration). Even the contention on ground of smell of kerosene and/or delay in filing the complaint and/or the complaint is an afterthought also do not support the appellant's claim or his challenge against the judgment and the conclusions by the learned Sessions Court. Any other evidence which would corroborate and establish that the incident was an accident is not available on record. The evidence on record does not lead the Court, or convince the Court, to accept that the incident occurred accidentally. 24. At this stage it is appropriate to refer to the decision relied on by learned Senior Counsel for the appellant. The learned Senior Counsel relied on the decision in case of H.D. Khavasa vs. State of Gujarat ( 1997 1 GLH 102 ) in support of the submission that the dying declaration may be accepted and relied on as sole basis for rejecting the allegation by the complainant and the case of the prosecution, is of no assistance to the appellant in view of the above discussed facts and circumstances of present case and the evidence available on record of present appeal. The facts of this case are materially different and in the fact of this case the statement is not found to be voluntary. Learned Senior Counsel then relied on the decision in case of State of Gujarat vs. Sunilkumar Kanaiyalal Jani, 1996 2 GLR 797 in support of the contention that merely because it is alleged that husband was treating the wife with cruelty would not be sufficient to establish abetment. The said decision is also of no assistance to the appellant in view of the material difference between facts of this case and the facts involved in cited case. The said decision is also of no assistance to the appellant in view of the material difference between facts of this case and the facts involved in cited case. The decision in case of Indrasing M. Raol vs. State of Gujarat [ 1999 (2) G.L.H. 596 ] on which the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant relied to support the contention that the prosecution must establish that the cruelty or harassment was grave in nature and with intention to force women to commit suicide is also of no assistance in view of the evidence available on record of present case in light of which it is established that the victim in present case was subjected to continuous harassment and even on the date of incident quarrel between the victim and the husband took place. The evidence in this regard deserve to be appreciated having regard to the aspects like sensitivity of the victim, her social background, education and environment, nature or intensity and frequency of the instances of harassment and effect of the harassment on the psyche of the victim. In present case it has emerged from the evidence on record that sometime after marriage the victim felt helpless against harassment for dowry demand in view of the financial constraint and compulsion which her parents were passing through on account of her father's terminal illness and she realized that the demand and harassment for dowry would continue and she had no means to meet with such demand as her family is not in position to offer any help in the situation which she was facing. In such compelling or frustrating circumstances woman may feel left out and in hopeless and helpless situation. The feature and aspects attached to the victim's death, emerge in present case and they are established by the prosecution with aid of above discussed evidence and that therefore the decisions relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant including the decision in case of Indrasing M. Raol (supra) is of no assistance in the facts and available evidence in present case which are materially different from the facts in the cited decision and evidence available in the said case. 25. 25. In present case (a) the cause of death is established with the aid of deposition of Medical Officer (P.W. No. 1), the M.L.C. Case papers (exhibit 9 and 10), burn injury certificate (exhibit 11) and postmortem report (exhibit 16); (b) in light of said evidence it is also established that the victim received and suffered burns injuries and she died on account of burns injuries and its complications; and that (c) it is also established that the incident (on account of which she received burns injuries) occurred within short span of less than 2 years (i.e. about 15/18 months) after marriage; and that (d) it is also established that the incident occurred at the matrimonial house of the victim and at the time of accident only victim and the appellant were present in the house; and (e) it is established that the victim's death occurred in "other than normal circumstances". 25.1 Further, with aid of and in light of the deposition of the complainant (i.e. mother of the deceased, exhibit 28) which is corroborated by the deposition of the petitioner's father (exhibit 34) and in light of the deposition of the brother of the deceased (Exhibit 35) and the deposition by the child witness (exhibit 36), the prosecution has also established harassment for dowry demand and the said evidence collectively also establish the proximity and nexus between the dowry demand and the victim's death. So far as the aspect of proximity is concerned, it is appropriate to refer to the observation by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Rajinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477 :- Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand and the date of death. The test of proximity will have to be applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive approach of the court within the confines of law." In the said decision Hon'ble Apex Court while referring to the expression used in Section 304-B of the Code observed that:- Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that the word "soon" does not mean "immediate". Hon'ble Apex Court further observed and clarified that:- "soon before" is synonyms with the term "immediately before". What must be borne in mind is that the word "soon" does not mean "immediate". Hon'ble Apex Court further observed and clarified that:- "soon before" is synonyms with the term "immediately before". When evidence on record and above discussed aspects are considered in light of above quoted observations, it emerges that proximity and nexus are also established by the prosecution and learned Sessions Court's conclusion and decision cannot be faulted. 25.2 It is also relevant to note that from the deposition of victim's mother it has emerged that even on the day of the incident (i.e. in the morning on 3.7.2004) the victim had called her mother and talked with her mother on telephone and told her mother that in the morning (on 3.7.2004) her husband had quarreled with her and she was coming to Dedrapad (i.e. her parents house) however, the victim's mother had asked her to come in evening after her father returned from the hospital. Above referred evidence collectively also establish nexus and proximity between the demand/harassment and the incident. The said fact and the said evidence also establish that the victim continuously faced harassment for dowry demand. 25.3 Besides this, in the letter (exhibit 29) the victim - deceased has mentioned the details of the harassment and mental/physical torture caused to her for dowry demand and in her case it was more grave as she was, apparently, more vulnerable, weak and sensitive because she felt that in view of financial position of her parents it will not be possible to meet with any demand for dowry. 26. Though, in present case charge for offence under Section 304-B is not framed and charge is framed for offence under Section 306, it is appropriate to refer, at this stage, to the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Pawankumar vs. State of Haryana ( AIR 1998 SC 958 ) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that:- "11. It is true, as argued by learned counsel for the appellants, that in criminal jurisprudence benefit of doubt is extendable to the accused. But that benefit of doubt would arise in the context of the application of penal law, and in the facts and circumstances of a case. The concept of benefit of doubt has an important role to play but within the confines of the stringency of laws. But that benefit of doubt would arise in the context of the application of penal law, and in the facts and circumstances of a case. The concept of benefit of doubt has an important role to play but within the confines of the stringency of laws. Since the cause of death to a married woman was to occur not in normal circumstances but as a 'dowry death', for which the evidence was not to (too) easily available, as it is mostly confined to within four walls of a house, namely husband's house where all likely accused reside. Hence the aforesaid amendments brought in the concept of deemed 'dowry death' by the husband or the relatives, as the case may be. This deeming clause has a role to play and cannot be taken lightly and ignored to shield an accused, otherwise the very purpose of the amendment will be lost. Of course, the prosecution has to prove the ultimate essential ingredients beyond all reasonable doubt after raising the initial presumption of 'deemed dowry death'. 18. The next question is, whether there was any cruelty or harassment by the deceased's husband or any relative and that too was it soon before her death. The argument put in is that neither there is any physical injury nor any evidence of cruelty from any neighbours or other independent persons, hence there is no cruelty or harassment. In our considered opinion, cruelty or harassment need not be physical. Even mental torture in a given case would be a case of cruelty and harassment within the meaning of Sections 304-B and 498-A, IPC. Explanation (a) to Section 498-A itself refers to both mental and physical cruelty. In view of Explanation (a) the argument is, before it constitutes to be a cruelty there has to be willful conduct. Again willful conduct means conduct willfully done, this may be inferred by direct or indirect evidence which could be construed to be such. We find, in the present case, on account of not satisfying the demand of the aforesaid goods, right from the next day, she was repeatedly taunted, maltreated and mentally tortured by being called ugly etc. Again willful conduct means conduct willfully done, this may be inferred by direct or indirect evidence which could be construed to be such. We find, in the present case, on account of not satisfying the demand of the aforesaid goods, right from the next day, she was repeatedly taunted, maltreated and mentally tortured by being called ugly etc. A girl dreams of great days ahead with hope and aspiration when entering into a marriage, and if from the very next day the husband starts taunting for not bringing dowry and calling her ugly, there cannot be greater mental torture, harassment or cruelty for any bride. There was a quarrel a day before her death. This by itself, in our considered opinion, would constitute to be a willful act to be a cruelty both within the meaning of Section 498-A and Section 304-B, IPC. (emphasis supplied) 27. With reference to appellant's contention with regard to ingredients of abetment are absent it would be appropriate to recall the evidence on record and above discussed aspects which culminated into suicidal death of the victim and to refer to the observation by Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph No. 22 of said judgment: 22. A faint submission was also made that it would not be a case of abetment of suicide under Section 306, IPC. Reference to Section 107, IPC was also made where abetment should fall under any of the three heads. Reliance is placed on the first head. We find that the first head provides "instigates any person to do that thing". There is no doubt in the present case there is repeated demand from the husband's side from the girl and her parents for the various articles as aforesaid and on failure, the girl was tortured, harassed by words and deeds, amounting to cruelty. As we have held above and one day before the fateful day, the husband saturated the mental agony and cruelty by quarrelling with the wife (deceased) even at her sister's place, leaving no option which led the deceased to commit suicide. This mental state is further clear by the following words which she spoke to her sister, "it would be difficult now to see her face in the future". In our opinion all this would constitute to be an act which would be an abetment for the commission of the suicide by the girl. This mental state is further clear by the following words which she spoke to her sister, "it would be difficult now to see her face in the future". In our opinion all this would constitute to be an act which would be an abetment for the commission of the suicide by the girl. The husband, in the present case, has not led any cogent evidence or brought any circumstance to dislodge the aforesaid inference. Of course benefit of doubt to the accused would be available provided there is supportive evidence on the record. Hence, for creating doubt or granting benefit of doubt, the evidence was to be such which may lead to such doubt. We do not find that present is a case where any benefit of doubt results at least against the husband. There is direct evidence, as stated by the aforesaid witnesses PWs 5 and 7 that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty by the husband. However, we find in so far appellants Nos. 2 and 3, father-in-law and the mother-in-law, are concerned, the evidence is of a general nature. No convincing evidence has been led that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by appellant Nos. 2 and 3. Before holding that appellant Nos. 2 and 3 had committed the offence, it had to be found that they are responsible for subjecting her to cruelty or harassment, soon before her death. We find in this case evidence is only confined to the husband and not against appellants Nos. 2 and 3. Hence on the evidence on record, so far as appellants Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned, we extend to them the benefit of doubt and acquit them." (emphasis supplied) 28. From the above quoted observations (more particularly in para 22 and in para 19) of said decision and in light of the evidence in present case and in light of the fact that besides being asked to get dowry the victim was also being taunted and maltreated and she was continuously insulted as her husband's family used to tell her that she was from beggar's family, and that if she does not get dowry she will be thrown on road (Exh. 29) it becomes clear that the appellant's contention that the characteristics or ingredients of abatement do not exist, is not sustainable. 29) it becomes clear that the appellant's contention that the characteristics or ingredients of abatement do not exist, is not sustainable. 28.1 At this stage it is necessary to mention that in present case the gravity and seriousness of the pressure on the victim (for dowry demand) and the concept of proximity of demand with the act/incident needs to be considered in light of the fact that in this case the victim always felt helpless and hopeless in the matter of dowry demand because of the knowledge that due to her father's illness and consequent financial constraints of her family she or her family will not be able to meet with the demand and if the dowry demand was not met with then the pressure for the demand won't stop. The victim thus felt, and found herself, in helpless and hopeless situation. On this count it is also relevant to recall that according to the deposition of the complainant a quarrel between the victim and her husband had occurred in the morning on 3.7.2004 (i.e. the date when the incident occurred at 9.30 p.m.) which seems to have triggered the action/incident. 28.2 The concept of proximity and continuous demand emerges in light of the fact that because of the financial constraints of her family and the knowledge that she will not be able to meet with any demand for dowry she remained under continuous pressure and stress. Further, the evidence with regard to the issue of proximity needs to be examined in light of above quoted observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajinder Singh (supra). In light of the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence on record and observations by Hon'ble Apex Court it emerges that the proximity factory is also established. 28.3 It is also pertinent that either in his deposition or even in his statement under Section 313 the appellant has not offered any explanation as regards his conduct and/or as regards the aspects arising from the panchnama and the scene at the place of incident and he also not said anything as to the reason for not informing the victim's mother and the/or victim's brother about the incident immediately after the incident occurred or when the victim was in the hospital at Limbdi and before victim's statement was recorded by the magistrate. Further, there is nothing in his deposition and/or in his statement under Section 313 or on record to rebut the presumption against him. Neither any reason for not informing the victim's family until about 12.30 a.m. nor the reason as to the delay in informing the victim's family is explained in any manner by the appellant and there is no evidence or other material on record to explain the said aspect. He has also not offered any explanation for not informing police immediately after the incident and/or not calling for ambulance. 28.4 On the other hand the deposition by the complainant is corroborated by the deposition of victim's father as well as deposition of the victim's brother and the deposition of the child witness and the said evidence collectively establish the reason why the victim set herself ablaze. The letter exh. 29 also corroborates and aids and establishes the said aspect. 29. In this view of the matter when the evidence on record is examined it emerges that there is no evidence or material on record which would corroborate and support and establish the claim that the incident occurred accidentally. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the submission and contention that the incident occurred accidentally or to reject the case of the prosecution and to grant acquittal on the basis of the victim's statement (dying declaration). 29.1 The foregoing discussion has also brought out, inter alia, that (a) the ingredients necessary to demonstrate dowry demand and harassment are established in light of the evidence on record; and (b) it is also established that the victim's death is caused on account of burn injuries complications related to and arising from burn injuries; and (c) the prosecution also established with the evidence on record that the statement by the victim cannot be termed as voluntary and free from any other influence and that it does not match with the panchnama of the place of incident and natural and normal and instinctive conduct of person who suddenly noticed that dupatta of her dress "accidentally" caught fire. 30. 30. Moreover, there is nothing on record to convince the Court that in present case the findings and conclusions and final decision of the Sessions Court need to be set aside and/or that the dying declaration deserves to be accepted - even in absence of corroborating evidence - as the sole base to acquit the appellant by accepting the claim that the incident occurred accidentally and to set aside the conviction. In the result this Criminal Appeal No. 1746 of 2006 against the judgment and order dated 8.9.2006 in Sessions Case No. 27 of 2005 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Surendranagar does not deserve to be accepted/allowed. Therefore the Criminal Appeal against the judgment and order dated 8.9.2006 in Sessions Case No. 27 of 2005 is dismissed and the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 8.9.2006 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Surendranagar in Sessions Case No. 27 of 2005 is hereby confirmed. The bail bond stands cancelled. R & P to be sent back to the trial Court forthwith. It is informed that the appellant - accused is enlarged on bail. Therefore, the appellant - accused is directed to surrender before jail authority on or before 9.4.2016 failing which the concerned Sessions Court shall issue non-bailable warrant to effect the arrest of the appellant - original accused No. 1. The Appeal stands dismissed. Orders accordingly.