JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. 1. State has appealed against the judgment dated 19.5.2012, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Solan, Camp at Nalagarh, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, in Sessions Trial No.5-NL/7 of 2009, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sikander, challenging the acquittal of respondent Sikander (hereinafter referred to as the accused), who stands charged for having committed offences, punishable under the provisions of Sections 376 & 506 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. It is the case of prosecution that in the month of February, 2008, accused had come home on leave. Sometime in the month of February, accused subjected the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse in Peer Baba Dargah, falling in the jurisdiction of Police Station, Nalagarh, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh. Allegedly, the accused had allured the prosecutrix by making false promise of marriage. On such assurances, prosecutrix was again subjected to sexual intercourse in the month of March and last such act took place on 6.3.2008. Lateron accused resiled from his promise, as a result of which prosecutrix decided to commit suicide and jumped into water well, situate in the village, wherefrom she was rescued by Het Ram (PW-1), to whom she narrated the incident. She also narrated the incident to her father Ram Saran (PW-4), who got the meeting of Gram Panchayat convened, wherein though the accused admitted his guilt, but refused to marry the prosecutrix. Resultantly, the matter was brought to the notice of the police. Investigation was conducted by Inspector Dharam Singh (PW-13), who pursuant to FIR No.66, dated 18.3.2008 (Ex. PW-3/A) took into possession incriminating documents and material. With the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. With the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses and statement of the accused, under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was also recorded, in which he took the following defence: "I am innocent and I have been falsely implicated in this case at the instance of the father of Roopa as Roopa was involved in this case with the victim and my name has been falsely implicated in connivance with Roopa, victim and her father as well as grand father of the victim with the intervention of Om Parkash Batish." 5. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and the material on record, trial Court acquitted the accused of the charged offence. Hence, the present appeal by the State. 6. We have heard Mr. V.S. Chauhan, learned Additional Advocate General, Mr. Kush Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General and Mr. J.S. Guleria, learned Assistant Advocate General, on behalf of the State as also Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Lakshay Thakur, Advocate, on behalf of the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. In Prandas v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 36 , Constitution Bench of the apex Court, has held as under: "(6) It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under Section 417, Criminal P.C., to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. In our opinion, the true position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code in an appeal from an order of acquittal has been stated in – 'Sheo Swarup v. Emperor', AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) at pp. 229, 230 (A), in these words: "Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice."" 9. Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. There must be proper legal evidence and material on record to record the conviction of the accused. Conviction can be based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it lends assurance to her testimony. However, in case the court has reason not to accept the version of prosecutrix on its face value, it may look for corroboration. In case the evidence is read in its totality and the story projected by the prosecutrix is found to be improbable, the prosecution case becomes liable to be rejected. 10. It is a settled principle of law that testimony of prosecutrix is sufficient enough to convict the accused if it inspires confidence. (See: Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 3 SCC 791 and State of Rajasthan v. Babu Meena, (2013) 4 SCC 206 ). 11. The Courts while trying an accused on the charge of rape, must deal with the case with utmost sensitivity, examining the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the evidence of witnesses which are not of a substantial character. 12. However, even in a case of rape, the onus is always on the prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the offence it seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. It is no part of the duty of the defence to explain as to how and why in a rape case the victim and other witness have falsely implicated the accused. Prosecution case has to stand on its own legs and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. However great the suspicion against the accused and however strong the moral belief and conviction of the court, unless the offence of the accused is established beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of legal evidence and material on the record, he cannot be convicted for an offence. There is an initial presumption of innocence of the accused and the prosecution has to bring home the offence against the accused by reliable evidence. There is an initial presumption of innocence of the accused and the prosecution has to bring home the offence against the accused by reliable evidence. The accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt. (Vide: Tukaram & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2 SCC 143 ; and Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 . 13. Prosecutrix was born on 10.7.1988. Birth Certificate (Ex. PW-2/A) issued under the provisions of Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969, stands proved on record by Jai Chand Kaushal (PW-2). Thus, as on the date of commission of crime, prosecutrix was a major. 14. Prosecutrix (PW-3) admits to have studied upto middle standard. She left her studies midway. She is an intelligent witness. It is clear from her testimony as also from the testimony of her father that she has six brothers and sisters and she has been residing with her uncle Amar Nath. 15. Version of the prosecutrix of being subjected to sexual intercourse, on the assurance of marriage, does not inspire confidence at all. 16. In Court she states that 4-5 years prior to the month of February, 2008, while she had gone to pay obeisance at Peer Baba Dargah, accused caught her and subjected her to rape. Thereafter, accused had promised to marry her. Significantly, at that time, prosecutrix did not know the accused at all. She admits such fact. In any case, her version of being subjected to sexual assault at the Dargah is uninspiring in confidence, for it has come on record, not only through her version but also the version of her father Ram Saran and the Investigating Officer, that at a short distance from the Dargah there is a factory and a canteen, which is frequently visited by the workers. Also, Dargah is an open place. Thus, certainly place of the incident is not an isolated place. Prosecutrix admits not to have raised hue and cry or disclosed the incident to anyone. At least prior to the first incident, there was no promise of marriage. 17. Further, prosecutrix wants the Court to believe that the accused had given her a mobile phone and both were in constant touch with each other. This had been continuing for about four years. There is nothing on record to establish such fact. Document (Ex. At least prior to the first incident, there was no promise of marriage. 17. Further, prosecutrix wants the Court to believe that the accused had given her a mobile phone and both were in constant touch with each other. This had been continuing for about four years. There is nothing on record to establish such fact. Document (Ex. PW-8/A) is the manifest of the calls made from the phone of the accused to the phone owned by Amar Nath. There is nothing to link the mobile number of Amar Nath on which calls were made, to the prosecutrix. 18. It is the version of the prosecutrix that from the time of the first incident till February, 2008, she was not subjected to sexual intercourse, though according to her, she was in constant touch with the accused. Had the intent of the accused been to deceive the prosecutrix, he would have regularly subjected her to sexual assault. 19. She further states that in the month of February/March, 2008, thrice she was subjected to sexual intercourse by the accused and last such act being on 6.3.2008. Significantly, prosecutrix states that accused came to her room and spent the night with her. This version of hers cannot be said to be inspiring in confidence, for even according to her, in the house, which is small, other members of the family, of all age groups and gender, were residing together. Further, at no point in time did she raise any hue and cry or resist the alleged overt acts of the accused. 20. On the question of false promise and allurement of marriage, it be only observed that the alleged relationship between the two continued for more than four years, yet she did not disclose the promise of marriage to anyone, including her friends, sisters or family members. Her version of accused resiling from his promise, prompting her to jump into water well and being rescued by Het Ram also is unbelievable, for Het Ram has not corroborated the same nor anyone from the village has come forwards to support the same. Now, the place where the will is situate, there is lot of habitation. None from her family, Biradari or the village have came forward to corroborate such fact. Now, the place where the will is situate, there is lot of habitation. None from her family, Biradari or the village have came forward to corroborate such fact. Het Ram, as has come on record, is a resident of another village, which is ten kilometres away from the place of occurrence of the incident. That witness Het Ram has his business in the village, remains unproven on record. 21. Prosecutrix's further version of meeting of Panchayat, being convened on the asking of her father, wherein though accused admitted having physical relationship but refused to marry, is not corroborated by any Member of the Panchayat and the version of her father as also Roopa (PW-5) to such effect is uninspiring in confidence. Both Ram Saran and Roopa could not disclose the name of the Members of the Panchayat; the place where the meeting was convened; who all attended the same; and why the proceedings, if any, were not reduced into writing. 22. Also, we find there is contradiction in the version so narrated by the prosecutrix and her father. Prosecutrix wants the Court to believe that the first incident, which took place at Dargah, was four years prior to the month of February, 2008 and subsequent three acts, which took place in the month of February/ March were in her own house, whereas according to her father, only one incident took place in the Dargah and that too in the month of February, 2008. 23. Investigating Officer admits that Roopa was impleaded as an accused for commission of offence under the provisions of Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, but however later on cited as a prosecution witness. Why it was so done? remains unexplained on record. 24. As such, we do not find the testimony of the prosecutrix to be inspiring in confidence. 25. Both, the prosecutrix and the accused, are adults and were fully aware of the consequences of their actions, if any. The prosecutrix is not a rustic villager. She is an independent person and cannot be said to have been swayed by the acts of the accused. Also, there is no link evidence to establish complicity of the accused in the crime. 26. The prosecutrix is not a rustic villager. She is an independent person and cannot be said to have been swayed by the acts of the accused. Also, there is no link evidence to establish complicity of the accused in the crime. 26. The Apex Court in Tilak Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2016 SC 406 , has clearly held that if the testimony of the prosecutrix, alleging false promise of marriage, resulting into sexual intercourse, is not believable, the accused cannot be convicted. 27. Hence, it cannot be said that prosecution has been able to prove its case, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence so as to prove that the accused committed sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix against her will and without her consent, on the pretext that he will marry her, and also criminally intimidated and threatened her. 28. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence so placed on record by the parties. 29. The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, (2010) 1 SCC 94 , it cannot be said that the Court below has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice. No ground for interference is called for. The present appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending applications, if any.