JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anjani Kumar Mishra, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents. 2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has sought a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 15.9.2016, passed by the respondent No. 1. By this order, a revision has been held to be maintainable and the objection of the petitioner that it was not maintainable has been repelled. Hence this writ petition. 3. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that proceedings under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act were instituted, whereupon an order was passed against which, the said revision was filed. The revision was filed invoking Section 210 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. 4. On an earlier occasion, the petitioner had come up before this Court by means of writ petition No. 34423 of 2016 contending that against an order passed in a mutation case, an appeal would lie and that no revision against such an order was maintainable in view of the amendment that has been incorporated in Section 210 of the Revenue Code, 2006 itself. This Court vide order dated 22.8.2016 disposed of the writ petition directing the revisional Court to consider the application filed by the petitioner-opposite party, in the revision, regarding its maintainability. 5. The order impugned has been passed in pursuance of the earlier order of this Court dated 22.8.2016. 6. From a perusal of the record, it transpires that initially the revision had been filed invoking Section 210 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. Subsequently on an amendment application, this provision was amended to read as Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. 7. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that this amendment was wrongly allowed. 8. The question therefore, which arises for consideration is as to the provision whereunder, an order passed in proceedings under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act can be challenged once the Revenue Code, 2006 has been enforced. 9. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that after the repeal of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, by enforcement of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, any appeal or revision, necessarily lies in accordance with the provision contained in the Revenue Code, 2006, and not in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Act. 10. 9. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that after the repeal of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, by enforcement of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, any appeal or revision, necessarily lies in accordance with the provision contained in the Revenue Code, 2006, and not in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Act. 10. From deciding this issue, Section 231 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 is relevant and the same is extracted below : “Section 231 :Applicability of the Code to pending proceedings.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Code, all cases pending before the State Government or any revenue Court immediately before the commencement of this Code, whether in appeal, revision, review or otherwise, shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of the appropriate law, which would have been applicable to them had this Code not been passed. (2) All cases pending in any Civil Court immediately before the commencement of this Code which would under this Code be exclusively triable by a revenue Court, shall be disposed of by such Civil Court according to the law in force prior to the date of such commencement.” 11. Sub-section 1 of Section 231 quoted above, is in my considered opinion absolutely categorical. Therefore, an order on an application under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, is appealable and revisable in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, itself and, therefore, the provision of Section 210 as also Section 219 of the U.P. Revenue Act are attracted and can be invoked even after the enforcement of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. 12. Under the circumstances, therefore, there is no illegality in the order, whereby the amendment application was allowed and the revision was stated to be one under the Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. 13. It is settled law than an appeal is continuation of the proceedings or a suit. 14. It is contended that an appeal is continuation of the proceedings but a revision is not so. In the instant case, a revision has been preferred and therefore Section 231 of the Revenue Code shall not come into play. 15. A mutation order under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act is amenable to an appeal under Section 210 of the said Act. In the instant case, a revision has been preferred and therefore Section 231 of the Revenue Code shall not come into play. 15. A mutation order under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act is amenable to an appeal under Section 210 of the said Act. Section 219 which provides for a revision states that a revision lies against orders which are not appealable or against orders which are appealable but no appeal has actually been filed. 16. These revisional jurisdiction can be invoked in place of appellate jurisdiction and therefore, in cases where a revision is filed instead of an appeal, in view of the provisions contained in the second part of Section 219, the same is akin to an appeal and must be held to be continuation of the proceedings. 17. For the reasons given above, this revision has rightly been held to be maintainable and I do not find any illegality in the said order. The writ petition is therefore, liable to be dismissed. 18. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the amendment application was allowed ex parte. Copy of the same have not been served upon him. 19. Although, in my considered opinion, nothing much turns upon this submission, however in case the petitioner considers it appropriate, he may file a recall application before the Court concerned. 20. At the same time, it would be relevant to note that an amendment in the cause title of proceedings, which merely amends the section whereunder the said proceedings have been initiated, is an amendment which can be allowed at any stage, even without hearing, because no manifest right can be said to have accrued in favour of opposite party, which would necessarily require his being heard. 21. Subject to the above observation, this writ petition is dismissed.