Hon'ble RAFIQ, J.—This writ petition has been filed by defendants no.1 to 5-petitioners (hereinafter referred to as 'petitioners') challenging order dated 16.09.2014 passed by learned Additional District Judge No.1, Beawar, District Ajmer, whereby their two applications have been dismissed. First application filed on 06.06.2011 was under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, 'the CPC'), praying for declaring the agreement to sell dated 26.10.2010 as inadmissible in evidence as it was insufficiently stamped and unregistered. Second application was filed on 06.06.2011 under Sections 10, 11, 35 and 40 of the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961 (for short, 'the Act of 1961') read with Section 151 of the CPC praying for rejection of the suit on the ground of willful and deliberate undervaluation of the suit and failure to pay requisite court fee. 2. Plaintiff-respondents instituted a suit in the court of Additional District Judge No.1, Beawar, District Ajmer, inter alia, praying for a decree of specific performance of agreement to sell dated 26.10.2010 and for injunction against petitioners. Along-therewith, they also filed an application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC. In the suit, plaintiff-respondents also prayed for a direction to petitioners to construct gravel roads and pillars and to get numbering done and thereafter execute sale-deed and transfer physical possession of the plots to them. While there were four purchasers to the agreement to sell dated 26.10.2010 i.e. plaintiff-respondents no.2, 3 and 4, but respondent no.5 herein, who was also a co-purchaser, did not file the suit but he has been included in the array of respondents as respondent no.10. Apart from aforesaid, it was also prayed in the plaint that decree of partition be passed in favour of plaintiff to the extent of 80% of their share and possession thereof be restored to them. In alternative, it was prayed that if the court does not deem it appropriate to grant that relief, decree of specific performance be passed for execution of sale-deed for the entire land, wherefor the plaintiffs were prepared to pay the entire sale consideration and the expenses of the stamp duty payable on registration of the sale-deed. In view of this alternative prayer, plaintiff was in any case required to pay court fee on full sale consideration and accordingly value the suit. 3. In view of this alternative prayer, plaintiff was in any case required to pay court fee on full sale consideration and accordingly value the suit. 3. Defendants, in aforesaid application filed by them, maintained that suit was liable to be rejected with costs on the ground of willful and deliberate undervaluation of the suit by the plaintiff-respondents. As per agreement to sell, total value of sale consideration was Rs.4,60,57,179.70, but the plaintiff-respondents have actually valued the suit for a sum of Rs.3,68,46,000/- and have accordingly paid the court fee. While the plaintiff-respondents have prayed in the suit for decree of partition but they have failed to value the suit on that count and have paid no court fee for the same. Alternative prayer in the application was made that issue with regard to payment of court fee be adjudicated first based on the materials and allegations contained in the plaint and on the materials contained in the statement filed under Section 10, before proceeding to hear the suit or application for temporary injunction on merits. 4. Defendant-petitioners in written statement filed by them on 01.09.2011, also agitated the issue of deficiency in payment of stamp duty on agreement to sell as also deliberate undervaluation of the suit and payment of insufficient court fee. The defendant-respondent no.5, who was defendant no.10 to the suit, also filed written statement on 01.09.2011 specifically admitting that sale deed could not be registered solely on account of failure of the plaintiff-respondents to comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 26.10.2010 and other omissions, including their failure to pay remaining amount of sale consideration within time and their unwillingness to execute the sale deed, failure to pay the stamp duty and get the same registered. Therefore, the agreement to sell was terminated and advance was forfeited. Plaintiff-respondents contested the application by filing reply on 10.04.2013. Learned trial court dismissed both the applications by order dated 16.09.2014. Hence this writ petition. 5. Shri Vivek Dangi, learned counsel for defendant-petitioners argued that it is trite law that a court cannot as a general rule, compel specific performance of a part of a contract unless it cannot be executed as a whole, especially when the contract, cannot be split into parts and where one part taken by itself does not stand on a separate and independent footing and is not capable of enforcement individually. In the present case, the intention of the parties is evidently clear and they never intended to split the contract into parts. The amount of total sale consideration for the transfer of the property in issue, as reflected in the agreement to sell is Rs.4,60,15,179.70. However, the plaintiff-respondents, on the pretext of seeking relief to the extent of only 80% of the property, have valued the suit for Rs.3,68,46,400/- including a sum of Rs.400/- towards the relief of injunction and have paid the court fee accordingly. No court fee whatsoever has been paid for relief sought regarding partition, whereas the suit property admittedly was not in possession of the plaintiffs. Learned trial court has dismissed the application without deciding the objection on which the petitioners sought rejection of the plaint. It has merely deferred the decision thereon to be decided at the time of hearing of the suit on merits, whereas they ought to have been decided as preliminary issues. Learned counsel for petitioners argued that Section 40(a) of the Act of 1961 clearly provided that in a suit for specific performance, whether with or without possession, fee shall be payable in the case of a contract of sale, computed on the amount of the consideration. Section 10 of the Act of 1961 provides that in every suit in which the fee payable under the Act of 1961, on the plaint depends on the market value of the subject-matter of the suit, the plaintiff shall file with the plaint a statement in the prescribed form of particulars of the subject-matter of the suit and his valuation thereof unless such particulars and the valuation are contained in the plaint. 6. It is argued that Sec. 35(1) of the Act of 1961 provides that in a suit for partition and separate possession of a share in joint family property or of property owned, joint or in common, by a plaintiff, who has been excluded from possession of such property, fee shall be computed on the market value of the plaintiff's share of the property. Sec. 4 of the Act of 1961, as applied to the State of Rajasthan, puts a complete embargo on the power of the Court to proceed upon with or act upon a document of any kind including a plaint in the suit unless it bears the prescribed court fees. Sub-sec. Sec. 4 of the Act of 1961, as applied to the State of Rajasthan, puts a complete embargo on the power of the Court to proceed upon with or act upon a document of any kind including a plaint in the suit unless it bears the prescribed court fees. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11 of the Act of 1961 stipulates that in every suit instituted in any Court, the Court shall before, ordering the plaint to be registered, decide on the materials and allegations contained in plaint and on the materials contained in the statement, if any, filed under Sec. 10. Its sub-sec. (2) stipulates that any defendant may plead that the subject-matter of the suit has not been properly valued or that the fee paid is not sufficient. All questions arising on such pleas shall be heard and decided before the hearing of the suit as contemplated by Order XVII, in the First Schedule to the C.P.C., 1908. If the court decides that the subject-matter of the suit has not been properly valued or that the fee paid is not sufficient, the Court shall fix a date before which the plaint shall be amended in accordance with the Court's decision and the deficit fee shall be paid. If the plaint be not so amended or if the deficit fee be not paid within the time allowed, the plaint shall be rejected and the Court shall pass such order as it deems just regarding costs of the suit. Proviso to Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC read with sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 11 of the Act of 1961 empowers the court to, in cases of grave injustice or hardship, extend time for payment of Court Fees, but neither the Act of 1961 nor the CPC empowers the court to grant exemption from payment of prescribed court fees. 7. Learned counsel for petitioners, in support of his case in respect of court fee, has relied on judgments of this court in Motilal and Others vs. Jagdish Prasad Sharam and Others – 1968 WLN 206, Mohkam Chand Dasot and Another vs. Additional District and Sessions Judge No.3 – AIR 2006 Raj 156 , judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 14.07.2014 in Dr. Zubair Ul Abidin and Others vs. Sameena Abidin @ Sameena Khan – FAO (OS) 427/2013 & C.M. No.14794/2013 (stay), judgment of Delhi High Court in Sahara India Airlines Limited vs. R.A. Singh – 1997 (43) DRJ 217 , and judgment of Madras High Court in Tmt. V.R. Maragatham vs. Tmt. A. Dhanalakshmi – (2013) 4 MLJ 528 . 8. In so far as the question regarding non-registration and non-payment of stamp duty on the agreement to sell is concerned, learned counsel for petitioner argued that Section 3(a) of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 (for short, 'the Act of 1998'), provides that every instrument mentioned in the Scheduled appended to the Act of 1998, which previously not having been executed by any person, is executed in the State of Rajasthan on or after the date of commencement of the Act of 1998, shall be chargeable with stamp duty of the amount as indicated in the Schedule. Entry 5(bb) of the Schedule appended to the Act of 1998 unambiguously provides that the rate of stamp duty payable on any agreement or memorandum of agreement to sell of an immovable property, when possession is neither given or agreed to be given, is three percent of the total consideration of the property as set forth in the agreement or memorandum of agreement. Further, Section 37(1) of the Act of 1998, provides that every person having by law or consent of parties, authority to receive evidence, before whom any instrument chargeable with duty is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, shall necessarily impound the same, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped. Moreover, Section 39 of the Act of 1998, inter alia, mandates that no instrument chargeable with duty under the Act of 1998 shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties, authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any such public officer, unless the said instrument is duly stamped. Proviso to Section 39, however, stipulates that any such instrument be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable or in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty and a penalty of one hundred rupees or ten times the amount of deficient portion thereof, whichever is higher. A bare perusal of agreement dated 26.10.2010 makes it clear that the same has been insufficiently stamped. Moreover, the said agreement to sell is also unregistered as required under the provisions of Sections 17 and 49 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, as held in catena of judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court as also of this Court. Learned court below, vide impugned order dated 16.09.2014, thus wrongly rejected the application filed by defendant-petitioners under Section 151 of the CPC praying that said agreement be declared inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of suit preferred by the plaintiff-respondents. Learned court below has merely deferred the decision regarding sufficiency/insufficiency of stamp duty on the agreement to sell dated 26.10.2010 observing that the said issue shall be adjudicated upon only after both the parties have led their evidence, which reasonings are wholly erroneous, misconceived and contrary to law. In view of Sections 35 and 36 of the Act of 1998, power to determine the stamp duty chargeable in respect of any instrument, is vested in the Collector and not with the Courts. Jurisdiction of civil court is confined to recording a finding on the question whether an instrument is duly stamped. If any civil court finds that the document, which is not duly stamped, is sought to be tendered in evidence, the power under Section 37 of the Act of 1998, will necessarily have to be exercised and the document will have to be impounded. Thereafter, the court is under an obligation to send a true copy of the said document for adjudication of the Collector in accordance with sub-section (4) of Section 37 of the Act of 1998. The party relying upon the document will have to pay deficit stamp duty and penalty. Only after payment thereof, the civil court can exercise power under proviso (a) to Section 39 of the Act of 1998. 9. The party relying upon the document will have to pay deficit stamp duty and penalty. Only after payment thereof, the civil court can exercise power under proviso (a) to Section 39 of the Act of 1998. 9. Learned counsel for petitioners, in support of his case in respect of stamp duty, has relied on judgments of this court dated 29.01.2013 in Pabudan Singh vs. Nand Lal – S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6522/2010, Nakoda Granite and Marmo Pvt. Ltd. vs. Yogendra Singhvi – AIR 2014 Raj 91 , Jagdish Prasad and Others vs. Parshu Ram and Another – AIR 2013 Raj 17 , M/s. Hari Om Enterprises vs. Court of Additional District Judge (FT) No.4, Ajmer – RLW 2011 (4) Raj. 2858, judgment dated 06.05.2014 of this court in Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Jeevraj Singh and Others – S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.4595/2014 (Jaipur Bench), judgment dated 01.04.2010 of Bombay High Court in Santosh Anant Raut vs. Pukhraj Chogmal Rathod and the State of Maharashtra – Writ Petition NO.7509/2009, and judgment of the Supreme Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal vs. State of Gujarat and Another – AIR 2001 SC 1158 . 10. Per contra, Shri Alok Chaturvedi, learned counsel for plaintiff-respondents opposed the writ petition and submitted that learned court below, by impugned order, has rightly dismissed the application filed by defendant-petitioners because it noted that the suit filed for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 26.10.2010 and partition to the extent of 80% of the land was presently at the preliminary stage awaiting service of summons on the defendants. Plaintiffs have prayed for specific performance of the agreement to the extent of 80% and rightly paid the court fee to the extent of 80% value of the land covered by the agreement falling in their share. The court below, if comes to the conclusion that the agreement to sell is not being properly stamped and therefore being inadmissible in evidence, it can, at that time, direct the plaintiff-respondents to make the deficiency in the court fee good. Learned trial court has rightly observed that this was again a mixed question of law and fact, which can be decided only after evidence of the parties is adduced. Section 39 of the Act of 1961 empowers the court to require the parties, relying on document supplied, for making good the deficiency of stamp duty. Learned trial court has rightly observed that this was again a mixed question of law and fact, which can be decided only after evidence of the parties is adduced. Section 39 of the Act of 1961 empowers the court to require the parties, relying on document supplied, for making good the deficiency of stamp duty. The matter was still at the preliminary stage and therefore this question was not required to be decided at the stage. Learned counsel for plaintiff-respondents, in support of the arguments, has relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in P.C. Varghese vs. Devaki Amma Balambika Devi and Others – AIR 2006 SC 145 , to argue that relief of partition, prayed for by plaintiff-respondents, to the extent of 80% share, was incidental and ancillary to main relief of specific performance of contract and in addition thereto. He relied on para 37 of the judgment, wherein it has been observed that ordinarily, proceeding for grant of final decree for partition should be initiated after sale deed in terms of decree for specific performance of contract is executed and registered and not vice-versa. Learned counsel for plaintiff-respondents also relied on judgment of a coordinate bench of this court in Radha Charan vs. ADJ (FT) No.1, Dholpur and Others – 2013 WLC (Raj.) UC 41. 11. I have given my anxious consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 12. Let me begin with analyzing the relied citations on the question of undervaluation and deficit court fee on plaint. This court in Motilal, supra, has held that it is open to a defendant before filing a written statement in reply to all the allegations in the plaint to take a plea that the suit has been under-valued and the court-fee paid is insufficient. In that case the court would be bound to decide the question as to whether the suit has been properly valued. But once the written statement has been filed, the only manner in which the plea can be taken is by amending the written statement. All questions as to value for the purpose of the determining the jurisdiction of courts arising on the written statement of a defendant shall be heard and decided before the hearing of the suit, as contemplated by Order XVIII in the First Schedule to Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. All questions as to value for the purpose of the determining the jurisdiction of courts arising on the written statement of a defendant shall be heard and decided before the hearing of the suit, as contemplated by Order XVIII in the First Schedule to Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It was held that the court cannot proceed with the trial of the suit without being satisfied that the court fee paid is sufficient. Section 11(1) lays down that the court shall apply its mind to the question as to whether the court-fee paid is sufficient before the plaint is registered. This decision is subject to review, further review and correction, but only in the manner specified in the provisions contained in the Act of 1961. It is open to a defendant before filing a written statement in reply to all the allegations in the plaint to take a plea that the suit has been undervalued and the court-fee paid is insufficient. In that case the court would be bound to decide the question as to whether the suit has been properly valued. 13. This court in Mokham Chand Dasot, supra, while dealing with the question of payment of court fee, held that considering the provisions of Section 11 of the Act of 1961, if any party raise objection in regard to proper court fee as per provisions of the Act of 1961, the court shall before ordering plaint to be registered, decide on materials and allegations contained in plaint and under Section 10 of the Act of 1961 proper fee payable thereon. Such decision should be taken first of all. This issue ought to be decided prior to hearing suit on merits. If the court decides that the subject matter of the suit has not been properly valued or that the court fee paid is not sufficient, the court shall fix a date before which the plaint shall be amended in accordance with the Court's decision and deficit fee shall be paid, thereby that decision should be taken first and whatever decision is taken by the court concerned is mandatory to be complied with by the plaintiff to amend the plaint and to pay the deficit fee. If the plaintiff failed to amend the plaint and to pay the deficit fee within the time allowed by the Court, the plaint shall be rejected and the Court shall pass such order as it deems just regarding costs of the suit. 14. A Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Dr. Zubair Ul Abidin, supra, has held that payment of court fees cannot be deferred to the stage of final decision unless entails any factual adjudication in trial. In taking this view, that Division Bench relied on a judgment of another Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Sahara India Airlines Limited, supra, which, while setting aside an order of the Single Judge granting exemption to the plaintiff in a suit for recovery of damages from payment of court fees and directing that in case the plaintiff succeeded, court fees will be deducted from the decretal amount, Section 4 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, as applied to Delhi, puts a complete embargo on the power of the Court to proceed upon with or act upon a document of any kind including a plaint in the suit unless it bears the prescribed court fees. Though, Order XI Rule 11 of the CPC empowers the Court to, in cases of grave injustice or hardship, extend time for payment of court fees, but neither the Court Fees Act nor the CPC empower the Court to grant exemption from payment of prescribed court fees. Law does not provide for deferment of payment of court fees till the decision of the suit and recovery thereof from the decretal amount. If the plaintiff failed to pay the court fees, the only course available is to apply to sue as an indigent person, or else, a suit cannot be tried without payment of court fees. 15. The Madras High Court in Tmt. V.R. Maragatham, supra, noted that at the earliest point of time, the appellant/defendant took a plea that the suit had been grossly under-valued and the court fee paid was insufficient. The plaintiff was required to amend the valuation of the suit and pay the deficit court fee within six weeks. In case plaintiff fails to amend the valuation and pay deficit court fee, the plaint was ordered to be rejected. 16. The plaintiff was required to amend the valuation of the suit and pay the deficit court fee within six weeks. In case plaintiff fails to amend the valuation and pay deficit court fee, the plaint was ordered to be rejected. 16. This court in Smt. Kamla and Another vs. Ramesh Chandra and Others – 2002(4) WLC 321, held that in view of wastage of time, labour of court and injustice to opponent the issue of valuation of suit should be decided as preliminary issue. 17. Now adverting to the case law on the question of non-registration and deficiency of stamp duty on the agreement to sell dated 26.10.2010, this court in Jagdish Prasad, supra, plaintiff filed a suit against defendants seeking declaration to the effect that the suit property was purchased from the funds of HUF consisting of plaintiff and father of defendants, and that therefore the plaintiff had one half share therein. The plaintiff also prayed for partition of said property and for possession of his one-half share and also for permanent injunction in respect of said property. Defendant contested the suit and denied the allegations and averments made in the plaint by filing written statement. During the course of evidence of the plaintiff, the document, deed of partition, was admitted in evidence by the trial court. Defendant objected against admissibility of such document in evidence on the ground that same was unregistered and therefore inadmissible in evidence, which objection was rejected by the trial court. The writ petition was filed thereagainst. In those facts, this court, in para 21 of the judgment, held as under:- “21. In the above referred judgment also the Apex Court has clarified that if the objection against admissibility of any document on the ground of deficiency of stamp duty is raised, the court has to decide such objection before proceeding further. It was sought to be submitted by the learned counsel Mr. Sharma for the respondent-plaintiff that the petitioners-defendants had not specifically raised the issue about the non-payment of stamp duty. The court does not find any substance in the said submission also. The petitioners in their written statement have challenged the very genuineness of the said document of partition, and further contended that such a document was unregistered and inadmissible in evidence. The court does not find any substance in the said submission also. The petitioners in their written statement have challenged the very genuineness of the said document of partition, and further contended that such a document was unregistered and inadmissible in evidence. When any document which required payment of stamp duty under the Stamp Act is sought to be brought into evidence, it is incumbent on the part of the court to see whether such a document is duly stamped or not, and is admissible in the evidence or not under the relevant Stamp Act. In the instant case, when the petitioners-defendants had specifically raised the objection with regard to the admissibility of the said document in evidence, the trial court ought to have considered the provisions of the Stamp Act and the Registration Act before admitting such document in evidence.” 18. Another coordinate bench of this court in Pabudan Singh, supra, dealt with a case where the court permitted the document, for being insufficiently stamped and unregistered, to be marked as exhibit and deferred the question of admissibility and legal evaluation at the time of final disposal of the suit. The court found that the document, which was alleged to be a sale deed by petitioner and claimed to be an agreement by respondent was the foundation of the suit and, therefore, it was imperative for the Court to decide about the admissibility of the said document on account of the same being properly/deficiently stamped before it could be marked as exhibit. 19. The Supreme Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal, supra, also had an occasion to dealt with this question, and held that it is an archaic practice that during the evidence-collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regrading admissibility of any material in evidence the court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection. Such practice when realized through the course of long period to be hindrances which impede steady and swift progress of trial proceedings must be recast or remoulded to give way for better substitutes which would help acceleration of trial proceedings. “It is an archaic practice that during the evidence collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any material in evidence the court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection. “It is an archaic practice that during the evidence collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any material in evidence the court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection. But the fall out of the above practice is this: Suppose the trial court, in a case, upholds a particular objection and excludes the material from being admitted in evidence and then proceeds with the trial and disposes of the case finally. If the appellate or revisional court, when the same question is re-canvassed, could take a different view on the admissibility of that material in such cases the appellate court would be deprived of the benefit of that evidence, because that was not put on record by the trial court. In such a situation the higher court may have to send the case back to the trial court for recording that evidence and then to dispose of the case afresh. Why should the trial prolong like that unnecessarily on account of practices created by ourselves. Such practices, when realised through the course of long period to be hindrances which impede steady and swift progress of trial proceedings, must be recast or re-moulded to give way for better substitutes which would help acceleration of trial proceedings. When so recast, the practice which can be a better substitute is this: Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence the trial court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage in the final judgment. If the court finds at the final stage that the objection so raised is sustainable the judge or magistrate can keep such evidence excluded from consideration. In our view there is no illegality in adopting such a course.” 20. The Supreme Court in Avinash Kumar Chauhan vs. Vijay Krishna Mishra - (2009) 2 SCC 532 , which judgment clinches the issue, held as under, “17. Parliament has, in Section 35 of the Act, advisedly used the words "for any purpose whatsoever". In our view there is no illegality in adopting such a course.” 20. The Supreme Court in Avinash Kumar Chauhan vs. Vijay Krishna Mishra - (2009) 2 SCC 532 , which judgment clinches the issue, held as under, “17. Parliament has, in Section 35 of the Act, advisedly used the words "for any purpose whatsoever". Thus, the purpose for which a document is sought to be admitted in evidence or the extent thereof would not be a relevant factor for not invoking the aforementioned provisions.” It has been further held therein that:- “22. We have noticed heretobefore that Section 33 of the Act casts a statutory obligation on all the authorities to impound a document. The court being an authority to receive a document in evidence is bound to give effect thereto. The unregistered deed of sale was an instrument which required payment of the stamp duty applicable to a deed of conveyance. Adequate stamp duty admittedly was not paid. The court, therefore, was empowered to pass an order in terms of Section 35 of the Act. 23. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the document was admissible for collateral purpose, in our opinion, is not correct. 24. ........ 25. Section 35 of the Act, however, rules out applicability of such provision as it is categorically provided therein that a document of this nature shall not be admitted for any purpose whatsoever. If all purposes for which the document is sought to be brought in evidence are excluded, we fail to see any reason as to how the document would be admissible for collateral purposes. 26. The view we have taken finds support from the decision of the Privy Council in Ram Rattan vs. Parmananad, ( AIR 1946 PC 51 ) wherein it was held:- "That the words `for any purpose' in Section 35 of the Stamp Act should be given their natural meaning and effect and would include a collateral purpose and that an unstamped partition deed cannot be used to corroborate the oral evidence for the purpose of determining even the factum of partition as distinct from its terms." The said decision has been followed in a large number of decisions by the said Court.” 21. Thus, the Supreme Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal, supra, also clarified that if objection regarding admissibility of any document on the ground of deficiency of stamp duty is raised, the court has to decide such objection before proceeding further. However, for all other objections, the procedure suggested in the aforesaid judgment could be followed. Similar view was expressed by this court in M/s. Hari Om Enterprises, supra, and Manohar Lal Sharma, supra. Similar view has been taken by the Bombay High Court in Santosh Anant Raut, supra, wherein it has been held that when a document is sought to be tendered in evidence before the Court, if it is found that the document/instrument is not sufficiently stamped, it is the duty of the Court to impound the said document in accordance with section 33 of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958. It is significant to note that this provision is in pari materia to Section 37 of the Act of 1998. 22. The Bombay High Court in Conwood Agencies Pvt. Ltd. vs. Namdeo Pandurang Panchal and Another – 2005 (107 (2)) BOMLR 319, held that question with regard to admissibility of document in evidence, which is insufficiently stamped, must be determined by the court before allowing the party to rely on such document even for collateral purpose. Insufficiently stamped document cannot be received in evidence for any purpose whatsoever. The question of proof and admissibility must be resolved by the Court in order to ensure that the cross-examination or re-examination, if any, then proceeds to take place on the basis of documents which have been held to be proved and which have been admitted in evidence. This cannot be permitted without determining the question of proof or admissibility of document. Whenever objection is raised about a document not duly stamped, the court has to impound the document and proceed to recover deficit stamp duty along-with penalty as required by relevant provisions. Similar view was expressed by Bombay High Court in Santosh Anant Raut, supra. 23. This cannot be permitted without determining the question of proof or admissibility of document. Whenever objection is raised about a document not duly stamped, the court has to impound the document and proceed to recover deficit stamp duty along-with penalty as required by relevant provisions. Similar view was expressed by Bombay High Court in Santosh Anant Raut, supra. 23. The Supreme Court in P.C. Varghese, supra, which has been cited on behalf of plaintiff-respondent, while relying on its earlier decision in Babu Lal vs. M/s. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal and Others – (1982) 1 SCC 525 , has held that in view of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, a decree for partition and separate possession of the property can be granted in addition to a decree for specific performance of contract, being incidental or ancillary to the main relief of specific performance of contract. In that case, the plaintiff filed a suit against defendants for a decree of specific performance of contract in respect of the agreement of sale in respect of the entire 19 cents share of the defendants in the property in dispute. The trial court in that case granted decree of partition along-with decree of specific performance of contract, which was, in view of Section 22(a)(a) of the Specific Relief Act, was held permissible and argument to the contrary was repealed. The Supreme Court held that Section 22 enacts a rule of pleading that in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the plaintiff may claim a decree for possession and/or partition in a suit for specific performance. Even though strictly speaking, the right to possession accrues only when a suit for specific performance is decreed. Indisputably, in the present case, such a decree for possession and/or partition is prayed for in anticipation of the grant of prayer for specific performance of contract, which is permissible in law. 24. As regards partial specific performance of the contract through the court, Section 12, in its sub-sec. (1) of the Act of 1963, provides that except as otherwise provided therein, the court shall not direct the specific performance of a part of a contract. Sub-sec. 24. As regards partial specific performance of the contract through the court, Section 12, in its sub-sec. (1) of the Act of 1963, provides that except as otherwise provided therein, the court shall not direct the specific performance of a part of a contract. Sub-sec. (2) thereof provides that where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, but the part which must be left unperformed by only a small proportion to the whole in value and admits of compensation in money, the court may, at the suit of either party, direct the specific performance of so much of the contract as can be performed, and award compensation in money for the deficiency. Sub-sec. (3) provides that where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, and the part which must be left unperformed either (a) forms a considerable part of the whole, though admitting of compensation in money; or (b) does not admit of compensation in money, he is not entitled to obtain a decree for specific performance; but the court may, at the suit of other party, direct the party in default to perform specifically so much of his part of the contract as he can perform, if the other party - (i) in a case falling under clause (a), pays or has paid the agreed consideration for the whole of the contract reduced by the consideration for the part which must be left unperformed and a case falling under clause (b), pays or had paid the consideration for the whole of the contract without any abatement; and (ii) in either case, relinqui-shes all claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract and all right to compensation, either for the deficiency or for the loss or damage sustained by him through the default of the defendant. Sub-section (iv) provides that when a part of a contract which, taken by itself, can and ought to be specifically performed, stands on a separate and independent footing from another part of the same contract which cannot or ought not to be specifically performed, the court may direct specific performance of the former part. 25. Sub-section (iv) provides that when a part of a contract which, taken by itself, can and ought to be specifically performed, stands on a separate and independent footing from another part of the same contract which cannot or ought not to be specifically performed, the court may direct specific performance of the former part. 25. The Supreme Court in A. Abdul Rashid Khan and Others vs. P.A.K.A. Shahul Hamid and Others – (2000) 10 SCC 636 , held that where any property is held jointly, and once any party to the contract has agreed to sell such joint property by agreement, then, even if the other co-sharer has not joined, at least to the extent of his share, he is bound to execute the sale deed. However, in the absence of the other co-sharer there could not be any decree of any specified part of the property to be partitioned and possession given. The decree could only be to the extent of transferring the share of the vendor-appellants in such property to other such contracting party. In that case, the vendor-appellants had 5/6th share in the property and therefore it was held that plaintiff's suit for specific performance to the extent of 5/6th share was rightly decreed by the High Court. The Supreme Court, in that case, where relief of partition and delivery of separate possession had been granted while decreeing suit for specific performance of agreement for sale to the extent of share of vendor-appellants, held that order for partition and delivery of posse-ssion must be set aside because the right of vendee in the property had not yet matured, sale deed not having been executed and also because partition could not take place without participation of the other non-party co-sharers. 26. The Supreme Court in Manzoor Ahmed Magray vs. Ghulam Hassan Aram and Others – (1999) 7 SCC 703 , while dealing with provisions of Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, held that there is no bar to part performance of contract. 26. The Supreme Court in Manzoor Ahmed Magray vs. Ghulam Hassan Aram and Others – (1999) 7 SCC 703 , while dealing with provisions of Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, held that there is no bar to part performance of contract. Where a party is unable to perform the whole of his part, Section 15 of the J&K Specific Relief Act, 1977 makes clear that the court may direct the party in default to perform specifically so much of his part of the contract as he can perform, it was held that Division Bench of High Court rightly upheld the decree of specific performance awarded in respect of 1/3rd share of the vendor-appellant and rightly allowed purchaser-respondent's appeal in respect of specific performance of 1/3rd share belonging to vendor-appellant's minor son. 27. In Chhatar Singh vs. Arjun Singh – AIR 1995 Raj. 73 , this court held that transfer by a person not authorized to dispose of the transferable properties not his own are void ab initio in law. In Sardar Singh vs. Smt. Krishna Devi – AIR 1995 SC 491 , the Supreme Court held that it is a well settled law that justice demands partial enforcement of contract instead of refusal of specific performance in its entirety. The Supreme Court in Kalyankur Lime Works vs. State of Bihar – AIR 1954 SC 165 , held that the purchaser may relinquish claim to further performance of the remaining part of the contract and the right to compensation at any stage of the proceedings. 28. All the aforesaid cases arise out of the agreement to sell to the extent of share of vendor, but present case gives rise to a converse situation where on account of difference amongst buyers, one of them has joined hands with vendor and in his separate written statement, supported his claim that the sale deed could not be registered solely on account of failure of the plaintiff-respondents to comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 26.10.2010 and other omissions, including their failure to pay remaining amount of sale consideration within time and their unwillingness to execute the sale deed, failure to pay the stamp duty and get the same registered. 29. 29. Having noted rival submissions extensively and also critically examined the cited precedents, I am of the considered opinion that questions raised indeed go to the root of the case but expression of any opinion at this stage thereabout either way might prejudice the case of the parties. I would, therefore, refrain myself from making any comment on any of the questions involved, on which the parties are litigating before the court below. Since the defendants have already filed written statements, learned trial court should, if it has already not framed the issues, proceed to now frame the issues in regard to following questions:- 1. That the trial court shall frame an issue whether the suit has been undervalued and deficient court fee has been paid on the plaint and if so, what is its effect. 2. That the trial court shall also frame issue with regard to admissibility or otherwise of document viz., the agreement to sell dated 26.10.2010, and also whether on the basis of non-registration and alleged deficiency of stamp duty, the same would be liable to be impounded and sent to the Collector (Stamps) for the purpose of its registration and payment of stamp duty. 3. That the trial court shall frame a separate issue whether the plaintiffs can, in view of Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, maintain the suit for part performance of the agreement to sell dated 26.10.2010 to the extent of 80% of their share, particularly when they have simultaneously prayed for a decree of partition and recovery of possession by meets and bounds and also alternatively prayed for specific performance of whole of the contract. 4. That while first two of above three issues may be tried as preliminary issues but third one may be tried with rest of the issues. 30. In view of above, the impugned order dated 16.09.2014 is set aside. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. This also disposes off stay application.