JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This criminal revision petition filed under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C. is directed against the judgment and order dated 23.06.2014 delivered in Criminal Appeal No.48(3) of 2013 by the Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. 2. The petitioners herein were convicted by the judgment dated 31.08.2013 in PRC No.60 of 2010 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala along with two other accused persons namely Aruna Rani Debnath and Smt. Tapashi Debnath and they were sentenced to suffer Simple Imprisonment (SI) for one year and to pay a fine of R.2,000/- each, in default to suffer further SI for another 9 months for committing offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC. 3. Being aggrieved, the petitioner along with those accused persons preferred an appeal under Section 374(3) of the Cr.P.C. questioning the legality of the said judgment and order dated 31.08.2013. The said appeal being Criminal Appeal No.48(3) of 2013 has been disposed by the Sessions Judge on observing as under: ”14. In the result, while upholding the conviction of all the three appellants and so also the sentence imposed upon Partha Debnath, the sentence of imprisonment imposed on Smti. Aruna Rani Debnath and Smti. Tapashi Debnath is quashed and set aside approving the fine imposed with the default clause. The appeal is thus disposed of on contest. 15. The appellant no.1 shall surrender before the learned Court below on 11.08.2014 to suffer the sentence and remaining appellants shall pay the fine money before the learned Court below on that date. Fine money, if realized, shall be paid to the victim as compensation.” 4. There is no appeal against the reduction of sentence by the Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. 5. Section 498-A prescribes the punishment as under: “Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.” 6. The Sessions Judge while reducing the sentence has completely overlooked the said provision whereby the imprisonment has been made mandatory if any person is convicted under Section 498-A. Even the pecuniary sentence is also mandatory in nature. The Sessions Judge while reducing the sentence has completely overlooked the said provision whereby the imprisonment has been made mandatory if any person is convicted under Section 498-A. Even the pecuniary sentence is also mandatory in nature. Therefore, on conviction under Section 498-A of the IPC, a person if is liable to sentence, the sentence has to be given in terms of the said provision, meaning the sentence shall be constituted of both imprisonment, term of which may extend to 3 years and to the fine. But against those two accused persons the Sessions Judge has only imposed punishment of fine. There is no appeal for inadequate sentence under Section 377 of the Cr.P.C. In this revision petition, the conviction and sentence of the petitioners by the impugned judgment is under challenge. 7. The genesis of the prosecution case can be located in the written ejahar filed by Smt. Anima Debnath, wife of the petitioner, disclosing that after her marriage with the petitioner as per Hindu Rites and Customs, she was subjected to torture both physically and mentally by her husband, mother-in-law and one sister-in-law on unlawful demand. The victim was pressurised to bring money from her parents. Her parents paid the petitioner a sum of Rs.5,000/-. She was without any harassment for some days. In the meanwhile, she gave birth of a male child. There was meeting for amicable settlement. In the meeting, the accused persons were advised not to torture the victim. On 20.01.2010, after physically assaulting the victim the accused persons had thrown her outside the home. Thereafter, she filed the ejahar (Exbt.1). Based on the said ejahar, Agartala Women PS Case No.05 of 2010 was registered under Section 498-A of the IPC and taken up for investigation. On completion of the investigation, the chargesheet was filed and duly the charge was framed under Section 498-A of the IPC. The accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 8. In order to substantiate the charge, 7 witnesses were examined by the prosecution and a few documents such as the written ejahar etc were exhibited. After examination of the accused persons under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the accused persons adduced three witnesses in their defence. The accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 8. In order to substantiate the charge, 7 witnesses were examined by the prosecution and a few documents such as the written ejahar etc were exhibited. After examination of the accused persons under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the accused persons adduced three witnesses in their defence. After recording the evidence, the additional CJM, West Tripura, Agartala has observed that the prosecution has established the fact that the victim was subjected to cruelty on demand of money as dowry. The defence, through its evidence has not been able to rebut and the cruelty in terms of Explanation below Section 498-A of IPC has been well established. Hence, the petitioner and the two other accused persons were convicted under Section 498-A of the IPC denying them probation considering Section 498-A of the IPC as heinous offence. The accused persons were given the sentence as stated above. By the impugned judgment, the first appellate court has affirmed the conviction returning the finding as under: “7. I have gone through the evidence on record. As regards failure to mention specific date and time of the incident, it is to be firstly stated that keeping such record by the wife is possible when intention to file the case is there right in the beginning. Secondly, no question being asked in the cross-examination of the victim on the point, appellants are precluded from raising it at appellate stage. Fact that the husband and wife are still separate, there can be no doubt that matter was much beyond the normal stress and strain of marital life. As replied by learned Public Proportion, it is prerogative of the prosecution to omit examination of any witness.” It has been further observed that: “ ....... after a lapse of time, her husband demanded Rs.20,000/- which she could not meet. For this, the accused persons started torturing her. On the night intervening 19th January, 2010 and 20th January, 2010 her husband returned home in drunken condition and asked her to bring Rs.20,000/- as he wanted to start business of Generator. As he refused the demand, he and her sister in law tortured her physically. For this, the accused persons started torturing her. On the night intervening 19th January, 2010 and 20th January, 2010 her husband returned home in drunken condition and asked her to bring Rs.20,000/- as he wanted to start business of Generator. As he refused the demand, he and her sister in law tortured her physically. On the following morning around 9 a.m. she was again beaten by her husband and her mother in law, sister in law, aunt in law and uncle in law cooperated her husband in making the torture.” Even the appellate court did not find probative value in the testimonies of DWs.1, 2 and 3 to hold that the prosecution evidence has been substantially neutralised. 9. Mr. J. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that having placed reliance on the testimonies of PW-1 in particular that the appellate court has committed miscarriage of justice as PW-1, as is evident, did not give any date except the last occurrence that had taken place in the intervening night between 19.01.2010 and 20.01.2010. This is a single instance but not an overt act in the continuous and series of acts for forming cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that even it is assumed that the money was demanded by the petitioner No.1 for purpose of business and as such said demand since cannot be linked to the marriage and hence it cannot be treated as dowry. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has further submitted that the statement of Dr. Niladri Sengupta is vague inasmuch as in the cross-examination he has stated that whether there was any statement regarding the injury prior to his intervention in the treatment he was not in a position to say. That apart, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has submitted that from appreciation of the testimonies of the DWs (DWs.1, 2 and 3) it would appear that the story as planted by PW-1 cannot for any reason be believed. In support of his contention, he has placed his reliance on a decision of this court in Nishi Kanta Das and another vs. State of Tripura reported in 2015 (1) TLR 1036 where this court held that: “...... In support of his contention, he has placed his reliance on a decision of this court in Nishi Kanta Das and another vs. State of Tripura reported in 2015 (1) TLR 1036 where this court held that: “...... since the intention to have the money for purpose of business, this cannot be held to be dowry which is a fairly well-known social custom and now it is well defined by the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In Appasaheb vs. State of Maharashtra, it has been categorically enunciated that ‘a demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry’ as the word is normally understood. It has been further observed that: For purpose of business if the money was so demanded it cannot be brought within the meaning of dowry. 10. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has also relied on a decision of this in Priwitish Dutta and Ors. vs. State of Tripura reported in (2014) 1 TLR 848, where it has been also held that: “Dowry in common parlance means where the husband or his relations demand valuable security from the parents or other relations of the wife after the marriage. It can be also treated as the price of marriage.” 11. In Priwitish Dutta (supra) has been placed reliance on Satvir Singh and ors. vs. State of Punjab and anr. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 633 where the apex court has dwelled on the definition of ‘dowry’ as defined under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. It has been held in Satvir Singh (supra) that it should be any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel, the demand of Rs.20,000/- even if assumed to have been made but denied, cannot be brought within the meaning of ‘dowry’ and for that purpose under unlawful demand. 12. Mr. A. Ghosh, learned PP appearing for the State has submitted that there is no perversity in appreciation of the evidence as carried out by the trial court as well as by the appellate court and hence no interference is called from this court. 13. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, this court has reassessed the testimonies as recorded in the trial. 13. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, this court has reassessed the testimonies as recorded in the trial. PW-1, Smt. Anima Debnath, has categorically stated that she was subjected to torture by the accused persons on unlawful demand and her parents was made to give Rs.5,000/-. Even thereafter, the demand was made for Rs.20,000/-. Since the victim could not fetch that money from his parents, she was subjected to continuous torture and finally on the intervening night on 19.01.2010 and 20.01.2010 her husband had beaten her in a drunken condition ‘on demand of money’. On 20.01.2010 at about 9 a.m., she was again physically beaten up by her husband on demand of that sum and her mother-in-law, aunt-in-law and uncle-in-law co-operated her husband. She received bleeding injuries on her hand and head. She was taken to the GBP Hospital. There CT scan and other examinations were carried out. In the cross-examination, she did not deviate from the statement made in the examination-in-chief, rather she had elaborated in cross-examination that there was meeting for mitigating the problem. PW-2, Smt. Sandhya Debnath, has stated that the said sum of Rs.20,000/- was demanded by the petitioner to start business of generator. In the cross-examination, she admitted that she had no occasion to talk to the petitioner in respect of the demand. PW-3, Subal Ch. Debnath father of the victim, has confirmed that he paid Rs.5,000/- to the petitioner and his daughter was put to physical and mental torture by the petitioner at the instigation of his mother, sister, aunt and uncle and on the intervening night of 19.01.2010 and 20.01.2010, his daughter was physically tortured on demand of Rs.20,000/-. On the following day, his daughter was again beaten up and was forced to leave the matrimonial home. He has also stated that his daughter received injuries on head and hand. PW-4, Minati Debnath is aunt of the victim. She has also supported the version of the victim and did not deviate in the cross-examination. PW-5, Dr. Niladri Sengupta has clearly stated that on 20.01.2010 at about 9 a.m. he had examined the victim. The victim was discharged from the hospital on 22.02.2010. In the cross-examination, he has clearly stated in the injury report in terms of the victim’s statement it has been recorded that she was assaulted at 9 a.m. on 20.01.2010. PW-5, Dr. Niladri Sengupta has clearly stated that on 20.01.2010 at about 9 a.m. he had examined the victim. The victim was discharged from the hospital on 22.02.2010. In the cross-examination, he has clearly stated in the injury report in terms of the victim’s statement it has been recorded that she was assaulted at 9 a.m. on 20.01.2010. PW-7, Sri Dinesh Sarkar scribed the FIR at the dictate of PW-3 and he had added nothing more. DW-1, the petitioner himself, has stated that his wife wanted to have separate mess but since that could not be done, she was very annoyed and threatened that she would not live in the joint family mess. That is the reason why she concocted the story against the petitioner. DW- 2, Smt. Mina Das is a witness from the neighbourhood. She has stated that on hearing the alarm, she went out of her house and she saw that the victim was taking out her small children. Beyond that she stated nothing material. DW-3, Smt. Jharna Das has stated that on the day of occurrence she did not hear any quarrel between the petitioner and his wife. One pertinent question, that is very relevant in this case, is that whether the ‘dowry’ as engrafted in Section 304-B of the IPC and ‘unlawful demand’ as engrafted in Section 498-A of the IPC are carrying the same meaning. If the answer is in the negative, the observation of this court in Priwitish Dutta (supra) or Nishi Kanta Das (supra) may not be of any help to the petitioners. 14. The ‘dowry’ as explained in those two cases, have been so discussed in the background that the accused was convicted under Section 304-B/498-A of the IPC. Section 498-A of the IPC clearly provides that while death of the woman is caused by any bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstance within 7 years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband and relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. Whereas in Section 498-A of the IPC while defining cruelty, the following has been provided, inter alia under Explanation (b): “harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 15. Section 498-A of the IPC provides by way of Explanation (b) that harassment of a woman where such a harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or she is harassed on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. In Section 304-B of the IPC it has been cautiously used as ‘on demand of dowry’ not ‘on unlawful demand’ as engrafted in Explanation (b) below Section 498-A of the IPC. Therefore, the decisions as relied by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioners has no relevance at all as according to this court the words ‘unlawful demand’ is distinguishable from the word ‘dowry’. 16. The objection as urged by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner that the demand for purchasing a generator set even if it is assumed to be correct, such demand cannot be brought within the meaning of dowry and as such the conviction is wholly unreasonable. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner has persuaded this court to believe since there are no material particulars such as date and time of occurrence, the prosecution’s case should not be believed. There is no proof of continuous torture to bring the said act of the petitioner within the ambit of Section 498-A of the IPC. 17. Having scrutinized the records, as stated, what has come forth is that the victim was assaulted and harassed by the petitioner on unlawful demand also on the intervening night of 19.01.2010 and 20.01.2010. That followed on 20.01.2010. PW-5 is an independent witness and he has categorically stated that on 20.01.2010, he examined the victim and she had the tenderness on her interior chest wall which was simply caused by blunt object. The victim was admitted in the hospital on 20.012010 at about 9 a.m. and she was released on 20.02.2010. That followed on 20.01.2010. PW-5 is an independent witness and he has categorically stated that on 20.01.2010, he examined the victim and she had the tenderness on her interior chest wall which was simply caused by blunt object. The victim was admitted in the hospital on 20.012010 at about 9 a.m. and she was released on 20.02.2010. There cannot be any amount of doubt that on 20.01.2010, the victim was tortured and for that reason alone, the testimony of the victim can safely be relied. That apart, even the statement of DW-2 has corroborated the victim’s statement. The other witnesses have supported that there was unlawful demand and for realising such unlawful demand the victim was harassed and even physically tortured. The law as developed by Appasaheb (supra) was on ‘dowry’ but whether all unlawful demands are dowry? The answer must be in the negative. The ‘dowry’ is essentially unlawful demand. Beyond dowry, there may be other unlawful demands, unrelated to marriage, for which if harassment is caused to wife by the husband or his relatives, it would come within the ambit of offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC. Even the demand which is not within the province of dowry can be noticed to find whether harassment has been caused to a married woman by her husband or other relatives of the husband. As in the considered opinion of this court, the unlawful demands, unrelated to the marriage, can also be noticed for purpose of finding out whether any harassment has been committed within the meaning of Explanation (b) below Section 498-A of the IPC. 18. So far the legal principle is concerned, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel is quite correct that in cases where accusation has been made, the overt acts attributed to the persons have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. By mere conjuncture, it cannot be held proved. In Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar reported in 2014 (8) SCC 373 the apex court has held that if there are no specific and credible allegation with necessary particulars against the accused, only omnibus allegations shorn of basic details, the accused shall not be made to undergo the rigmarole of a criminal trial and allowing the trial to proceed against those relatives would be travesty of justice and abuse of process of law. But at the same time, when there is adequate corroboration and proof of overt act, the court should not be reluctant to return the finding of conviction. Else, the very object of engrafting of Section 498-A of the IPC would be frustrated. What this court has observed that against the petitioner there are cogent evidence which can safely be relied for returning the finding of conviction and hence this court does not have any hesitation to affirm the finding returned both by the trial court and by the appellate court. As a result, the conviction and sentence are not warranted to be interfered with. This petition stands dismissed. Send down the LCRs forthwith.