ORDER : The Revision Petitioner/A-4 has focussed the present Criminal Revision Petition as against the order dated 30.04.2014 in Cr.M.P.No.51 of 2014 in Spl.C.C.No.4 of 2012 passed by the Learned Special Judge (Chief Judicial Magistrate), Nagercoil. 2. The Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, while passing the impugned order, on 30.04.2014 in Cr.M.P.No.51 of 2014 (filed by the Revision Petitioner/Petitioner/A-4) in Spl.C.C.No.4 of 2012, at paragraph No.8, had observed that who had invested in the shares of Tamil Malai Fishing Net Firm, whether a person remaining as a sleeping partner can take profit from the said firm or not, these details like who had invested for the aforesaid shares and for the said business whether Managing Director or sleeping partners were responsible and before examination of witnesses, it cannot be concluded that the petitioner/A-4 had not committed the offence, as alleged by the prosecution, can be ascertained only by means of evidence being let in on appearance before the Court of Law and further at paragraph No.10 had came to the resultant conclusion that there was no prima facie case to allow the present petition and consequently dismissed the petition. 3. Challenging the correctness, validity and legality of the orders dated 30.04.2014 in Cr.M.P.No.51 of 2014 in Spl.C.C.No.4 of 2012 passed by the Learned Special Judge (Chief Judicial Magistrate), Nagercoil, the Revision Petitioner/Petitioner has preferred the present Criminal Revision Petition basically contending that the impugned order is opposed to the facts of the case, an illegal and improper one. 4. The Revision Petitioner takes a plea that the trial court should have considered the specific allegation against the Revision Petitioner/A-4 and the circumstances pertaining to invocation of Section 109 of I.P.C and per contra, it ought not to have taken into account the facts which were not related to the petitioner. 5. The Revision Petitioner proceeds to take a stand that the trial court should have considered the specific allegation against each accused particularly against the Revision Petitioner/A-4 for a limited purpose of finding out whether there are any grounds to proceed further. 6. According to the Petitioner, the Respondent/Prosecution itself had admitted that the Ambassador Car was purchased before the check period and as such, the trial court ought not to have taken into account the said car as an 'Asset'. 7. 6. According to the Petitioner, the Respondent/Prosecution itself had admitted that the Ambassador Car was purchased before the check period and as such, the trial court ought not to have taken into account the said car as an 'Asset'. 7. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the dispute is in regard to accounts of 'Tamil Malai Nets' viz., that the investments were made by the first accused in the name of Petitioner/A-4 and that the Revision Petitioner is an aged person. 8. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Revision Petitioner contends that as per partnership deed dated 19.09.2001 between the Revision Petitioner (A-4) as first party and the second party Mrs. D.S. Bharathy (A-2) (wife of Tr. N. Suresh Rajan), the business of the firm was that of manufacture and sale of Nylon Fishing Knitted Fabrics in length and that the firm may carry on business in other lines also with the mutual consent of all the partners. 9. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Revision Petitioner refers to 'Clause 7' of the partnership deed dated 19.09.2001, which enjoins that Mrs. D.S. Bharathy shall be styled as 'Managing Partner' with all powers of management viz., to effect purchases, to operate the bank accounts of the firm including Cash Credit and Overdraft accounts, to enter into contracts and other agreements on behalf of the firm etc., and that the investment of fixed capital in Tamil Malai Nets over the year ended 1st March 2003 as 'Fixed Capital' was Rs.7,50,000/- and contends that the same is being carried out till date and the said 'Fixed Capital of Rs.7,50,000/- was well before the check period and the firm was managed by A-2 and every year, the firm was assessed to the 'Income Tax'. 10. It is also represented on behalf of the Petitioner/A-4 that a sum of Rs.7,50,000/- as 'Fixed Capital' was invested in Tamil Malai Nets long before the check period and the said amount is reflected in the Income Tax Return (filed through Auditor) from the year 2003 to 2011 of petitioner/A-4 and that the auditor of the petitioner/A-4 is a witness. 11. 11. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Revision Petitioner contends that in statement No.IV (Expenditure during the check period from 13.05.2006 to 31.03.2011), serial No.21 mentions a sum of Rs.5,964 being the expenditure incurred towards the payment of vehicle insurance premium for the Ambassador car bearing Regn.No.TN-74-D-5995 by Tr. N. Suresh Rajan in the name of his mother Tmt. R. Rajam during the check period and that serial No.35 refers to expenditure incurred towards payment of income tax in the name of Tmt.R.Rajam, the mother of Tr. N. Suresh Rajan for the financial year 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09 amounting to Rs.65,674/- and that serial No.55 speaks of the drawings made in the name of Tmt. R. Rajam (Petitioner/A-4) from Tamil Malai Nets to meet out expenses as reported in the Income Tax Returns of Tamil Malai Nets for the financial year 2006-2007 was Rs.60,000/-. Furthermore, serial No.56 refers to drawings made in the name of Tmt. R. Rajam (Petitioner/A-4) from Tamil Malai Nets to meet out expenses as reported in income tax returns of Tamil Malai Nets for the financial year 2007-08 was Rs.60,000/- and a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- was mentioned in serial No.57, pertaining to the drawings made in the name of Tmt. R. Rajan from Tamil Malai Nets to meet out the expenses of income tax return of Tamil Malai Nets for the financial year 2008-09. 12. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the closing balance in the year 2003, as seen from the statement of accounts (investment in Tamil Malai Nets) shows that it was Rs.2,34,109/- and the said sum was brought as 'Opening Balance' in the year 2004 and every year, the closing balance sum is taken up and in the year 2009, the opening balance was shown as Rs.17,28,552/- and the statement of accounts deals with 'Remuneration', 'interest of capital', State Government Subsidy in 2004 etc., and the closing balance of Rs.23,25,616/- was brought as opening balance in the year 2010 and a sum of Rs.32,20,421/- was brought as opening balance in the year 2011 and that the closing balance in the year 2010 was Rs.32,20,421/- and that the closing balance for the year 2011 was Rs.42,04,996/- and the said sum of Rs.42,04,996/- was taken into account by the Respondent/Prosecution as 'New Investment' and that the respondent had misconstrued the said sum of Rs.42,04,996/- as 'Investment'. 13. 13. Added further, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the contents of paragraph No.9 of the additional counter of the respondent was not reflected in any of the statements Nos.I to VII (relied on by the prosecution). 14. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits that in statement No.I (Assets at the commencement of the check period as on 13.05.2006), item No.11 was not mentioned and that serial No.10 of the statement No.I refers to the value of Ambassador Car bearing Regn.No.TN-74-D-5995, acquired by Tr. N. Suresh Rajan by way of purchase in the name of his mother Tmt. R. Rajam on 13.08.1996 from M/s. Sanchetty Motors Limited, Chennai for Rs.4,25,182/-) and it shows that it was before the commencement of the check period and there is no evidence that A-1 gave any money to Revision Petitioner/A-4 and that the petitioner/A-4 was having exclusive money on her own etc., Further, there is nothing to show that Rs.42,00,000/- was invested in the Tamil Malai Nets by A-1. 15. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner contends that there is nothing to show in the present case that the Revision Petitioner/A-4 has anything to do with the case and further that there is no iota of evidence to exhibit that the petitioner/A-4 intentionally aided the other accused to commit the crime. Further, it is represented that there is no evidence for 'Abetting'. 16. Conversely, it is the submission of the Learned Public Prosecutor that the case of the Respondent/Prosecution that there was information that Tr. Further, it is represented that there is no evidence for 'Abetting'. 16. Conversely, it is the submission of the Learned Public Prosecutor that the case of the Respondent/Prosecution that there was information that Tr. N. Suresh Rajan (Former Minister for Tourism and Registration) had acquired and was in possession of pecuniary resources and properties in his name beyond his known sources of income and that based on the said information and also after observing the necessary legal formalities, a case in Nagercoil V & AC Cr.No.7 of 2011 was registered in Cr.No.7 of 2011 under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against him and after completion of investigation, the said Suresh Rajan, his mother (Revision Petitioner) and his father (K. Neelakanda Pillai) were charged under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act r/w 109 of the IPC for having acquired disproportionate assets during the check period between 13.05.1996 and 14.05.2001, worth Rs.17,20,976.44 in his name, in the name of his father and in the name of his mother (the Revision Petitioner). 17. The Learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent brings it to the notice of this Court that the aforesaid case was taken on file in Special C.C.No.4 of 2012 by the trial court and the discharge petition filed by the accused was dismissed by the trial court, but the Revision Petition filed by the accused was allowed by this Court. Also, it is represented on behalf of the respondent that the State filed a Criminal Appeal bearing No.22-23/2014 before the Honourable Supreme Court of India and the said appeal was allowed and that the case is ordered for framing 'Charges' and for 'Trial'. 18. On behalf of the respondent, it is pointed out before this Court that the Honourable Supreme Court in Crl.A.No.22-23/2014 had observed that “the property in the name of Income Tax Assessee itself cannot be a ground to hold that it actually belongs to such an Assessee.” 19. The Learned Public Prosecutor forcefully takes a plea that to ascertain whether the petitioner/A-4 had committed an offence under Section 109 of I.P.C or not, not only the assets acquired in her name alone is sufficient, but the entire assets acquired by the accused Tr. The Learned Public Prosecutor forcefully takes a plea that to ascertain whether the petitioner/A-4 had committed an offence under Section 109 of I.P.C or not, not only the assets acquired in her name alone is sufficient, but the entire assets acquired by the accused Tr. N. Suresh Rajan in his name and his family was necessary and that a final opportunity was provided to the Revision Petitioner/A-4, A-1 (Suresh Rajan), who had replied on behalf of his wife (A-2), his father (A-3), his mother A-4 (Revision Petitioner) and in the said reply, he had not whispered anything about the sources of the Revision Petitioner/A-4 from which she had invested huge amounts in Tamil Malai Nets (P) Limited. 20. The Learned Public Prosecutor refers to the bank statement of A-1 (Tr. N. Suresh Rajan) (SB A/C No.37312 of Canara Bank, Nagercoil) (statement of account for the period from 01.01.06 to 01.06.08.2011), wherein on 24.05.2006, the accused Suresh Rajan received an amount of Rs.6,00,000/- from the account of Tamil Malai Nets through cheque No. 881666 and was credited into his bank account on 24.05.2006. It is also represented that similarly, on 28.06.2006, the said Suresh Rajan (A-1) issued a cheque No.325059 for Rs.1,00,000/- in favour of the said Tamil Malai Nets and this was credited into Tamil Malai Nets' Bank account number on the same day viz., on 28.06.2006 and that these transactions would point out that A-1/Suresh Rajan was the hand behind all the transactions that led to the acquiring of assets. 21. The Learned Public Prosecutor for the Respondent submits that the partnership deed of Tamil Malai Nets dated 19.09.2001 does not show that the Revision Petitioner/A-4 is a sleeping partner and in 'partnership', ordinarily, each partner is liable for the act of other/another partner and even if somebody runs the partnership concern, then, it is a matter to be seen in evidence. Moreover, the partnership Deed dated 19.09.2001 was not filed by the Respondent/Prosecution along with the charge-sheet and the authenticity of the said Deed is to be tested during the course of trial of the main case in Spl.C.C.No.4 of 2012 on the file of the trial court. 22. The Learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent submits that 'Auditor's Statement' cannot be taken into account for the 'Plea of Discharge'. 22. The Learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent submits that 'Auditor's Statement' cannot be taken into account for the 'Plea of Discharge'. Further, it is the stand of the Respondent that the investigating officer is to look into the documents only produced by the prosecution and that there is no right on the part of an accused to file any new material or document at the time of framing charge. 23. The Learned Public Prosecutor for the Respondent contends that the charge of 'Abetment' can be drawn from inference and that truth or falsity of the charges levelled by the prosecution against the accused cannot be gone into in 'Discharge Petition'. 24. It is the stand of the Respondent that it had collected sufficient evidence to show that the Revision Petitioner, knowing fully well that she had no income, had allowed her son to acquire assets in her name, which attracts the ingredients of Section 109 of Indian Penal Code. 25. The Learned Public Prosecutor for the Respondent cites a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court State By Central Bureau of Investigation V. S.Bangarappa reported in (2001) 1 Supreme Court Cases at page 369 at special page 370, whereby and whereunder, it is observed as follows: “At the stage of framing charge, the court should not enter upon a process of evaluating the evidence by deciding its worth or credibility. The limited exercise during that stage is to find out whether the materials offered by the prosecution to be adduced as evidence is sufficient for the court to proceed further. No doubt, the prosecution has to establish that the pecuniary assets acquired by the public servant are disproportionately larger than his known sources of income and then it is for the public servant to account for such excess. The offence becomes complete on the failure of the public servant to account for or explain such excess. It does not mean that the court could not frame charge until the public servant fails to explain the excess or surplus pointed out to be the wealth or assets of the public servant concerned. This exercise can be completed only in trial. In the present case, the materials which the prosecution enumerated are sufficient to frame the charge for the offence under section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.” 26. This exercise can be completed only in trial. In the present case, the materials which the prosecution enumerated are sufficient to frame the charge for the offence under section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.” 26. He also relies on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court State of Orissa V. Debendra Nath Padhi reported in (2005) 1 Supreme Court Cases at special page 569, wherein, it is observed and held as follows: “The law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material. No provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the “Code”) grants to the accused any right to file any material or document at the stage of framing of charge. That right is granted only at the stage of the trial. Satish Mehra case, (1996) 9 SCC 766 holding that the trial court has powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage of Section 227 of the Code has not been correctly decided. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge, the defence of the accused cannot be put forth. The acceptance of the contention of the accused would men permitting the accused to adduce his defence at the stage of framing of charge and for examination thereof at that stage which is against the criminal jurisprudence.” 27. Apart from that, the Learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent seeks in aid of the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court Rajath Prasad V. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2014) Supreme Court Cases 495 at special page 506, wherein, at paragraph No.19, it is inter alia observed as follows: “... Any such principle would be abhorrent to our criminal jurisprudence. At the same time, the criminal intent behind the commission of the act which is alleged to have occasioned the crime will have to be established before the liability of the person charged with the commission of crime can be adjudged. The doctrine of mens rea, though a salient feature of the Indian criminal justice system, finds expression in different statutory provisions requiring proof of either intention or knowledge on the part of the accused. The doctrine of mens rea, though a salient feature of the Indian criminal justice system, finds expression in different statutory provisions requiring proof of either intention or knowledge on the part of the accused. Such proof is to be gathered from the surrounding facts established by the evidence and materials before the court and not by a process of probe of the mental state of the accused which the law does not contemplate. The offence of abetment defined by Section 107 I.P.C or the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A I.P.C would, thus, require criminal intent on the part of the offender like any other offence. Both the offences would require existence of a culpable mental state which is a matter of proof from the surrounding facts established by the materials on record. Therefore, whether the commission of an offence under Section 12 of the PC Act read with 120-B I.P.C had been occasioned by the acts attributed to the appellant-accused or not, ideally, is a matter that can be determined only after the evidence in the case is recorded.” 28. The Learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent relies on yet another decision of the Honourable Supreme Court Sajjan Kumar V. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2010) 9 Supreme Court Cases at page 368 at special page Nos.376 and 377, whereby and whereunder, it is observed and held as follows: “On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Section 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:- (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.” 29. This Court had heard the Learned Senior Counsel for the Revision Petitioner/A-4 and the Learned Public Prosecutor for the Respondent. 30. At this stage, this Court very relevantly points out that an application to discharge an accused under Section 239 of Cr.P.C arises when the concerned court considers the charge against an accused to be a baseless or groundless one. This Court had heard the Learned Senior Counsel for the Revision Petitioner/A-4 and the Learned Public Prosecutor for the Respondent. 30. At this stage, this Court very relevantly points out that an application to discharge an accused under Section 239 of Cr.P.C arises when the concerned court considers the charge against an accused to be a baseless or groundless one. Indeed, the acid test for deciding whether the charge should be considered groundless is that where the materials are such that even if unrebutted make out no case whatsoever, as per decision Om Prakash V. State reported in 1983 CrLJ 1151 , 1153 (Cal-DB). 31. It is to be noted that at the early stage, if there is a strong suspicion, which leads a court to arrive at a conclusion that there is ground for presuming that an accused has committed an offence, then, it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, in the considered opinion of this court. It is to be remembered that the term 'Discharge' must be read as having reference to a 'Discharge' in relation to the specific offence for which an accused has been charged. 32. In this connection, this court significantly points out that at the time of framing charges, a 'Court of Law' is to essentially take into account prima facie materials available on record for the purpose of proceeding further against an accused. In reality, it is not for the Honourable High Court to enter into the domain of an enquiry as to whether the evidence relied on by the Respondent/Prosecution is reliable or not in as much as the same would be within the ambit of the trial court's consideration. 33. Besides the above, at the time of framing charges, it is not for a Court of Law to indulge in a detailed enquiry as to whether the materials collected by the Respondent/Prosecution are sufficient for convicting an accused. It is enough that the materials so collected by the Respondent/Prosecution exhibits prima facie case for a Court of Law to proceed further against the concerned accused. 34. It cannot be forgotten that at the time of framing of charge, the trial court is to consider only the police report. The only right the accused has at that stage is of being heard and nothing more than that. 34. It cannot be forgotten that at the time of framing of charge, the trial court is to consider only the police report. The only right the accused has at that stage is of being heard and nothing more than that. Indeed, at that stage, an accused may be examined by the concerned court, which, of course, is its prerogative, in the considered opinion of this court. Even the sifting and meticulous scanning of evidence in an elaborate manner is not permissible, at the time of framing charge. Further, even a very strong suspicion based on materials before the concerned court is sufficient for framing a charge, as per decision Naresh Chandra V. State of Uttar Pradesh; 1987 (3) Crimes page 842 (All). 35. Be that as it may, on a careful consideration of respective contentions, in the upshot of detailed, qualitative and quantitative discussions and also this court, taking note of the entire attendant facts and circumstances of the case in an integral manner, comes to an inescapable conclusion that there are prima facie materials/grounds to frame necessary charge/charges against the Revision Petitioner/Accused. In short, the said materials cannot be said to be in any manner a 'Groundless one', as opined by this court. Viewed in that perspective, the Criminal Revision Petition fails. 36. In fine, the Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed. Resultantly, the order dated 30.04.2014 in Cr.M.P.No.51 of 2014 in Spl.C.C.No.4 of 2012, passed by the Learned Special Judge (Chief Judicial Magistrate), Nagercoil is affirmed by this Court for the reasons assigned in this Revision. It is abundantly made clear that the dismissal of the present Criminal Revision Petition by this Court will not preclude the Revision Petitioner/A-4 to raise all factual and legal pleas before the trial court, during the trial of main case in Special Case No.4 of 2012, if she so desires/advised.