JUDGMENT : Dinesh Maheshwari, J. These two intra court appeals, preferred against two different but similar nature orders dated 26.11.2013, as passed in WP(C) No.47 of 2013 and WP(C) No.243 of 2012, have been considered together; and are taken up for disposal by this common judgment. 2. After having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material placed on record, we are of the view that looking to the terms of contract in question and nature of dispute, the parties ought to take recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism provided in Clause 14 of the respective agreements. As the parties are proposed to be relegated to the settlement mechanism provided in the respective agreements, dilatation on all the factual aspects appears inexpedient. Only a brief reference to the background aspects would suffice. 3. The relevant background aspects of the matter are that the parties herein had entered into respective agreements whereby, the appellants were to supply, and the respondents (writ petitioners) were to lift, the coal for a period of 5 years from the date of the agreement. The agreement between the parties of WA No.1 of 2014 was entered on 04.02.2009 whereas that between the parties of WA No.2 of 2014 was entered on 18.07.2008. In both the cases, the disputes cropped up because the writ petitioners, though took the supply of coal for some time but then, did not lift the coal for subsequent years. The allegation against the respondent of WA No.1 of 2014 had been of short lifting of coal for the years 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 whereas that against the respondent of WA No.2 of 2014 had been of short lifting for the year 2011-2012. 4. It appears that the appellants had effected increase in the price of coal to be supplied to the respective respondents; and the increase was sought to be justified with reference to Clauses 9.1 and 9.2 of the said agreements. The respondents, on the other hand, attempted to submit that such an increase of price was unjustified and had put them on high economic pressure, making the purchase enviable. In both the cases, the appellants served notices demanding compensation from the respondents and then, also served the notices for termination of contract on 29.05.2012. 5. The respondents, on the other hand, attempted to submit that such an increase of price was unjustified and had put them on high economic pressure, making the purchase enviable. In both the cases, the appellants served notices demanding compensation from the respondents and then, also served the notices for termination of contract on 29.05.2012. 5. It is also noticed that in the wake of such a dispute, the respondent of WA No.1 of 2014 earlier preferred a writ petition bearing No.3238 of 2012 in the Gauhati High Court against the termination of contract and before that, also filed two appeals with the appellants against the notice of demand as also against the notice of termination of contract. The said writ petition (No.3238 of 2012) was disposed of by the learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court on 29.06.2012 while directing the competent authority of the appellants to consider the appeals filed by the present respondent and to dispose of the same by way of a speaking order. It was also provided that until the appeals were decided, the appellants would not invoke the Bank Guarantee provided by the respondent. 6. It is borne out that such appeals were ultimately considered and dismissed by the General Manager of the appellant-Coal India Limited on 28.02.2013. Questioning the terms of the agreement as also the impugned demand notice and termination notice as also the orders passed in appeals, the respondent of WA No.1 of 2014 preferred the writ petition in this Court, being WP(C) No.47 of 2013. 7. On the other hand, the respondent of WA No.2 of 2014 preferred another writ petition in this Court, being WP(C) No.243 of 2012, questioning the demand notice dated 10.05.2012 as also the termination notice dated 25.09.2012. 8. Both the writ petitions aforesaid were considered and disposed of by separate but similar orders by the learned Single Judge on 26.11.2013. In the orders impugned, the learned Single Judge referred to some of the contentions of the parties and also took note of the fact that there was a clause in the agreement for revision of price and then, referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of LIC of India and another v. Consumer Education Research Centre and others: (1995) 5 SCC 482 . After reproducing paragraphs 33 and 34 of the said decision, the learned Single Judge proceeded to allow the respective writ petitions with similar nature observations, which are reproduced from the order passed in WP(C) No.47 of 2013, as under:- "14. After perusal of the above observation given by the Apex Court keeping in mind that the bargaining power is solely in the hand of the respondent, I am of the opinion that, it is not proper to revise the rate to such an extent which may cause difficulty to other parties to comply with the agreement, exactly what had happened in this instant case. However, it is also remained open that since the petitioner had entered into an agreement, he is bound by the contract agreement and to come out from the agreement by giving proper notice. 15. The most important question involved in this instant case which is an admitted fact as submitted by both the learned counsel for the parties is that, when the petitioner failed to lift the coal allotted to him as per the agreement and the same was subsequently sold. If it is so, I am of the opinion that the respondent has not incurred any loss, therefore, just to slap notice of demand upon the petitioner to pay Rs. 74,24,699.91/- as compensation has no logic and not proper. 16. Therefore, in my view the impugned order dated 11.05.12 and subsequent demand notice for compensation cannot survive, hence, the same is set aside. 17. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and the matter stands disposed of." 9. It has been indicated during the course of submissions in these appeals that so far the matter relating to WA No.1 of 2014 [arising out of WP(C) No.47 of 2013] is concerned, the amount recoverable had already been recovered by encashment of the Bank Guarantee before passing the order by the learned Single Judge. But, in the case relating to WA No.2 of 2014 [arising out of WP (C) No.243 of 2012], the Bank Guarantee for an amount of Rs. 1,37,02,800/- as furnished towards security by the respondent was renewed and extended from time to time pursuant to the orders of this Court; and lastly, the Court ordered on 18.06.2015 that the Bank Guarantee will be kept renewed until pronouncement of judgment. 10. 1,37,02,800/- as furnished towards security by the respondent was renewed and extended from time to time pursuant to the orders of this Court; and lastly, the Court ordered on 18.06.2015 that the Bank Guarantee will be kept renewed until pronouncement of judgment. 10. As observed at the outset and for the reasons indicated infra, the other submissions of the parties in challenge to or in support of the impugned orders need not be gone into as the parties are proposed to be relegated to the settlement mechanism provided in the respective agreements. 11. It is an admitted position of the learned counsel for the parties that in the agreements in question, a specific mechanism for settlement of disputes has been provided in Clause 14 with sub-clauses 14.1 to 14.3 as under:- "14. Settlement of Disputes: 14.1. In the event of any dispute, disagreement or difference arising out or in connection with this Agreement, including any question regarding its performance, existence, validity, termination and the rights and liabilities of the Parties to this Agreement ("Disputes"), the parties shall in the first instance endeavour to amicably settle the same through negotiations carried out in good faith. 14.2 For the purpose of conducting such negotiations, each Party shall designate in writing to other Party or representative who shall be authorized to negotiate on its behalf with a view to resolving any Dispute (the "Representative"). Each such Representative shall remain so authorized until his replacement has been designated in writing to the other party by the Party he represents. 14.3 The Representative of the Party which considers that a dispute has arisen shall give to the Representative of the other Party, a written notice setting out the material particulars of the dispute ("Dispute Notice"). Within thirty days, or such longer period as may be mutually agreed, of the Dispute Notice having been delivered to the other Party, the Representatives of both Parties shall meet in person, to attempt in good faith and using their best endeavours at all times, to resolve the Dispute. Once the Dispute is resolved, the terms of the settlement shall be reduced in writing and signed by the Representatives of the Parties." 12. It is also an admitted position that the Clause 14 aforesaid has not been taken recourse of in these matters. Once the Dispute is resolved, the terms of the settlement shall be reduced in writing and signed by the Representatives of the Parties." 12. It is also an admitted position that the Clause 14 aforesaid has not been taken recourse of in these matters. As noticed, only in the matter relating to WA No.1 of 2014, the so called appeals were filed by the respondent with the appellants and those appeals were ultimately decided by the General Manager concerned on 28.02.2013. Though this aspect of the matter, that there is a specific dispute redressal mechanism in the agreements, does not appear to have acquired the attention of learned Single Judge but, in our view, such a provision in the agreement cannot be ignored, particularly looking to the nature of dispute in these contractual matters. It is indisputable that the matters essentially relate to contractual obligations; and when a contract specifically provides for a mechanism for settlement of dispute, unless there are exceptional and strong reasons to by-pass the same, ordinarily, the parties need to be directed to take recourse of such a mechanism. In other words, when the background aspects make it clear that the dispute between the parties essentially relate to performance and allegations of breach of contract, such a dispute ought to be taken up for resolution in the mechanism provided in the agreements between the respective parties. 13. The settlement mechanism per Clause 14 ibid. makes it clear that in case of any dispute arising, the parties are expected to make all efforts to come to an 'amicable' settlement while conducting the proceedings in that regard in 'good faith'. Broadly speaking, under the mechanism aforesaid, the parties are expected to designate their representatives and such representatives are expected to meet in person and attempt, in good faith and using their best endeavours, to resolve the dispute. In the dispute of the present nature, there was no reason that the parties could not have taken recourse of the said mechanism. 14. So far the impugned order is concerned, though it is noticed that the learned Single Judge has indicated the submissions of parties but, thereafter, the requisite findings on all the contentious issues have not been returned. In the dispute of the present nature, there was no reason that the parties could not have taken recourse of the said mechanism. 14. So far the impugned order is concerned, though it is noticed that the learned Single Judge has indicated the submissions of parties but, thereafter, the requisite findings on all the contentious issues have not been returned. In fact, even while observing that there cannot be exorbitant revision of rates, the learned Single Judge has not referred to the norms and methods for revision of rates under the agreements. At the same time, the learned Single Judge has observed that the petitioner would remain bound by the contract. As to whether the writ petitioners were entitled to wriggle out of the terms of agreement remains a question unanswered. 15. Having said so, we need not elaborate on the aspects overlooked or omitted from consideration in the order impugned because, in the totality of circumstances, we are of the view that looking to the terms in agreements as regards settlement of disputes, it was required in the first place that the parties were driven to the mechanism agreed to by themselves instead of the Writ Court directly interfering in the matter. 16. For what has been observed herein above, we are clearly of the view that the parties deserve to be directed to take recourse of the settlement mechanism provided in the agreements. When the parties are being relegated to the agreed settlement, it does appear necessary that the order impugned be annulled and also to make it clear that none of the observations made in the impugned order or even in this judgment shall be having any bearing on settlement of dispute by the parties in terms of the mechanism provided in the agreements. In other words, for entering into the negotiation/settlement, any observation made by the Court in this litigation shall not be of any impediment for either of the parties; and none of the parties would rely on any such observation except to the extent of the observations herein that the settlement of dispute between the parties ought to be made through negotiations; and that such negotiations ought to be carried out in 'good faith', as contemplated by the dispute resolution mechanism itself. In the interest of justice, it is also considered necessary that the order dated 28.02.2013 as passed by the General Manager of the appellant [in WA No.1 of 2014] be annulled so as to pave the way for amicable settlement without any impediment by any of the observations made in any other proceedings. Ordered accordingly. 17. It has also been indicated during the course of submissions that the Bank Guarantee relating to WA No.2 of 2014 has been extended from time to time. In the interest of justice, it is provided that the said Bank Guarantee shall be kept alive and renewed till 30.06.2017. 18. For the purpose of carrying out the requirements of this judgment, it would be expected of the writ petitioners (respondents herein) to designate their respective representatives and to communicate such designation with complete particulars of their representatives within 30 (thirty) days from today to the appellant No.3. Thereafter, It would be required of the appellants to designate their representative within 15 (fifteen) days from the date of receipt of the communication from the respective respondents. The designated representatives may thereafter meet in person within 30 (thirty) days from the date of designation of the representative of the appellants and conduct the proceedings in terms of and in the manner indicated in Clause 14.3 ibid. with reasonable expedition, and to conclude the same, in any case, before 31.05.2017. 19. In the interest of justice, it is also provided that in case the respondent of WA No.2 of 2014 feels dissatisfied with the final decision in terms of Clause 14.3 ibid. and seeks to take recourse to the legal remedies, encashment of any part of the said Bank Guarantee shall not be effected for a period of 30 (thirty) days from the date of such decision. 20. With the observations and directions foregoing, these appeals stand disposed of. Miscellaneous cases related with these appeals also stand disposed of. No costs.