JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This is an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC from the judgment of affirmation dated 16.04.2012 delivered in Title Appeal No.45 of 2012 by the Addl. District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, Court No.5. While admitting this appeal, the following substantial questions of law was formulated by this court by the order dated 12.09.2012: (i) Non-reading and misreading of material evidences on record like the recitals of Exhibit-4 regarding boundary of Exhibit-3 and wrong consideration and misconsideration of evidence on record made the decisions of the Ld Courts below perverse? (ii) The learned Courts below misconstrued the provisions of Section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act? (iii) Non-consideration of burden of prove of ownership of ‘D’ schedule land of Bankim Ch. Das? and any other substantial questions of law at the time of hearing. 2. Mr. K. N. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants did not raise any other substantial question of law in exercise of liberty granted by the order dated 12.09.2012. For purpose of appreciating the appeal vis-a-vis the substantial question of law, the essential fact related to the suit may briefly be noted. The appellants instituted the suit for declaration of title, cancellation of registered sale deed and perpetual injunction as consequential relief, being Title Suit No.97 of 2007, in the court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Court No.1, Agartala, West Tripura. 3. The appellants pleaded that the predecessor of the plaintiffs namely Hiralal Saha was the owner of a piece of tilla class of land measuring .80 acre as described in Schedule-A appended to the plaint. After death of the predecessor of the plaintiffs, father of the plaintiffs No.1 and 2 and grandfather of the plaintiff No.3 [the plaintiff No.3 is the son of plaintiff No.1], the plaintiffs No.1 and 2 inherited the land as described in Schedule-A along with their mother. However, in the course of time their mother [wife of Hiralal Saha, since deceased] transferred her share in the inherited land [described A schedule] to the plaintiff No.3. Thus, the plaintiffs became absolute owner and possessor of the A-Schedule land. The predecessor of the plaintiffs sold .10 acre i.e 5 gandas of nal class of land to the defendant No.1 by the registered sale deed No.1-3355 dated 21.03.1966. Thus, the plaintiffs became absolute owner and possessor of the A-Schedule land. The predecessor of the plaintiffs sold .10 acre i.e 5 gandas of nal class of land to the defendant No.1 by the registered sale deed No.1-3355 dated 21.03.1966. But the defendant No.1 had illegally and unauthorisedly sold .10 acre i.e 5 gandas of tilla class of land from the A-schedule land by a registered sale deed bearing No.1-12421 dated 20.12.2006. Thereafter, the defendant No.2, to whom the defendant No.1 sold the said land which is a part of the A-schedule land measuring .10 acre sold it to the defendants No.3 and 4. The predecessor of the plaintiffs sold only .10 acre of nal class of land to the defendant No.1. But no tilla class of land was ever transferred by the predecessor. No part of the schedule-A land was ever sold to the defendant No.1. Thus, the transfer as caused by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant No.2 or the transfer as caused by defendant No.2 in favour of the defendants No.3 and 4 are all illegal and therefore, those deeds as described in the Schedule-B and C according to the plaintiffs are liable to be cancelled. When the defendants No.3 and 4 had started excavating earth from Schedule-D land by mechanical process, there was resistance from the mother of the plaintiffs No.1 and 2 and grandmother of the plaintiff No.3. The said dispute reached to the panchayat for settlement. When the defendants No.3 and 4 had started excavating earth from Schedule-D land by mechanical process, there was resistance from the mother of the plaintiffs No.1 and 2 and grandmother of the plaintiff No.3. The said dispute reached to the panchayat for settlement. Even she went to Lok Adalat and subsequently the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs praying the following reliefs: (i) a decree declaring the right, title, interest and possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land; (ii) pass a decree confirming the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land; (iii) pass a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant Nos.3 and 4 from entering into the suit land described in schedule-D of the plaint and from raising any boundary wall around it and making any construction thereon; (iv) pass a decree declaring the Sale Deeds described in schedule-B and C of the plaint as illegal, un-authorised and void in the eye of law and to adjudge the said Deed void and order it to be delivered up and cancelled and after such cancellation sent a copy of the decree to the Sub-Registrar Sadar, Agartala, West Tripura where the impugned Sale Deeds were registered to keep note on the copy of instrument contained in his book the fact of such cancellation; (v) any other order or orders as this Learned Court may deem fit and proper may kindly be passed with the order for cost of this suit. 4. For purpose of reference to the suit land the Schedule-A is reproduced here under: “SCHEDULE-A District-West Tripura, Sub-Division-Sadar, P.S. East Agartala, Mouza and Tehsil-Uttar Champamura, Revenue Circle-Jirania covered by Khatian NO.465 comprising C.S. Plot No.3939(Old), 6592 (present) land measuring 0.80 acres or 2(two) Kanis as per local measurement, class of land Biti (Tilla) bounded:- In the North Mount View Vanijya Pvt. Ltd. In the South The Plaintiff In the East Smti Manju Rani Som & Ors. In the West Mount View Vanijya Pvt. Ltd. 5. In the West Mount View Vanijya Pvt. Ltd. 5. The land as transferred by the defendant No.1 vide sale deed No.1-12421 in favour of the defendant No.2 is purportedly bound by in the north-Mount View Vanijya Pvt. Ltd., in the South-the plaintiffs, in the East-the plaintiffs and in the West-Mount View Vanijya Pvt. Ltd. From the land situated within that boundary, a piece of land measuring 0.10 acre was sold by the deeds described in Schedule-B and Schedule-C [respectively the sale deed No.1-12421 and the sale deed No.1- 2433]. As stated, according to the plaintiffs, the defendant No.1 did not have any competence to transfer the said land as described in Schedule-D by virtue of the disputed deeds as described in Schedule-B or the defendant No.2 by the disputed deed in Schedule-C in favour of the defendants No.3 and 4. The defendant No.1 filed the written statement seriously disputing the claims of the plaintiff and categorically stated that the predecessor of the plaintiffs by the sale deed No.1-3355 dated 21.03.1966 sold a piece of land measuring 5 ganda nal class in his favour. By a mistake, the tilla class of land was mentioned as nal class of land though within jote No.181 there was no nal class of land. The entire jote consisted of tilla class of land. Thus, the claims and contentions based on that mistake according to the said defendant are mischievous and they cannot stand the scrutiny as, according to him, the classification of the land was never used as the identification of the land when the land by physical boundaries is definitely described or the land as described by the settlement plot number having due reference to the record of right. 6. Having perused the pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues for purpose of adjudication of the suit: (i) Whether the suit is maintainable in law and form? (ii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of right title interest and possession over the suit land? (iii) Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land? (iv) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of perpetual injunction restraining defendant Nos. 3 and 4 from entering into the suit land described in schedule B of the plaint and from restraining for constructing any boundary wall around it? (iii) Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land? (iv) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of perpetual injunction restraining defendant Nos. 3 and 4 from entering into the suit land described in schedule B of the plaint and from restraining for constructing any boundary wall around it? (v) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree declaring the sale deed described in schedule B & C of the plaint as illegal unauthorised and void and is liable to be cancelled? (vi) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any relief or reliefs in this case? 7. It further appears from the records that the plaintiff adduced one witness and admitted 7(seven) documents in the evidence whereas the defendants examined as many as 3(three) witnesses and admitted 5(five) documents in support of their claim. After appreciating the evidence, both documentary and oral, the trial court has observed as under: “Moreover, considering the fact that in Ext.3, the sale deed vide No.1-3355, it is mentioned that the land which was transferred to defendant No.1 by the predecessor of the plaintiff belongs to jote No.181 and also considering Ext.4 and 5, the sale deeds Nos.1-12421 and 1-2433 wherefrom it is found that the land which was transferred by defendant No.1 to defendant No.2 and by defendant No.2 to defendant Nos.3 & 4 also belongs to jote No.181, I find that the land which was transferred by predecessor of the plaintiff to the defendant No.1 and the land which was transferred by defendant No.1 to defendant No.2 and by defendant No.2 to defendant Nos.3 and 4 are belongs to same jote number, i.e., jote No.181. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the land belongs to same jote number may be of the same class of land and this inference will go in favour of the defendants unless contrary if proved by the plaintiff and in the case in hand, plaintiff has failed to prove anything contrary. Hence, it becomes doubtful that the predecessor of the plaintiff’s sold null class of land to the defendant No.1. Therefore, I find that the plaintiff has failed to prove the fact that the predecessor of the plaintiff sold null class of land to the defendant. Hence, it becomes doubtful that the predecessor of the plaintiff’s sold null class of land to the defendant No.1. Therefore, I find that the plaintiff has failed to prove the fact that the predecessor of the plaintiff sold null class of land to the defendant. Learned counsel for the plaintiff also submitted that the person residing in the boundary of the land pertaining to Ext.3 and the person residing n the land pertaining to Ext.4 and 5 are not same in all sides. Therefore, the land belonged to Ext.3 and land belonged to Ext.4 and 5 are different and not the same one. In this context, Learned counsel for the defendant submitted that the person residing in the year 1966 in the boundary of the land pertaining to Ext.3 may have been changed due to sale, gift and lease etc. And therefore a person residing in the boundary of any land may not be same in the year 2006-2007 and therefore it is found that different persons are residing in the boundary. In this context, I am of the opinion that the person residing in the boundary of the land pertaining to Ext.3 may not be the same in the year 2006-2007 and therefore naturally the boundary description will vary between the land pertaining to Ext.3, Ext.4 and Ext.5. Considering all these aspect, I find that the plaintiff has failed to prove the fact that null class of land was transferred to the defendant No.1 by the predecessor of the plaintiff.” 8. Having observed thus, the remaining issues were decided against the plaintiffs meaning that the trial court held that the defendant No.1 and thereafter the defendant No.2 hadthe competence to sell the land in the Schedule-D measuring .10 acre, which is the part of the jote No.181. Thus, the trial court refused to grant any reliefs as stated to the plaintiffs by dismissing the suit. 9. Being aggrieved by that judgment dated 25.11.2010 delivered in Title Suit No.97 of 2007 by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Agartala, West Tripura, the plaintiffs filed an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in the court of the District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala being Title Appeal No.45 of 2010. The said appeal was transferred to the court of the Addl. District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, Court No.5, who by the impugned judgment dated 16.04.2012 has dismissed the said appeal. 10. The said appeal was transferred to the court of the Addl. District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, Court No.5, who by the impugned judgment dated 16.04.2012 has dismissed the said appeal. 10. In the appellate court judgment, the origin of the ownership of the land or its devolution has been lucidly described. It has been observed by the first appellate court that Hiralal Saha and his brother namely Chintaharan Saha were the owners of 4 kanis of tilla class of land. According to the respondents, Chinta Haran Saha had transferred 2 kanis of land to Bankim Chandra Das by the registered sale deed No.1-3813 dated 30.03.1963 (Exbt.B). Since Bankim Chandra Das was in possession on the land belonged to Hiralal Saha, Hiralal Saha also wanted to sell his share to Bankim, but Bankim could not purchase the entire 2 kanis of land. He purchased only 5 gandas of land from Hiralal’s share. The said sale deed is Exbt.A/Exbt.3. The said 5 gandas of land has been described in the Schedule-D and according to the plaintiff that 5 gandas of land as sold to Bankim was not part of the entire tract of land measuring 2 kanis and as described in the Schedule-A. It has been further asserted by the defendant No.1 that despite sale of 5 gandas of land, the remainder of land was under possession of Bankim Chandra Das. Now the plaintiffs have instituted the suit taking a plea that mistake that had crept in the sale deed while transferring the land by Hiralal in favour of Bankim Chandra Das in view of describing the class of land as tilla in the sale deed, it has been described as nal. The said land, according to the defendants, falls in the C.S. Plot No.3939, corresponding to R.S. Plot No.6592 classified as tilla under jote No.181 as described in A-Schedule of the plaint. On appreciation of the records afresh, the appellate court has affirmed the finding of the trial court observing as under: “Basing upon the discussion above, it is hereby held that Ld. Trial Court committed no mistake while rejecting the claim of the appellants for cancellation of the said sale deed mentioned in Schedule B and Schedule C of the plaint. On appreciation of the records afresh, the appellate court has affirmed the finding of the trial court observing as under: “Basing upon the discussion above, it is hereby held that Ld. Trial Court committed no mistake while rejecting the claim of the appellants for cancellation of the said sale deed mentioned in Schedule B and Schedule C of the plaint. And as it was also not clarified by the appellants regarding exact plot number of 0.10 acre (5 gandas) as sold out by their predecessor, Hiralal Saha to Bankim Ch. Saha, it was also not clear before the Court regarding actual ownership and possession of the appellants in A-Schedule land of area 0.80 acre (2 kanies). The appellants also proved one sale deed executed by Giribala Saha in favour of appellant no.3 (Exhibit 6) by which said Giribala, W/O said Hiralal Saha sold out her 1/3 share in said ASchedule land in the year 2003. The boundary description as given in said deed regarding ASchedule land of area 0.80 Acre is as follows- North- Plot no.6587, South-another part of land sold by said vendor by the same deed to the appellant no.3. East-Sunil Some, West-Manik Datta. (As per Exhibit 1 i.e. Khatian no.465, one ‘Manik’ is possessor of said plot no.6587) But while describing A-Schedule land in the plaint, the following boundary description was given by he appellants- North-Mount View Vanijya Pvt. Ltd. South-The plaintiffs i.e the appellants East-Smti Manju Rani Some & ors. West-Mount view Vanijya Pvt. Ltd. The appellants are also not asserting that in place of Manik Datta in Northern side and western side, Mount View Pvt. Ltd. has taken place by way of purchase or otherwise. In the southern side, name of appellant no.3 only ought to have been mentioned, whereas names of all the appellants are mentioned. So, in such a position, further doubt crops up regarding the correctness of boundary description of suit land. Thus, there was also no mistake committed by Ld. Court below rejecting the prayer of injunction as well as not granting declaration of ownership of appellants in whole portion of A Schedule land.” 11. Mr. K.N. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the concurrent finding returned by the courts below are the outcome of perverse reading of the evidence. Court below rejecting the prayer of injunction as well as not granting declaration of ownership of appellants in whole portion of A Schedule land.” 11. Mr. K.N. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the concurrent finding returned by the courts below are the outcome of perverse reading of the evidence. According to him, from the appreciation afresh it would appear that the original defendant No.1 did not have any competence to transfer the land in favour of the defendant No.2. For the same reason, the defendant No.2 did not have the competence to transfer the land in favour of the defendants No.3 and 4 inasmuch as the predecessor of the appellants namely Hiralal Saha never transferred Schedule- D land in favour of the defendant No.1. He has contended that Order 7 Rule 3 of the CPC provides as under: “Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, and, in case such property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in a record of settlement or survey, the plaint shall specify such boundaries or numbers.” 12. Mr. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel has submitted that the schedule of the sale deed dated 21.03.1966 (Exbt.3) by dint of which the defendant No.1 has claimed to have acquired the title of the Schedule-D land is materially different from the sale deed dated 22.12.2006 (Exbt.4) or the schedule as given in the sale deed dated 02.04.2007 (Exbt.5). But he has not questioned the settlement number or the jote number provided in sale deed dated 21.03.1966 (Exbt.3). Even he did not question the claim that the predecessor of the plaintiffs [the appellants herein] transferred a piece of land measuring .10 acre [5 gandas] from the jote No.181. On this premises, Mr. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel has reflected in the line of the written argument as submitted on 24.06.2016. he has projected that the original defendant No.1 and the original defendant No.2 transferred the D-Schedule land without competence to transfer as such sale deed dated 20.12.2006 (Exbt.4) as described in the Schedule-B and the sale deed dated 02.04.2007 (Exbt.5) as described in Schedule-C were liable to be cancelled. But the courts below held that both the original defendant No.1 and the original defendant No.2 had the competence to transfer those lands. But the courts below held that both the original defendant No.1 and the original defendant No.2 had the competence to transfer those lands. For the same reason, the perpetual injunction as sought on confirmation of the possession has been denied. Since the defendants No.3 and 4 started excavation of the land for purpose of constructing boundary wall, the plaintiffs asserted their right on that cause by instituting the suit. 13. Mr. K.N. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel reiterated that the land as transferred in favour of the original defendant No.1 by the predecessor of the plaintiffs was a nal class of land. But the land described in the A-Schedule is tilla class of land. He has however referred that the defendant No.1 has asserted that there was no nal class of land in the jote No.181 and thereby he claimed that he acquired title over 5 gandas tilla class of land by the said sale deed. Thereafter, he transferred the land to the original defendant No.2 by executing a registered sale deed dated 20.12.2006 (Exbt.4). The defendants’ version has been accepted both by the trial court and the first appellate court by giving a seal of approval and holding that, that was an insignificant mistake by describing the land as a nal class of land. Mr. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel has stated that such mistake has been accepted under proviso 1 to the Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. Mr. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel on questioning that finding has submitted that unless there is evidence from the defendant No.1 that the land in question was in the class of nal, such presumption ought not have been drawn by the courts below. He has submitted that at no point of time, the original defendant No.1 made any attempt to get such wrong description corrected. But while he executed the sale deed (Exbt.4), he described the land as the tilla class of land measuring 0.10 acre. Therefore, he was quite aware that there was difference in class between the land he purchased from the predecessor of the plaintiffs and land he sold out to the original defendant No.2. According to Mr. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel, the classification of land is one of the components for identifying the land properly. 14. Finally, Mr. Therefore, he was quite aware that there was difference in class between the land he purchased from the predecessor of the plaintiffs and land he sold out to the original defendant No.2. According to Mr. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel, the classification of land is one of the components for identifying the land properly. 14. Finally, Mr. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel has submitted that the land described in the sale deed dated 20.12.2006 (Exbt.4) is different from the land as described in the sale deed dated 21.03.1966 (Exbt.3). Mr. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel for purpose of reference has placed reliance on the written argument for making comparison between the sale deed dated 21.03.1966 (Exbt.3) and the sale deed dated 20.12.2006 (Exbt.4) in the following manner: Schedule in the sale deed dated 21/03/1966 (Exhibit-3) In the North Khas tilla In the South Original defendant No.1 (Bankim Chandra Das) i.e. the purchaser In the East The purchaser In the West The seller (i.e. Hiralal Saha) In the impugned sale deed dated 20/12/2006 (Exhibit-4) In the North Kamal Dey In the South Ananta Kr. Saha i.e. the appellant No.1 In the East The land of seller (Bankim Chandra Das) In the West Kamal Dey 15. Mr. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel on such comparison has contended that it would be apparent that the physical boundaries of the land as described in the Schedule-D of the plaint is not same. The boundaries are different. He has further submitted that even the defendant No.1 did not claim that he purchased any land from the successor of Hiralal Saha. He has pointedly submitted that in the sale deed dated 21.03.1966 (Exbt.3) in the northern boundary, there is ‘khas tilla’ whereas in the sale deed dated 20.12.2006 (Exbt.4), in the northern boundary, the land of Kamal Dey. It thus appears clearly that the original schedule in the sale deed dated 21.03.1966 (Exbt.3) has not been reproduced. This aspect of the matter was considered substantially by both the courts below and it has been held that physical boundary changes for the reason of transfer, lease or allotment. But the settlement plot number or jote number does not change. According to Mr. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel these changes were not established by the defendants and as such the benefit must go to the plaintiffs. One necessary aspect was pointed by Mr. But the settlement plot number or jote number does not change. According to Mr. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel these changes were not established by the defendants and as such the benefit must go to the plaintiffs. One necessary aspect was pointed by Mr. Bhattacharji, learned senior counsel that the original defendant No.1 was not given the mutation of the land. In support of such contention, copies of some orders of case No.97/96 have been produced. Whether these are related to the application dated 01.07.1996 or not, is a matter of evidence. Since those documents are not part of the evidence, this court is completely prohibited from looking into those documents as filed with the written argument. The procedure as has been followed by the appellants is totally alien and not germane to the procedure. Hence, those documents is of no value whatsoever. 16. Having regard to all the grounds of objection and on appreciation of the evidence afresh, this is court is confronted with the following aspects which are relevant for determining the substantial questions of law: (i) Whether by Exbt.3, the Schedule-D land was transferred in favour of the original defendant No.1? and (ii) Whether the classification of the land is essential competent for identification or whether the other components get eclipsed in absence or incorrect description of the same? 17. This court has compared the schedule of the sale deed dated 21.03.1966 executed by Hiralal Saha, the predecessor of the plaintiffs (Exbt.3) and the schedule of sale deed No.1-12421 dated 20.12.2006 (Exbt.4) executed by the original defendant No.1 in favour of the original defendant No.2 and finds that though the physical boundaries have changed but from the comparison it appears that except the changes in the physical boundaries, the said land can be identified inasmuch as the plaintiff never stated on the face of their admission that Hiralal Saha executed the sale deed dated 21.03.1966 (Exbt.3) in favour of the original defendant No.1 that from which land owned by Hiralal Saha, the said land described in the sale deed [Exbt.3] was purchased as it is admitted fact that Hiralal and his brother had 4 kanis of land. Out of which Hiralal Saha got 2 kanis (.80 acre) as described in the Schedule-A to the plaint. Out of which Hiralal Saha got 2 kanis (.80 acre) as described in the Schedule-A to the plaint. If these two aspects are juxtaposed there cannot be any confusion that Schedule-D land is the part and parcel of the Schedule-A land and by the specific boundary Schedule-D land was transferred to the defendant No.1. The plaintiffs have created some confusion by making a queer ‘comparison’ without reproducing the schedule in the sale deed dated 21.03.1966 (Exbt.3), but when the originals were compared, the court could comfortably come to a conclusive finding. There cannot be any amount of doubt that the land described in the Schedule-D in the plaint is part and parcel of Schedule-A land in the plaint. Therefore, the defendant No.1 had competence to transfer the land in favour of the defendant No.1 and further the defendant No.2 had the competence to transfer the land in favour of the defendants No.3 and 4. As such there is no infirmity in the finding of the courts below. The concurrent finding as returned by the impugned judgment dated 16.04.2012 is therefore affirmed. Before parting, this court must note that the class of land is not at essentially material for identification of the land when by physical boundaries or by the number in the settlement records the land is identified or identifiable, even if there is any mistake in the class of land, the correct class of land always can be presumed by the court. 18. Having held so, this appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Draw the decree accordingly. Send down the LCRs thereafter.