JUDGMENT : AJAY KUMAR MITTAL, J. 1. Challenge in this Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) is to the judgment dated 11.5.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby CWP No. 3558 of 1987 filed by the respondents was allowed. 2. The facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeal as narrated therein may be noticed. The appellant had framed 17 Town Planning Schemes (in short “the Scheme”) for the development of the town under Section 192 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. The present case relates to Town Planning Scheme No. 3 Part 2. The said Scheme was quashed by the learned Judge vide impugned judgment dated 11.5.2011. As per the rough site plan (Annexure A-1) and the photographs (Annexure A-2), the said Scheme had already been impleaded to the extent of 98% by spending crores of rupees and the other remained un-implemented on account of pendency of cases in various courts. According to the appellant, the Scheme was framed and published earlier as the respondents had purchased the property from Gian Chand. The Scheme in question was sanctioned in the year 1983. The declaration as un-built area was passed by the appellant on 23.8.1975 and the same was confirmed by the State Government on 21.10.1975. In the local area, the Scheme was published on 25.5.1979 and thereafter, the objections were invited. Finally the Scheme was sent to the State Government on 27.2.1981 and the approval thereof was granted on 31.8.1983. However, the respondents had never filed the objections. This Court vide impugned order dated 11.5.2011 allowed the writ petition filed by the respondents and quashed the Scheme in question. Hence, the present Letters Patent Appeal. As the appeal is barred by limitation, CM No. 3053-LPA of 2016 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short, the “1963 Act”) has been filed for condonation of 1760 days' delay in filing the appeal whereas CM No. 3049-LPA of 2016 has been filed for condonation of 85 days' delay in refiling the appeal. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant. 4. The preliminary question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 1760 days in filing and 85 days in refiling the appeal. 5. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant. 4. The preliminary question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 1760 days in filing and 85 days in refiling the appeal. 5. Examining the legal position relating to condonation of delay under Section 5 of the 1963 Act, it may be observed that the Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Another, (2010) 5 SCC 459 laying down the broad principles for adjudicating the issue of condonation of delay, in paras 14 & 15 observed as under:- “14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. 15. The expression “sufficient cause” employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate-Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil.” 6. It was further noticed by the Apex Court in R.B. Ramlingam vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (1) RCR (Civil) 892 as under:- “.....It is not necessary at this stage to discuss each and every judgment cited before us for the simple reason that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not lay down any standard or objective test. The test of “sufficient cause” is purely an individualistic test. It is not an objective test. The test of “sufficient cause” is purely an individualistic test. It is not an objective test. Therefore, no two cases can be treated alike. The statute of limitation has left the concept of “sufficient cause” delightfully undefined, thereby leaving to the Court a well-intentioned discretion to decide the individual cases whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. There are no categories of sufficient cause. The categories of sufficient cause are never exhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the Court as such.” It was also recorded that:- “For the aforestated reasons, we hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special leave petition stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition....” 7. From the above, it emerges that the law of limitation has been enacted which is based on public policy so as to prescribe time limit for availing legal remedy for redressal of the injury caused. The purpose behind enacting law of limitation is not to destroy the rights of the parties but to see that the uncertainty should not prevail for unlimited period. Under Section 5 of the 1963 Act, the courts are empowered to condone the delay where a party approaching the court belatedly shows sufficient cause for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period. The meaning to be assigned to the expression “sufficient cause” occurring in Section 5 of the 1963 Act should be such so as to do substantial justice between the parties. The existence of sufficient cause depends upon facts of each case and no hard and fast rule can be applied in deciding such cases. 8. The Apex Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. and R.B. Ramlingam's cases (supra) noticed that the courts should adopt liberal approach where delay is of short period whereas the proof required should be strict where the delay is inordinate. Further, it was also observed that judgments dealing with the condonation of delay may not lay down any standard or objective test but is purely an individualistic test. The court is required to examine while adjudicating the matter relating to condonation of delay on exercising judicial discretion on individual facts involved therein. Further, it was also observed that judgments dealing with the condonation of delay may not lay down any standard or objective test but is purely an individualistic test. The court is required to examine while adjudicating the matter relating to condonation of delay on exercising judicial discretion on individual facts involved therein. There does not exist any exhaustive list constituting sufficient cause. The applicant/petitioner is required to establish that inspite of acting with due care and caution, the delay had occurred due to circumstances beyond his control and was inevitable. 9. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the writ petition was decided on 11.5.2011. After the decision of the said writ petition, the appellant sought requisite permission from the higher authorities for challenging the said judgment in the LPA. Since the matter was old, some time was consumed in collecting the documents. After collection of documents, the matter was entrusted to the Advocate for filing the LPA. The said Advocate was elevated to the Bench and, therefore, the appeal could not be filed. The Municipal Corporation, Bathinda engaged a different counsel. The main judgment on the basis of which writ petitions were allowed was accepted by this Court on 26.11.2014 and thereafter it came to their notice that the judgment in the present case had not been assailed. On coming to know about the non-filing of the appeal, the appellant approached the counsel and filed the present appeal after a delay of 1760 days. It was urged that the delay, if any, has occurred in the aforesaid circumstances in filing the appeal. Learned counsel further argued that the delay was unintentional and due to the circumstances beyond the control of the appellant. 10. Adverting to the factual matrix in this case seeking condonation of inordinate delay of 1760 days in filing and 85 days in refiling the appeal, we do not find any merit in the same. The question regarding whether there is sufficient cause or not depends upon each case and primarily is a question of fact to be considered taking totality of events which had taken place in a particular case. In the present case after appreciating the matter it cannot be said that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The question regarding whether there is sufficient cause or not depends upon each case and primarily is a question of fact to be considered taking totality of events which had taken place in a particular case. In the present case after appreciating the matter it cannot be said that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The learned Single Judge decided the matter on 11.5.2011 and the appeal was required to be filed within the stipulated period of limitation of thirty days. But the appellant has filed the appeal on 5.4.2016 and refiled on 10.8.2016, after a colossal delay of 1760 days. The explanation of the appellant praying for condonation of delay in filing and refiling the appeal, as noticed hereinabove, is bereft of sufficient cause for delay caused in filing the appeal. Moreover, even after the judgment dated 26.11.2014 was passed accepting the appeal against the judgment on the basis of which order was passed in the present case, the Letter Patent Appeal was filed on 5.4.2016, i.e., after about one year and four months. There is no satisfactory explanation for this delay as well. The Government department is supposed to pursue its litigation with due diligence. A stale matter cannot be revived by approaching the Court belatedly. 11. In view of the above, finding no merit in the applications for condonation of 1760 days' delay in filing and 85 days' in refiling the appeal, the same are hereby dismissed and consequently, the appeal is dismissed as time barred. 12. Since the appeal has been dismissed as time barred, the Misc. Applications are also dismissed.