JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. This is an appeal under section 100 of the CPC from the judgment of reversal dated 10.06.2013 delivered in T.A. 05 of 2012 by the District Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur [as it then was]. 2. By the order dated 22.08.2013, the substantial question of law as noted hereunder was formulated by this court for hearing the appeal: “Whether the predecessor of the respondent had competence to transfer the suit land by dint of the sale deed (Exbt.1) in view of the provisions of Rule 15 of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms (Allotment of Land) Rules, 1962 inasmuch as the allotment was made on 11.07.1976 whereas the sale took place on 08.08.1977?” 3. Facts those are essential for hearing of this appeal may be introduced at the outset. The respondent instituted the suit for declaration of title and recovery of vacant possession of the suit land, which has been described more fully in the schedule of the plaint. The appellant who is the sole defendant in the suit is the son of one Bipin Ch. Das who got allotment of the land measuring 2 acres under Khatian No. 1280 of mouza West Jalepha [now Khatian No. 1101] and comprised in the plots No. 2113/3242 corresponding to the C.S. Plot No. 5736(new). Bipin Ch. Das proposed to sell the said land to the plaintiff on a consideration of Rs. 500/-. The plaintiff purchased the said land by the Registered deed of sale No. 1021 of 1977 [Exbt.1] and during the revisional survey operation, on his prayer, the said land was mutated in his name in the revenue record and a separate Khatian being No. 1101[Exbt.3] was prepared and finally published. 4. From the said sale deed, it appears that the said land was purchased on 08.08.1977. From the Khatian No. 1280, it appears that the said land was allotted to Bipin Ch. Das with condition that the said land shall remain inalienable for ten years with effect from 1976. Further case of the plaintiff is that the defendant taking advantage from the temporary absence entered surreptitiously in the suit land and put up two huts on 01.07.2008 and began to reside there despite the plaintiff’s request to vacate the suit land. On 18.11.2008, Tehsildar of Sabroom, Tehsil Kachari went to demarcate the land and found the defendant in unauthorized occupation. On 18.11.2008, Tehsildar of Sabroom, Tehsil Kachari went to demarcate the land and found the defendant in unauthorized occupation. On the report of the Tehsildar, the plaintiff sought intervention of the local panchayat but the defendant denied to deliver the vacant possession of the land. In the suit, the plaintiff prayed for the following reliefs : (a) Decree declaring right, title and interest of the suit land over the plaintiff. (b) Decree directing the defendant for delivering the vacant possession of the suit land ; and other conventional reliefs. 5. The defendant by filing the written statement has raised objection against the valuation of the suit and the court fees paid thereon. The defendant has denied the story as introduced by the plaintiff. According to the defendant, the suit land was government khash land and full of jungles and he along with his family members had reclaimed the jungle. As his father, Bipin Ch. Das was in possession of the said land by the allotment order under Sl. No. 3 dated 11.07.1976 the said land was settled in favour of the plaintiff’s father. But with prohibition that within ten years no transfer shall take place. After the allotment, Bipin Ch. Das constructed his dwelling huts. On 09.11.1982, Bipin Ch. Das died but the defendant continued in the possession. The plaintiff in connivance with the revenue officials got a Khatian created in his name. The defendant has categorically stated that Bipin Ch. Das did not execute any sale deed transferring the suit land as Bipin Ch. Das had no competence to transfer the suit land. 6. The trial court [Civil Judge, Jr. Division, Sabroom, South Tripura] framed several issues inter alia: “3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land ? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get delivery of vacant possession from the defendant of the suit.” On appreciation of the evidence, the trial court observed that the transfer of the suit land by the said sale deed was made within the prohibited period. The defendant’s plea that his father did not sell the suit land to the plaintiff was not believed by the trial court but the trial court held that the father of the defendant had no competence to sell the said land and accordingly, the said transfer was voidable. The defendant’s plea that his father did not sell the suit land to the plaintiff was not believed by the trial court but the trial court held that the father of the defendant had no competence to sell the said land and accordingly, the said transfer was voidable. Thus, the plaintiff did not acquire any title by the sale deed. The trial court has also observed discrepancies in the description of the boundary of the suit land and in the procedure followed for mutation based on the sale deed dated 08.08.1978. On such basis the suit was dismissed by the said judgment dated 18.01.2012. 7. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the plaintiff filed the appeal under Section 96 of the CPC being T.A. 05 of 2012. By the said judgment dated 10.06.2013, the said appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed by returning the finding as under : “The sale deed was 30 years old document and the court below rightly decided that it has got presumptive value. The transfer of the land also not specifically denied. It is contended that Bipin Ch. Das had no transferable title over the suit land within 10 years from 1976. So, transferable right he acquired only in the year, 1986 . But he transferred the land in the year 1977. So, title was not transferred. The matter is discussed by the learned court below and learned court below considered that such transfer is invalid in view of Section 41 and 43 of the T.P. Act. It was also viewed that the sale was not made by ostensible owner. Purchase of the land from Bipin Ch. Das is admitted fact. Section 41 of the T.P. Act relates to the sale of the land by ostensible. In such a case, learned court below rightly decided and viewed that consent expressed or implied by the person, who is interested is necessary. Here it is found absent. In case of Section 43 of the T.P. Act, the erroneous or fraudulent representation by the owner is to be proved. It is found absent in the pleading. Learned court below referred a decision of the Karnataka High Court reported in AIR 1993 Kar. 326 . In that case, it is decided that the transferee get title only when the alienator acquires a valid title. In this case also Bipin Ch. It is found absent in the pleading. Learned court below referred a decision of the Karnataka High Court reported in AIR 1993 Kar. 326 . In that case, it is decided that the transferee get title only when the alienator acquires a valid title. In this case also Bipin Ch. Das acquired valid title after 10 years i.e. in the year 1986. So, the valid title definitely would be transferred to the transferee i.e. the plaintiff-appellant by the application of the doctrine of feeding the estoppels. The alienation was barred for some period the proviso that the alienation is not possible without permission of the competent authority after the period of 10 years. So, transfer is valid if permission is taken. It is true that permission was not obtained from the competent authority. At the time of execution of deed of transfer i.e. the deed itself cannot be invalid transfer because after lapse of 10 years Bipin Ch. Das acquired the transferable title. If the deed of transfer is perused then it is found that no where it is written that the land was allottee land. In the 30 years old document deed of transfer, the transferee Bipin Ch. Das clearly disclosed himself as a real owner, not as an allottee. As per Section 43 of the T.P. act where a person fraudulently erroneously represents that he was authorized to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the opinion for the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists. Here, in this case, though no specific plea is made in the plaint, the document itself shows that the transferee erroneously and fraudulently represents that he was authorized to transfer Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Section 43 embodies a rule of estoppel, and enacts that person who makes a representation shall not be heard to allege the contrary as against a person who acts on such representation. Transferor acted bona fide. The person who made the contract for sale was competent to contract. His legal heirs is estopped to allege the contrary against a person who acts on such representation. Therefore, the findings of the learned court below that the transfer is invalid and improper. Learned court below also raised the issue of boundary of the land. Transferor acted bona fide. The person who made the contract for sale was competent to contract. His legal heirs is estopped to allege the contrary against a person who acts on such representation. Therefore, the findings of the learned court below that the transfer is invalid and improper. Learned court below also raised the issue of boundary of the land. The land can be detected either by boundary or by the dag or Khatian number. When the dag or Khatian No. is clear and mutation prayer was allowed on the basis of possession and title, then it can be said that the plaintiff-appellant acquired right, title and interest over the suit land. The wrong description by giving the boundary cannot take away his right, title and interest. Therefore , it is decided that the plaintiff-appellant acquired right, title and interest over the suit land and respondent is stopped to claim inheritance over the suit land by unauthorizedly and occupying the part of the suit land. Therefore, the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to get the decree for declaration and recovery of possession, as prayed for.” 8. Mr. A. Sengupta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant while questioning the finding of the first appellate court has submitted that the said finding is wholly erroneous inasmuch as Bipin Ch. Das did not have the right to transfer and there was no question of making misrepresentation. Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that : "where, with the consent express or implied, of the persons interested in immovable property, a person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorised to make it : Provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, has acted in good faith." Mr. Sengupta, learned counsel has submitted that there is no such pleading in this regard. According to him, the entire transaction or agreement for such transfer was unlawful. In this regard he has referred a decision of the apex court in Jehtal Tanti & Ors. versus Nageshwar Singh (D) thr. LRs. reported in 2013 AIR SCW 2854. Sengupta, learned counsel has submitted that there is no such pleading in this regard. According to him, the entire transaction or agreement for such transfer was unlawful. In this regard he has referred a decision of the apex court in Jehtal Tanti & Ors. versus Nageshwar Singh (D) thr. LRs. reported in 2013 AIR SCW 2854. In that case, in the context of deliberate disregard to an order of injunction a transaction took place at the behest of the person who was restrained by the said order. Having regard to that context the apex court observed as under : “13. We may also notice Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which lays down that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is unlawful and every agreement executed with such an object or consideration which is unlawful is void. Since the sale deed was executed in favour of respondent No. 1 in the teeth of the order of injunction passed by the trial Court, the same appears to be unlawful.” 9. Mr. Sengupta, learned counsel has referred a decision of the apex court in Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh versus Randhir Singh & Others reported in 2010 AIR SCW 3308 which is not at all relevant in the context. The said decision relates to how to determine the court fees when the mandatory injunction for handing over possession is sought as consequential relief in a suit for declaration. This decision however supports the plaintiff’s case vis a vis the objection as raised by the defendant appellant in his written statement as to the valuation of the suit and the court fees paid thereon. 10. Ms. S. Deb Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent has relied a decision of the Bombay High Court in Amrutu Kaluji Shejol & 5 others versus Vithal Ganpat Wadekar & Others [judgment dated 15.07.2016] where it has been held as under : "30. The plaintiffs are held to be the real owners of the suit property. 10. Ms. S. Deb Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent has relied a decision of the Bombay High Court in Amrutu Kaluji Shejol & 5 others versus Vithal Ganpat Wadekar & Others [judgment dated 15.07.2016] where it has been held as under : "30. The plaintiffs are held to be the real owners of the suit property. The question is whether the transfer of suit property by Laxmibai in favour of the defendant Nos.1 and 3 on 4-6-1974 Exhibit 74 is protected under the provisions of Section 41of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 115 of the Evidence Act. The equitable principle of estoppel contained in Section 115 of the Evidence Act is also one which is contained in Section 41of the Transfer of Property Act. Hence, the provisions of Section 115 of the Evidence Act and Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act being relevant, are reproduced below : "115. Estoppel.- When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing." "41. Transfer by ostensible owner.- Where, with the consent, express or implied, of the persons interested in immovable property, a person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorised to make it: provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, has acted in good faith." The transfer of property by a person other than the real owner becomes voidable at the instance of the real owner on the ground that the transferor had no authority to make it, and, therefore, it is not binding upon him. Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act is aimed at protecting the transfer by an ostensible owner with the consent - express or implied - of the real owner of the immovable property for consideration, provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, has acted in good faith. Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act is aimed at protecting the transfer by an ostensible owner with the consent - express or implied - of the real owner of the immovable property for consideration, provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, has acted in good faith. However, where the real owner of the property by his own conduct, as per Section 115 of the Evidence Act, intentionally causes another person, i.e. the transferee, to believe that the transferor is the true owner or is authorized by him to transfer the property, it shall not be necessary for the transferee to make any further enquiry to establish that he took reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer the property." 11. Ms. S. Deb Gupta, learned counsel has submitted that both the courts below have returned the finding that Bipin Ch. Das, the father of the defendant appellant had the title of the suit property subject to the conditional restriction. If the said condition of restriction were absolute, the transaction would have been hit by Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act sans the estoppel. But the restriction in this case was not absolute. From the reading of the sale deed, the first appellate court has correctly observed that the owner represented him as authorized to cause the sale. When the sale by the sale deed has been held to be genuine by drawing presumption under section 90 of the Evidence Act and no grievance has been demonstrated by the defendant-appellant, provisions of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act would be attracted and the transfer cannot be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorized to make it. 12. Ms. S. Deb Gupta, learned counsel has further submitted that the purchase was bona fide on payment of due consideration and taking reasonable care to ascertain whether the transferor had power to make the transfer. Even she has referred to Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act to contend that even if the representation was erroneous but when on expiry of ten years the right to transfer absolutely vested with the transferor which includes his heirs and assignee, it shall not impair the right of the transferee. 13. The crux of the submission advanced by Ms. 13. The crux of the submission advanced by Ms. S. Deb Gupta, learned counsel is that any claim over the title of the suit land cannot be maintained by the legal representatives of the deceased transferor inasmuch as they are estopped from acting in the manner as stated. Thus, there is no infirmity in the finding of the first appellate court . This court has noted that the trial court has observed that the description of the suit land as provided in the schedule differs from the description of the land purchased by the said sale deed. 14. Having compared both the description, this court finds there exists no variance in the description of the suit land. The physical boundaries with efflux of time may change and unless properly clarified it may create serious confusion at sometimes. As such, it would be duty of the Civil Courts to prefer the description of the physical boundaries as given referring to the settlement records. The physical boundaries have their own advantages but when there is incongruity between the reference by settlement records and the physical boundaries, the physical boundaries may be kept aside for purpose of identification of the land. The unique feature that has surfaced from the records that the allotment authority has waived their objection and mutated the suit land in the name of the plaintiff in a new Khatian as stated. The permission for transfer of the allotted land within the prohibited time lies with the District Collector. If any wrong has been committed by the Settlement Authority by mutating the records the defendant would have approached the Settlement Authority as a corrective measure but no such action as it appears from the records has been resorted to by the defendant-appellant. Even no action has surfaced from the defendant as to the entry in the Khatian showing the plaintiff in possession of the suit land. Thus, by taking presumption of the plaintiff’s being in the possession under Section 43(3) of the TLR & LR act before his dispossession, the first appellate court did not commit any irregularity. 15. Having held so, this court is of the considered view that the impugned judgment does not warrant any interference from this court. Hence, the appeal being bereft of merit is dismissed. Draw the decree accordingly. Send down the LCRs.