SWAMI VASUDEVANAND SARASWATI DISCIPLE OF S. H. N. SARASWATI v. JAGAT GURU SHANKARACHARYA JYOTISHPEETH P. S. S. N. SARASWATI
2016-09-22
SHAMSHER BAHADUR SINGH, SUDHIR AGARWAL
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. Civil Misc. Application No. 143408 of 2016 : 2. Civil Misc. Application No. 69142 of 2016 : By the Court.—Appellant filed Civil Misc. Application No. 143408 of 2016, under Section 21 of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1887), with a prayer that record of First Appeal, under consideration, be transmitted to the Court of District Judge, Allahabad, in view of amendment in Section 21 of Act,1887 by U.P. Act No. 14 of 2015 as well as notification issued by Chief Justice, dated 9.2.2016, under Section 21 (1) (b) of Act, 1887. 2. This application was assigned to the Bench presided by one of us (Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J) by Chief Justice vide order dated 3.5.2016. 3. When matter came-up on 10th May, 2016, learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent informed that they have also filed Civil Misc. Application No. 69142 of 2016, under Section 24 of Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “C.P.C.”) read with Chapter XXII, Rule 1 of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1952”) for transfer of this appeal to this Court since substantial hearing has already taken place and matter having been expedited by Hon’ble Supreme Court, it be appropriate to be heard and decided by this Court. This Transfer Application was cognizable by Single Judge, hence, Division Bench again on 10.5.2016 directed the matter to be placed before Chief Justice so that both applications may be heard by same Bench. 4. Acting Chief Justice passed order dated 17.5.2016 directing that both these matters as well as other connected/incidental matters be placed before a Bench presided by one of us (Hon’ Sudhir Agarwal, J) and that is how both these applications have come-up before us. 5. Sri Manish Goyal, Advocate appearing for appellant-applicant vehemently contended that valuation of appeal is less than 25 lacs and by operation of law, appeal stands transferred to Court of District Judge, hence, neither this Court has any jurisdiction nor Transfer Application is admissible nor even otherwise jurisdiction can be retained by this Court to decide this appeal as that would deny a right of second appeal to appellant. 6.
6. On the contrary, Sri Shashi Nandan, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of plaintiff-respondent contended that here is a case where early hearing of appeal was consented by both parties on the very first day when appeal was entertained and admitted on 26.5.2016. Since, thereafter, appeal was heard on merit substantially and for quite a long time but on account of dilatory tactics adopted by appellant, hearing could not complete despite the fact that at the instance of appellant itself, Supreme Court has also directed that this appeal should be decided by this Court, expeditiously and it was required to be decided preferably by December, 2015 but since then even more than half of 2016 has passed, but matter has not proceeded further. 7. Before considering legal submissions advanced by both sides and other relevant aspects on merits of these applications, we find it appropriate to place on record certain background facts of this appeal. 8. This is a regular First Appeal arising from judgment dated 5.5.2015 and decree dated 15.5.2015 passed by Civil Judge (Senior Division), Allahabad in Original Suit No. 503 of 1989. It could be decided by Civil Court after almost 26 years and that too when orders were passed by Supreme Court for expeditious disposal of Suit. 9. Dispute relates to Office of Jagat Guru Shankaracharya at Jyotirmath Badrikashram. 10. When appeal came-up for admission before Division Bench on 26.5.2016, looking to nature of dispute and volume of record etc., Court found that instead of keeping matter pending and deciding only interim application, it would be in the interest of parties, if appeal itself is decided on merits, expeditiously and to this, both sides agreed. Appeal was fixed for 14.7.2015 for final hearing. The relevant part of order dated 26.5.2015, is reproduced below: “.......... 4. Looking to the nature of dispute and also the earlier order passed by the Apex Court by which the matter was remanded to Trial Court for deciding the suit expeditiously, we are of the view that this is a matter which should be decided expeditiously. 5. Let the record of Court below be summoned through Special Messenger. Steps shall be taken by appellant within three days. 6. Parties thereafter shall take steps to get the paper-book prepared and the same shall be filed within five weeks. 7.
5. Let the record of Court below be summoned through Special Messenger. Steps shall be taken by appellant within three days. 6. Parties thereafter shall take steps to get the paper-book prepared and the same shall be filed within five weeks. 7. Learned counsels for parties agreed that this matter should be decided expeditiously and they request to have this matter for final hearing at an early date. 8. List this appeal for final hearing on 14.07.2015.” 11. Lower Court record was received on 3.6.2015, but parties could not file respective paper-books. Ultimately on 3.8.2015, respondent’s counsel stated that his paper-books are ready and he may be permitted to file in Office while appellant’s paper-books were not ready and he sought further time. 12. Hearing on appeal commenced on 5.8.2015. After addressing Court on six dates and that too on two issues No. 16 and 20, counsel for appellant stated that since hearing of appeal will take time, therefore, Court should pass order on interim injunction application. Thereupon, with a detailed order dated 20.8.2015, application for stay of execution of decree and ad interim injunction was rejected and appeal was directed to be listed on 9.9.2015 for further hearing. This order was taken in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 25947 of 2015, but Supreme Court declined to interfere with said order. However accepting request made by Sri Harish N. Salve, Senior Advocate, appearing for appellant Swami Vasudevanand Saraswati, Court required this Court to continue hearing of appeal and decide the same on merits, expeditiously as possible, preferably by 31st December, 2015. The order dated 21.9.2015 passed in aforesaid Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 25947 of 2015, is reproduced as under: “We have heard learned senior counsel appearing for the parties. We do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court. It appears that the High Court itself take up the matter for final hearing and fixed date. The arguments have already begun. Hence, as agreed by Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel, we request the High Court to continue the hearing of the appeal and decide the same on merit as expeditiously as possible, preferably by 31st December, 2015. With the above observation, the special leave petition is disposed of.” (emphasis added) 13. Thereafter, appellant moved an amendment application, seeking addition of 97 grounds in memo of appeal.
With the above observation, the special leave petition is disposed of.” (emphasis added) 13. Thereafter, appellant moved an amendment application, seeking addition of 97 grounds in memo of appeal. The said application was also allowed vide order dated 4.11.2015 whereupon memo of appeal was amended and number of grounds, which were earlier only 50, now rose to 147. Thereafter, hearing of appeal deferred on certain dates, since learned counsels for parties sought adjournment on account of their preoccupation and other reasons. 14. In the mean time, U.P. Legislature amended Act, 1887 by publishing U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Amendment Act, 2015") which received assent of President on 19.11.2015 and published in U.P. Gazette extraordinary dated 7.12.2015. 15. In view of aforesaid amendment, appeals having valuation of less than 25 lacs, stood transferred to Court of District Judge. Therefore, this Court could not proceed on an objection raised by learned counsel for appellant and he has prayed that record be transmitted to District Judge, Allahabad. 16. Learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent, on the contrary, submitted that plaintiff-respondent is now 96 years of age; matter was substantially heard on several dates by Court, therefore, it is in the interest of justice that this appeal be heard by this Court instead of transmitting record to Court of District Judge, Allahabad. It was objected by appellant and it filed an application bearing No. 143408 of 2016 with request to transmit record to Court of District Judge. Plaintiff-respondent, on the contrary, filed a Transfer Application, under Section 24 C.P.C. on 1.3.2016 and both these applications now have been heard by us. 17. Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel for appellant contended that provision pertaining to pecuniary jurisdiction under Section 21 of Act, 1887, is mandatory and no discretion has been left to High Court to retain any matter but to transfer record of appeal where pecuniary jurisdiction has been vested in District Judge. When appeal was filed in this Court, it was within jurisdiction but with subsequent amendment, pecuniary jurisdiction of District Judge has been enhanced, hence pending appeal, by operation of law, would stand transferred to Court of District Judge. He relied on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Kanyal Das and others v. Har Prasad and others, AIR 1972 All 249 .
He relied on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Kanyal Das and others v. Har Prasad and others, AIR 1972 All 249 . He submitted that mere fact that paper-books have been filed by parties, record is bulky or other similar grounds are not sufficient, not to transfer record of this appeal to Court, competent to hear appeal, in the light of amendment under Section 21 of Act, 1887 and there is no valid reason to transfer appeal to this Court. He further submitted that in fact, record is yet to be transmitted, hence, application under Section 24 C.P.C. does not lie and in any case, Court has no authority to retain appeal ignoring the fact that pecuniary jurisdiction, due to amendment in legislation, is, now vested in Court of District Judge. He lastly submitted that in case, this Court retain appeal, appellant shall loose right of second appeal, which it may exercise, in case, record of this appeal is transmitted to District Judge and matter is decided against appellant. This is also a reason for not retaining this appeal and instead it should be transmitted to District Judge. 18. Sri Shashi Nandan, Senior Advocate, appearing for plaintiff-respondent, on the contrary, contended that transfer of record is automatic, once pecuniary jurisdiction has been enlarged under law. Vide Section 21 (1A) it is deemed transferred to Court of District Judge and, thereafter, if any case can be retained by higher Court, it is only when an application for transfer is allowed and particular case is then transferred from lower Court to higher Court. 19. Relevant authority relied by respective parties, we shall discuss while discussing matter on merit. 20. To put the record straight, we may also mention that after amendment of Act, 1887 and notifications were issued by Hon’ble Chief Justice on 9.2.2016, this appeal was listed before us on 29.2.2016 when we passed order directing for transmission of record to District Judge having jurisdiction in the matter. Thereafter, on 1.3.2016, plaintiff-respondent filed application under Section 24 C.P.C. and, as noted above, this application as well as appellant’s application requesting for transmission of record of District Judge, both have been assigned to this Bench for disposal on merit. 21. It is not in dispute, when appeal was filed, pecuniary jurisdiction lay in this Court. Therefore, appeal was maintainable in this Court.
21. It is not in dispute, when appeal was filed, pecuniary jurisdiction lay in this Court. Therefore, appeal was maintainable in this Court. Had there been no amendment in Act, 1887 in respect of pecuniary jurisdiction, under Section 21, it is not disputed, in that case also, appellant would have no right of second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. but against judgment of this Court, only remedy available would have been, to file appeal before Supreme Court. 22. Under Section 21 (1) (b) of Act, 1887 against judgment and decree of a Civil Judge, appeal was admissible before District Judge where valuation did not exceed Rs. 1 lacs. By ‘Amendment Act, 2015’, Section 21 of Act, 1887 has been amended and Rs. 1 lacs has been substituted by 5 lacs and 5 lacs has been substituted by 25 lacs. 23. Sub-section 1-A provides, where appeal was initially filed in High Court but during pendency, stand transferred to District Judge, it shall be decided by him or by any Judge subordinate to him to whom matter has been assigned by District Judge. There is a validation clause by way of Proviso declaring that any judgment and decree of this Court, passed in appeal after relevant date, shall be valid as if High Court has withdrawn appeal under Section 24 C.P.C. 24. A cumulative reading of Section 21 (1) and (1-A) and proviso, it is evident that once there is an amendment and enhancement of valuation with regard to appeal, matters pending in High Court shall stand transferred after such enhancement of valuation to District Judge, but in some matters, if cases are decided by High Court, judgment would not be nullity but it would be deemed that appeal stood transferred under Section 24 C.P.C. to this Court. Thus, High Court may in certain cases retain First Appeal and decide, which after enhancement of valuation would have otherwise been within the jurisdiction of District Judge. 25. Section 21 of Act, 1887 which came to be considered before Full Bench in Kanyal Das case (supra) was different then what it is before us having been substituted by U.P. Act No. 17 of 1991. Earlier Section 21 (1-A) states that all appeals within prescribed valuation shall stand transferred to District Judge, not being an appeal in which arguments have been concluded before relevant date and only judgment disposing of appeal remains to be pronounced.
Earlier Section 21 (1-A) states that all appeals within prescribed valuation shall stand transferred to District Judge, not being an appeal in which arguments have been concluded before relevant date and only judgment disposing of appeal remains to be pronounced. The legislature made its intention clearly as to what appeals shall not stand transferred. Full Bench considered legislation intend expressed in the light of Section 21 (1) (1-A) of Act, 1887 as it then was, read with Section 24 C.P.C. 26. Legislature subsequently substituted Sub Section 1-A in 1991 and limited exception earlier provided has been removed. Instead, a proviso has been inserted making scope of transfer under Section 24 C.P.C. much wider giving wider room to this Court to exercise its authority in appropriate cases and instead of transferring record of such cases, itself may proceed to decide. Sub Section 1-A, as it was under consideration before Full Bench and as it stand substituted by U.P. Act.17 of 1991 and available today, are compared in the form of chart, which reads as under: Section 1-A (before amendment) Section 1-A (amended) An appeal from decree or order of a Civil Judge where the value of the original suit in which, or in any proceeding arising out of which, the decree or order was made exceeded ten thousand rupees but was less than twenty thousand rupees instituted in the High Court before the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1970, and pending in the High Court, immediately before the said date, not being an appeal in which arguments have been concluded before the said date and only judgment disposing of the appeal remains to be pronounced, shall stand transferred to the District Judge having jurisdiction who may either decide it himself or assign it to any Additional Judge subordinate to him.
(1-A) An appeal, from a decree or order of a Civil Judge where the value of the original suit in which, or in any proceeding arising out of which the decree or order was made was not more than the amount fixed by or under clause (b) of sub-section (1) instituted in the High Court and pending in the High Court immediately before the relevant date, shall stand transferred to the District Judge having jurisdiction who may either decide it himself or assign it to any additional judge subordinate to him; Provided that any judgment, decree or order passed in such an appeal by the High Court after the relevant date shall be valid as if the High Court had withdrawn the appeal under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 27. Despite restricted language of Sub Section 1-A of Section 21 as it then was, Full Bench said that power of this Court with regard to transfer under Section 24 C.P.C. is not impinged upon and does not stand repealed. Instead, in an appropriate case, Court can pass order of transfer a case under Section 24 C.P.C. This is very clear from paragraph 6 of Full Bench judgment in Kanyal Das (supra), which reads as under: “6. Though Sub-section (1-A) of the Amending Act entrenches upon the discretion conferred on the High Court to transfer an individual case, in the sense that it takes away the discretion in regard to the category of cases mentioned in it, yet, in our opinion, Sub-section (1-A) does not in law impinge upon the operation of Clause (b) of Section 24 (1), Civil Procedure Code. Technically, the power of withdrawal vested in the High Court under Clause (b) does not stand repealed by Sub-section (1-A) of the Amending Act (sic). The High Court can on appropriate grounds withdraw an individual appeal for trial or disposal by itself, even though that appeal may have stood transferred from the High Court to the District Judge under Sub-section (1-A). In that sense, the power of withdrawal under Sub-clause (b) still continues to vest in the High Court.” (emphasis added) 28.
The High Court can on appropriate grounds withdraw an individual appeal for trial or disposal by itself, even though that appeal may have stood transferred from the High Court to the District Judge under Sub-section (1-A). In that sense, the power of withdrawal under Sub-clause (b) still continues to vest in the High Court.” (emphasis added) 28. Further argument that transfer of appeal from District Judge to High Court, if allowed, then a right of second appeal will be lost, has been negatived by this Court in State of U.P. and others v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf and others, 1989 (15) ALR 696. It is an order passed on an application under Section 24 C.P.C. whereby suits pending in Court of Civil Judge/Munsif were transferred to this Court at Lucknow. A similar argument of loss of right of appeal was negated by observing as under: “Powers of the Court under Section 24 of the C.P.C. are not to be rendered negatory because right of one or two appeals is lost. In suitable cases and situations like the present are the same has rather become necessary for advancing the cause of justice and putting an end to the litigation rotating round the same controversy.” 29. So far as circumstances when this Court would be justified in transferring a case pending in subordinate Court to High Court is concerned, in Baselius Mar Thoma Mathews I and others v. Paulose Mar Asthanasius and others, AIR 1979 SC 1909 , it has been held, where dispute may affect lot of people, who are excitedly affected by ultimate decision, and exercise of transfer would save some years and duplication of hearing, which is likely to take ample time, transfer of matter to High Court is a wise measure. 30. Here we do not propose to multiply this judgment by referring to catena of authorities on the question when exercise of jurisdiction under Section 24 C.P.C. would be justified and suffice it to mention, where a matter is of importance of general public and parties also agree for early disposal, and more so that early disposal of matter has been found expedient even by highest Court of law, an attempt should be made so that dispute is adjudicated at the earliest so as not to consume much more time and leave scope of dispute to prolong and take long time. 31.
31. It cannot be doubted that office of Jagat Guru Shankaracharya at Jyotirmath Badrikashram is of high importance to majority of people and lakhs of people visit the Holy Math. Dispute of holder of Office of such place, is a matter of wide importance and ought to be adjudicated at the earliest. 32. It is appellant himself, who initially agreed for early disposal of appeal on the very first day when appeal was filed in this Court. Thereafter, for the reasons best known to him, appellant himself started delay. However, when interim injunction application was rejected and appellant went to Supreme Court, it is on request of his own counsel Sri Harish N. Salve, Senior Advocate, the Highest Court of Lord directed this Court to continue hearing of case and decide appeal expeditiously, preferably by 31st December, 2015. 33. Under said direction, we endeavoured our best to continue with hearing but again appellant created obstructions and sought amendment in memo of appeal for adding 97 grounds, enhancing initial 50 grounds to 147. Plaintiff-respondent cooperated so that appeal may be heard expeditiously and did not object to such amendment. It was allowed on 4th November, 2015 but again, thereafter, hearing could not mature for one or the other reason. 34. Considering entirety of circumstances, as discussed above, we have no hesitation in holding that here is a fit case requiring exercise of our power under Section 24 C.P.C. for transferring record of this appeal to this Court so that, as desired by Supreme Court also, it can be decided expeditiously. 35. Civil Misc. Application No. 69142 of 2016 filed by plaintiff-respondent is, accordingly, allowed. Civil Misc. Application No. 143408 of 2016 filed by appellant is hereby rejected. 36. The record of appeal shall stand transferred to this Court for hearing and Office is directed to list this matter before Court for hearing. Office shall list this matter for final hearing on 17th October, 2016, after lunch. 37. We also direct that hearing in this matter shall continue on day-to-day basis.