JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge The Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 provides for compensation in motor vehicle accidents, which should be equitable, fair, reasonable and not arbitrary. But then what would be the “just compensation” is a vexed question and there can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. It is more than settled that there must be material before the Court to arrive at a compensation and the same cannot be awarded as a windfall or bonanza for the victim and the statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be just and not a source of profit or an extravagant one and unjust enrichment should be discarded. But at the same time, the compensation should not be a pittance. 2. The difficulty in awarding just compensation has been aptly pointed out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Suresh Vs. New India Assurance Company Limited and another (2012) 12 SCC 274 , wherein it was held:- “2. Despite many a pronouncement in the field, it still remains a challenging situation warranting sensitive as well as dispassionate exercise how to determine the incalculable sum in calculable terms of money in cases of personal injuries. In such assessment neither sentiments nor emotions have any role. It has been stated in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associate Collieries Ltd. (No. 2) 1942 AC 601 that it is a matter of Pounds, Shillings and Pence. There cannot be actual compensation for anguish of the heart or for mental tribulations. The quintessentiality lies in the pragmatic computation of the loss sustained which has to be in the realm of realistic approximation. Therefore, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity “the Act”) stipulates that there should be grant of “just compensation”. Thus, it becomes a challenge for a court of law to determine “just compensation” which is neither a bonanza nor a windfall, and simultaneously, should not be a pittance. 3. Therefore, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity “the Act”) stipulates that there should be grant of “just compensation”. Thus, it becomes a challenge for a court of law to determine “just compensation” which is neither a bonanza nor a windfall, and simultaneously, should not be a pittance. 3. In Jai Bhagwan v. Laxman Singh (1994) 5 SCC 5 , a three- Judge Bench of this Court, while considering the assessment of damages in personal-injury-actions, reproduced the following passage from the decision by the House of Lords in H.West & Son, Ltd. v. Shephard (1963) All ER 625 (HL): “My Lords, the damages which are to be awarded for a tort are those which ‘so far as money can compensate, will give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act and for all the natural and direct consequences of the wrongful act’ [Admiralty Commissioners v. Susquehanna (Owners), The Susquehanna 1926 AC 655]. The words ‘so far as money can compensate’ point to the impossibility of equating money with human suffering or personal deprivations. A money award can be calculated so as to make good a financial loss. Money may be awarded so that something tangible may be procured to replace something else of like nature which has been destroyed or lost. But money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All that judges and courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be the endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards. When all this is said it still must be that amounts which are awarded are to a considerable extent conventional.” (Jai Bhagwan case (1964) 5 SCC P. 7, para 9) 4. In the said case in Jai Bhagwan reference was made to a passage from Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (16th Edn.) which is apposite to reproduce as it relates to the awards for non-pecuniary losses: (SCC pp. 7-8, para 10) “10….In all but a few exceptional cases the victim of personal injury suffers two distinct kinds of damage which may be classed respectively as pecuniary and non-pecuniary. 7-8, para 10) “10….In all but a few exceptional cases the victim of personal injury suffers two distinct kinds of damage which may be classed respectively as pecuniary and non-pecuniary. By pecuniary damage is meant that which is susceptible of direct translation into money terms and includes such matters as loss of earnings, actual and prospective, and out-of-pocket expenses, while non-pecuniary damage includes such immeasurable elements as pain and suffering and loss of amenity or enjoyment of life. In respect of the former, it is submitted, the court should and usually does seek to achieve restitutio in integrum in the sense described above, while for the latter it seeks to award ‘fair compensation’. This distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage by no means corresponds to the traditional pleading distinction between special and general damages, for while the former is necessarily concerned solely with pecuniary losses notably accrued loss of earnings and out-of- pocket expenses the latter comprises not only non-pecuniary losses but also prospective loss of earnings and other future pecuniary damage. 5. In this regard, we may refer with profit the decision of this Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and others (2003) 2 SCC 274 wherein the observations of Lord Denning M.R. in Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and Islington Area Health Authority 1979 QB 196 were quoted with approval. They read thus: - “25……The practice is now established and cannot be gainsaid that, in personal injury cases, the award of damages is assessed under four main heads: first, special damages in the shape of money actually expended; second, cost of future nursing and attendance and medical expenses; third, pain and suffering and loss of amenities; fourth, loss of future earnings. 6. While having respect for the conventional determination there has been evolution of a pattern and the same, from time to time, has been kept in accord with the changes in the value of money. Therefore, in the case of Ward v. James (1996) 1 QB 273 it has been expressed thus: - “(iii) Loss during his shortened span----Although you cannot give a man so gravely injured much for his lost years, you can, however, compensate him for his loss during his shortened span, that is, during his expected years of survival. You can compensate him for his loss of earnings during that time, and for the cost of treatment, nursing and attendance. You can compensate him for his loss of earnings during that time, and for the cost of treatment, nursing and attendance. But how can you compensate him for being rendered a helpless invalid? He may, owing to brain injury, be rendered unconscious for the rest of his days, or, owing to a back injury, be unable to rise from his bed. He has lost everything that makes life worthwhile. Money is no good to him. Yet judges and juries have to do the best they can and give him what they think is fair. No wonder they find it well nigh insoluble. They are being asked to calculate the incalculable. The figure is bound to be for the most part a conventional sum. The judges have worked out a pattern, and they keep it in line with the changes in the value of money.” 7. While assessing the damages there is a command to exclude considerations which are in the realm of speculation or fancy though some guess work or some conjecture to a limited extent is inevitable. That is what has been stated in C.K. Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair (1969) 3 SCC 64 . Thus, some guess work, some hypothetical considerations and some sympathy come into play but, a significant one, the ultimate determination is to be viewed with some objective standards. To elaborate, neither the tribunal nor a court can take a flight in fancy and award an exorbitant sum, for the concept of conventional sum, fall of money value and reasonableness are to be kept in view. Ergo, in conceptual eventuality just compensation plays a dominant role. 8. The conception of “just compensation” is fundamentally concretized on certain well established principles and accepted legal parameters as well as principles of equity and good conscience. In Yadav Kumar v. Divisional Manager, National Insurance Company Limited and another (2010) 10 SCC 341 , a two-Judge Bench, while dealing with the facet of just compensation, has stated thus: - “15….It goes without saying that in matters of determination of compensation both the tribunal and the court are statutorily charged with a responsibility of fixing a just compensation. It is obviously true that determination of just compensation cannot be equated to a bonanza. It is obviously true that determination of just compensation cannot be equated to a bonanza. At the same time the concept of just compensation obviously suggests application of fair and equitable principles and a reasonable approach on the part of the tribunals and the courts. This reasonableness on the part of the tribunal and the court must be on a large peripheral field.” In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi (1979) 4 SCC 365 this Court has expressed thus: - “2….The determination of the quantum must be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in free country in generous scales.” 9. In Helen C. Rebello and others v. Maharashtra SRTC (1999) 1 SCC 90 , while dealing with concept of “just compensation”, it has been ruled that: “28….The word just, as its nomenclature, denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness having large peripheral field. The largeness is, of course, not arbitrary; it is restricted by the conscience which is fair, reasonable and equitable, if it exceeds; it is termed as unfair, unreasonable, unequitable, not just.” The field of wider discretion of the tribunal has to be within the said limitations. It is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which in turn appears to be just and reasonable, for compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales as has been stated in State of Haryana and another v. Jasbir Kaur and others (2003) 7 SCC 484 . 10. It is noteworthy to state that an adjudicating authority, while determining quantum of compensation, has to keep in view the sufferings of the injured person which would include his inability to lead a full life, his incapacity to enjoy the normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries and his ability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. Hence, while computing compensation the approach of the tribunal or a court has to be broad based. Needless to say, it would involve some guesswork as there cannot be any mathematical exactitude or a precise formula to determine the quantum of compensation. In determination of compensation the fundamental criterion of just compensation should be inhered.” 3. Hence, while computing compensation the approach of the tribunal or a court has to be broad based. Needless to say, it would involve some guesswork as there cannot be any mathematical exactitude or a precise formula to determine the quantum of compensation. In determination of compensation the fundamental criterion of just compensation should be inhered.” 3. This writ petition has been preferred by the Insurance Company questioning the award passed by learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on the ground that the same is a windfall and a bonanza for the claimant. The award is not only an extravagant one, but is virtually a source of profit and being totally perverse, is liable to be set aside. The facts in brief may be noticed. 4. On 19.9.1999 claimant/respondent No. 1 (herein after referred to as claimant) boarded Bus bearing No. HP-24-4295 at Ghagas. When the bus reached at Khudi Nallah on Ghagas-Hamirpur Road, on account of rash and negligent driving by its driver, respondent No. 3, it struck against truck bearing No. HP-28-1515. As a result of this accident claimant sustained multiple injuries on his head and other parts of body. He was firstly taken to Ayurvedic Hospital, Kandraur, from where he was referred to IGMC, Shimla. The claimant remained admitted in the said hospital for 20 days w.e.f. 19.2.1999 to 9.10.1999. On his discharge he was advised rest and remained on leave from his duty w.e.f. 19.9.1999 to 21.8.2000. 5. Claimant filed a claim petition before the MACT, Mandi alleging therein that he had undergone treatment in various hospitals for which he had incurred an expenditure of about Rs.4,00,000/-. It was further alleged that he was still undergoing physiotherapy from the date of his accident till the filing of the petition. It was further alleged that he suffered 50% disability on account of the accident and on these basis a total compensation of Rs.25,00,000/- was claimed by him from the petitioner, as also respondents No. 2 to 6. 6. Petitioner in its reply did not dispute the accident. However raised the plea that the driver of the offending vehicle was not possessing valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident. 7. Learned tribunal on 4.11.2008 and 25.8.2009 respectively framed the following issues/additional issues:- “1. 6. Petitioner in its reply did not dispute the accident. However raised the plea that the driver of the offending vehicle was not possessing valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident. 7. Learned tribunal on 4.11.2008 and 25.8.2009 respectively framed the following issues/additional issues:- “1. Whether the petitioner sustained grievous injuries on 19.9.1999 at Khuddi-Nala near Ghagas at about 10 A.M. due to rash and negligent driving of Bus No. 24-4295 by respondent No. 2, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the compensation amount if so to what amount and from whom? OPP 3. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, as alleged? OPRs. 4. Whether the accident has taken place due to rash & negligent driving by the driver of Truck No. H.P-28-1515? OPRs. 4(a) Whether the Truck No. H.P-28-1515 was not insured with respondent No. 6, as alleged? OPR-6 4(b) Whether the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident was not holding valid and effective driving licence to drive the vehicle involved in the accident? OPR-6 5. Relief.” 8. The learned tribunal after recording evidence and evaluating the same awarded compensation of Rs.26,17,576/-, but since the claimant had only claimed Rs.25,00,000/- as compensation, he was awarded compensation of Rs.25,00,000/- only and was further held entitled to interest over this amount @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till deposit of the awarded amount. 9. Mr.B.M. Chauhan, Advocate learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the award passed by the learned tribunal is totally perverse and based on no evidence and therefore, no compensation, much less a whooping compensation of Rs.25,00,000/- could have been awarded in favour of claimant. 10. On the other hand, Mr.R.L. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the claimant has sought to support the award as just and legal and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case. 11. It is more than settled that compensation in personal injury cases has to be determined under the following heads:- Pecuniary damages (special damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food and miscellaneous expenditure. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case. 11. It is more than settled that compensation in personal injury cases has to be determined under the following heads:- Pecuniary damages (special damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food and miscellaneous expenditure. (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising: (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries. (v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage). (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity.” 12. The learned Tribunal has awarded a total compensation of Rs.26,17,576/- under the following heads:- “1. Past and Present Medical Expenses on Medicines. 1,04,935/- 2. Future Medical Expenses in future medicines. 50,000/- 3. Transportation charges Past & Present 1,00,000/- 4. Transportation charges in future 1,00,00/- 5. Loss of Past Earning 1,42,692/- 6. Loss of future income 3,49,440/- 7. Past and present Physiotherapy Treatment charges 2,47,200/- 8. Physiotherapy treatment charges for further 1,40,000/- 9. Attendant charges for the Period from 19-9-99 till 19-8-2000 66,000/- 10. Attendant charges from August 2000 till today 6,00,000/- 11. Attendant charges in future 1,40,000/- 12. Consultation charges 10,000/- 13. Lodging & Boarding charges 27,309 14. Laboratory charges 10,000/- 15. M.R.I. Charges 20,000/- 16. Pain & suffering 3,00,000/- 17. Future discomforts, inconvenience hardship and frustration etc. 3,00,000/- Total 26,17,576/- 13. Before proceeding further, certain undisputed facts may be noticed. Claimant at the time of the accident was a Government servant, working as Assistant District Attorney and had resumed his duties after availing total leave of 335 days and at the time of passing of award had been promoted as District Attorney. Bearing in mind these facts, I now proceed to analyze the legality and correctness of the compensation awarded under different heads:- Heads No. 1 & 2 14. Learned tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.1,04,935/- towards past and present medical expenses on medicines and another sum of Rs.50,000/- towards future medical expenses towards medicines, by relying upon the bills of medicines mark A-1 to A-72, the discharge slip of IGMC Shimla Ex. PW-2/B and treatment chits Ex.PW-2/C to Ex. PW-2/C-21. 15. Learned tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.1,04,935/- towards past and present medical expenses on medicines and another sum of Rs.50,000/- towards future medical expenses towards medicines, by relying upon the bills of medicines mark A-1 to A-72, the discharge slip of IGMC Shimla Ex. PW-2/B and treatment chits Ex.PW-2/C to Ex. PW-2/C-21. 15. It is more than settled that mere admission of document in evidence does not amount to its proof. In other words, mere marking of “exhibit or mark” on a document does not dispense with its proof, and the same is required to be proved in accordance with law. (Refer The Roman Catholic Mission Vs. The State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1457 ; Marwari Khumhar & Others Vs. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri & Another, AIR 2000 SC 2629 ; R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder Vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple & Another, AIR 2003 SC 4548 ; Smt.Dayamathi Bai Vs. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082 and Life Insurance Corporation of India & Another Vs. Rampal Singh Bisen, (2010) 4 SCC 491 ). 16. Indisputably, save and except the sole testimony of claimant, no other witness who may have issued these bills has been examined and therefore, no credence can be placed on the same and it can safely be concluded that these bills have not been proved in accordance with law. These unexhibited documents could not have been relied upon and then formed basis to award compensation for the past and present medical expenses. 17. In so far as the future medical expenses towards medicines are concerned, the claimant has lead no evidence whatsoever whereby it could be gathered that he would require this amount towards purchase of medicines in future. That apart, the claimant is otherwise a government servant and would be entitled to reimbursement in accordance with rules. Therefore, the claimant is not entitled to any compensation under both these heads. Head No. 3. 18. Claimant has been awarded a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- under this head on the premise that he had visited various hospitals at Chandigarh, Kullu, Delhi, Panchkula and Sangrur (Punjab) at different occasions and looking into the nature of injury sustained by him, it would not have been possible for him to undertake the journey by public transport and the same must have been undertaken by taxi. 19. 19. I am not convinced by this logic, for the simple reason that the learned tribunal appears to be totally oblivious of the fact that it was dealing with the case where the claimant is not a layman, but a law knowing person working as an Assistant District Attorney. In case the claimant had in fact traveled by taxi, then I see no reason why the bills thereof should not be forthcoming. If claimant could have kept all the documents relating to all the aforesaid hospitals along with various other documents exhibited on the record, then what prevented him from keeping the bills of such travel. 20. That apart, the claimant even failed to examine those witnesses in whose vehicle he had undertaken the journeys to these hospitals. But nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the claimant must have incurred at least some expenses for traveling to these hospitals, therefore, in place of Rs.1,00,000/- as awarded by the tribunal, the claimant is awarded a sum of Rs.20,000/- under this head. Head No. 4 21. The learned tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.10,000/- towards transportation charges for future, I find it to be just and reasonable and therefore, this finding call for no interference. Heads No. 5 and 6 22. Since both these heads are interconnected and interrelated, therefore, they are decided through common reasoning. 23. The learned tribunal for awarding a sum of Rs.1,42,692/- towards loss of past earning has accorded the following reasons: “PW-6 has stated that the petitioner remained on earned leave for 174 days and medical leave for 161 days. Thus, the petitioner remained on leave for total 335 days. He would have not remained on leave, had he not sustained injuries. He could have encashed his leave at the time of retirement. He could have reserved this leave for any other contingency. Thus, the petitioner, who per force remained on leave on account of injuries, is also entitled to get compensation on account of loss of earning. Ex.PW6/A shows that the salary of the petitioner in the year 2000 was Rs.12,972/-. He remained on leave for 11 months. Thus, the loss of earning for the leave period comes to Rs.12972 X 11=1,42,692/- and as such, the petitioner is awarded compensation of Rs.1,42,962/- on account of loss of earning.” 24. Ex.PW6/A shows that the salary of the petitioner in the year 2000 was Rs.12,972/-. He remained on leave for 11 months. Thus, the loss of earning for the leave period comes to Rs.12972 X 11=1,42,692/- and as such, the petitioner is awarded compensation of Rs.1,42,962/- on account of loss of earning.” 24. Before I proceed any further, it would be noticed that even at the time when the matter was pending admission before this Court, a learned Division Bench of this Court on 1.7.2011, passed the following order:- “Learned counsel for the first respondent seeks two weeks’ time to file reply. He shall produce along with the reply the particulars of the Doctor, who issued medical Certificates to him, including the medical Certificate he has produced for fitness to joint duty. He will also explain as to what is the jurisdiction in claiming the salary and other benefits for the period he had not actually worked. Still further he will explain as to what is the jurisdiction of making the various claims before the Tribunal. There shall also be a particular explanation to the claim for an amount of around Rs.8 lacs for Attendant. The particulars of the Physiotherapist, who has been allegedly paid more than Rs. 3 lacs shall also be furnished.” 25. In compliance to the aforesaid directions, the claimant did file his reply, but failed to produce any new document and in fact annexed copies of those very documents which had been produced by him before the learned tribunal. 26. The case thereafter came to be listed at various dates the learned Division Bench on 22.9.2011 passed the following order:- “There will be a direction to the Director, Prosecution, to file a statement showing the pay and allowances, as admissible to the first respondent, Shri Jagdish Lakhanpal, who was functioning as Additional District Attorney, Bilaspur between September, 1999 to February, 2002. The service book of the first respondent shall also be made available. The Registry will communicate this order to the Director, Prosecution.” 27. In compliance to the aforesaid order, the employer clarified that in so far as the earned leave/commuted leave of claimant was concerned, the same was sent to the Government for approval and necessary sanction inturn was accorded by the Government. The Registry will communicate this order to the Director, Prosecution.” 27. In compliance to the aforesaid order, the employer clarified that in so far as the earned leave/commuted leave of claimant was concerned, the same was sent to the Government for approval and necessary sanction inturn was accorded by the Government. Therefore, on such basis it can safely be concluded that the claimant had not suffered on any account during the period he was on leave and is therefore, not entitled to any compensation under the head loss of past earning. 28. Now in so far as the loss of future earning is concerned, the learned tribunal for awarding a sum of Rs.3,49,440/- has recorded the following reasons:- “PW-6 has specifically stated that on account of leave, the petitioner has suffered loss of an increment of Rs.2,912/-. Thus, the annual loss to the petitioner on account of loss of increment comes to Rs.2912x12=34,944/-. Considering the fact that the amount is to be paid in lump sum, it would be just and proper if multiplier of 10 is applied. By applying multiplier of 10, the future loss of income of the petitioner comes to Rs.3,49,440/-. Accordingly, the petitioner is awarded an amount of Rs.3,49,440/- on account of loss of future income.” 29. To say the least the reasoning is fallacious because there was no recurring loss to respondent No. 1 and this fact is clear from the reply filed by the employer of the claimant, more particularly para 3 thereof, which reads as under:- “3. That as far as loss of income mentioned at Sr. No. 6 at page 16 in the award of Motor Accident Claimants Tribunal is concerned, it is humbly submitted that the respondent No. 1 has remained on leave w.e.f. 19.9.1999 to 20.8.2000 and his increment was due on 1.1.2000 but it was deferred till 20.8.2000 because respondent No. 1 joined his duties on 21.8.2000, after availing the leave. His increment was granted on 21.8.2000 and as such there was loss of Rs.2912/- only which is not a recurring loss for future. Hence, future loss of income of respondent No. 1 amounting to Rs.3,49,440/- is not correctly awarded by the Ld. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.” 30. The claimant has though filed a counter affidavit to the aforesaid reply, but then the aforesaid averments have not been denied. Hence, future loss of income of respondent No. 1 amounting to Rs.3,49,440/- is not correctly awarded by the Ld. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.” 30. The claimant has though filed a counter affidavit to the aforesaid reply, but then the aforesaid averments have not been denied. Rather, the claimant has tried to set up an entirely new case by claiming that the award of Rs.3,49,440/- was for future loss of income, which he had incurred as an agriculturist, because of the injuries sustained in the accident. 31. At this stage it would be apt to notice that the employer in its reply has categorically stated that the claimant remained on leave w.e.f. 19.9.1999 to 20.8.2000 and because of this, his increment which was otherwise due on 1.1.2000 was deferred till 20.8.2000. Upon his joining on 21.8.2000 the increment was granted immediately on 21.8.2000 itself and as such there was no loss of even Rs.2912/-, much less, recurring loss. That apart, it is specifically pleaded that the future loss of income of Rs.3,49,440 has not been correctly awarded by the learned MACT. 32. In view of my findings recorded above, the claimant is not entitled to any compensation under either of these heads. Heads No. 7 and 8 33. Learned tribunal has proceeded to award a sum of Rs.2,47,200/- towards past and present Physiotherapy treatment charges and a further sum of Rs.1,40,000/- towards future Physiotherapy treatment charges. 34. Learned tribunal has awarded this compensation solely on the basis of statement of PW-4 Dr. Abdul Rehman, who has stated that the claimant was being administered physiotherapy by him since 2003, for which he had been charging a sum of Rs.2100/- per month. It is apt to reproduce paras 38 and 39 of the award, which read thus:- “38. PW-4 Dr. Abdul Rehman has stated that the petitioner is under his physiotherapy treatment since, 2003 and he is charging Rs.2100/- per month. It is well known that for the victim of road accidents, physiotherapy is one of the acknowledged mode of treatment which requires to be pursued for a long duration. Ex. PW2/B is discharge slip which shows that the petitioner was discharged from the hospital with advise to undergo physiotherapy since October, 1999. It is well known that for the victim of road accidents, physiotherapy is one of the acknowledged mode of treatment which requires to be pursued for a long duration. Ex. PW2/B is discharge slip which shows that the petitioner was discharged from the hospital with advise to undergo physiotherapy since October, 1999. If the petitioner is paying Rs.2100/- per month to physiotherapist then the amount spent on physiotherapy treatment by the petitioner till today comes to Rs.2100 X 12 = 2,47,200/- and as such, the petitioner is awarded an amount of Rs.2,47,200 on account of past and present physiotherapy treatment. 39. PW-4, Dr. Abdul Rehman has stated that the petitioner is still under his physiotherapy treatment. It is a well known fact that the victims of road accidents require to take physiotherapy treatment for a long duration and in some cases throughout life. In the present case, since the petitioner has suffered 50% permanent disability qua brain and nerve, he is likely to take physiotherapy treatment throughout his life. Hence, it would be just and proper, if any amount of Rs.1,40,000/- is awarded to the petitioner on account of future physiotherapy treatment.” It is evident from the aforesaid that the leaned tribunal has completely ignored the statement of PW-5, Dr.Mangal Kumar, who was one of the signatories to the disability certificate and had in his cross-examination categorically stated that the disability suffered by the claimant could not improve with the help of physiotherapy. The relevant portion of his statement in cross-examination reads thus:- “It is incorrect to suggest that this disability can improve with the help of physiotherapy.” Further the learned tribunal has proceeded to award compensation under this head by taking judicial notice of the fact that the victim of road accident are required to take physiotherapy treatment for a long duration of time and in some cases throughout life time. The learned tribunal was obviously not an expert on the subject and its observations are otherwise contrary to the aforesaid statement of PW-5, who is qualified doctor and expert on the subject. 35. Leaving all these contentions aside, the question arises as to whether the claimant had in fact taken treatment from PW-4. The learned tribunal was obviously not an expert on the subject and its observations are otherwise contrary to the aforesaid statement of PW-5, who is qualified doctor and expert on the subject. 35. Leaving all these contentions aside, the question arises as to whether the claimant had in fact taken treatment from PW-4. At this stage, it would be relevant to make a note of the cross-examination of PW-4, which is reproduced in its entirety and reads as follows:- “xxxxx(cross-examination by respondents No. 1) xxxx When patient came to us for treatment I maintained the record. I have not maintained the record in this case. Self stated I used to give the treatment at the house of petitioner. I am not issued any receipt with regard to the receipt of Rs.2100/- PM. I have not seen the previous record of petitioner. Self stated I have already seen the record when I started the treatment of the petitioner. I have 25 patients in OPD and 5 patients in home visit. I remember the record of each and every patient. Xxxx (cross-examination by respondents No. 3 and 6) xxxx I have seen the record of discharge from Chandigarh Hospital when he came to me first time. That belongs to some physiotherapy centre. It is incorrect that I have not seen any record. I have not maintained any file of petitioner. When patient was come to me he was suffering from disability. I cannot say how much disability he was suffering. It is correct to suggest that the disability which he was earlier facing when he came to me is improve now a days. It is also correct that petitioner can do his daily routine work. Self stated that daily routine work means is light and petty work. This disability may or may not improve in future. It is incorrect to suggest that I am giving physiotherapy treatment to the petitioner and deposing falsely.” 36. It is evident from the reading of the above statement of PW-4 that he was a procured witness or else like any other patients, records of the treatment of claimant would have certainly been maintained by him, that too irrespective of the fact that the alleged treatment was being given at home. Having failed to prove the physiotherapy treatment, the claimant cannot be held entitled to any amount under these heads. Heads No. 9, 10 and 11 37. Having failed to prove the physiotherapy treatment, the claimant cannot be held entitled to any amount under these heads. Heads No. 9, 10 and 11 37. Learned tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.66,000/- as attendant charges for the period from 19.9.1999 to 19.8.2000, and thereafter Rs.6,00,000/- towards attendant charges have been awarded for the period commencing from August, 2000 till date of passing of the award and yet another sum of Rs.1,40,000/- towards future attendant charges have been awarded. 38. In doing so, the learned tribunal has relied upon the statements of the claimant and one Mahesh Thakur, PW-9. The claimant had stated that after joining his duties, he had employed a permanent attendant and was paying a sum of Rs.3,000/- per month to him. He had further stated that he had hired a three-wheeler for going to his office and back and paying a sum of Rs.2,000/- per month to him. Surprisingly, it is PW-9, who is supposed to be both the three-wheeler driver, as also the attendant. But then, even this witness has not produced on record any receipt acknowledging the receipt of any amounts, which cumulatively work out to Rs.8,00,000/-. It has come in the statement of PW-9 that he is graduate and whereas his father was a shopkeeper having very good business. Then why would PW-9 work as an attendant and also drive a threewheeler is difficult to comprehend. 39. That apart, it has come on record that the claimant himself in year 1999 was drawing a salary of Rs.12,500/- and it is, therefore, unbelievable that out of this amount, he was parting with Rs.5,000/- to PW-9, who was not even a full time attendant. At this stage, it shall be apt to reproduce the cross-examination of PW-9 in entirety and the same reads:- “xxx(cross-examination by Ld. counsel for the respondent)xxx I am graduate. I passed my graduation in the year, 2002. I did my graduation from Govt. Post Graduate College Mandi. I was regular student for first year and thereafter private student. My father is a shop-keeper. My father shop is confessionary shop. My father is having very good business. I not used to go to the shop of my father. The three wheeler which I have purchased is financed from Bajaj finance company, Gutkar. I pay installment of finance myself and for that I plied my three wheeler in bajar. My father is a shop-keeper. My father shop is confessionary shop. My father is having very good business. I not used to go to the shop of my father. The three wheeler which I have purchased is financed from Bajaj finance company, Gutkar. I pay installment of finance myself and for that I plied my three wheeler in bajar. From the house of Jagdish Lakhanpal Mandi Court is 3 K.M. in one side. Normal three wheeler charged is Rs.30/- for one side. I left the petitioner in the court and thereafter I do my own work. Thereafter petitioner do his work himself. It is incorrect to suggest that the petitioner is not giving me Rs.3000/- monthly remuneration for attendance and Rs.2000/- for three wheeler charges. I returned from the bajar at 8.30 P.M. to my house. In the morning first of all I do my business Auto and thereafter pick the petitioner. It is incorrect to suggest that I do not attend the petitioner at his home. It is incorrect that I am deposing falsely.” 40. In case the entire statement coupled with the cross-examination of PW-9 is read, then one would come to an inescapable conclusion that he was not at all employed as an attendant and at best had only been picking up and dropping respondent No. 1 to his work place and residence and nothing more. Thus, the claimant cannot be awarded any compensation towards attendant charges. Therefore, claimant cannot be held entitled to any compensation under Head No. 9. 41. Now in so far as the picking and dropping charges are concerned, it has come in the statement of PW-9 that normal threewheeler were charging a sum of Rs.30/- for one side, which means that the claimant had been spending about Rs.2,000/- per month towards his commuting/transportation charges. 42. The aforesaid transportation charges would be reasonable keeping in view the nature of injuries sustained by the claimant and accordingly, the claimant is held entitled to the transportation charges at the rate of Rs,2,000/- per month from 21.8.2000 till passing of the award i.e. 20.9.2010 i.e. ten years one month and the same works out to be Rs,2,64,000/-. Heads No. 12 and 13 43. Since nominal amounts of Rs.10,000/- and Rs.27,309/- respectively have been awarded under these heads, the same call for no interference. Heads No. 14 and 15 44. Heads No. 12 and 13 43. Since nominal amounts of Rs.10,000/- and Rs.27,309/- respectively have been awarded under these heads, the same call for no interference. Heads No. 14 and 15 44. The claimant has been awarded a sum of Rs.10,000/- and Rs.20,000/- under these heads, the same are not being interfered with only because it has come in the affidavit of the employer that the claimant had not claimed any reimbursement of medical expenses from the department w.e.f. 19.2.2000 to 26.2.2002. Heads No. 16 and 17 45. The learned tribunal has awarded to the claimant a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- towards pain and suffering and a further sum of Rs.3,00,000/- towards future discomforts, inconvenience, hardship and frustration etc. 46. It is more than settled that in an accident, if a person loses limb or eye or sustains an injury, the Court while computing damages for the loss of organs or physical injury, does not value the limb or eye in isolation, but only values totality of harm which the loss has entailed, the loss of amenities of life and infliction of pain and suffering; the loss of the good things of life, joys of life and the positive infliction of pain and distress. However, the compensation cannot be put in a straight jacket formula and shall have to be worked out on case to case basis. Since the monetary compensation for pain and suffering is above palliative, the correct dose of which, in the last analysis, will have to be determined on case to case basis. 47. PW-5, Dr. Mangal Kumar, has duly proved on record the disability certificate, Ex. PW-5/A which proves that the claimant was suffering left side hemipresis and there was a paralysis of the seventh nerve. Therefore, taking into consideration the entirety of the injuries, which has left the claimant partially paralytic for life, I see no reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned tribunal, thereby awarding a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- towards pain and suffering. 48. Learned tribunal has awarded a further sum of Rs.3,00,000/- as compensation towards future discomforts, inconvenience, hardship and frustration etc. 49. It is more than settled that a victim of injury is required to be compensated for the loss of amenities of life, which may include verity of matters i.e. on account of injuries the claimant may not be able to work, run or sit. 49. It is more than settled that a victim of injury is required to be compensated for the loss of amenities of life, which may include verity of matters i.e. on account of injuries the claimant may not be able to work, run or sit. His normal longevity of life may be shortened because of the injury. That apart, as a result of the injury, the victim will have to face inconvenience, hardship, distress, discomfort, frustration and mental stress in life, therefore, award in such cases should be just, which means that the compensation should to the extent possible to restore the claimant to the position prior to the accident. The object of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered, as a result of wrong done as far as money can do so in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. 50. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that once the claimant had submitted his fitness certificate, then there was no occasion for the learned tribunal to award any compensation under both these heads, i.e. heads No. 16 and 17, as the claimant was deemed to be fit to discharge his duties. 51. I am afraid, I cannot agree with the contention as put forth by learned counsel for the petitioner. It has categorically come in the statement of PW-5, Dr. Mangal Kumar that the claimant has sustained 50% disability and not only suffered left side hemipresis, but there was also paralysis of seventh nerve. He had further stated that it was only a miracle which could cure the claimant, as his physical condition would not improve with the passage of time. In so far as the question of fitness certificate is concerned, the petitioner has not cared to produce the same on record. 52. Learned counsel for the petitioner would then argue that at the time of accident, the claimant was working as Assistant District Attorney and thereafter promoted as Deputy District Attorney on 7.1.2004 and thereafter as District Attorney on 24.8.2009, which in itself establishes that respondent No. 1 had not suffered any disability and was fit enough to do his work. 53. Learned counsel for the petitioner would then argue that at the time of accident, the claimant was working as Assistant District Attorney and thereafter promoted as Deputy District Attorney on 7.1.2004 and thereafter as District Attorney on 24.8.2009, which in itself establishes that respondent No. 1 had not suffered any disability and was fit enough to do his work. 53. Even this contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the petitioner firstly has failed to prove on record the fitness certificate and that apart it has specifically come in the affidavit of the employer that respondent No.1 had in fact suffered permanent disability to the extent of 50%. 54. Moreover, the injuries sustained by claimant had adverse affect on his physical frame, but that does not mean that there was any defect in his mental faculties. Mere fact that the claimant continue to work and attained promotions would only go to show that his mental faculties were intact, but in no manner prove that the physical condition of the claimant was normal. 55. Moreover, looking into the nature of injuries sustained by the claimant, when he was barely 39 years of age, it cannot be denied that he shall in future be put to lot of distress, discomfort, inconvenience, hardship, which inturn will create a lot of frustration. Therefore, the sum awarded under this head calls for no interference. CONCLUSION 56. Resultantly in view of the foregoing discussion and findings, the claimant would now be entitled to the following compensation under different heads:- 1. Past and Present Medical Expenses on Medicines Nil 2. Future Medical expenses in future medicines Nil 3. Transportation charges past & present 20,000/- 4. Transportation charges in future 10,000/- 5. Loss of Past Earning Nil 6. Loss of future income Nil 7. Past and present Physiotherapy Treatment Charges Nil 8. Physiotherapy treatment charges for future Nil 9. Attendant charges for the period from 19-9-99 till 19-8-2000 Taxi charges 2,64,000/- 10. Attendant charges from august 2000 till today 11. Attendant charges in future Nil 12. Consultation charges 10,000/- 13. Lodging & Boarding charges 27,309/- 14. Laboratory charges 10,000/- 15. M.R.I. Charges 20,000/- 16. Pain & suffering 3,00,000/- 17. Future discomforts, inconvenience hardship and frustration etc. 3,00,000/- Total Rs.9,61,309/- INTEREST 57. Attendant charges from august 2000 till today 11. Attendant charges in future Nil 12. Consultation charges 10,000/- 13. Lodging & Boarding charges 27,309/- 14. Laboratory charges 10,000/- 15. M.R.I. Charges 20,000/- 16. Pain & suffering 3,00,000/- 17. Future discomforts, inconvenience hardship and frustration etc. 3,00,000/- Total Rs.9,61,309/- INTEREST 57. Learned counsel for the petitioner has laid challenge to the grant of interest, that too, from the date of filing of the petition till date of actual deposit and has further questioned the rate at which such interest has been awarded i.e. 9% per annum. 58. It is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that though the petition had been filed on 26.2.2000, it was on account of in action and negligence on part of the claimant that issues could only be framed on 4.11.2008 and thereafter additional issues were framed on 25.8.2009 and therefore, in such circumstances, no interest could have been awarded for the aforesaid period or else that would amount to granting premium to the claimant for his own inaction and negligence. 59. Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for grant of interest in cases arising out of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, which reads thus:- “171. Award of interest where any claim is allowed. Where any claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation made under this Act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf.” The aforesaid provision provides for awarding of simple interest on the compensation awarded at such rate and from such date, not earlier than the date of making the claim, as it may specify in this behalf. The interest is not awarded for the damage done. Interest is awarded to the claimant for being illegally kept away from the due money, which ought to have been paid to him. Conversely, the claimant cannot claim interest as a matter of right for the proved delay, inaction or negligence on his part. 60. It would be evident from the records of the case that the matter initially remained pending w.e.f. 2.3.2002 till 26.8.2003 for service. Thereafter from 20.10.2003 till 6.8.2004, the parties were afforded opportunity to reconcile the matter. Conversely, the claimant cannot claim interest as a matter of right for the proved delay, inaction or negligence on his part. 60. It would be evident from the records of the case that the matter initially remained pending w.e.f. 2.3.2002 till 26.8.2003 for service. Thereafter from 20.10.2003 till 6.8.2004, the parties were afforded opportunity to reconcile the matter. On 6.8.2004, the claimant himself made an offer of Rs.7,00,000/-. The matter remained under conciliation till the year 2007, when for some strange reasons the case was fixed for evidence of the claimant, though issues were yet to be framed. This fact was subsequently detected only on 17.5.2008 and thereafter the case was listed for framing of issues on 4.11.2008. 61. It would also be evident from the orders passed from time to time that at no stage can it be said that the claimant was negligent, much less, grossly negligent in pursuing his case. It cannot also be said that there was any culpable inaction on his part, rather he had already put forth his offer on 6.8.2004 and it was thereafter for the petitioner to take a call by taking action on such proposal. Thus no fault can be found with the findings of the tribunal when it awarded interest from the date of filing of the petition till its deposit. 62. Now coming to challenge laid with respect to the rate of interest, it would be noticed that the recent trend of the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly indicates that instead of awarding 7 or 8%, as is canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it has been awarding interest @ 9% per annum. Here I need only refer to a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme in Jakir Hussein Vs. Sabir (2015) 7 SCC 252 , wherein it was held:- “20. As regards the rate of interest to be awarded on the compensation awarded in this appeal, we are of the view that the Tribunal and the High Court have erred in granting interest @ 7% p.a. and 8% p.a., respectively on the total compensation amount instead of 9% p.a. by applying the decision of this Court in MCD Vs. Uphaar Tragedy Victims Assn. (2011) 14 SCC 481. Uphaar Tragedy Victims Assn. (2011) 14 SCC 481. Accordingly, we award the interest @ 9% p.a. on the compensation determined in the present appeal.” Therefore, I see no reason to interfere even with the rate of interest, as awarded by the learned tribunal below. 63. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the petition is partly allowed and instead of Rs.25,00,000/- as awarded by the learned tribunal below, the claimant/respondent No. 1 is held entitled to the total compensation of Rs.9,61,209/- along with simple interest @9% per annum from the date of filing of the petition i.e. 26.2.2002 till the deposit of the award amount. 64. However, it is clarified that the interest shall not be payable on the amount directed to be paid under Head No. 17. Since the bus involved in the accident was insured with the petitioner, the amount of compensation along with interest shall be paid only by the petitioner. It is further clarified that in case the claimant has withdrawn the amount of Rs.5,00,000/- deposited by the petitioner pursuant to the directions passed by this Court on 16.3.2011, then the same shall be adjusted on pro-rata basis. 65. With these observations the writ petition is partly allowed in the aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their costs.