JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard Sri Ashok Kumar Pandey, Additional Advocate General, assisted by Sri R.C. Yadav, Dr. Y.K. Srivastava and Sri Lokendra Kumar, learned Standing Counsels for appellant; and, Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Udayan Nandan and Sri Rahul Agarwal, Advocates, for respondent. 2. This is a defendant’s appeal under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure, arisen from the judgment and decree dated 2.7.1979 passed by Sri Ghanshyam Pandey, Civil Judge/Judge Small Causes Court at Allahabad in Original Suit No. 107 of 1969, whereby he had decreed the suit with cost in the following manner : “Defendants are restrained from interfering in any manner whatsoever with the enjoyment and possession of the plaintiff over the land and mines held by her in pursuance of lease dated and as granted by the lease-deeds dated 16.4.47 and 27.4.59 and also of all the minerals extracted from mines from the areas covered by said leases. Defendants are further restrained from inviting or accepting applications and considering or granting any mining lease for any mineral covered under the mining lease held by plaintiff for the area or any part or portion thereof which is mentioned in aforesaid plaintiff’s lease-deeds dated 16.4.47 and 27.4.59 so long as the subsisting lease in favour of plaintiff is in force and is not otherwise terminated or cancelled by any Court of law of competent jurisdiction or in accordance with law. Defendants also cannot demand or realise the sum of rupees nine lacs forty thousand two hundred thirty five and paise five (940235.5 p.) as royalty for the period from 1.1.52 to 26.6.68, from plaintiff as claimed by them other than royalty stipulated in plaintiff’s lease-deed dated 16.4.47 and 27.4.59 till these leases are subsisting and are not cancelled or amended in accordance with law. It is also declared that the impugned order dated 31.5.68 and all subsequent orders etc. flowing there from in any manner directing that a clearance certificate from D.M./Collector is necessary before booking and transfer of silica sand situated within the district of Allahabad is void illegal and without jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s suit for damages and also pendentelite and future damages is dismissed with cost. flowing there from in any manner directing that a clearance certificate from D.M./Collector is necessary before booking and transfer of silica sand situated within the district of Allahabad is void illegal and without jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s suit for damages and also pendentelite and future damages is dismissed with cost. It is also made clear that defendants and all their servants, agent and subordinates will not hold out threat of criminal prosecution against plaintiff for alleged illegal mining of silica sand till her lease-deeds are subsisting and are not terminated, modified or cancelled by any law or competent Court and plaintiff does not act centrary to any relevant law and also against the terms of lease.” (emphasis added) 3. Original Suit No. 107 of 1969 was filed by Smt. Rani Rajendri Kumari Ba, w/o-Maharao Raja Kamlakar Singh, R/o- Sankargarh, Tehsil Karchhana, District Allahabad, impleading State of U.P. through Secretary, Industries and Union of India, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff-respondent) as defendants. Plaintiff initially impleaded only State of U.P. as sole defendant but subsequently made amendment by impleading Union of India as defendant No. 2 vide Court’s order dated 24.9.1969. The plaintiff-respondent claimed following reliefs: “(a) by prohibiting the defendants and all their servants, agents and subordinates by a permanent prohibiting injunction directing the defendants by themselves and through their officers and agents not to hold out threats of criminal prosecution against the plaintiff alleging that the plaintiff will be prosecuted and proceeded criminally for the alleged illegal mining silica sand from the area under lease of the plaintiff. (Valued at Rs. 2,000/-). (b) by restraining the Government of U.P. and the Union of India by issue of a permanent prohibitory injunction prohibiting them from interfering in any manner whatsoever with the enjoyment and possession of the plaintiff over the land and mines held by the plaintiff in pursuance of the lease-deed and as granted by the lease-deed dated 16th April, 1947 and 27 April 1959 and also of all the minerals extracted from the mines from the areas covered by the said lease. (valued at Rs. (valued at Rs. 10,000/-) (c) to issue a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the Government of U.P. from inviting or granting any mining lease for any mineral covered under the mining lease held by the plaintiff for the area or any part or portion thereof which is mentioned in the aforesaid lease-deed dated 16th April, 1947 and 27th April, 1959 so long as the subsisting lease in favour of the plaintiff is in force and is not otherwise terminated or cancelled by any Court of law of competent jurisdiction. (valued at Rs. 2,000/-) (d) to issue a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the Government of U.P. and the Union of India from demanding or releasing the sum of Rs. 9,40,225/25 claimed by the defendants as royalty for the period from 1.1.1952 to 26.6.68 for the alleged mining of the so called silica sand or any royalty other than the royalty stipulated in the lease-deed dated 16th April 1947 and 27th April 1959 from the plaintiff for extracting minerals including sand (silica sand) from the area held under lease-deed is subsisting and is not otherwise cancelled amended or altered by the any competent Court having jurisdiction in the matter. (valued at Rs. 10,000/-)” 4. At the bottom of the plaint a list of 46 villages, subject-matter of suit which fell within Pargana Bara, Tehsil Karchhana, District Allahabad was also given and reads as under : 1. Shankargarh 17. Lakhanpur 33. Lohgara 2. Talapar 18. Kaitha 34. Gadhamar 3. Kapari 19. Sheorajpur 35. Chandra 4. Barui 20. Osa 36. Lalai 5. Khansemra 21. Atari Kapson 37. Baisa 6. Beonra 22. Charihari 38. Laund Khurd 7. Raipatna 23. Gobra Sangram 39. Baghla 8. Matarwar 24. Pagwar 40. Pandua 9. Gorkha 25. Majhiari Bahelia 41. Parvezabad alia Burhi 10. Gheodora 26. Gobra Hewar 42. Basahra Tarahar 11. Chak Arazi Garhwa 27. Barhaiya 43. Lalapur 12. Gara 28. Bhonri 44. Manduri 13. Benipur 29. Ghoghar 45. Partappur 14. Ledar 30. Bokuliha 46. Surwal 15. Biharia 31. Mabaiya Raksel 16. Abhaipur 32. Mehaiya Pahalwan 5. The plaint case set up is that Maharao Raja Kamlakar Singh (hereinafter referred to as Kamlakar Singh) was proprietor of Bara Estate. 46 Villages mentioned in Schedule-A of the plaint and others comprised Bara Estate and Kamlakar Singh was the owner and proprietor of villages. Bokuliha 46. Surwal 15. Biharia 31. Mabaiya Raksel 16. Abhaipur 32. Mehaiya Pahalwan 5. The plaint case set up is that Maharao Raja Kamlakar Singh (hereinafter referred to as Kamlakar Singh) was proprietor of Bara Estate. 46 Villages mentioned in Schedule-A of the plaint and others comprised Bara Estate and Kamlakar Singh was the owner and proprietor of villages. In his capacity of owner and proprietor of these villages, he had absolute right to excavate and quarry Stones, Ballast, Kankar, Moram etc., found in those villages. 6. On 16th April, 1947, Kamlakar Singh transferred quarries of stones, Ballast, Kankar, Moram etc. by a registered lease-deed executed in favour of plaintiff-respondent, his wife. The stipulations of lease-deed, relevant for the purpose of the suit, and reproduced in para-5 of plaint, are reproduced as under: “(a) That the lessee shall have liberty and power to enter upon the land mentioned in the Schedule ‘A’ hereto and to search for and dig and obtain by excavation and quarrying both open to the day light and by underground working, the demise stone, ballast, kankar, moram and sand and to carry away and dispose of the same for her own benefit. (b) That the lessee shall have liberty and power to enter upon and to use and occupy to such an extent as may be deemed necessary by the lessee, the lessor’s other land adjoining other pits (hereinafter called the said land) for depositing and heaping thereon the produce of the said quarries and all earth, soil and other substance dug up and brought to the surface in or about the working of the same and for otherwise carrying on the work of the said quarries. (c) The lessee shall have the liberty and power to take lead and carry away from the said land the stone, ballast, kankar, morrum and sand to be obtained as aforesaid and disposed of the same at her will and pleasure. (d) During the term of this demise, the lessee shall pay a royalty at the rate of Rs. 4000/- (four thousand only) annually payable in two equal instalments, the first instalment to be due on the 1st of June and the second instalment on the 1st of December every year whether the lessee quarries or carries on any operations or not. 4000/- (four thousand only) annually payable in two equal instalments, the first instalment to be due on the 1st of June and the second instalment on the 1st of December every year whether the lessee quarries or carries on any operations or not. (e) that lessee may export stone, ballast, kankar, morrum and sand from the quarries, hereby demised all the year round. (f) The lessee shall be entitled to sublet the premises hereby demised or any part hereof or any right or privileges under the lease to any person without the consent in writing of the lessor. But it will not be open to the lessee to assign her interest in the said lease in any manner whatsoever without the written consent of the lessor. (g) At the end of every fifty years from the date of the execution hereof it will be open to the lessor to increase the amount of annual royalty payable by the lessee in accordance with the terms hereof by 10% in which case the royalty so fixed at the time of revision thereof by the lessor shall be payable by the lessee and all the terms with regard to the payment thereof shall apply to the amount so fixed.” (Emphasis added) 7. The Estate held by Kamlakar Singh known as Bara Raj is an ancient Estate. Succession to the said Estate was governed by primogeniture. It was an impartible Estate. The family of Kamlakar Singh was directly connected with the ruling family of erstwhile Rewa Estate. Emperor Shah Alam in Hijri 1188 had granted a Sanad of full ownership of whole property of “Bara Raj” to the then Raja Rao Vikramaditya Singh. By virtue of said Sanad and by virtue of Wajibul Arz applicable to Bara Raj, the ancestors of Kamlakar Singh had been enjoying, all through, full, absolute and unrestricted rights over the area comprised in “Bara Raj”, and worked, excavated, carried out and appropriated all minerals found within the area of Bara Raj, without any restriction and without paying any royalty to any superior authority. From time to time, proprietors of Bara Raj had been granting mining leases to different parties for extracting ballast, sand, bolders, moram and other minerals found within the area comprising Bara Raj. Mining of minerals by lessees, all through being done without any interruption and without paying royalty to the Government or any superior authority. From time to time, proprietors of Bara Raj had been granting mining leases to different parties for extracting ballast, sand, bolders, moram and other minerals found within the area comprising Bara Raj. Mining of minerals by lessees, all through being done without any interruption and without paying royalty to the Government or any superior authority. The plaintiff-respondent after having lease of 46 villages, mentioned in Schedule-A to the plaint, sublet portions of demised land and right to excavate quarry stones, ballast, Kankar, Moram etc. to various other parties. 8. With effect from 1st July, 1952, with the enactment and enforcement of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 (U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as “U.P. Act, 1951”), rights of Kamlakar Singh in the land in dispute extinguished by virtue of Section 4 of the said Act. However under Section 108 of 1951, the plaintiff became lessee of Government of U.P. on 1.7.1952, on the same terms and conditions of the then subsisting lease. 9. The plaintiff-respondent continued to excavate and quarry sand (silica sand) under the lease-deed of 1947 till it was acknowledged by State of U.P. in accordance with Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951. On 27.4.1959, Governor of U.P. and plaintiff-respondent entered into a lease of mines, situated in the aforesaid villages, on the same terms and conditions as leased out by Kamlakar Singh in 1947. Under lease-deed dated 27.4.1959, plaintiff was given liberty and power to enter upon the land mentioned in the schedule, attached to the deed of lease, and to search for, dig and obtain by excavation and quarrying, both open to day light and under ground working Stone, Ballast, Kankar, Moram and Sand etc. and to carry away and dispose of the same for her own benefit. The plaintiff was also conferred right to sublet the premises demised under the aforesaid lease or any part thereof or any right or privilege to any person, without written consent of the lessor. The plaintiff thus was enjoying all the aforesaid rights throughout. 10. After State Government executed lease-deed on 27.4.1959, in 1959 in the area leased out to plaintiff, sand which was available and used to be extracted, quarried, mined etc. is commonly called as “silica sand”, used for manufacture of glass, silicate and in foundry etc. It is this sand which plaintiff had been quarrying, excavating etc. 10. After State Government executed lease-deed on 27.4.1959, in 1959 in the area leased out to plaintiff, sand which was available and used to be extracted, quarried, mined etc. is commonly called as “silica sand”, used for manufacture of glass, silicate and in foundry etc. It is this sand which plaintiff had been quarrying, excavating etc. throughout and none else. 11. Under lease-deed dated 27.4.1959, plaintiff was to pay royalty at the rate of Rs. 4000/- per annum in two equal installments on 1st of June and 1st of December in the year, irrespective of whether plaintiff’’s quarries are carried in mining operation or not during the year. This royalty had been paid and is being paid by plaintiff throughout. The plaintiff was excavating and digging Stones, Ballast, Kankar, Moram and sand etc. under the lease-deed dated 16.4.1947 and continued to do so under the lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 executed by State of U.P. 12. At no point of time, State of U.P. took objection regarding digging or excavation of sand i.e. “silica sand”. On 17th February, 1966, the plaintiff received a letter from Secretary of Government of U.P., dated 14.2.1966, stating that plaintiff had been quarrying large quantity of silica sand from villages mentioned in lease-deed in contravention of terms thereof and also in flagrant violation of the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as “MMRD Act, 1957”) and Rules framed thereunder. Plaintiff was called upon to stop quarrying of “silica sand” forthwith and cancel all sub-leases granted by her, authorizing quarrying of silica sand to others. Plaintiff was also directed to render full account of silica sand quarried by her and her sub-lessees within 15 days of the receipt of letter and deposit royalty for silica sand, quarried by her or her sub lessees, at the rate of Rs. 0.75 per tone within a month of receipt of the letter. It was also written in the notice that in case of default, lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 may be cancelled and action for recovery of royalty money as well as prosecution for unauthorised mining may be initiated. 13. The case of plaintiff is that she had every right to quarry sand found at the leased out premises. State Government had no right to prohibit plaintiff from doing so and direction to stop quarrying or demand of royalty money was illegal. 13. The case of plaintiff is that she had every right to quarry sand found at the leased out premises. State Government had no right to prohibit plaintiff from doing so and direction to stop quarrying or demand of royalty money was illegal. Lease was granted by virtue of Section 108 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 and Mineral Concession Rules had no application to the same. District Magistrate/Collector, Allahabad also issued an order dated 31.5.1968 to Divisional Superintendent, Railway Administration operating within the district of Allahabad that illegal quarried silica sand is being transported by Railways at the instance of persons, who have no licence for such quarrying and this is causing huge loss to Revenue and they were directed to stop such transportation immediately. 14. On account of the aforesaid illegal activity of State of U.P. and its authorities, plaintiff sent a notice under Section 80 CPC calling upon them to desist from : (a) Holding out threats and attempting to interfere in any manner whatsoever with the exercise of rights secured to the plaintiff by aforesaid lease for mining morrum, ballast, stone, sand (wrongfully described as silica sand), kankar etc. (b) Holding out threat of inviting applications and considering and granting mining leases of areas already under lease of the plaintiff, for mining of aforesaid or any of the aforesaid minerals. (c) Holding out threat for prosecuting plaintiff in criminal Court for extraction of ‘silica sand’ from the area held under lease by plaintiff. (d) Interfering with the working of mines and extraction of aforesaid minerals by plaintiff and her sub lessees in the area under lease of plaintiff. (e) Putting any restriction by any order, direction or request either by themselves or through any other official of the State Government preventing booking and transport of sand or silica sand by rail from any railway station situated within the district of Allahabad to any other place within the Union of India. (f) Threatening to put physical obstructions to the movement and sale of sand extracted from the mines held under lease by the plaintiff. (g) Compelling the plaintiff and her sub lessees to take a clearance certificate from District Magistrate and/or Collector or from any other authority or authorities for the purposes of booking of sand (silica sand). (h) Holding threats to realise royalty at the rate of Rs. (g) Compelling the plaintiff and her sub lessees to take a clearance certificate from District Magistrate and/or Collector or from any other authority or authorities for the purposes of booking of sand (silica sand). (h) Holding threats to realise royalty at the rate of Rs. 0.75 per tonne of the sand (silica sand) extracted by plaintiff or her sub lessees from the mines situated within the area under lease of plaintiff. (i) Putting restrictions on the freedom of trade as stated above, held and enjoyed by plaintiff. (j) Doing any act directly or indirectly interfering with or curtailing the rights, privileges and properties held owned and enjoyed by the plaintiff as the lease holder. 15. State Government demanded a sum of Rs. 940225.25 from plaintiff towards royalty for the period from 1.1.1952 to 26.6.1968 which demand was wholly illegal. It is in these circumstances, suit was filed seeking relief as already noticed above. 16. State of U.P. contested suit by filing a detailed written statement dated 8th October, 1969. It pleaded that neither there was any Estate named as “Bara Estate” known to the defendants nor Kamlakar Singh was proprietor thereof. He, in fact was an “Intermediary” in the district of Allahabad. He was “Zamindar” and “Intermediary” in some villages of the district. In this area, settlement of land was made in 1874 AD. Lumberdar Sri Vanaspati Singh of the family of Kamlakar Singh executed an agreement dated 10th March, 1874 and agreed to pay rent with effect from 1282 Fasli onwards until the next settlement in respect of each village or part of village in which he was an intermediary. His claim that he was owner and proprietor of the villages and had absolute right of excavation, quarrying etc. was incorrect. “Zamindar” or “intermediary” had no rights over mineral, hence, Kamlakar Singh also had no right to grant mining lease for quarrying to anyone. In fact, no valid lease for quarrying stones, ballasts, kankar, moram, sand, etc. was granted to plaintiff as required by law. The lease-deed dated 16.4.1947 did not result in any legal consequences since lessor himself had no legal right to grant a mining lease to plaintiff. There is no record about alleged succession to the Estate, or that the succession was governed by primogeniture and that the aforesaid Bara Raj was an impartible estate. The lease-deed dated 16.4.1947 did not result in any legal consequences since lessor himself had no legal right to grant a mining lease to plaintiff. There is no record about alleged succession to the Estate, or that the succession was governed by primogeniture and that the aforesaid Bara Raj was an impartible estate. The allegation that the then Emperor Shah Alam in Hijri 1188 had granted a sanad of full ownership of the property of Bara Raj is incorrect and not admitted by defendant-1. After enforcement of U.P. Act, 1951, all the rights of Kamlakar Singh vested in State of U.P., since he was only an “Intermediary”. There is no mineral known as “silica sand”. The term “glass sand” finds mention in MMRD Act, 1957. Colloquially “glass sand” is known as “silica sand” as well. It is a major mineral, the lease whereof is governed by the statute enacted by Central Government. The State Government has no power to grant lease against provisions of Central Act and Rules framed thereunder. 17. State Government never granted a lease in favour of plaintiff for quarrying “glass sand” or “silica sand” as it is commonly known. The lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 executed by State Government was for quarrying minor minerals and not glass sand, which is a ‘major mineral’ under central statute i.e. MMRD Act, 1957. Kamlakar Singh was also not a “Zamindar” or “Intermediary” of entire area in 46 villages, mentioned in the lease-deed since there were other intermediaries also. There was a stipulation in deed dated 27.4.1959 that plaintiff shall pay royalty at the rate of Rs. 4000/- per annum, to State Government for quarrying minor minerals only. 18. Most of the paragraphs of plaint were basically denied whereunder plaintiff had endeavored to set up a case of valid lease rights for quarry of “silica sand”/“glass sand.” In additional pleas, defendant-1 pleaded that cause of action arose on or after 24th May, 1969 and the suit was filed in Court on 28th May, 1969, hence no notice under Section 80 C.P.C. on cause of action in question was served upon defendants. No notice under Section 80 C.P.C. was ever received by defendants. Plaintiff had quarried a huge quantity of silica sand worth lacs of rupees and suit is undervalued. Union of India was a necessary party but not impleaded, hence suit is bad for non joinder of necessary party. No notice under Section 80 C.P.C. was ever received by defendants. Plaintiff had quarried a huge quantity of silica sand worth lacs of rupees and suit is undervalued. Union of India was a necessary party but not impleaded, hence suit is bad for non joinder of necessary party. The plaintiff had never quarried stones, ballasts, kankar, moram or sand etc., hence has no right to file suit in question. Kamlakar Singh was a Zamindar and Intermediary in the District of Allahabad, not permanently settled in district and as such had no right or power to make collections of rent etc. from the tenants and pay a fixed revenue to Government according to revenue records. Kamlakar Singh was never owner or proprietor of any village or land as stated in the plaint. Paramount proprietary right and ownership of land within Zamindari of Kamlakar Singh vested in State of U.P. Defendant was never divested of any of the rights and powers vested in it. Lease-deed dated 16.4.1947 was illegal and inoperative, for various grounds mentioned in para 65 of written statement which we shall discuss at the appropriate stage. Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951 has no application to the land in question. There was no valid lease subsisting in favour of plaintiff, hence she had no right to claim a statutory lease under Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951. No mining operation could have been allowed in violation of MMRD Act, 1957 and Rules framed thereunder. 19. Trial Court formulated 20 issues as under : 1. “Whether the plaintiff was holding a mining lease dated 16th April, 1947 and was carrying on mining operations prior to 1.7.1952 ? 2. If so, is the above mining lease dated 16.4.47 invalid and illegal alleged by defendant No. 1 in para 65 of its written statement.? 3. Whether the lease-deed dated 27.4.59 executed in favour of the plaintiff is valid and legal as alleged by the plaintiff? If so, its effect? 4. Whether no notice under Section 80 C.P.C. was served on the defendant in respect of the cause of action dated 24th May, 1969? 5. Whether a valid notice under Section 80 C.P.C. was served on the defendant? 6. Whether the suit is barred by estoppel and acquiscence? 7. Whether the suit is under valued? 8. If so, the Court fee paid insufficient? 9. 5. Whether a valid notice under Section 80 C.P.C. was served on the defendant? 6. Whether the suit is barred by estoppel and acquiscence? 7. Whether the suit is under valued? 8. If so, the Court fee paid insufficient? 9. Whether the plaintiff has a right to quarry sand which is now being described by the Government as silica sand under the lease-deed executed on 27.4.59 and she had also full right to grant sub-leases for quarrying such sand? 10. Whether the District Magistrate is authorised to impose conditions regarding the transport of silica sand Rail and can insist upon the plaintiff to take a clearance certificate for such transport from him? 11. Whether the lease-deed dated 27.4.59 executed in favour of the plaintiff is liable to be modified in view of the provisions contained in the Mines and Minerals Concession Rules? 12. Is defendant No. 1 entitled to realise royalty at the rates provided under the Mines and Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act for the sand (now called silica sand) mined by the plaintiff? If so, from what date? 13. Whether the lease-deed dated 27.4.59 could not have been executed for a term exceeding 20 years and as such the aforesaid lease-deed is determinable and therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of injunction? 14. Is the plaintiff entitled to any damage on account of the alleged threats for criminal prosecution/If so, what is the amount? 15. Is the lease-deed dated 27.4.59 for minor minerals only? Is to its effect? 16. Whether Maharao Raja Kamlakar Singh was the Zamindar of all the 46 villages mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ annexed with the plaint. 17. Whether the Government is not entitled to consider and execute a mining lease under the mines and mineral development and regulation Act for excavating sand stone moram etc., in favour of other persons for the areas and villages covered under the lease dated 27.4.59 held by the plaintiff as long as it had not been terminated? 18. That relief if any is the plaintiff entitled? 19. Is defendant No. 1 not entitled to claim Rupees 9 lacs (Rs. 9,00,0225 and paise 05 as royalty for the period 1.1.52 to 26.6.68. 20. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try suit?” 20. Issues 7 and 8 relating to valuation and sufficiency of Court fees were separately considered and decided vide order dated 26.7.1972. 19. Is defendant No. 1 not entitled to claim Rupees 9 lacs (Rs. 9,00,0225 and paise 05 as royalty for the period 1.1.52 to 26.6.68. 20. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try suit?” 20. Issues 7 and 8 relating to valuation and sufficiency of Court fees were separately considered and decided vide order dated 26.7.1972. Since dispute relating to recovery of Rs. 9 lacs and odd towards royalty came to be inserted in the plaint by an amendment, requisite Court fees was also paid by plaintiff. Both these issues 7 and 8 thus were answered in negative i.e in favour of plaintiff. 21. Issues 1, 2, 3, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16 and 17 were all taken together and while answering the same, Trial Court held : (a) Kamlakar Singh was Zamindar of all 46 villages described in the plaint. (b) From surface ownership, a presumption would arise that mines quarried and minerals in situ are part and parcel of the land. The owner of surface land is entitled prima facie to everything beneath or within it, down to the centre of earth and this principle applies even where title of surface has been acquired by prescription, unless by some conveyance etc., it is shown that the mines etc. are being enjoyed by persons other than owner of the surface. Defendant failed to make out any circumstance otherwise to dislodge rights of Kamlakar Singh. (c) In Wajibul Arz (paper No. 176-C) filed by plaintiff in respect of village Shankergarh, there was entry that Zamindar had the right in respect of minerals. In view of above entry and definition of ‘Intermediary’ under Section 3(2), ‘Estate’ under Section 3(8) and ‘Proprietor’ under Section 3(21) of U.P. Act, 1951 and also the fact that under Section 27, compensation was determined by taking into consideration royalty received by Kamlakar Singh, he was the owner of underground minerals of his estate covering 46 villages. (d) Another Wajibul Arz (paper No. C-362/7) in respect of village Shivrajpur filed by defendant, having no such entry in favour of Kamlakar Singh, was not believed by Trial Court on the ground that for the purpose of compensation, royalty in respect of 46 villages has been considered. (e) Kamlakar Singh, the owner or proprietor of minerals lying in his estate, was legally entitled to execute sub-lease. (e) Kamlakar Singh, the owner or proprietor of minerals lying in his estate, was legally entitled to execute sub-lease. (f) The lease-deed dated 16.4.1947 executed by Kamlakar Singh was neither a sham transaction nor benami. The defendants also could not prove that transaction was for no consideration or inadequate consideration. Defendants also could not prove that the lease was executed on a plain unstamped paper. (g) The plaintiff became a statutory lessee within the meaning of Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951. MMRD Act, 1957 applies to those leases which have been granted by Government and not to statutory leases, hence had no application to lease granted to plaintiff in 1947 and in respect whereto plaintiff’ became statutory lessee under Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951. (h) Lease of plaintiff was not affected by Section 8(1) (b) of MMRD Act, 1957 for the reason that it was a statutory lease and remained unaffected by the provisions of MMRD Act, 1957. Defendant’s contention that lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 was liable to be modified in view of Section 16 of MMRD Act, 1957, is also without any force. Plaintiff’s lease cannot be read so as to confine it to “minor minerals” or to exclude “silica sand” from its ambit. (i) Mining Concession (Central) Rules, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1939”) were made by Governor General in respect of British Baluchistan and by Governor General in Council in respect of other Chief Commissioner’s Provinces for regulating grants of prospective licences and mining leases in Chief Commissioner’s Provinces. The aforesaid Rules were not applicable in State of U.P. or United Provinces of Agra and Awadh since it was not a Chief Commissioner’s Province. (j) United Provinces Mining Concessions and Mineral Development Rules, 1940 do not indicate the statute under which same were framed. It also do not clarify that the same was a delegated legislation. Moreover, these Rules relate to mines and minerals which were properties of Crown but here, mines and minerals were properties of Kamlakar Singh and not of Crown, hence the aforesaid Rules of 1940 had no bearing with the suit land. (k) State Government is bound by principle of estoppel, having executed lease in favour of plaintiff in 1959 with effect from 1.7.1952 and cannot turn around otherwise. (k) State Government is bound by principle of estoppel, having executed lease in favour of plaintiff in 1959 with effect from 1.7.1952 and cannot turn around otherwise. (l) State Government will have to honour terms of lease executed by it with plaintiff on 27.4.1959, being bound by the principle of Promissory Estoppel. (m) Plaintiff’ was holding a mining lease dated 16.4.1947 and carrying on mining operations prior to 1.7.1952, and it was neither invalid nor illegal. (n) Lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 executed by State Government in favour of plaintiff is valid and legal. (o) Plaintiff has right to quarry “silica sand” under lease-deed dated 27.4.1959. Lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 is for major minerals and Government is not entitled to consider and execute a mining lease under MMRD Act, 1957 for area in villages covered under lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 and held by plaintiff, to any third person so long as it had not been terminated in accordance with law. 22. Issues 4 and 5 having not been pressed, were decided against defendants. Issue 6 was also answered against defendants on the ground that the defendants could not show how suit was barred by principle of acquiescence and estoppel. Issue 10 was answered against defendants holding that District Magistrate cannot impose conditions regarding transport of silica sand by rail etc. 23. While answering issues 12 and 19, Court below held that royalty is payable during continuance of lease. Any amount not payable under lease would not be called ‘royalty’. Demand of royalty under MMRD Act, 1957 is not permissible. Issue 19 was answered against State of U.P. Issue 20 was also answered against defendants. However, issue 14 was answered against plaintiff. 24. Ultimately Issue 18 was answered in favour of plaintiff holding that she is entitled to all reliefs excluding damages pendente lite and future. 25. Learned Additional Advocate General, giving backdrop of entire dispute, stated that Kamlakar Singh granted a lease in favour of his wife Rani in 1947 for operating mining lease on various mines within his Zamindari. It is remarkable that resolution for abolition of Zamindari was passed by the then Government in the year 1937, when it assumed reign of the State after General Elections in the year 1937. Thereafter the then Government again came in power in 1946 and it had become an open secret that Zamindari is going to be abolished very soon in or about 1948. Thereafter the then Government again came in power in 1946 and it had become an open secret that Zamindari is going to be abolished very soon in or about 1948. The final resolution for abolition of Zamindari in State was adopted and accordingly Bill was prepared. Under these circumstances, Raja wanted to save as much property for himself and his family and he granted a fake and sham lease in favour of his wife for an inadequate consideration for indefinite period. The royalty stipulated in the lease was Rs. 4000/- per annum. Somehow or other Raja prevailed upon State Government and obtain another lease in favour of Rani in 1959 and had been making gains thereunder. In fact, Rani never worked equerry. The lease was granted inter alia for ‘’sand’ which included “ordinary sand”. Kamlakar Singh transferred mining rights to his wife, by lease dated 16.4.1947 on the eve of independence and on the eve of enactment of U.P. Act, 1951 and Rules, the impending 1957 Mines Act, in a collusive attempt to give her a lease in perpetuity of mines to defeat attempt by State to acquire land and mines therein. Interestingly, he even received compensation from Compensation Officer for the land and mines which were held by him and which he had adroitly transferred to his wife at eleventh hour. 26. Sri Pandey continued to urge that under Government of India Act, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as “GI Act, 1935”), legislative field of Regulation of Mines and Development of Minerals was divided between Central Legislature and Provincial Legislature. Entry-36, List-1, Seventh Schedule of GI Act, 1935 reads as under: “36. Regulation of mines and oilfields and mineral development to which such regulation and development under Federal control is declared by Federal law to be expedient in the public interest.” 27. List-1 provides subjects within legislative power of Central Legislation. Similarly under GI Act, 1935, Entry-23, List-II, Seventh Schedule, which contains subjects of Provincial Legislation, reads as under: “23. Regulation of mines and oilfields and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under Federal control.” 28. The word “Federal” in the above entries was substituted by the word “Dominion” by India (Provincial Constitution) Order 1947. In 1939, Government of India made Rules, 1939, for regulating grants of prospecting licences and mining leases in Chief Commissioner’s Provinces and British Baluchistan. The word “Federal” in the above entries was substituted by the word “Dominion” by India (Provincial Constitution) Order 1947. In 1939, Government of India made Rules, 1939, for regulating grants of prospecting licences and mining leases in Chief Commissioner’s Provinces and British Baluchistan. Need for Central regulation of mines and oilfields and minerals development began to be increasingly felt and became highlighted during second World war with the result that certain key minerals had to be controlled under Defence of India Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as “DI Act, 1939”). It was recognized that a planned and uniform policy of mineral development was essential to economic and industrial progress. Subsequently, pursuant to power conferred by Entry 36 of Federal Legislative List, Legislature of Dominion of India enacted on September 8, 1948, “Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948” (hereinafter referred to as “MMRD Act, 1948”) which was brought into force on 25.10.1949. The object of MMRD Act, 1948 was to regulate mines and oilfields and mineral development on the lines contemplated in the Industrial Policy Resolution of April, 1948. 29. In 1957, Parliament decided that Regulation and Development of Mines and Minerals should feature by themselves in a separate Act. Accordingly, Parliament enacted on December 28, 1957, MMRD Act, 1957. Section 32 of MMRD Act, 1957 amended MMRD Act, 1948 in the manner set out in Schedule-III to MMRD Act, 1957 so as to remove from MMRD Act, 1948 all references to mines and minerals and to confine it to oilfields and mineral oil resources. Title of MMRD Act, 1948 was amended suitably. The MMRD Act, 1957 was brought into force on 1.6.1958 by Notification No. GSR 432, dated 29.5.1958 (published in the Gazette of India, extraordinary, 1958, Part II) and was enacted by Parliament, specially for the purpose of Regulation of mining operation and development of minerals and as such for all purposes (mining purposes), provisions of MMRD Act, 1957 will exclude other law relating to mining operations and development of minerals. 30. In the context of U.P. Act, 1951, learned Additional Advocate General stated that this is an Act to provide abolition of Zamindari system which involves Intermediaries and for acquisition of their rights, titles and interest and to reform law relating to land tenure consequent upon such abolition and acquisition and to make provision for other matters connected thereto. It came into force on 1.7.1952. It came into force on 1.7.1952. Thus, mining operations and its development, being subject of List-I, Seventh Schedule of Constitution, and in exercise of power thereof, MMRD Act, 1957 was enacted covering field of mining operations, and mineral, it shall prevail over all general Acts including U.P. Act, 1951. Special law shall prevail over general statute. He sought to fortify aforesaid proposition by relying on decisions in J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1170 and State of Orissa and others v. Commissioner of Land Records and Settlement, Cuttack and others, (1998) 7 SCC 162 . 31. Learned Additional Advocate General urged that Kamlakar Singh was not owner and proprietor of disputed land, hence execution of lease-deed by him on 16.4.1947 and grant of mining rights to lessee was illegal and conferred no valid authority upon lessee to continue quarrying of “silica sand” etc. in the villages in dispute. He further contended that in any case with enactment of U.P.Act, 1951, entire disputed area vested in State Government. It is also admitted by plaintiff. In the circumstances, whatever rights Kamlakar Singh had as owner and proprietor of villages in dispute, if any, same ceased after enactment of U.P.Act, 1951 and thereafter, status of Kamlakar Singh became as that of a tenant and mining rights, if any, so far as permitted under U.P. Act, 1951 could have continued only to that extent. In respect of mining operations of minerals governed by MMRD Act, 1957, when it came into force, the rights, if any, of Kamlakar Singh as also plaintiff’s lessee ceased and after enactment of MMRD Act, 1957, neither plaintiff’ nor Kamlakar Singh nor anybody else could have continued with mining operations of minerals governed by MMRD Act, 1957, unless licence/permission is granted in accordance with the procedure thereunder. Court below in holding that MMRD Act, 1957 has no application to the villages in question, has completely erred in law, therefore, the impugned judgment and decree is ex facie illegal and liable to be set aside. 32. He further submitted, assuming that on 16.4.1947, Kamlakar Singh had proprietary and ownership right over area within disputed villages and may have corresponding rights of mining and quarrying but the ownership and proprietary rights ceased and stood vested in State of U.P. with effect from 1st July, 1952 on enforcement of U.P. Act, 1951. 32. He further submitted, assuming that on 16.4.1947, Kamlakar Singh had proprietary and ownership right over area within disputed villages and may have corresponding rights of mining and quarrying but the ownership and proprietary rights ceased and stood vested in State of U.P. with effect from 1st July, 1952 on enforcement of U.P. Act, 1951. Thereafter, corresponding rights regarding minerals etc. which were available to Kamlakar Singh, if any, being proprietor and owner of disputed villages, also vested in State of U.P. and he (Kamlakar Singh) ceased to have such rights. That being so, plaintiff lessee also ceased to have such rights unless permitted by State of U.P. or by U.P. Act, 1951. If plaintiff is held to be entitled to continue with lease rights under Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951, the same ceased on enactment and enforcement of MMRD Act, 1957 in respect of minerals governed by such enactment and thereafter minerals and mining rights would be governed by MMRD Act, 1957. Since in the present case, admittedly no mining rights had been conferred upon plaintiff lessee under MMRD Act, 1957, after following procedure prescribed therein, by competent authority, she has/had no right to continue with mining operations in respect of minerals governed by MMRD Act, 1957 and Court below in holding otherwise, has acted wholly illegally, hence the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 33. Sri Pandey contended that in any case MMRD Act, 1957 has two different aspects, one, regulating mining lease and the procedure of grant of lease; and, another, charge of Royalty on extraction and transportation of minerals. Right to charge Royalty on extraction, excavation and transportation of minerals is absolute and covers all kind of leases whether governed by MMRD Act, 1957 or otherwise having a overriding provision on instruments of leases as also on otherwise law. Therefore, plaintiff-respondent in any case is liable to pay Royalty on minerals excavated or extracted from disputed land and in that view of matter, Collector rightly raised demand of Royalty for the period plaintiff had carried out mining operations and extracted minerals without payment of Royalty prescribed under Section 9 read with Second Schedule of MMRD Act, 1957 to the State. Trial Court has completely erred in law in not appreciating scope of Section 9 of MMRD Act, 1957 and, therefore, judgment in question is liable to be set aside. Trial Court has completely erred in law in not appreciating scope of Section 9 of MMRD Act, 1957 and, therefore, judgment in question is liable to be set aside. He placed reliance on Khas Karanpura Collieries Ltd. and others v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1971 Pat 328 and Sheo Varan Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1980 All. 92 . 34. Lastly, he contended that lease-deed by which Kamlakar Singh transferred his right in favour of his wife i.e. agreement executed on 16.4.1947, and agreement between Rani Rajendri and State of U.P. dated 27.4.1959 are void in view of Sections 23 and 24 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1972”) and 19 of MMRD Act, 1957 as terms and conditions of agreement were not consistent with the law in force . Illustrating his submission, he urged that in view of following facts, terms and conditions referred to in agreements are inconsistent with the law in force on the date agreement was executed: (I) The agreement is violative of Section 8(1) of MMRD Act, 1957 which limits maximum period for operation of major mining (Silica sand). Furthermore, for extension of period, permission of Central Government was needed and apparently in the present case no such permission was obtained. The agreement refers to lease in perpetuity and as such, the agreement is void in terms of MMRD Act, 1957. (II) The maximum area of which lease could be given are 10 sq.km. as per Section 6(1)(b) of MMRD Act, 1957. This area could only be extended with the permission of Central Government. Admittedly, in agreement area is much more than the area referred to in MMRD Act, 1957 Act and, as such, agreement is void. 35. In support of above submissions, Sri Pandey, learned Additional Advocate General placed reliance on Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India and another, 1996 (9) SCC 709 , Kaviraj Basudevanand v. Harihar Gir, AIR 1974 SC 1991 and Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Devendrappa Bujjappa Kadabi and others, AIR 1987 Kant 129. 36. He summed up his argument and urged that in view of Section 19 of MMRD Act, 1957, lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 is void being in contravention of provisions of MMRD Act, 1957. Any agreement in conflict to existing law is void and would give no right to plaintiff-respondent to operate mining lease. 37. 36. He summed up his argument and urged that in view of Section 19 of MMRD Act, 1957, lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 is void being in contravention of provisions of MMRD Act, 1957. Any agreement in conflict to existing law is void and would give no right to plaintiff-respondent to operate mining lease. 37. Per contra, Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for plaintiff-respondent, submitted that here is not a case of any contradiction between a lease which became ‘statutory lease’ under U.P. Act, 1951 and provisions of MMRD Act, 1957 inasmuch Section 4 of MMRD Act, 1957 confines application of said Act to the matters where leases are granted under MMRD Act, 1957 while plaintiff’s lease became ‘statutory lease’ by virtue of Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951 and so long as such lease is not modified and cancelled in accordance with U.P. Act, 1951 and Rules and Regulations framed thereunder, neither plaintiff’s lease can be interfered by defendants-appellants nor they have any right to raise a demand which is not consistent with the terms and conditions of ‘statutory lease’ which now is deemed to be granted to plaintiff-respondent by State of U.P. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance on Bihar Mines Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 887 , Hindustan Steel Limited, M/s. Rourkela v. Kalyani Banerjee, AIR 1973 SC 408 , Sone Valley Portland Cement Co. Ltd. v. General Mining Syndicate Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1976 SC 2520 , State of Bihar v. Khas Karanpura Collieries Ltd., AIR 1976 SC 1978 , Chhatu Ram Horil Ram Private Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1969 SC 177 , India Thermal Power Ltd. v. State of M.P. and others, 2000 (3) SCC 379 and Mary v. State of Kerala and others, 2014 (14) SCC 272 . 38. Before coming to the effect of statutes dealing with mining and minerals and their consequences on the lease and extraction of minerals on the lease land in dispute, we propose to examine two basic questions: (i) Whether Kamlakar Singh was proprietor and owner of disputed villages when he executed lease-deed dated 16.4.1947 and entitled to execute a lease-deed in respect of minerals found in those villages ? (ii) Whether Kamlakar Singh continued to have ownership rights over minerals found in disputed villages after vesting of land in State of U.P. with effect from 1.7.1952 under U.P.Act, 1951 ? (ii) Whether Kamlakar Singh continued to have ownership rights over minerals found in disputed villages after vesting of land in State of U.P. with effect from 1.7.1952 under U.P.Act, 1951 ? 39. The first question up for consideration for deciding this appeal is the status of Kamlakar Singh before enactment of U.P. Act, 1951, in respect of disputed land. Plaintiff claimed status of Kamlakar Singh as owner and proprietor of disputed property in 1947. Judgment of Court below shows that there was no documentary evidence adduced by plaintiff to show that Kamlakar Singh or his predecessors were owner and proprietor of disputed land. In this regard, Kamlakar Singh himself appeared in witness box and deposed. His statement on oath is paper No. 337-A. He claimed to be ‘Zamindar’ of Bara Estate. Smt. Rajendri Kumari Ba is his second wife. In cross-examination, he said that he was resident of Tehsil Karchhna, which had two Parganas, Bara and Arail. His Zamindari extended to both parganas, i.e. Bara and Arail. He, however, admitted that in Pargana ‘Bara’, besides him, there were some other petty/small Zamindars. Pargana Bara consisted of 250 villages and he had share in 10-12 villages. In 50-60 villages of pargana Bara; Gitti, Moram, Balu, Patthar etc., used to be quarried. He, however, could not tell names of those villages. He further said that area for which lease was granted, mostly was in his Zamindari, while in some, he was a share holder but could not give details thereof. His statement, in this regard is as under: ^^38- tks ekSts lease esa fn;s x;s Fks muesa ls vf/kdka'k dk eSa eqlYye tehankj Fkk vkSj dqN esa share holder FkkA ijUrq izR;sd ,sls xkaWo dk fooj.k eSa ugha ns ldrkA** “38. Of most of the villages mentioned in lease, I was full fledged Zamindar and in some, I was a share holder. But I cannot give details of each of such villages.” (English translation by the Court) 40. He further said that he is not aware of permanent settlement at Allahabad. His statement reads as under: ^^39------- eSa ugha tkurk fd bykgkckn esa LFkk;h cankscLr gqvk Fkk fd ughaA** “ 39....... I do not known whether there had been any permanent settlement in Allahabad or not.” (English translation by the Court) 41. Besides, plaintiff also deposed in support of her case. His statement reads as under: ^^39------- eSa ugha tkurk fd bykgkckn esa LFkk;h cankscLr gqvk Fkk fd ughaA** “ 39....... I do not known whether there had been any permanent settlement in Allahabad or not.” (English translation by the Court) 41. Besides, plaintiff also deposed in support of her case. In her own deposition also, she did not say regarding status of Kamlakar Singh except that he was ‘’Zamindar’ in the area and disputed land was leased out to her by Kamlakar Singh. 42. Trial Court while answering Issue 16, whether Kamlakar Singh was Zamindar of disputed villages, has referred to the pleadings contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of plaint and its reply contained in paragraph 2 of written statements and therefrom has held that Kamlakar Singh was ‘’Zamindar’ of all 46 villages. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of plaint read as under: “1. That Maharao Raja Kamlakar Singh (herein after referred to as the Raja Saheb of Shankergarh) Tehsil Karchana in the District of Allahabad was the proprietor of the Bara Estate. 2. That a number of villages including 46 villages mentioned in the Schedule “A” of the plaint were situated in the Bara Estate and Raja Saheb of Shankergarh was the owner and proprietor of these villages.” 43. The defendant State of U.P. had replied aforesaid paragraphs No. 1 and 2 of plaint in paragraphs No. 1 and 2 of written statement, as under: “1. That the facts stated in Paragraph 1 of the plaint are not admitted. In fact, there was no BARA ESTATE known to the defendant or its officers and Maharaja Kamlakar Singh (hereinafter called the Raja) was not the proprietor thereof. Of Course the Raja was an intermediary in the district of Allahabad. 2. That the facts stated in paragraph 2 of the plaint are denied. In fact, the Raja was not the owner or proprietor of any of the villages in the district of Allahabad. Of course as, stated above, the Raja was zamindar and intermediary in some of the villages of the district. 2. That the facts stated in paragraph 2 of the plaint are denied. In fact, the Raja was not the owner or proprietor of any of the villages in the district of Allahabad. Of course as, stated above, the Raja was zamindar and intermediary in some of the villages of the district. In this area the Settlement of land was last made in 1874 A.D. The Lambardar Sri Banspati Singh of the family of the Raja, executed an agreement dated March 10, 1874 and agreed to pay rent w.e.f. from 1282 Fasli onwards until the next settlement in respect of each village or part of the village in which he was an intermediary.” (emphasis added) 44. This Court does not find any ambiguity in reply of State denying assertions made in paragraphs No. 1 and 2 of plaint. Plaintiff claimed that Kamlakar Singh was proprietor of above Estate, which has been denied specifically in paragraph 1 of written statement. Similar assertion in paragraph 2 of plaint has been denied specifically in paragraph 2 of written statement. Defendant appellant has clarified that Kamlakar Singh was not “owner” or “proprietor” of disputed land but a “Zamindar” and “Intermediary” in some villages of district. It referred to settlement of 1874 A.D. and said that Lambardar Sri Banaspati Singh of the family of Kamlakar Singh, executed an agreement dated 10.3.1874, agreeing to pay rent w.e.f. 1242 Fasli onwards until the next settlement in respect of each village or part of village in which he was an “Intermediary.” 45. Copy of the agreement, which is a document in Urdu was filed by defendant-appellant alongwith list of documents dated 25.8.1972. A certified copy obtained from Revenue Department was filed and marked as Paper No. 170-C/2. Hindi transliteration is also on record as Paper No. 170-C/3 and reads as under: ^^uEcjnkjku ekStk 'kadjx< ijxuk ckjk ftyk bykgkckn ds gSa eu eqdjku budkj djrs gSa fd c'krZ eutwjh xouZesUV bOrnk; 1282 Qyxk;r 1311 Qlyh ;kuh rhl lky rd tek ljdkj cdnj vkSj ckn vtkWa rk u gksus bdkjkjukek tnhn cUnkscLr ds lky vk[khj ds 'kjg ls vnk djrs jgsaxsA** “Numberdars are residents of village Shankargarh, Pargana Bara, District Allahabad. We the parties agree that subject to the sanction by the Government from 1282 Fasli till 1311 Fasli i.e. for 30 years, we shall be depositing the requisite fee with the Government in accordance with the agreement and thereafter at the rate paid in the last year of this agreement till the new settlement/agreement is not entered into.” (English translation by the Court) 46. The defendants-appellants also filed copy of Wajibul Arz, Mouza Shivrajpur, Pargana & Tahseel Bara, District Allahabad, which is also a document in Urdu and certified copy thereof obtained from record room of Revenue Section of Collector’s office has been filed as Paper No. 170-C/4 to 170-C/6. Its Hindi transliteration has been filed as Paper No. 170-C/7. The aforesaid document clearly mentions status of predecessor of plaintiff as that of ‘Zamindar’. Section 1 of aforesaid document clearly mentions as under: nQk &1 ft+dz uob;r egky Cklwjr tehUnkjh gS Section 1 Description of the nature of possession Is in the form of Zaminidari 47. Trial Court has observed by referring to Avadh Kishore Das v. Ram Gopal and others, AIR 1979 SC 861 , that “Wazibul Arz” is a village administration paper prepared with due care and after due enquiry by public servant in discharge of his official duty. It is a part of settlement record and statutory presumption of correctness is attached to it. Therefore, unless shown otherwise, a “Wazibul Arz” is a creditworthy document. In view thereof it has relied on the “Wazibul Arz” (paper No. 176) filed by plaintiff-respondent for Village-Sankargarh, which contains a statement that ‘Zamindar’ had a right in respect of minerals, to hold that Kamlakar Singh was owner over minerals in village Sankargarh. It says that Kamlakar Singh being Zamindar of 46 villages was also an ‘Intermediary’ within Section 3 (21) of U.P. Act, 1951. It, then relied on Sections 27, 34, 49 and 50 of U.P. Act, 1951 to hold that Compensation Officer in determining gross assets of Kamlakar Singh took into consideration royalties, he received in respect of quarry, which shows that Kamlakar Singh was owner and proprietor of minerals. To our mind, all these considerations by Trial Court were not necessary for the reason that status of Kamlakar Singh as “Zamindar” and “Intermediary” was admitted by defendant-appellant clearly in para-2 of the written statement. 48. To our mind, all these considerations by Trial Court were not necessary for the reason that status of Kamlakar Singh as “Zamindar” and “Intermediary” was admitted by defendant-appellant clearly in para-2 of the written statement. 48. The aforesaid documents also make it clear that Kamlakar Singh claimed status of his predecessor and himself as ‘Zamindar’ in respect of disputed villages. 49. On behalf of State an attempt was made to claim that being “Zamindar”, predecessor and Kamlakar Singh were not owner and proprietor of disputed villages but it was in the nature of “Intermediary.” Record makes it very clear that predecessors of Kamlakar Singh were given status of “Zamindar” which continued and by succession, devolved upon Kamlakar Singh. 50. Here it takes us to examine meaning of the term “Zamindar” at the relevant time. “Wajibul Arz” (Paper No. 170C)/4-6 was executed on 15th June/10th July, 1875 A.D. We have got some part of this document translated in english and it shows that the same was executed by Sri Syeed Jahir Hussain Khan, the then Deputy Collector. It had various stipulations in four chapters which read as under : “CHAPTER-1, Nature of Possession Section-1: Description of the Nature of Possession Section-2: Description of the method of realization of rent of payment of Malguzari In form of Zamindari Sole owner CHAPTER-2, Right of owner Section-1: Description of the distribution of Profit NIL Section-2: Description of the appointment of Numberdars According to customs, the eldest son of Zamindars would be owner of the property and he would be appointed Numberdar. Section-3: Description of the Right of Pre-emption At the time of death, the ownership may be transferred to anyone without the consideration of family. Section-4: Description of the Sir & Khudkasht NIL Section-5: Description of the expenses of village Responsibility of Zamindar Section-6: Description of Management of Realization of Rent within the sharers of MOHAL NIL Section-7: Description of the Management of Land, fit for Agriculture. Management of the cultivable land will be through servant (Karinda) (Sic). Section-8: Description of realization and distribution of amount. Rs. 52/- annual income is realized as under: 1. Income from Mahua trees in the possession of Zamindar : Rs. 30/- 2. Income from Bazar: Rs. 20/- 3. (Sic) : Rs. 2/- Section-9: Description of customs of irrigation between co-sharers. NIL Section-10: Description of land which are exempted from rent for any reason. Rs. 52/- annual income is realized as under: 1. Income from Mahua trees in the possession of Zamindar : Rs. 30/- 2. Income from Bazar: Rs. 20/- 3. (Sic) : Rs. 2/- Section-9: Description of customs of irrigation between co-sharers. NIL Section-10: Description of land which are exempted from rent for any reason. NIL Section-11: Description of flooded and non-flooded lands. NIL Section-12: Description of titles and co-sharers. NIL Section-13: Description of any specific thing or custom which does not fall in the above sections. NIL CHAPTER-3 Section-1: Description of Maafi, permanent OR till life NIL Section-2: Description of Maafi by forfeiture NIL Section-3 : Description of the land in possession of others (Non-Zamindar) 2 Bigha, 7 Biswan, 10 Dhur Section-4: Description of the land of other specific nature NIL Section-5: Description of the land in the possession of any privileged. NIL CHAPTER-4, Right of Cultivators Section-1: Description of the time of realization of revenue/rent of land. Rent from the non-occupant tenant is realized 36 Youm and 21 Youm from the other tenants, before the time fixed. Section-2: Description of ponds and wells. No tenant can dig pond or well without the permission of Zamindar. Section-3 : Description of the construction of houses No farmer can construct a new house without the permission of landlord. The farmer can sale, if he has built it on his own expense. Landlord is the owner of land where farmer is absconding . Every farmer uses his compost. The compost of non-farmers is in the use/right of landlord. Section-4: Description of unplanted and miscellaneous trees Farmers can cut trees for the purpose of making instrument of agriculture from the infertile land with the permission of Zamindar. Section-5: Description of gardens, farms and lands of unknown owners Owner of the gardens will have right to sale/rent. Nobody can (sic) a new garden without the permission of Zamindar. Section-6: Description of the methods of irrigation by ponds and lakes. Fields are irrigated from ponds and rivers. Right of irrigation is not fixed. The garden land will be exempted from (sic) but when the land will be vacant from the trees and fresh trees are not planted on it, the Government will have power to decide. Section-6: Description of the methods of irrigation by ponds and lakes. Fields are irrigated from ponds and rivers. Right of irrigation is not fixed. The garden land will be exempted from (sic) but when the land will be vacant from the trees and fresh trees are not planted on it, the Government will have power to decide. Sd/-j Illegible Sd/-j Illegible Sd/-j Illegible Written on 10th July, 1875, A.D., the present Wajibul-Arz between the landlords and farmers, in presence of the Deputy Collector, Sahab Bahadur Syed Zahid Husain Khan.” Order filed in the “Settlement File” dated : 15th June, 1875.” 51. The aforesaid document is in respect of Mauja Shivrajpur, Pargana Bara, Tehsil Karchhana, District Allahabad. The document makes it very clear that it declared status of ‘Zamindar’ as “sole owner” and expenses of villages are responsibility of ‘Zamindar’. He shall manage cultivable land through servants etc. Any other tenant or farmer needs permission of Zamindar to do anything in the land governed by aforesaid document. Erstwhile concept of ‘Zamindar’ was also that he was a man of the land or landlord. They were a sort of micro king who ruled their own small territory by collecting taxes and running a Court to resolve dispute maintaining security-personnel and building palaces. In most cases, they had to share a big chunk of their taxes with the Lord above them like in the present case, the British Government, but otherwise they were owners of land under Zamindari. 52. We find that the kind of Zamindari system inherrited by British India was created by Mughals who replaced earlier tax collection system and appointed their own Collectors. They were responsible for local law and order. In British Rule, Zamindari system was introduced by Lord Cornwallis in 1793 through Permanent Settlement Act. It was introduced in Provinces of Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa and Varanasi. In every reference, including history books, we find that “Zamindars” were recognized as owners of land. They were given right to collect rent from peasants. There were two other parallel systems introduced in British system, one is ‘Rayyatwari’ system, sometime in 1820 by Thomos Munro, but it prevailed mostly in South India and some areas of erstwhile Bombay, part of Assam and Kurk Provinces of British India. They were given right to collect rent from peasants. There were two other parallel systems introduced in British system, one is ‘Rayyatwari’ system, sometime in 1820 by Thomos Munro, but it prevailed mostly in South India and some areas of erstwhile Bombay, part of Assam and Kurk Provinces of British India. A third system similar to ‘Zamindari’ was ‘Mahalwari system’ introduced sometime in 1833 during the period of William Bentick in Central Provinces and North-West Frontier i.e. Provinces in Agra, Punjab and Gangetic Valley. However, for our purpose, that is not relevant. 53. Artificial distinction, sought to be drawn by defendant-appellant, that Kamlakar Singh or his predecessors were ‘Zamindar’ and ‘Intermediary’ but not owner or proprietor of concerned villages has no basis or justification and none could be pointed out before us by learned Additional Advocate General. From settlement of 1875, relied on by defendant-appellant on their own, we have no doubt that status of ‘Zamindar’ conferred upon predecessors of Kamlakar Singh therein was nothing but a conferment of ownership rights or proprietors right. Therefore, status of ‘ownership’ was conferred upon predecessors of Kamlakar Singh and it stood devolved upon him also. In 1947 when he executed deed dated 16.4.1947, he was a ‘Zamindar’ (owner and proprietor) of villages in dispute. 54. Whether aforesaid ownership would include minerals found in the villages concerned, on this aspect, learned Additional Advocate General could place nothing before us to show that rights of ‘Zamindar’ were confined only to cultivation or collection of rent taxes etc. and he had no right over minerals found in concerned villages. Ownership right as conferred by “Wazibul Arz” dated 10.7.1875 did not restrict rights of ‘Zamindar’ in respect of land only and not minerals. Learned counsel appearing for appellant could not place any contractual or statutory provision or otherwise to persuade us to hold that Kamlakar Singh or his predecessor despite being ‘Zamindar’ of disputed area, did not possess ownership or proprietorship rights on minerals found in disputed area. We, therefore, concur with the findings of Court below that Kamlakar Singh, when executed lease-deed dated 16.4.1947, possessed absolute right to deal with the disposal of minerals, found in disputed area, after quarry, excavation etc. and its findings on issue-16 are hereby confirmed. 55. Question (i), we have formulated above, therefore, is answered accordingly in favour of plaintiff-respondent. 56. Now we come to question (ii). and its findings on issue-16 are hereby confirmed. 55. Question (i), we have formulated above, therefore, is answered accordingly in favour of plaintiff-respondent. 56. Now we come to question (ii). It is an admitted case of plaintiff-respondent that on enforcement of U.P.Act, 1951, area of the land of disputed villages vested in State of U.P. The Notification required under Section 4(1) was published in U.P. Gazette, Extraordinary dated 1.7.1952. This is also admitted by plaintiff-respondent. In para-11 of plaint, plaintiff-respondent himself has stated as under : “11. That in 1951 the U.P. Legislature enacted the U.P.Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (U.P.Act No. 1 of 1951) and with effect from 1st July, 1952 the rights of Raja Saheb of Shankargarh in the land demised under the lease were extinguished under Section 4 of the Act.” 57. Section 4(1) of U.P.Act, 1951 reads as under : “4. Vesting of estates in the State—(1) As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the State Government may, by notification, declare that, as from a date to be specified, all estates situate in Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from the beginning of the date so specified (hereinafter called the date of vesting), all such estates shall stand transferred to and vest, except as hereinafter provided, in the State free from all encumbrances.” (Emphasis added) 58. Section 4 talks of vesting of all ‘Estates’ situated in the State of U.P. The term ‘Estate’ has been defined in Section 3(8) of U.P.Act, 1951. Initially, Section 3(8) read differently and was substituted by U.P. Act No. XIV of 1958 with effect from 1.7.1952. A proviso was also added in Section 3(8) of U.P. Act, 1951 with effect from 1.7.1952. It reads as under: “(8). Initially, Section 3(8) read differently and was substituted by U.P. Act No. XIV of 1958 with effect from 1.7.1952. A proviso was also added in Section 3(8) of U.P. Act, 1951 with effect from 1.7.1952. It reads as under: “(8). “Estate” means and shall be deemed to have always meant the area included under one entry in any of the registers described in Clause (a), (b), (c) or (d) and, in so far as it relates to a permanent tenure holder, in any register described in Clause (e) of Section 32 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, as it stood immediately prior to coming into force of this Act, or, subject to the restriction mentioned with respect to the register described in Clause (e), in any of the registers maintained under Section 33 of the said Act or in a similar register described in or prepared or maintained under any other Act, Rule, Regulation or Order relating to the preparation or maintenance of record-of-rights in force at any time and includes share in, or of an “estate”: Provided that in Mirzapur District each of the areas bounded as given in Schedule VII shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing definition, be deemed to be an estate. Explanation—The Act, Rule, Regulation or Order referred to in this clause shall include, Act, Rule, Regulation, or Order made or promulgated by the erstwhile Indian States whose territories were merged or absorbed in the State of Uttar Pradesh prior to the date of vesting notified under Section 4 of this Act.” 59. Consequences of vesting of ‘Estate’ are provided in Section 6. The relevant part i.e. Section 6 (a) (b) and (c) is reproduced as under: “6. Consequences of vesting of ‘Estate’ are provided in Section 6. The relevant part i.e. Section 6 (a) (b) and (c) is reproduced as under: “6. Consequences of the vesting of an estate in the State—When the notification under Section 4 has been published in the Gazette, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or document or in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, the consequences as hereinafter set forth shall, from the beginning of the date of vesting, ensure in the area to which the notification relates, namely : (a) all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries- (i) in every estate in such area including land (cultivable or barren), grove-land, forests whether within or outside village boundaries trees (other than trees in village abadi, holding or grove), fisheries, tanks, ponds, water-channels, ferries, pathways, abadi sites, hats, bazars and melas (otherthan hats, bazars and melas held upon land to which Clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 18 apply and, (ii) in all sub-soil in such estates including rights, if any, in mines and minerals, whether being worked or not; shall cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances; (b) all grants and confirmations of title of or to land in any estate so acquired, or of or to any right or privilege in respect of such land or its land revenue shall, whether liable to resumption or not, determine; (c) (i) all rents, cesses, local rates and sayar in respect of any estate or holding therein for any period after the date of vesting and which, but for the acquisition would be payable to an intermediary, shall vest in and be payable to the State Government and not to the intermediary and any payment made in contravention of this clause shall not be valid discharge of the person liable to pay the same; (ii) where under an agreement or contract made before the date of vesting any rent, cess, local rate or sayar for any period after the said date has been paid of or compounded or released by an intermediary the same shall, notwithstanding the agreement or the contract, be recoverable by the State Government from the intermediary and may without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, be realized by deducting the amount from the compensation money payable to such intermediary under Chapter III;.............” (Emphasis added) 60. The above provisions make it clear that all rights, title and interest of all Intermediaries in every estate, including land and sub-soil in such estate, including the right, if any, in mines and minerals shall cease and be vested in State of U.P., free from all encumbrances, unless provided otherwise in U.P. Act, 1951. 61. The term ‘Intermediary’ has been defined in Section 3(12) and reads as under: “Intermediary” with reference to any estate means a proprietor, under-proprietor, sub-proprietor, thekedar, permanent lessee in Avadh and permanent tenure-holder of such estate or part thereof.” 62. Kamlakar Singh, therefore, was covered by term ‘Intermediary’ and his estate vested in State of U.P. including all rights etc. in respect of mines and minerals in sub-soil in such estate. 63. A three Judge Bench of Apex Court had an occasion to consider effect of Section 4 and 6 of U.P.Act, 1951 in Bhagwan Das v. State of U.P., 1976 (3) SCC 784 . After referring to Section 4 and Section 6(a) (i & ii), Court said: “these provisions of the 1951 Act leave no doubt that whatever rights, inclusive of the rights to mines and minerals, which the erstwhile Zamindars possessed, stood extinguished and became vested in the State Government.” (emphasis added) 64. The above view was followed in King Pal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 1996 (11) SCC 571 , wherein para 16, Court quoted an exerpt from its earlier judgment in Bhagwan Das v. State of U.P. (supra) as under: “16. In this connection, we need only to refer to the judgment of this Court rendered under the very same provisions with which we are concerned. In Bagwan Das v. State of U.P. and others ( AIR 1976 SC 1393 ). this Court observed as follows : “The right of the former Zamindars to mines and minerals was extinguished by the Act of 1951 and became vested in the State Government. So long as the proprietory right to the land was vested in the Zamindar, he was entitled to mines and minerals. With the abolition of Zamidari by the 1951 Act that right has passed on not to the appellant but to the State Government. The appellants’ writ petition filed to restrain the State Government from auctioning the right to undertake mining operations must, therefore, fail.” (Emphasis added) 65. With the abolition of Zamidari by the 1951 Act that right has passed on not to the appellant but to the State Government. The appellants’ writ petition filed to restrain the State Government from auctioning the right to undertake mining operations must, therefore, fail.” (Emphasis added) 65. In view of provisions discussed above as well as judicial authorities, considering effect of Sections 4 and 6 of U.P. Act, 1951, we have no manner of doubt that not only land of disputed villages, but all rights relating to mines and minerals, whether on the surface or under the surface etc. vested in State of U.P. and it became sole owner thereof. All the rights etc. of erstwhile owner, i.e. Intermediary, i.e., Kamlakar Singh, ceased and extinguished as on 1.7.1952 and thereafter. 66. Question (ii), therefore is answered accordingly in favour of defendant-appellant and against plaintiff-respondent. We find that on this aspect, Trial Court has not dealt with matter properly and has misled itself with assessment of compensation under Section 27. Consequences of Sections 4 and 6 of U.P. Act, 1951 are not otherwise affected by assessment of compensation and that was a totally different aspect. Trial Court in taking an otherwise view has clearly erred in law and it is also contrary to express provisions of U.P. Act, 1951 hence contrary findings are reversed. 67. Learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent contended that rights of lessee and sub-lessee have been allowed to continue under Chapter VI read with Section 7 of U.P. Act, 1951 and to that extent, even if erstwhile lessor, i.e., Kamlakar Singh, ceased to have any right of ownership etc. over disputed land, lessee’s and sub-lessee’s rights to continue with their mining operations in terms of existing lease dated 16.4.1947 were protected and that would not stand affected. Though this aspect we intend to discuss while considering other substantial issues, which have arisen in Suit, but at this stage, we may consider the above argument only to the extent whether Section-7 and Chapter-VI of U.P. Act, 9151 in any manner affects ownership rights of State, vested on 1.7.1952 by virtue of Sections 4 and 6 of U.P. Act, 1951, so as to whittle down to any extent. 68. With respect to continuance of mining operations, attention of Court has been drawn to Section 7 and Chapter VI comprising Sections 106 to 112 of U.P.Act, 1951. 68. With respect to continuance of mining operations, attention of Court has been drawn to Section 7 and Chapter VI comprising Sections 106 to 112 of U.P.Act, 1951. Sections 7, 106, 107 and 108 of U.P.Act, 1951 relevant for our purpose read as under : 7. “Saving in respect of certain rights—Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way affect the right of any person- (a) to continue to work any mines comprised in any estate herein above acquired which shall be governed by the law for the time being in force; (aa) being a bhumidhar, sirdar, adhivasi or asami of any land, to continue to enjoy any easement or any similar right for the more beneficial enjoyment of the land, as he was enjoying on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting; (b) to recover any arrears of rent, cesses, sayar or other dues which accrued before the date of vesting and the same shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, be recoverable as hereto before by the person entitled thereto. Provided that no decree for an arrear of rent or order for ejectment in default of an arrear of rent shall be executed by ejectment of the judgment debtor from his holding: Provided further that rent, cesses, local rates, sayar or other dues as aforesaid which are payable by an intermediary, whose interest in the state in respect of which the arrear is due has been acquired under the provisions of this Act, may in addition to any other remedy open to the person entitled, be realized from or paid out of the compensation money payable to such intermediary.” “106. Working of mines to be governed by this chapter—Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the right to operate or work mines and to extract minerals therefrom shall, from the date of vesting, be governed by the provisions of this chapter. 107. Mines worked by the intermediary—(1) With effect from the date of vesting, all mines comprised in the estate or estates acquired under this Act, as were in operation on the date immediately preceding the said date and were being worked directly by the intermediary shall, if so desired by him, be deemed to have been leased by the State Government to the intermediary and such intermediary shall be entitled to retain possession of those mines as a lessee thereof. (2) The terms and conditions of the said lease by the State Government shall be such as may be agreed upon between the State Government and the itnermediary, or, in default of agreement, as may be settled by a Mines Tribunal appointed under Section 110. Provided that all such terms and conditions shall be in accordance with the provisions of any Central Act for the time being in force regulating the grant of new mining leases. 108. Subsisting leases of mines and minerals—(1) Where immediately before the date of vesting of the estate or estates, there is a subsisting lease of mines or minerals comprised in the estate or estates or any part thereof the whole or the part of the estate or estates comprised in such lease shall, with effect from the date of vesting, be deemed to have been leased by the State Government to the holder of the said subsisting lease for the remainder of the term of that lease and such holder shall be entitled to retain possession of the held property. (2) The terms and conditions of the said lease by the State Government shall, mutatis mutandis, be the same as the terms and conditions of the subsisting lease referred to in sub-section (1), but with the additional condition that, if, in the opinion of the State Government, the holder of the lease had not, before the date of the commencement of this Act, done any prospecting or development work, the State Government shall be entitled at any time before the expiry of one year from the said date to terminate the lease by giving three months’ notice in writing: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to prevent any modifications being made in the terms and conditions of the said lease in accordance with the provisions of any Central Act for the time being in force regulating the modification of existing mining leases. (3) The holder of any such lease of mines and minerals as is referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entitled to claim any damages from the outgoing intermediary on the ground that the terms of the lease executed by such intermediary in respect of the said mines and minerals have become incapable of fulfillment by the operation of this Act.” (Emphasis added) 69. The lease-deed executed by Kamlakar Singh on 16.4.1947 in his capacity as proprietor/owner/Zamindar of the land in dispute, including mines and minerals found on the land or in sub-soil was valid at that time. We find no infirmity since statute existed on that date to make it invalid. Thereafter, when entire disputed land vested in State of U.P. with effect from 1st July, 1952 under Sections 4 and 6 of U.P.Act, 1951, Kamlakar Singh ceased to have any rights, whatsoever, in respect of the said land as well as mines and minerals etc. His right even to excavate minerals etc. or transfer of such rights on rent to others extinguished. The entire estate including mines and minerals etc., from the date of vesting, vested in State of U.P. leaving status of Kamlakar Singh only that of an ex Zamindar entitled to compensation under Section 27 of U.P. Act, 1951. 70. It is not disputed before us that as a result of vesting of Estate of Kamlakar Singh in State of U.P., resultant compensation determined under U.P. Act, 1951 has been paid to Kamlakar Singh and he ceased to have any interest, right or otherwise privilege or benefit in the disputed land, including minerals found therein, on and after 1.7.1952. Section 107 protected existing lease rights of Intermediary if he was continuing any mining lease but that was not a case with respect to Kamlakar Singh since he was not carrying on any mining activity on the disputed land, and, instead, entire land in dispute was let out to plaintiff-respondent. Hence, Kamlakar Singh did not continue any right of mining under Section 107. The existing rights of lessee or sub-lessee, if any, insofar as protected under Section 108 read with Section 7 of U.P. Act, 1951, is a different thing, which may be discussed in detail while considering other issues, but at this stage, we may elaborate the aforesaid provisions only to the extent said provisions have been relied by learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent having effect on Question (ii) regarding ownership on mines and minerals. 71. Section 7 of U.P.Act, 1951 protected a right to continue to work any mines comprised in any ‘Estate’ vested in State of U.P. If there was any arrears of rent, cesses, sayar or other dues, the same could have been recovered from such person. The ownership, therefore, in respect of minerals etc. 71. Section 7 of U.P.Act, 1951 protected a right to continue to work any mines comprised in any ‘Estate’ vested in State of U.P. If there was any arrears of rent, cesses, sayar or other dues, the same could have been recovered from such person. The ownership, therefore, in respect of minerals etc. ceased to be vested in Kamlakar Singh and acquired by State of U.P. Thereafter, manner in which mining operations etc. may continue, as we have already said, would be governed by the provisions contained in Chapter-VI of U.P. Act, 1951. Section 106 very clearly says that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, i.e. U.P. Act, 1951, right to operate or work mines and to extract minerals therefrom, on and after the date of vesting, would be governed by provisions of Chapter VI. Section 107 has no application in this case. Since plaintiff has nowhere pleaded facts, either in the plaint or otherwise, before Court below, that area of 46 villages leased out to it by Kamlakar Singh, any part thereof had continued under mining operation with Kamlakar Singh, who was “Intermediary” on the date of vesting. On the contrary, the case set up by plaintiff is that entire mining operations etc. in 46 villages were leased out to plaintiff by Kamlakar Singh. The plaintiff, therefore, was in the capacity of lessee while lessor-Intermediary i.e. Kamlakar Singh lost ownership rights over mines and minerals, being part ‘Estate’, to State of U.P. by virtue of Sections 4 and 6 of U.P. Act, 1951. Therefore, Kamlakar Singh did not get any “deemed lease” from State of U.P. under Section 107(1). 72. Case of plaintiff in fact is founded on Section 108 which deals with interest of subsisting lessees in respect of mines and minerals, who were operating on the date of vesting. Here also, Section 108(1) makes it very clear that from the date of vesting, susbsisting lease may continue but instead of initial lessor, the ‘Estate’ thereof would be that of State of U.P. Section 108(1) also says that from the date of vesting, subsisting lease shall be deemed to have been leased out by State Government to the holder for remaining term of that lease and such holder shall be entitled to hold possession of leasehold property. Regarding terms and conditions, Section 108(2) provides that it would be the same as were in subsisting lease but State Government, in certain conditions, would have a right to terminate the same. The Proviso thereof however, makes it clear that nothing in Section 108(2) would prevent any modification in terms and conditions of subsisting lease to make it consistent with the provisions of any Central Act, in force for the time being, in respect of existing mining leases. 73. The resultant effect of above discussion is that subsisting lease(s) continued to be operated by plaintiff-respondent by virtue of Section 108(1) and (2) respectively but plaintiff could not have raised any objection if any modification is made to bring terms and conditions of subsisting lease in accordance with any Central Act, for the time being in force, in respect of existing mining leases. The status of plaintiff became as lessee of State of U.P. 74. Plaintiff-respondent, therefore, is not much, off the point, in contending that despite vesting of Estate in State of U.P., subsisting lease of plaintiff-respondent, continued subject to change of the terms and conditions by State of U.P. and plaintiff got a deemed lease with State of U.P. 75. Till enactment of MMRD Act, 1957, it is nobody’s case that State of U.P. proceeded to make any change in terms and conditions of lease-deed dated 16.4.1947. Therefore, plaintiff-respondent validly continued with mining operations even after vesting of ‘Estate’ in State of U.P., as per terms and conditions of lease dated 16.4.1947. 76. The right to continue mining operations is one thing but it cannot be said that plaintiff-respondent possessed ownership rights over minerals found in disputed villages despite vesting of same in State of U.P., who became owner. Subject to payment of rent, royalty etc., as the case may be, subsisting lessees only continued with the right to operate mines under subsisting lease. In other words, by virtue of Section 108, plaintiff’-respondent continued lease rights of mining etc. under lease-deed dated 16.4.1947 with the modification that in place of Kamlakar Singh, owner of land became State of U.P. and all dues towards rent etc. became payable to State of U.P. 77. The view, we have taken above, is further fortified from Section 6 of U.P. Act, 1951, which makes it clear that contracts or leases etc., already executed by “Intermediary,” notwithstanding thereof, rent etc. became payable to State of U.P. 77. The view, we have taken above, is further fortified from Section 6 of U.P. Act, 1951, which makes it clear that contracts or leases etc., already executed by “Intermediary,” notwithstanding thereof, rent etc. shall be payable/recoverable by State Government from “Intermediary” as well as “lessees”, as the case may be, and nothing would be payable to “Intermediary”. The land etc. would stand transferred without any encumbrance, meaning thereby, State of U.P. would enter into the shoes of erstwhile owner and will enjoy the same status after vesting. That being so, lease/contract, as the case may be, executed by “Intermediary” before date of vesting, if are allowed to continue by any provision of U.P. Act, 1951 with respect to right to operate or work mines etc., that would mean that agreement/contract would be read as if after vesting, it continued as was executed by State Government. Any other view, would be contrary to specific effect of Section 4 and 6 of U.P. Act, 1951. 78. Further Section 108(1) says, where there is a subsisting lease of mines or minerals in respect of ‘Estate’ which vested in State of U.P. and was executed before date of vesting, with effect from the date of vesting, it shall be deemed to have have been leased by State Government to the holder of said subsisting lease and such holder shall be entitled to retain possession of the lease held property. Thus the view we have taken above is duly founded on clear provisions of statute, i.e. U.P. Act, 1951. 79. The terms and conditions of subsisting lease would continue to be same but State Government is conferred with right to alter the same or to terminate, before expiry of one year from the said date, by giving three months’ notice in writing. The provision is very clear. It provides that subsisting lease, would continue under Section 107 and 108, as the case may be, by operation of law and State Government would be deemed to have granted such lease. 80. Question (ii), therefore, is answered holding that after vesting of ‘Estate’ constituting disputed villages in State of U.P., with effect from 1st July, 1952, under U.P. Act, 1951, including sub-soil, mines and minerals, Kamlakar Singh ceased to have any ownership right over mining and minerals found in the said land. 80. Question (ii), therefore, is answered holding that after vesting of ‘Estate’ constituting disputed villages in State of U.P., with effect from 1st July, 1952, under U.P. Act, 1951, including sub-soil, mines and minerals, Kamlakar Singh ceased to have any ownership right over mining and minerals found in the said land. The protection of existing lease rights of plaintiff did not dilute ownership rights of State of U.P. which it acquired free of all encumbrances. 81. Now, we formulate questions relating to substantial aspects which gave cause of action to plaintiff-respondent to file Suit, i.e., action of defendant-appellant and its authorities in demanding Royalty in accordance with the provisions of MMRD Act, 1957 and also to take action for execution of fresh lease to third parties with regard to mining and extractions etc. of minerals in the disputed villages. In addition to two questions answered above, further questions/points for determination, arise in this appeal, as we have culled out from respective arguments, are: (iii) Whether mining lease dated 16.4.1947 continued to be contractual lease or by virtue of Section 7 read with Sections 107 and 108 of U.P. Act, 1951 became ‘statutory lease’? (iv) Whether lease rights of plaintiff were controlled by any Central or Provincial legislation in 1947 or thereafter when it was a contractual lease controlling terms and conditions of lease as well as excavation, transportation etc. of minerals? (v) Whether lease rights of plaintiff were controlled by any Central or Provincial legislation when it became a ‘statutory lease’, controlling terms and conditions of lease as well as excavation, transportation etc. of mineral? (vi) Whether terms and conditions of statutory lease under U.P. Act, 1951, are governed, regulated and controlled by MMRD Act, 1957 and Rules framed thereunder so as to affect terms and conditions of lease and also dead rent and royalty on the minerals? (vii) Whether lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 is/was legal and executable in view of MMRD Act, 1957. 82. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for plaintiff-respondent, at the outset, contended that after enforcement of U.P. Act, 1951 with effect from 1.7.1952, Estate vested in State Government but the existing lease continued with lessee and only difference is that in place of private lessor, i.e. Zamindar, State Government was substituted by operation of law and that is how existing lease changed its nature from contractual to statutory and became a “statutory lease”. He also contended that aforesaid statutory lease was not governed by provisions of any Central or State legislation dealing with mines and minerals including MMRD Act, 1957 and, therefore, demand of royalty under provisions of MMRD Act, 1957 by Collector is wholly illegal and plaintiff-respondents or any other sub-lessee is liable to pay only such dead rent or royalty, as is admitted under lease-deed dated 16.4.1947 and 27.4.1959. 83. The question whether lease-deed dated 16.4.1047 entered into between erstwhile Zamindar/Intermediary and plaintiff-respondent became statutory lease when it was allowed to continue by virtue of Section 7 read with Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951 cannot detain us long since we find substance in submission of Sri Shashi Nandan that it became a “statutory lease” as on 1.7.1952. 84. This question has been considered in Bihar Mines Ltd. v. Union of India (supra). It is a Constitution Bench judgment deciding the matter by majority, consisting of Hon’ble Raghubar Dayal, Hon’ble K. Subba Rao and Hon’ble S.M. Sikri, J.J. Therein Court considered question, whether a lease granted before enactment of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “Bihar Act, 1950”), continued by virtue of Section 10 would be a new “statutory lease” or an existing mining lease executed before 25.10.1949. It would be necessary to examine basic facts giving rise to the dispute in Bihar Mines Ltd. v. Union of India (supra). One Raja Ran Bahadur Singh of Palganj had a big Estate under his Zamindari. On 11.8.1928 he executed a lease with respect to certain area of his estate in favour of Babu Tribanj Murari Chakravarti of Asansol (hereinafter referred to as “Head Lessee”) for a period of 49 years. Purpose of execution of lease as mentioned therein, was to carry out mining operations in the said area for “soap stone”, “kaoline” etc. “Head Lessee” executed a sub-lease in favour of Deoji Jairam Solanki on 18.5.1933. Sri Solanki, sub-lessee, granted a further sub-lease in respect to same area to M/s Hirji Premji Parmar and Brothers on 18.5.1934. Then on 18.10.1954 M/s Hirji Premji Parmar and Brothers assigned their right, title and interest in the said area in favour of M/s Bihar Mines Ltd., Calcutta for a period of 19 years and 7 months expiring on 17.5.1974. On 25.9.1952, Bihar Act, 1950 came into force. Then on 18.10.1954 M/s Hirji Premji Parmar and Brothers assigned their right, title and interest in the said area in favour of M/s Bihar Mines Ltd., Calcutta for a period of 19 years and 7 months expiring on 17.5.1974. On 25.9.1952, Bihar Act, 1950 came into force. On 13.7.1953, Government of Bihar issued a Notification under Section 3(1) of Bihar Act, 1950 declaring that estate of Palganj passed to and became vested in State. On 26.1.1955, Government of Bihar issued another notification under Section 3A of Bihar Act, 1950 declaring that intermediary interests of all intermediaries in whole estate had passed to and become vested in the State. An argument was advanced that in view of Section 10, by aforesaid vesting in State and protection of existing leases to continue with the change of lessor by substituting “Zamindar” with “State Government”, there came into existence a “new statutory lease” on the date of such vesting. 85. Section 10 of Bihar Act, 1950 reads as under: “Subsisting leases of mines and minerals— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where immediately before the date of vesting of the estate or tenure there is a subsisting lease of mines or minerals comprised in the estate or tenure or any part thereof, the whole or that part of the estate or tenure comprised in such lease shall, with effect from the date of vesting, be deemed to have been leased by the State Government to the holder of the said subsisting lease for the remainder of the term of that lease, and such holder shall be entitled to retain possession of the leasehold property. (2) The terms and conditions of the said lease by the State Government shall mutatis mutandis be the same as the terms and conditions of the subsisting lease referred to in sub-section (1), but with the additional condition that, if in the opinion of the State Government the holder of the lease had not, before the date of the commencement of this Act, done any prospecting or development work, the State Government shall be entitled at any time before the expiry of one year from the said date to determine the lease by giving three months’ notice in writing : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to prevent any modifications being made in the terms and conditions of the said lease in accordance with the provision of any Central Act for the time being in force regulating the modification of existing mining leases. (3) The holder of any such lease of mines and minerals as is referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entitled to claim any damages from the outgoing proprietor or tenure-holder on the ground that the terms of the lease executed by such proprietor or tenure-holder in respect of the said mines and minerals have become incapable of fulfilment by the operation of this Act.” (emphasis added) 86. Construing Section 10 of Bihar Act, 1950, Court held that effect of Estate being deemed to be leased by State Government is that lessee of Intermediary becomes lessee of State Government for all purposes from the date of vesting of Estate in the State. He cannot be deemed to be a lessee of Intermediary whose title under the original lease stood lost. It also held that “statutory lease” now held by ‘’Head Lessee’ from State Government is a new lease granted after 25.10.1949 i.e. on the date of vesting. The aforesaid judgment, however, lays down, firstly, that after vesting of Estate in State Government, individual lessor stood substituted by State Government and existing/subsisting lease became a new lease. Since it changed its nature from “contractual lease” to “statutory lease”; is deemed to have been granted on the date of vesting by State Government. This judgment was rendered interpreting Section 10 of Bihar Act, 1950. 87. Since it changed its nature from “contractual lease” to “statutory lease”; is deemed to have been granted on the date of vesting by State Government. This judgment was rendered interpreting Section 10 of Bihar Act, 1950. 87. Having gone through Section 10 of Bihar Act, 1950 and Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951, we do not find any substantial difference with regard to consequences of vesting of Estate in State of U.P. and substitution of Zamindar /Intermediary, the original lessor, by State Government. Thus, taking a view in favour of plaintiff-respondent and accepting argument of Sri Shashi Nandan, particularly when nothing otherwise could be placed by learned Additional Advocate General before us, we find no hesitation in holding that in the present case also, a new “statutory lease” came into existence on 1.7.1952 after vesting of land of disputed villages with State Government and substitution of status of lessor from erstwhile owner to State Government. 88. Now the effect would be that plaintiff-respondent or any other sub-lessee(s) continued to have a right of carrying on mining operations on the let out land under the erstwhile lease, but it would be treated to be a new lease which came into existence on 1.7.1952 with status of a “statutory lease”, instead of “contractual lease”. Further, right to make alteration in terms and conditions in statutory lease is also retained with State Government so as to make terms and conditions of lease consistent with provisions of Central Act, for the time being in force relating to mines and minerals. 89. We answer Question (iii) accordingly holding that lease-deed dated 16.4.1947 which was a “contractual lease” ceased to be in operation as such on and after 1.7.1952 and thereafter there came into existence a new “statutory lease”, though terms and conditions of said lease would continue to be same as were under contractual lease dated 16.4.1947, unless and until alterations are made. However, this lease had to conform with the provisions of any Central Act for the time being in force, regulating mining operations. 90. Now we propose to deal with Questions (iv), (v) and (vi) together. We are informed that earliest Legislation, which relates to mines and minerals is “Indian Mines Act, 1923” (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1923”). However, this lease had to conform with the provisions of any Central Act for the time being in force, regulating mining operations. 90. Now we propose to deal with Questions (iv), (v) and (vi) together. We are informed that earliest Legislation, which relates to mines and minerals is “Indian Mines Act, 1923” (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1923”). Neither the said Act has been placed before us by either of the parties nor we have otherwise advantage of its perusal, but it is also not shown by either of parties to us that the said Act in any manner impose any constraint upon erstwhile owner of land including mines, for leasing it out for extraction of minerals etc. Therefore, we have to proceed as if the said Act has no application to lease-deed dated 16.4.1947 granting rights to excavate or take away minerals from disputed land. 91. Next comes GI Act, 1935. Entry 36 List-I of Seventh Schedule (which was called “Federal Legislative List”) provided for legislation with regard to “mines and minerals”. We are informed that with reference to Entry 36, List-I of Seventh Schedule, Government of India framed Rules, 1939, but copy of such Rules has also not been made available to us to find out whether there was anything inconsistent with provisions of said Rules in the lease-deed dated 16.4.1947. In absence of such Rules placed before us to show that the same regulated or controlled grant of mining lease for extraction, transportation, removal etc. of minerals, we find no reason to hold that lease-deed dated 16.4.1947, as it was then executed by Kamlakar Singh, was invalid or inconsistent with any statutory provision. Hence it has to be held a valid lease as it then was executed between the parties. 92. But, the matter does not rest here for the reason that after a short while of execution of lease-deed dated 16.4.1947, exercising legislative power, Federal Legislation enacted MMRD Act, 1948 (Act No. LIII of 1948), which received assent of Governor General on 8.9.1948 and came into force on 25.10.1949 by virtue of Notification issued by Central Government under Section 1(3) of MMRD Act, 1948. Section 4 prohibited grant of any mining lease after commencement of MMRD Act, 1948 otherwise than in accordance with Rules made thereunder and also declares that any mining lease granted contrary to Sub-section (1) shall be void and of no effect. Section 4 prohibited grant of any mining lease after commencement of MMRD Act, 1948 otherwise than in accordance with Rules made thereunder and also declares that any mining lease granted contrary to Sub-section (1) shall be void and of no effect. Section 5 conferred power upon Central Government for making Rules in respect of mining leases. Section 6 conferred power to make Rules in respect of mineral development, which may provide for regulation or prohibition of mining, quarrying or digging for or excavating or collecting of minerals from any mine or in any area and also collection of royalties, fees etc. and various other aspects detailed in Sub-section (2) of Section 6. Section 7 provided that in respect of existing leases, Central Government may make Rules for modifying or altering terms and conditions of any mining lease granted prior to commencement of MMRD Act, 1948 so as to bring such lease in conformity with Rules made under Sections 5 and 6. 93. The aforesaid Act had its application to the area of disputed villages. Since lease-deed was already executed and it was an existing lease, being that of 16.4.1947, if any Rules would have been made by Central Government under Section 7, it was open to modify or alter terms and conditions of lease-deed dated 16.4.1947 to bring the same in accordance with such Rules, else lease-deed dated 16.4.1947 could have been operated without obstruction. 94. We are informed that under MMRD Act, 1948, Central Government published Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1949”) for regulating grant of prospecting licences and mining leases for minerals other than petroleum and natural gases. These Rules came into force on 25.10.1949. 95. Lease-deed dated 16.4.1947, thus, so long as it continued to be a “contractual lease” is not shown to have been affected otherwise by defendant-appellant even when MMRD Act, 1948 and Rules, 1949 were framed. The said lease-deed continued to hold field on its own and right of lessor and lessee did not get adversely affected or regulated by said Statutes on their enactment. 96. As soon as lease became “statutory”, it ceased to be an existing lease granted on 16.4.1947. The said lease-deed continued to hold field on its own and right of lessor and lessee did not get adversely affected or regulated by said Statutes on their enactment. 96. As soon as lease became “statutory”, it ceased to be an existing lease granted on 16.4.1947. Court in Bihar Mines Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) said in para 18 of judgment, “We are therefore of opinion that the statutory lease now held by head lessee from the State Government is a new lease granted after October 25, 1949.” 97. Thus, we may now examine whether this “new statutory lease” had to comply with the provisions of MMRD Act, 1948 and Rules, 1949. Terms “mines”, “minerals” and “mining lease” were defined in Section 3 (b) (c) and (d) of MMRD Act, 1948 and read as under: “3. Definitions.—In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- (a) .... (b) “mine” means any excavation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals and includes an oil-well; (c) “minerals” include natural gas and petroleum; (d) “mining lease” means a lease granted for the purpose of searching for, winning, working, getting, making merchantable, carrying away or disposing of minerals or for purposes connected therewith, and includes an exploring or a prospecting license;” 98. Section 4 prohibits grant of any mining lease after commencement of MMRD Act, 1948 otherwise than in accordance with Rules. It reads as under: “4. No mining lease to be valid unless it is in accordance with this Act.—(1) No mining lease shall be granted after the commencement of this Act otherwise than in accordance with the rules made under this Act. (2) Any mining lease granted contrary to the provision of sub-section (1) shall be void and of no effect.” 99. Section 7 deals with the modification of existing leases granted prior to commencement of MMRD Act, 1948. It is contended that the word “granted” means a lease granted by owner and not where a lease has come into existence by operation of law, i.e., a “statutory lease”. Therefore, statutory lease came into existence on 1.7.1952, would remain unaffected by MMRD Act, 1948, since it is not a lease granted. 100. We find force in the submission of learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent. Therefore, statutory lease came into existence on 1.7.1952, would remain unaffected by MMRD Act, 1948, since it is not a lease granted. 100. We find force in the submission of learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent. Even after coming into existence a “new statutory lease” on 1.7.1952, it remained unaffected by provisions of MMRD Act, 1948 and Rules, 1949 framed thereunder, since it was not a lease granted by owner but operated by virtue of operation of law. 101. We are also informed that under Section 7 of MMRD Act, 1948, Central Government published in Gazette of India, Extraordinary dated 5.9.1956 “The Mining Leases (Modification of Terms) Rules, 1956” (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1956”). Section 7 was applicable to existing leases granted prior to commencement of MMRD Act, 1948. In the present case, a new statutory lease has come into existence on 1.7.1952, hence the said Rules would have no impact on the continuance of mining operations by plaintiff-respondent, i.e., Head Lessee and sub-lessees. Thus, even new statutory lease remained unaffected by MMRD Act, 1948 and Rules framed thereunder. The plaintiff’s right to operate mining lease under statutory lease thus continued validly. 102. Under Constitution of India, Entry 54, List-I, Seventh Schedule empowers Union to make laws regulating mines and mineral development to the extent such regulation and development under the control of Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. This Entry reads as under: “54. Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.” 103. With respect to Provincial Legislation, the relevant Entries 23 and 50 of List-II, Seventh Schedule, read as under: “23. Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union.” “50. Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.” 104. Parliament, consequently, enacted MMRD Act, 1957 making a declaration under Section 2 that it is expedient in public interest that Union should take under its control regulation of mines and development of mineral to the extent hereinafter provided. Section 4 thereof regulates mining leases. Parliament, consequently, enacted MMRD Act, 1957 making a declaration under Section 2 that it is expedient in public interest that Union should take under its control regulation of mines and development of mineral to the extent hereinafter provided. Section 4 thereof regulates mining leases. Section 9 read with Second Schedule provides for rate of Royalty payable by a lessee in respect of each mineral and Section 9-A provides for dead rent which is in the nature of minimum Royalty. 105. Court below after referring to Section 4 has held that MMRD Act, 1957 is not applicable to statutory lease of plaintiff-respondent which has continued under Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951 for the reason that it is not a lease granted under MMRD Act, 1957 and Rules framed thereunder and the said Statute is not applicable to statutory leases. In our view, Court below has misread and misconstrued Section 4 of MMRD Act, 1957. It reads as under: “4. Prospecting or mining operations to be under licence or lease : (1) No person shall undertake any prospecting or mining operations in any area, except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a prospecting licence or, as the case may be, a mining lease, granted under this Act and the rules made thereunder: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect any prospecting or mining operations undertaken in any area in accordance with the terms and conditions of a prospecting licence or mining lease granted before the commencement of this Act which is in force at such commencement. (2) No prospecting licence of mining lease shall be granted otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.” (emphasis added) 106. Section 4(1) is in two parts. First part prohibits any prospecting or mining operations in any area whatsoever. Second part permits such activities subject to terms and conditions on which a prospecting licence or a mining lease is granted under MMRD Act, 1957 and Rules framed thereunder. The prohibition is complete. It applies to all kinds of mining operations. The term “mining operation” has also been defined in Section 3 (d) of MMRD Act, 1957 and reads as under: “(d) “mining operations” means any operations undertaken for the purpose of winning any mineral;” 107. The prohibition is complete. It applies to all kinds of mining operations. The term “mining operation” has also been defined in Section 3 (d) of MMRD Act, 1957 and reads as under: “(d) “mining operations” means any operations undertaken for the purpose of winning any mineral;” 107. The term “mining operation” which is prohibited by Section 4(1) is very wide and has no reservation, restriction or reason so as to be given a narrow meaning or interpretation. Any work which is carried out for winning any mineral is included within the words “mining operation”. An attempt was made to read the word “winning” in a restricted manner, but negating the same in Bihar Mines Limited v. Union of India (supra), Court said that there is no reason to give a narrow meaning to expression “winning”. In popular sense, winning a mineral means getting or extracting it from mine. 108. In D.K. Trivedi and Sons v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1986 SC 1323 , Court held that quarrying mineral is a mining operation as it consists of an operation undergone for the purpose of winning particular classes of minerals. 109. In Industrial Fuels Marketing Company v. Union of India, AIR 1983 Cal 253 , also Court followed comprehensive meaning of the expression “winning” and said that “winning” does not necessarily means extracting a mineral by excavating earth or soil, but it means also collection of mineral from surface of earth. In other words, if a mineral is extracted or obtained irrespective of the fact, whether the activity is carried out on the surface or in the bowels of earth, it is within the meaning the word “winning”. 110. It is not the case of plaintiff-respondent that sand, ballast, stones etc., which were being quarried from disputed land is not winning of minerals, and, therefore, it was a “mining operation” as defined under Section 3(d). Section 4(1) prohibits any “mining operation” in any area. The only exception is, where mining lease is granted under MMRD Act, 1957 and Rules framed thereunder or it is one covered under Proviso to Section 4(1) of MMRD Act, 1957. Meaning thereby, it was mandatory and obligatory for any person whatsoever to obtain a mining lease under MMRD Act, 1957 and the Rules framed thereunder to carry out mining operations, else it is void, illegal and contrary to MMRD Act, 1957. 111. Meaning thereby, it was mandatory and obligatory for any person whatsoever to obtain a mining lease under MMRD Act, 1957 and the Rules framed thereunder to carry out mining operations, else it is void, illegal and contrary to MMRD Act, 1957. 111. We may also point out that term “mining lease” is defined under Section 3(c) and it talks of a lease granted for the purpose of undertaking mining operations. Unlike MMRD Act, 1948, intention of Legislature under MMRD Act, 1957 is much wide and comprehensive. Under MMRD Act, 1948, term “mining operation” was neither defined nor stressed but only “mining lease” was defined therein under Section 3(d) and controlling provision, i.e., Sections 4 and 7 were in respect of mining leases whether granted before MMRD Act, 1948 or thereafter. In MMRD Act, 1957, Legislature after having experienced in the past nine years, realised difficulty in controlling matters relating to mines with reference to mining leases, and, therefore, made it wider by expanding the horizon using the term “mining operation”. Therefore, under Section 4 of MMRD Act, 1957 what has been restricted/prohibited is a mining operation, which is very wide and covers everything. It is wholly irrelevant whether such mining operation was under a “contractual mining lease” or “statutory mining lease”. Parliamentary legislation enacted under List-I completely prohibits a mining operation in any area and that applies to all. Court below in observing that Section 4(1) is applicable only to “contractual lease” and not “statutory lease”, has read something therein which is not there and aforesaid finding of Court below is clearly incorrect and has to be reversed. Court below also has erred in holding that MMRD Act, 1957 would apply to such leases only as are granted thereunder. 112. Then Section 4 permits mining operations etc. in two circumstances; (1) permit, licence or lease, as the case may be, is granted under Act, 1957 and Rules framed thereunder; and, (2) if there was already a prospecting or mining operation, undergoing in an area in terms and conditions of a prospecting licence or mining lease granted before the commencement of MMRD Act, 1957 which is in force at such commencement, that would continue and prohibition under Section 4(1) shall have no application on such prospecting licence or mining lease. 113. 113. Here again this proviso of Section 4(1) which permits a mining operation already undergoing in an area, is applicable to a mining lease granted before commencement of Act. We have already held while upholding contention of plaintiff-respondent that term “granted” means a lease granted by owner under an agreement, but this word “granted” will not cover a statutory lease. Plaintiff’s lease which became a “new statutory lease” by virtue of Section 7 read with Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951 cannot be said to be a mining lease granted so as to be covered by Section 4(1) proviso. The reasons is also obvious. Any contractual lease, if granted before commencement of MMRD Act, 1957, must and could have been granted complying provisions of MMRD Act, 1948 and Rules framed thereunder. Hence, Legislature allowed such lease to continue. 114. Counsel for plaintiff-respondent sought to explain the word “granted” in reference to Section 4 of MMRD Act, 1948 that the word “granted” would not mean a “statutory lease” and in that way claimed protection from application of MMRD Act, 1948 and Rules, 1949. If that be so, same interpretation and meaning will have to be assigned to word “granted” under Section 4(1) Proviso of MMRD Act, 1957 in the absence of any otherwise intention shown in the said provision. Hence, this proviso will not protect plaintiff-respondent so as to continue with mining operation under “statutory lease”, came into existence on 1.7.1952. We thus, have no hesitation in holding that on and after 1.6.1958 plaintiff-respondent lost any authority to continue mining operations on the land within villages in dispute relying on statutory lease of 1.7.1952 since all such mining operations stood prohibited by Section 4(1) of MMRD Act, 1957 and thereafter only those operations could have operated as are allowed/granted under such Act. 115. 115. However, for the benefit of plaintiff-respondent, even if we read proviso to Section 4(1) so as to protect existing statutory lease of plaintiff-respondent operating since before commencement of MMRD Act, 1957, still finding, of Trial Court that MMRD Act, 1957 is not applicable in this case cannot be saved and has to be declared illegal for the reason that proviso to Section 4(1) permits mining operations in an area in accordance with terms and conditions of a mining lease granted before commencement of MMRD Act, 1957 but that brings in applicability of MMRD Act, 1957 on the statutory lease, plaintiff respondent was having at the time of commencement of MMRD Act, 1957. That takes us to some other provisions of Act, which have overriding effect over instrument of lease or any law in force at the time of commencement of MMRD Act, 1957. We may refer to Section 9 of MMRD Act, 1957 which talks of royalties in respect to mining lease and is applicable to mining leases whether granted before commencement of said Act or thereafter. It reads as under: “9. Royalties in respect of mining leases : (1) The holder of a mining lease granted before the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument of lease or in any law in force at such commencement, pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee from the leased area after such commencement, at the rate for the time being specified in the Second Schedule in respect of that mineral. (2) The holder of a mining lease granted on or after the commencement of this Act shall pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee from the leased area at the rate for the time being specified in the Second Schedule in respect of that mineral. (2A) The holder of a mining lease, whether granted before or after the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Amendment Act, 1972, shall not be liable to pay any royalty in respect of any coal consumed by a workman engaged in a colliery provided that such consumption by the workman does not exceed one-third of a tonne per month. (3) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, amend the Second Schedule so as to enhance or reduce the rate at which royalty shall be payable in respect of any mineral with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification: Provided that the Central Government shall not enhance the rate of royalty in respect of any mineral more than once during any period of three years.” (Emphasis added) 116. Section 9(1) declares to have overriding effect over any instrument of lease or any law in force at the commencement of MMRD Act, 1957 and notwithstanding thereto holder of mining lease has to pay royalty in respect of mineral removed or consumed by him or his agent etc., at the rate specified in Second Schedule in respect of that mineral. Section 9 thus shall prevail even upon a statutory leases since not only instrument of lease but even any law in force will not come in the way is the clear intention of Legislature. Plaintiff-respondent, therefore, cannot absolve itself of the liability of payment of royalty as per rates specified in Second Schedule of MMRD Act, 1957. 117. We may also notice at this stage that Parliament had no reservation to bring in existing statutory leases also in conformity with MMRD Act, 1957 and Rules made thereunder. In initial enactment of MMRD Act, 1957, Section 16(1), as enacted, read as under: “16. (1) All mining leases granted before the 25th day of October, 1949 shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, be brought into conformity with the provisions of this Act and the rules made under Sections 13 and 18: Provided that if the Central Government is of opinion that in the interest of mineral development it is expedient so to do, it may, for reasons to be recorded, permit any person to hold one or more such mining leases covering in any one State a total area in excess of that specified in clause (b) of Section 6 or for a period exceeding that specified in sub-section (1) of Section 8.” 118. It was amended by substitution by Act 56 of 1972 in view of declaration by Court that contractual leases granted before statutes came to be enacted relating to abolition of Zamindari rights and vesting of land in State thereunder rendering contractual leases, by operation of law statutory leases to which Section 16(1) as it was initially enacted was inapplicable and thus, to bring in within its ambit even statutory leases, Section 16 was widely amended. For our purpose we may reproduce Section 16(1) as it was substituted by Act No. 56 of 1972, as under: “16. Power to modify mining lease granted before 25th October, 1949: (1) (a) All mining leases granted before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Amendment Act, 1972 (56 of 1972) if in force at such commencement, shall be brought into conformity with the provisions of this Act, and the rules made thereunder, within six months from such commencement, or such further time as the Central Government may, by general or special order, specify in this behalf. (b) Where the rights under any mining lease, granted by the proprietor of an estate or tenure before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Amendment Act, 1972, have vested, on or after the 25th day of October, 1949 in the State Government in pursuance of the provisions of any Act of any Provincial or State Legislature which provides for the acquisition of estates or tenures or provides for agrarian reform, such mining lease shall be brought into conformity with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder within six months from the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Amendment Act, 1972 (56 of 1972) or within such further time as the Central Government may, by general or special order specify in this behalf.” (emphasis added) 119. This amendment made in 1972 makes it clear that all mining operations which were carried out under contractual leases or statutory leases, irrespective of nature of lease, would be mining operation and within the ambit of Section 4(1) and such operation stood prohibited unless a lease under MMRD Act, 1957 is granted or is protected by Proviso to Section 4(1). 120. 120. If for the sake of benefit of plaintiff-respondent and reading the word ‘granted’ so as to cover statutory lease also, we extend protection of proviso to Section 4(1) of MMRD Act, 1957 to plaintiff-respondent, still she is not protected from her liability of payment of royalty under, and, in terms of Section 9 and subsequently in respect of the ‘dead rent’ also under Section 9-A which was also inserted by Act 56 of 1972. Section 9 applies to statutory leases also is the view expressed in State of Bihar v. Khas Karanpura Collieries Ltd. (supra), which we may discuss in detail at a later stage and on this aspect Sri Shashi Nandan could not place any thing when we drew his attention and made query. Section 9 is very clear and unambiguous so as to make obligatory upon plaintiff-respondent to pay royalty as per rates under Schedule-2 of MMRD Act, 1957. 121. Learned Counsel for plaintiff-respondent sought to argue that right of mining operations protected under Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951 could not have been overridden by the provisions of MMRD Act, 1957. The submission is thoroughly misconceived. Once a declaration was made by Central Government under Section 2 of MMRD Act, 1957 to take under its control regulations of mines and development of minerals to the extent provided under MMRD Act, 1957, Provincial Legislation having contrary provision, would cease to operate. Such Provincial Statutes would not then confer any right in respect of mines and minerals, contrary to the provisions of MMRD Act, 1957. To that extent plaintiff-respondent cannot claim protection under Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951 since provisions of MMRD Act, 1957 shall prevail and would render State statute inoperative. Various authorities relied by counsel for plaintiff-respondent, as referred to above, have no application so as to deal with the situation which had arisen with the enactment of MMRD Act, 1957 and, therefore, he cannot get any advantage under those authorities. 122. We may point out that all these authorities basically deal with the distinction of “contractual lease” and “statutory lease” and virtually a follow up of decision in Bihar Mines Ltd. v. Union of India (supra). This may be demonstrated as hereunder. 123. 122. We may point out that all these authorities basically deal with the distinction of “contractual lease” and “statutory lease” and virtually a follow up of decision in Bihar Mines Ltd. v. Union of India (supra). This may be demonstrated as hereunder. 123. In Chhatu Ram Horil Ram Private Ltd. v. State of Bihar (supra), appellant-Company, Chhatu Ram Horil Ram Private Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Company”) obtained a lease on 30.9.1940 from owners of 3,300 acres of mica land in Village Sapahi in the District of Gaya for a period of 15 years. With enactment of Bihar Act, 1950 and Notification issued under Section 3 thereof, right of owner of land vested in State of Bihar with effect from 27.6.1953. Thus, Company retained lease rights for the remaining period of contractual lease under a “deemed statutory lease” by State Government. After expiry of remaining period, Company sought to exercise option for renewal vide letter dated 22.2.1955 in terms of Clause 29 of lease-deed. State of Bihar on 6.1.1956 granted a lease to Company in respect of 410 acres of land for 20 years and remaining area was granted to one Sant Saran Bhadani, a Director of the Company. This action of State Government was challenged by one Sudha Devi in Patna High Court on the ground that fresh lease have been granted in violation of Rules 67 and 68 of Rules, 1949. High Court set aside Bihar Government’s order dated 5.7.1956. Company then filed a suit for specific performance for covenant of renewal under lease-deed dated 30.9.1940. Trial Court dismissed suit holding that Clause-29 provides a right of pre-emption and not renewal. High Court confirmed decree passed by Trial Court though on different grounds. High Court held that right granted by Clause 29 gave rise to an “encumbrance” which extinguished when interest of owners vested in the State of Bihar free of all encumbrances. Company then came in appeal. Supreme Court held that in view of Notification under Section 3 of Bihar Act, 1950 and vesting of land with State Government, Company acquired rights of “statutory lease” for the remaining period of lease with the same terms and conditions. However, right of renewal etc. which amounts to an “encumbrance” under the contractual lease could be claimed to have continued since State of Bihar got land vested free from any encumbrance or obligation granted by contract. However, right of renewal etc. which amounts to an “encumbrance” under the contractual lease could be claimed to have continued since State of Bihar got land vested free from any encumbrance or obligation granted by contract. Supreme Court upheld the view taken by High Court that Clause of renewal or pre-emption under Clause 29 as claimed by Company would have effect of limiting freedom of State of Bihar as an absolute owner which was against the provision of Section 4 of Bihar Act, 1950 which provides that vesting shall be free from all encumbrance. An attempt was made by Company by referring to Rule 40 of Rules, 1949 to argue that a lessee could have been entitled to at least one renewal thereunder. Court held that Rule 40 was applicable to a mining lease “granted” and interpreting the word “granted” Court held that the Rule applies to grants made by Government and has no application to “statutory lease” arising by virtue of Section 10 of Bihar Act, 1950. 124. The aforesaid judgment nowhere helps the plaintiff-respondent except to the contention that she got contractual lease converted into a “new statutory lease” on 1.7.1952 with the enforcement of U.P. Act, 1951 and there also land vested in State free from all encumbrances. Meaning of the word “grant” taken by Supreme Court in the above case fortify our view also as we have discussed above. Further the claim of renewal etc. under contractual lease would also disappear since land vested in State of U.P. free from all encumbrances. 125. Then comes Hindustan Steel Limited, M/s. Rourkela v. Kalyani Banerjee, AIR 1973 SC 408 . Therein by a registered document dated 11.7.1919 one Kumar Amardeyal Singh, proprietor of Ladi Estate, granted a lease in favour of one Pran Kristo Chatterjee. It was in respect of various minerals including iron ore and related to a large tract of land in District Palamau, covering an area of 2227 acres in village Adar and 1303 acres in village Gore of District Palamau. In 1937, heirs of original lessee, i.e., Pran Kristo Chatterjee, assigned and transferred their interest under lease dated 11.7.1919 to one Vyomkesh Mukherjee. Sri Mukherjee died in 1949. On 21.9.1951, heirs of late Vyomkesh Mukherjee granted sub-lease to one Madan Gopal Rungta. Deputy Commissioner of Palamau in December’ 1952 obstructed sub-lessee Madan Gopal Roongta in working of mining operations. In 1937, heirs of original lessee, i.e., Pran Kristo Chatterjee, assigned and transferred their interest under lease dated 11.7.1919 to one Vyomkesh Mukherjee. Sri Mukherjee died in 1949. On 21.9.1951, heirs of late Vyomkesh Mukherjee granted sub-lease to one Madan Gopal Rungta. Deputy Commissioner of Palamau in December’ 1952 obstructed sub-lessee Madan Gopal Roongta in working of mining operations. On 16.4.1953 sub-lessee Madan Gopal Roongta entered into an agreement to pay royalty to Government of Bihar for working mining rights covered by sub-lease. On Notification issued in January, 1955 whole of Ladi Estate vested in State of Bihar under Bihar Act, 1950. In 1959 Controller of Mining Leases started proceeding of modification of terms of lease dated 11.7.1919. Controller passed an order on 28.9.1959 exercising power under Rule 6 of Rules, 1956 and modified lease dated 11.7.1919 so as to make it terminable with effect from 20.9.1961. On 11.12.1961 Government of Bihar invited applications for grant of mining leases in respect of Village Gore. On 10.9.1962 Madan Gopal Rungta and his son Tribeni Prasad Rungta applied for mining lease for the said area. Certain other parties also applied. On 13.11.1962 a notice was issued to Tribeni Prasad Rungta under Section 7 of Bihar and Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act demanding Rs. 66,317.93 by way of dead rent and royalty alleged to have accrued during period when Madan Gopal Rungta was working mines under sub-lease. On 1.4.1963 M/s. Hindustan Steels Limited (hereinafter referred to as “HSL”) applied for grant of mining lease for an area of 67.26 acress in Village Gore. Tribeni Prasad Rungta filed a Writ Petition in Patna High Court which was allowed vide judgment dated 23.11.1964. On 22.7.1965 State of Bihar, acting with approval of Central Government, granted a mining lease to HSL in respect of 67.26 acres. Another lease was granted to M/s Bharat Marble Company on 17.10.1966. One S.K. Jain, acting on behalf of heirs of Vyomkesh Mukherjee, filed a Writ Petition challenging leases granted to HSL and M/s Bharat Marble Company. vide judgment dated 17.9.1971, Writ Petition was allowed and both these leases were cancelled and that is how HSL came to Supreme Court. The Court considered following four issues: “(1) Could Kumar Amardeyal Singh, the proprietor of Ladi Estate, grant a mining lease ? vide judgment dated 17.9.1971, Writ Petition was allowed and both these leases were cancelled and that is how HSL came to Supreme Court. The Court considered following four issues: “(1) Could Kumar Amardeyal Singh, the proprietor of Ladi Estate, grant a mining lease ? (2) What was the effect of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 upon the right and title, if any, of the petitioners ? (3) Assuming that the petitioners became lessees under the State of Bihar by reason of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, could the Controller of Mining Leases terminate their lease ? (4) What is the effect of the possession that has been enjoyed by the appellant since the grant of the mining lease on 22 July 1965.” 126. Following the view taken in Bihar Mines Limited (supra), Court held that on the date of vesting of Ladi Estate, there came into existence notionally a statutory lease granted by State Government to heirs of Vyomkesh Mukherjee who were holding lease rights on the date of vesting for the remainder terms of lease. It held that effect of vesting and continuance of lease rights of existing leases under Bihar Act, 1950 was that instead of being lessee under Kumar Amardeyal Singh and his successors, existing lessee petitioners became lessee directly under State Government on the same terms and conditions on which the original lease was granted by original lessor i.e. Kumar Amardeyal Singh. The decision in Bihar Mines Limited v. Union of India (supra) was followed and reaffirmed. Court also held that Controller of Mining Lease had no authority under Rules, 1956 for the reason that there was no subsisting contractual lease. By virtue of Section 10, a “new statutory lease” came into existence on the date when Estate vested in Government. 127. In the present case also, we have also held that Rules, 1956 having been framed under Section 7 of MMRD Act, 1948 were applicable to existing lease granted prior to commencement of MMRD Act, 1948 and, therefore, will have no application to “new statutory lease”, came into existence after enforcement of U.P. Act, 1951, for example, in the present case, on 1.7.1952. The aforesaid judgment also does not show anything otherwise to the view we have taken and discussed above. 128. In Sone Valley Portland Cement Co. The aforesaid judgment also does not show anything otherwise to the view we have taken and discussed above. 128. In Sone Valley Portland Cement Co. Ltd. v. General Mining Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. (supra), a lease was granted to Karunaranjan Dutt and Jugal Chandra Dutt (hereinafter referred to as “Original Lessees”) by Raja Bishambharnath Sahi on 31.7.1927 of the land known as Sonepura Estate, Pergana Rohtas, District Shahbad and some other villages for a period of 40 years commencing from 1.8.1927 with an option to continue for further period of 25 years. On 12.10.1928 Original Lessee executed a sub-lease in favour of Sone Valley Portland Cement Co. Ltd. (hereinafter after referred to as “Cement Company”). Sub-lessees were also given option to pay royalty directly to Original Lessor. On 15.2.1929, Original Lessees, i.e., Dutt brothers, transferred by a deed of assignment all their rights, title and interest under and by virtue of indenture of lease dated 31.7.1927 to General Mining Syndicate Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as “GMSPL”). Sub-lessee Cement Company had due notice of the said assignment and accepted GMSPL as Lessor in place of Original Lessee, i.e. Dutt borthers who were lessor so far as Cement Company is concerned when sub-lease was executed to it. Under MMRD Act, 1948, Central Government made Rules for regulating grant of mining leases or for prohibiting grant of such leases in respect of any mineral or in any area. Rules, 1949 were also framed thereunder, but had no application to leases or sub-leases prior to 25.10.1949. On 25.9.1950, Bihar Act, 1950 came into force. Under Section 3 and 3A of Bihar Act, 1950 a Notification was issued and Estate of Sonepura belong to Raja Bishambharnath Sah came to be vested in State of Bihar on 14.11.1951 pursuant to Notification dated 6.11.1995. Thereafter MMRD Act, 1957 came to be enacted wherein Section 9 was amended by Act No. 56 of 1972. Purporting to act under Rules, 1956, Controller of Mining Leases, by order dated 8.8.1959 enhanced royalty payable under lease dated 31.7.1927. Cement Company, however, as per Sub-lease dated 12.10.1928 paid royalty directly to Original Lessor up to the date, land vested in State of Bihar. Thereafter, Cement Company started paying royalty directly to State of Bihar in terms of sub-lease dated 12.10.1928 but stopped doing so from 1.7.1958. Cement Company, however, as per Sub-lease dated 12.10.1928 paid royalty directly to Original Lessor up to the date, land vested in State of Bihar. Thereafter, Cement Company started paying royalty directly to State of Bihar in terms of sub-lease dated 12.10.1928 but stopped doing so from 1.7.1958. GMSPL, who was assigned all rights by Original Lessee, i.e., Dutt Brothers, brought a suit on 10.7.1961 being Suit No. 1104 of 1961 in the High Court of Calcutta claiming declaration for payment of royalty from 1.7.1928 to 7.8.1959, the date immediately preceding the date on which Controller enhanced royalty payable to State of Bihar and 8.8.1959 to 31.3.1961. It also claimed interest on the aforesaid amount. 129. Cement Company contested the suit pleading that position of Dutt was like a tenure holder under erstwhile owner Raja Bishambharnath Sahi and after vesting of land with State of Bihar, the position of Cement Company became that of a lessee in possession. It mistakenly continued to pay royalty to GMSPL due to ignorance of Notification of vesting with State of Bihar. In the alternative, it pleaded that GMSPL continued to be lessee and Cement Company as sub-lessee, hence, GMSPL being holder of mining lease within the meaning of Section 9 of MMRD Act, 1957, was liable to pay royalty at the rate determined by Controller and since Cement Company has paid royalty to State being agent of GMSPL, it should be reimbursed by the said lessee. It is, thus, clear that in the aforesaid matter, there was a dispute between two parties, one was the assignee of Original Lessee of all lease rights and another, a sub-lessee, with regard to payment of royalty. There was no issue whether lease after vesting of land including mines, minerals etc. in State of Bihar would be governed by provisions of MMRD Act, 1957 or not. 130. Be that as it may, the aforesaid facts show that MMRD Act, 1948 and Rules, 1949, since both came into existence on 25.10.1949, hence did not apply to leases or sub-leases granted prior to 25.10.1949. 131. With enactment of Bihar Act, 1950 and issue of Notification dated 6.11.1951 under Section 3, Estate of Sonepura vested in State of Bihar. By Notification dated 1.1.1956 issued under Section 3A all Intermediary interest were also vested in State of Bihar. 131. With enactment of Bihar Act, 1950 and issue of Notification dated 6.11.1951 under Section 3, Estate of Sonepura vested in State of Bihar. By Notification dated 1.1.1956 issued under Section 3A all Intermediary interest were also vested in State of Bihar. Rules, 1956 came to be enacted on 4.9.1956 for modifying and altering terms and conditions of existing leases. Cement Company after vesting of land in State of Bihar, started paying royalty directly to State Government. A suit was brought claiming payment of royalty under sub-lease dated 12.10.1928 contending that notwithstanding the Notification under Section 3, interest of lessee under lease continued to subsist, did not vest in State of Bihar and lessee was entitled to receive royalty. The dispute basically was with regard to right to receive royalty by a sub-lessee. 132. Calcutta High Court held that sub-lessee was not an Intermediary or tenure holder in respect of Estate and its interest did not vest in State of Bihar as a result of Notification dated 6.11.1951 or 1.1.1956. Therefore, sub-lessee was entitled for a decree with respect to amount of royalty. In Appeal Supreme Court upheld this view and said: “... the estate comprised in the head lease in the instant case which was assigned to the respondent notionally stood leased by the State from the date of vesting to the holder of the subsisting lease for the remainder of the term of the lease and the respondent became entitled to retain possession of the leasehold property.” 133. However, there was also a dispute with respect to a subsequent period of 8.8.1959 to 31.3.1961 during which period there had come into existence MMRD Act, 1957. In this regard, Court observed that this aspect is not free from difficulties since has to be examined with reference to Section 9 of MMRD Act, 1957 read with Rules, 1956 and also Section 9 of Bihar Act, 1950. However, Court did not answer this question observing that the order of Controller dated 8.8.1959 appears to have been passed with agreement of parties, therefore, it is not necessary to resolve this aspect. 134. However, Court did not answer this question observing that the order of Controller dated 8.8.1959 appears to have been passed with agreement of parties, therefore, it is not necessary to resolve this aspect. 134. We find that this judgment does not help plaintiff-respondent in any manner except that it has followed the decision in Bihar Mines Limited v. Union of India (supra) to the extent that on vesting of land in State under the provisions of Bihar Act, 1950, State became owner and holder of a subsisting lease could have continued for remainder term of lease. 135. The next decision dealing with this aspect is State of Bihar v. Khas Karanpura Collieries Ltd. (supra) which has also been relied heavily by plaintiff-respondent. Therein also Rajas of Ramgarh and Jharia, proprietors of Big Estates, prior to 25.10.1949 granted mining leases, in Districts of Hazaribagh, Dhanbad and Singhbhum to various persons for winning and extracting coal for a period of 999 years, in lieu of payment of premiums and fixed annual rental. In the leases, either there was no stipulation for payment of royalty or the amount of royalty was very low. Except few cases, all other lessees granted sub-leases. After enactment of Bihar Act, 1950, entire land including mines and minerals of Rajas vested in State of Bihar free from all encumbrance. Under Section 9 of Bihar Act, 1950, it was provided that mines which were in operation at the commencement of Bihar Act, 1950 and being worked directly by Intermediary, shall be deemed to have been leased by State Government to Intermediary and he would be entitled to retain possession of those mines as a lessee thereof. Mines in dispute in State of Bihar v. Khas Karanpura (supra) were not worked out by Intermediary classes, therefore, Section 9 was not attracted. Section 4 read with Section 10 of Bihar Act, 1950 permitted continuance of subsisting leases of mines and minerals with change of Intermediary and substitution by State Government as lessor for remainder term of lease. Thus, Original contractual lease came to an end and “fresh statutory lease” in favour of lessee came into being under Section 10 of Bihar Act, 1950. Thus, Original contractual lease came to an end and “fresh statutory lease” in favour of lessee came into being under Section 10 of Bihar Act, 1950. Court clearly observed in para 10 that from 3.11.1951, when Estate of Jharia Rajya vested in State of Bihar, subsisting leases came to be treated “new statutory leases” granted by State Government in terms of Section 10 of Bihar Act, 1950. The mining leases were for coal. Court observed that though royalty under Section 9 of MMRD Act, 1957 was payable but Section 30-A inserted by Amendment Act of 1958 excluded Section 9(1) and 16(1) in respect of leases granted for coal before 25.10.1949. It also empowers Central Government by issuing a Notification in Official Gazette directing to apply Section 9(1) and 16(1) including any Rules made under Section 13 and 18 to such exempted leases. Section 30-A was inserted with retrospective effect. It exercise of power under Section 30-A, Central Government issued a Notification on 29.12.1961 to apply Section 9(1) to mining leases in respect of coal granted before 25.10.1949 subject to modification that lessee would pay royalty at the rate specified in agreement with the lessor or 2½ per cent of F.O.R. price of coal, whichever is higher, in place of rate of royalty specified for coal under Second Schedule. State Government then demanded royalty on 2½ per cent and initiated recovery proceedings. Thereafter Section 10-A was inserted in Bihar Act, 1950 by virtue of an amendment on 26.10.1964 whereunder even lessee’s interests in mines and minerals which were subject to sub-leases also came to vest in State of Bihar. Another Notification was issued by Central Government under Section 30-A of MMRD Act, 1957 on 1.1.1966 superseding Notification dated 29.12.1961 and applying Section 9(1) of MMRD Act, 1957 to leases granted prior to commencement of said Act of 1957. Court noticed that judgment in Bihar Mines Limited v. Union of India (supra) was pronounced on 3.10.1966 holding that from the date of vesting Original Lessor’s right came to an end and new “statutory leases” came into existence with the substitution of State Government as lessor for remainder term. Court noticed that judgment in Bihar Mines Limited v. Union of India (supra) was pronounced on 3.10.1966 holding that from the date of vesting Original Lessor’s right came to an end and new “statutory leases” came into existence with the substitution of State Government as lessor for remainder term. In the light of aforesaid judgment, Patna High Court in Narendra Nath Mandal v. State of Bihar decided on 22.12.1967 held that due to vesting, new statutory leases came into existence but by virtue of Section 9 read with Second Schedule royalty was payable as per rates mentioned therein and Section 30-A and Notifications issued thereunder were not applicable to such leases which came into being on vesting of Estate in State of Bihar on the date of vesting. District Mining Officer, consequently raised demand from Khas Karanpura Collieries Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “lessee”), who challenged the said demand by filing writ petition in Patna High Court. Their case was that Rule 41 of Rules,1949 requiring royalty at the rate specified in Schedule I of Rules, 1949 would apply to a lease granted under Rules, 1949 after commencement of MMRD Act, 1948 and had no application to sub-leases of lessees obliging them to pay royalty as per rates under Rules, 1949 for the period between date of vesting to 31.5.1958, i.e., just preceding date of enforcement of MMRD Act, 1957. They further pleaded that from 1.6.1958 to 28.12.1961 royalty was payable at contractual rates since Section 9(1) of MMRD Act, 1957 was not applicable to statutory leases and even otherwise Section 30-A excludes application of Section 9(1) to mining leases of coal. They said that in any case, they paid royalty at the rate of 2½ per cent from 29.12.1961 to 31.12.1965 as per Central Government’s Notification and State having accepted the same was not entitled to raise a further demand. State of Bihar contended that a combined reading of Section 9 and 29 of MMRD Act, 1957 read with Second Schedule to Rules, 1949 lessees or sub-lessees were liable to pay royalty as per rates of Rules, 1949 from the date of vesting of respective Estate of Proprietors in the State of Bihar. It also pleaded that Section 9 was applicable to all leases, whether contractual or statutory, which came into existence before MMRD Act, 1957. It also pleaded that Section 9 was applicable to all leases, whether contractual or statutory, which came into existence before MMRD Act, 1957. Section 30-A was applicable only in respect of mining leases of coal and not to statutory mining leases of lessees. A Special Bench of five Judges of Patna High Court heard the bunch of Writ Petitions and allowed vide judgment dated 3.9.1970 holding that earlier judgment in Narendra Nath Mandal v. State of Bihar (supra) was wrongly decided. It held that Rule 41 of Rules 1949 was applicable only to contractual grants and not to statutory leases arising by virtue of Section 10 of Bihar Act, 1950. It also held that there was no reason to relate back Section 9 by virtue of Section 29 to any date anterior to the date of enforcement of MMRD Act, 1957. Section 30-A was applicable not only to mining leases but other leases also which expression covered statutory leases. It is this judgment which came in appeal before Supreme Court. Two issues were raised in this matter: (1) Whether the claim for royalty in regard to the period prior to June 1, 1958 can be sustained? (2) whether the claim for royalty in regard to the period from June 1, 1958 to December 31, 1965 is justified? 136. Court upheld High Court’s view that Rule 41 of Rules 1949 was applicable only to contractual leases and not to statutory leases and fortified this view by referring to its earlier judgment in Chhatu Ram Horil Ram Private Ltd. v. State of Bihar (supra). It held that claim for royalty for period prior to 1.6.1958 was unfounded and unsustainable. Now coming to subsequent period, i.e., 1.6.1958 and onwards, Court held that no exception can be taken to the view taken by High Court that in view of Section 30-A which excludes application of Section 9 temporarily, royalty could have been demanded under Section 9 for the period of 1.6.1958 to 31.12.1965 for the reason that aforesaid provisions were applicable to statutory leases also. Court said that Section 9 consists of three parts and then it read Section 9 of MMRD Act, 1957 as under: “Sub-section (1) casts a liability on the holder of a mining lease granted before June 1, 1958 - the date of the commencement of the Act- to pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed by him from the leased area after that date at the rate for the time being specified in the Second Schedule, notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument of lease or in any law in force on the aforesaid date of the commencement of the Act. Sub-section (2) makes also the holder of a mining lease granted on or after June 1, 1958 liable to pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed by him from the leased area at the rate for the time being specified in the Second Schedule. Sub-section (3) empowers the Central Government to amend the Second Schedule and enhance or reduce the rate of royalty in respect of any mineral by issue of a notification subject to the restriction contained in the proviso to this sub-section.” 137. Court held that Section 9 embraces all leases which came into existence before 1.6.1958 and in case statutory lease is excluded from Section 30-A, it would render it nugatory for the reason that after enactment of Biahr Act, 1950 all mining leases became statutory by virtue of Section 10. The relevant observations are as under: “Section 30-A would be rendered nugatory because on the coming into being of the statutory leases as a result of Section 10(1) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, there would hardly be left any mining lease to which Section 30-A of the 1957 Act would be applicable. Thus there can be no room for doubt that the Legislature intended that Section 30-A of the 1957 Act should cover the aforesaid statutory leases as well.” 138. Thus, the aforesaid judgment makes it clear that Section 9 of MMRD Act, 1957 was applicable to all leases which came into existence before 1.6.1958 which includes statutory leases also. Thus there can be no room for doubt that the Legislature intended that Section 30-A of the 1957 Act should cover the aforesaid statutory leases as well.” 138. Thus, the aforesaid judgment makes it clear that Section 9 of MMRD Act, 1957 was applicable to all leases which came into existence before 1.6.1958 which includes statutory leases also. In cases wherever Section 30-A was applicable, payment of royalty under Section 9 stood excluded for the time being till embargo under Section 30-A is not lifted by Central Government by issuing a Notification in exercise of powers under the said provisions, i.e., Section 30-A. In the present case, however, Section 30-A has no application whatsoever since we are not concerned with leases relating to coal and, therefore, plaintiff-respondent having a statutory lease since before commencement of MMRD Act, 1957 was liable to pay royalty in accordance with provisions of Section 9. 139. We may make it clear that it has not been disputed by either of the parties that term “mining lease” since includes sub-leases also, therefore, whatever is liability of plaintiff-respondent as a lessee is extended to even sub-lessees also. 140. This judgment in State of Bihar v. Khas Karanpura Collieries Ltd. (supra), we find, in fact, goes against plaintiff-respondent to the extent that even if lease of plaintiff-respondent is taken to be “statutory” under Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951, it was an existing lease granted before 1.6.1958 and on enforcement of MMRD Act, 1957 for any removal, extracting or quarrying of minerals, lease holder was bound to pay royalty as per Schedule-2 of MMRD Act, 1957. 141. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel, in support of plaintiff-respondent relied on India Thermal Power Limited v. State of M.P. and others, 2000 (3) SCC 379 and contended that in order to constitute a statutory contract, mere fact, that contract entered into was in exercise of an enabling power under a Statute, is not sufficient, but terms and conditions must also be governed by Statute. In para 11 of judgment, we find that Court has said as under: “Merely because a contract is entered into in exercise of an enacting power conferred by a statute that by itself cannot render the contract a statutory contract. If entering into a contract containing prescribed terms and conditions is a must under the statute then that contract becomes a statutory contract. If entering into a contract containing prescribed terms and conditions is a must under the statute then that contract becomes a statutory contract. If a contract incorporates certain terms and conditions in it which are statutory then the said contract to that extent is statutory. A contract may contain certain other terms and conditions which may not be of a statutory character and which have been incorporated therein as a result of mutual agreement between the parties. Therefore, the PPAs can be regarded as statutory only to the extent that they contain provisions regarding determination of tariff and other statutory requirements of Section 43-A(2).” (emphasis added) 142. The aforesaid judgment for our purpose is not much relevant for the reason that with regard to mining leases, and, that too, with reference to provisions of Section 7 and 108 of U.P. Act, 1951, we have already upheld contention of plaintiff-respondent that with the vesting of land free of all encumbrances, in State of U.P., and continuance of lease rights of existing lease holders by virtue of Section 108, it became a statutory lease. Since this aspect is already covered by judgment in Bihar Mines Limited v. Union of India (supra) dealing with the pari materia provision, we have already held that on and after 1.7.1952, existing contractual lease of plaintiff-respondent became a “new statutory lease”. But having said so, further submission that such a statutory lease cannot stand altered or modified or subjected to any subsequent enactment is neither an argument which can be sustained nor in law such an argument is tenable. Legislature has ultimate power of legislation and like a statue can be altered, modified, repealed etc. by Legislature, similarly, even a statutory lease could/can be modified, amended, altered and subjected to conditions imposed under a subsequent enactment. MMRD Act, 1957 has been legislated by Parliament with reference to its Legislative power under List-1 Schedule-VII and such legislation prevails over any Provincial legislation or statutory instrument under Provincial legislation. MMRD Act, 1957, in respect of the subject of Mines and Minerals, cannot be read so as to sub-serve a Provincial Legislation. 143. A Central law dealing with mines and minerals cannot be said to be overridden by law made by Provincial Legislation enacted with reference to its legislative power under List-II, i.e., Land and Agrarian Reforms. MMRD Act, 1957, in respect of the subject of Mines and Minerals, cannot be read so as to sub-serve a Provincial Legislation. 143. A Central law dealing with mines and minerals cannot be said to be overridden by law made by Provincial Legislation enacted with reference to its legislative power under List-II, i.e., Land and Agrarian Reforms. In any case, subject of “Land and Agrarian Reform” are general terms and the subject of “mines and minerals” being specific, even otherwise, legislation on a specific aspect shall prevail over a general statute. The law relating to Land and Agrarian Reforms incidentally covers topic of “mines and mineral” but when Parliament enacted law in exercise of its legislative power for development and regulation of mines and minerals, we have no hesitation in holding that it is the Parliament’s Statute which shall prevail in the matter relating to mines and minerals. 144. Last authority, cited in support of plaintiff-respondent is Mary v. State of Kerala (supra). With great respect to learned Senior Counsel, we find nothing therein to help plaintiff-respondent in the present case. The matter relates to excise auction and liability of payment of consideration by parties for parting of privilege by State for trade in Liquor. Mary bid successfully in an auction conducted on 24.3.1994 for sale of privilege to vend arrack in ten shops for the period 1.4.1994 to 31.3.1995. Excise auction was governed by Kerala Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as “Excise Rules, 1974”). Mary was declared auction purchaser and she deposited 30 per cent of bid amount on the same date. She also executed a temporary agreement which was subject to confirmation by Board of Revenue. The shops were to run at a place known as Kalady Range-III. Kalady is the birth place of Adi Shankaracharya and adjoining thereto, existed a Christian Pilgrim Centre, associated with St. Thomas. Local people objected to excise shops as a result whereof, auction purchaser could not run business successfully. On 3.4.1994 she informed Excise Authorities as well as Board of Revenue that due to mass movement, it was not possible to open and run shops. She requested not to confirm auction since it was impossible to execute business for the reason beyond her control. She also reserved right to claim refund of amount already deposited. On 3.4.1994 she informed Excise Authorities as well as Board of Revenue that due to mass movement, it was not possible to open and run shops. She requested not to confirm auction since it was impossible to execute business for the reason beyond her control. She also reserved right to claim refund of amount already deposited. Excise Inspector, however, vide notice dated 8.4.1994 informed Mary that sale has been confirmed in her favour. She was asked to accept confirmation and enter into agreement. Auction purchaser informed Excise Inspector about facts which rendered her unable to run Excise shop and requested to cancel entire proceeding pursuant to auction held on 24.3.1994. Excise Authorities did not accept her request and Assistant Excise Commissioner by notice dated 24.4.1995 called upon auction purchaser to pay Rs. 33,41,400/- being the balance amount, alongwith interest at the rate of 18 per cent. A recovery notice was issued for the said amount. It was challenged by Mary in a Writ Petition before Kerala High Court and another Writ Petition was filed praying for refund of amount already deposited. A Single Judge allowed both the Writ Petitions, quashed demand notice and directed for refund of amount already deposited. State preferred two Intra-Court appeals. Division Bench dismissed appeal and confirmed judgment quashing demand notice, but judgment of Single Judge with regard to refund was set aside relying on Rule 5(15) of Excise Rules, 1974 observing that these are statutory provisions and contractual terms are governed by statutory provisions between the parties. Hence, in that view of matter, rights and liabilities between the parties have to be worked strictly in accordance with Rules and the offer of auction purchaser having been accepted could not have been withdrawn. In Appeal Supreme Court examined the matter in the light of Rule 5 of Excise Rules, 1974 and found that there was a non compliance of Rule 5(15) and in terms thereof money deposited by auction purchaser was liable to be forfeited. However, application of said Rules was examined considering whether doctrine of frustration or impossibility could be invoked therein or the auction purchaser would be bound by terms of statutory contract. Court observed that the facts attract Section 56 of Contract Act since there is an event which made performance of contract impossible. However, application of said Rules was examined considering whether doctrine of frustration or impossibility could be invoked therein or the auction purchaser would be bound by terms of statutory contract. Court observed that the facts attract Section 56 of Contract Act since there is an event which made performance of contract impossible. But then the question was “whether it would be applicable in a case of statutory contract or not.” Court ultimately held that doctrine of frustration is an incident of ordinary contract and would not be applicable to statutory contract. Consequences of non performance of contract are provided in the statutory contract itself. Court held that consequences of non performance when provided by statutory contract, Section 56 is not applicable and parties cannot take shelter beyond it. Court also held that a statutory contract is not to be struck down on the ground of unfairness in the cases relating to grant of privilege for dealing in liquor. It observed that in such case, there is no issue of consideration of bargaining power of parties. Relying on the decision in Excise Commissioner v. Issac Peter, 1994 (4) SCC 104 , Court observed that there is no room for invoking doctrine of fairness and reasonableness against one party to the contract (State), for the purpose of altering or adding to the terms and conditions of the contract, merely because it happens to be the State. Mutual rights and liabilities of parties in such cases are governed by the terms of contracts and laws relating to contracts. These contracts are entered into, pursuant to public auction, floating of tenders or by negotiation. There is no compulsion on anyone to enter into such contracts. It is voluntary on both sides. There is no question of inviting State power being involved in such contracts. In such contract, duty to act fairly so as to modify contract or its terms and conditions cannot be asked for. Court held: “... the duty to act fairly is sought to be imported into the contract to modify and alter its terms and to create an obligation upon the State which is not there in the contract. We must confess, we are not aware of any such doctrine of fairness or reasonableness. Nor could the learned Counsel bring to our notice any decision laying down such a proposition. We must confess, we are not aware of any such doctrine of fairness or reasonableness. Nor could the learned Counsel bring to our notice any decision laying down such a proposition. Doctrine of fairness or the duty to act fairly and reasonably is a doctrine developed in the administrative law field to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice where the action is administrative in nature. Just as principles of natural justice ensure fair decision where the function is quasi-judicial, the doctrine of fairness is evolved to ensure fair action where the function is administrative. But it can certainly not be invoked to amend, alter or vary the express terms of the contract between the parties. This is so, even if the contract is governed by statutory provisions, i.e., where it is a statutory contract - or rather more so. It is one thing to say that a contract - every contract - must be construed reasonably having regard to its language.” (emphasis added) 145. In Mary v. State of Kerala (supra), Court observed that a contract of employment cannot be equated with a contract to vend arrack. A contract of employment and a mercantile transaction stand on a different footing. Where bargaining power of contracting parties are equal or almost equal or where both the parties are businessmen and contract is a commercial transaction, doctrine of fairness or duty to act fairly or reasonably has no application. 146. The aforesaid decision, therefore, has no application in the case in hand inasmuch there is nothing to show that demanding royalty and to ask plaintiff-respondent not to proceed with the mining lease except in accordance with the provisions of MMRD Act, 1957 and Rules framed thereunder, is in any manner, unfair and unreasonable. 147. At this stage, we may observe hereat, as pointed out by learned Additional Advocate General, that disputed area of 46 Villages is extremely rich in commercially high value minerals like stones, ballast and more important “silica sand”. Silica sand is widely used as a potential raw material in Glass industries, Foundries, Pottery Industries etc., across the Country. Thousands of tons of silica sand every month is quarried and transported from these villages to such Industries and market value of “silica sand” transported every month runs in millions of rupees. Silica sand is widely used as a potential raw material in Glass industries, Foundries, Pottery Industries etc., across the Country. Thousands of tons of silica sand every month is quarried and transported from these villages to such Industries and market value of “silica sand” transported every month runs in millions of rupees. In the last more than 50 years, plaintiff-respondent initially took advantage of lack of clarity with respect to rights of State in regard to operation of mines, extraction and quarry of minerals therefrom, and when in 1966 letter was issued to plaintiff-respondent for stopping mining operations and demand of royalty was made in 1968, it filed a suit, wherein an interim injunction order was passed and pursuant thereto royalty worth hundreds of millions has been avoided by plaintiff-respondent. Subsequently under the judgment of Court below and during pendency of appeal, the same thing has continued and here is a case where staggering high amount of public revenue towards royalty has been evaded by plaintiff-respondent besides the facts that mining leases which need be distributed to various other persons, are being operated by creating a monopoly and that is how, plaintiff-respondent and her agents are also controlling price of mineral and ultimately earning huge and colossal profit. Here is not a case where there is anything unfair, unreasonable or impermissible in law, which is sought to be acted upon by State but plaintiff-respondent, with an intention of preventing State from implementation and observance of MMRD Act, 1957 and Rules famed thereunder, has raised this entire dispute which has continued for last half a century in Courts and ultimate sufferer is not only State but public exchequer as well. 148. Be that as it may, the aforesaid submissions do not influence us either way in considering and answering issues involved in this appeal and we have discussed entire matter strictly in the light of statutory provisions as also judicial precedents, we answer Questions (iv) (v) and (vi) holding that lease-deed dated 16.4.1947, when granted, was not controlled by any Central or Provincial legislation. On 1.7.1952, contractual lease granted earlier became a “new statutory lease” and continued to be governed by provisions of U.P. Act, 1951 till the enactment of MMRD Act, 1957. On 1.7.1952, contractual lease granted earlier became a “new statutory lease” and continued to be governed by provisions of U.P. Act, 1951 till the enactment of MMRD Act, 1957. On enforcement thereof, statutory lease got subjected to the provisions of MMRD Act, 1957 and could not have continued on its own but has to be governed by provisions of MMRD Act, 1957. 149. Before closing discussion on Issues No. (v) and (vi), we may also notice hereat that question, whether Section 9 of MMRD Act, 1957 would cover statutory lease or not has also been answered by a Division Bench of this Court in Sheo Varan Singh v. State of U.P. (supra) wherein it has said as under: “17. It may be noted here that the use of the words “or in any law in force at such commencement” in the non obstante clause of Section 9(1) is clearly suggestive of the fact that this sub-section (1) of Section 9 covers the cases of statutory leases as well.” 150. Now we come to Question No. (vii), i.e. validity of subsequent lease dated 27.4.1959. It is pleaded that aforesaid lease was granted by State Government, affirming lease rights of plaintiff-respondent with reference to Section 108 and, therefore, shall hold and prevail over any provision otherwise, under MMRD Act, 1957 or Rules framed thereunder. 151. The lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 does not refer, at all, to MMRD Act, 1957 for any purposes whatsoever. It only refers to State Government’s order dated 15.12.1956 so as to recognise terms of lease dated 25.4.1947 for the purpose of Section 108(1) of U.P.Act, 1951 and maintain royalty of Rs. 4000/- per annum with effect from 19.1.1957. Other conditions contained in the deed dated 27.4.1959 are as under: “This lease made on 27th day of April, 1959 between the Governor of U.P. (hereinafter called the lessor) on the one part and Shrimati Rani Rajendra Kumari Ba Saheba, wife of Maharao Raja Kamlakar Singh, caste Kshtriya Baghel, resident of Shankargarh, Pargana Bara, Tahsil karchana in the district of Allahabad (hereinafter called the lessee which includes her heirs, legatees or executors) on the other part. Whereas the ex-land lord Pushpraj Kripapatra Maharao Raja Kamlakar Singh Ji, Bara Estate had leased out to the lessee by a registered deed dated 25.4.1947, the quarries of stone, ballasts, Kankar, morrum and sand described in Schedule ‘A’ annexed hereto, and whereas the Government of Uttar Pradesh under G.O. No. 2766 EP/XVIII B-M-53/53 dated December 15, 1956, have ordered for the recognition the said lease in terms of Sec. 108(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act to the lessee. And whereas the lessee has paid to the lessor the royalty of Rs. 4000/- per annum accruing due to the lessor till the Ist day of June, 1957. Now this Deed witnesses and the parties hereto agree as follows : i) the lessee shall hold the premises hereby demised to her from the 18th day of July 1952 in accordance with Section 108(i) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 in perpetuity. ii) that the lessee shall have liberty and power to enter upon the land mentioned in schedule ‘A’ hereto and to search for and dig and obtain by excavation and quarrying both open today light and by underground working, the demised stone, ballast, kankar, morun and sand and to carry away and dispose of the same for her own benefit. iii) the lessee shall have the liberty and power to take lead and carry away from the said land the stone, ballast, kankar, morrum and sand to be obtained as aforesaid and dispose of the same at her will and pleasure. iv) the lessee shall have power and liberty to erect buildings necessary for the purpose of carrying out the business of the quarries. v) the lessee shall, at all times, upon finding in the demised premises any mineral or products other than stone, ballast, Kankar, Morrum and sand immediately report such find to the District Magistrate, Allahabad with full particulars of the nature and position of each find. vi) during the term of this demise, the lessee shall pay a royalty at the rate of Rs. 4000/- (rupees four thousand only), annually payable in two equal instalments, on Ist. June and on Ist. December every year irrespective of the fact whether the lessee quarries or carries on any operations or not during the year. vi) during the term of this demise, the lessee shall pay a royalty at the rate of Rs. 4000/- (rupees four thousand only), annually payable in two equal instalments, on Ist. June and on Ist. December every year irrespective of the fact whether the lessee quarries or carries on any operations or not during the year. vii) the lessee may export stone, ballast, kankar, morrum and sand from the quarries hereby demised all the year round. viii) the lessee shall be entitled to sublet the premises hereby demised or any part thereof or any right or privileges under this lease to any person without the consent in writing of the lessor but she shall not assign her rights under this deed without such consent first had and obtained. ix) the lessee shall not remove any stone, ballast, kankar, morrum and sand etc. from the limits of the demised premises during such time as any money payable by her as royalty under clause (vi) shall be in arrears or any fine or liability incurred by her under the provisions of the lease may be unpaid or unsatisfied and the lessor may stop further export in such cases. x) At the end of every fifty years from the date of the execution hereof it will be open to the lessor to increase the amount of annual royalty payable by the lessee in accordance with the terms of the lease by 10% in which case the royalty so fixed at the time of revision thereof by the lessor shall be payable by the lessee and all the terms with regard to payment-therefor shall apply to the amount so fixed. 1. Shankargarh 17. Lakhanpur 33. Lohgara 2. Talapar 18. Kaitha 34. Gadhamar 3. Kapari 19. Sheorajpur 35. Chandra 4. Barui 20. Osa 36. Lalai 5. Khansemra 21. Atari Kapson 37. Baisa 6. Beonra 22. Charihari 38. Laund Khurd 7. Raipatna 23. Gobra Sangram 39. Baghla 8. Matarwar 24. Pagwar 40. Pandua 9. Gorkha 25. Majhiari Bahelia 41. Parvezabad alia Burhi 10. Gheodora 26. Gobra Hewar 42. Basahra Tarahar 11. Chak Arazi Garhwa 27. Barhaiya 43. Lalapur 12. Gara 28. Bhonri 44. Manduri 13. Benipur 29. Ghoghar 45. Partappur 14. Ledar 30. Bokuliha 46. Surwal 15. Biharia 31. Mabaiya Raksel 16. Abhaipur 32. Baghla 8. Matarwar 24. Pagwar 40. Pandua 9. Gorkha 25. Majhiari Bahelia 41. Parvezabad alia Burhi 10. Gheodora 26. Gobra Hewar 42. Basahra Tarahar 11. Chak Arazi Garhwa 27. Barhaiya 43. Lalapur 12. Gara 28. Bhonri 44. Manduri 13. Benipur 29. Ghoghar 45. Partappur 14. Ledar 30. Bokuliha 46. Surwal 15. Biharia 31. Mabaiya Raksel 16. Abhaipur 32. Mehaiya Pahalwan (All the villages situated in Pargana Bara, Tahsil Karchana, District Allahabad.) In witness whereof Sri S.S.L. Kakkar for and on behalf of the Governor and the lessee have signed this deed on the day and year first above written.” (Emphasis added) 152. It is not disputed before us that the minerals mentioned in the said lease are all “major minerals”. The primary mineral which is being quarried, extracted and transported is “silica sand” in respect thereto, even Court below has held that it is a “major mineral”, as is evident from following finding recorded by Court below in the impugned judgment: “That being so plaintiff’s lease-deeds dated 16.4.1947 and 27.4.1959 are for Silica sand which is a major mineral.” (Emphasis added) 153. The term “minerals, mineral oils and minor minerals” are defined in Section 3(a),(b) and (e) of MMRD Act, 1957 and read as under : “Definitions—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires- (a) “minerals” includes all minerals except mineral oils; (b) “mineral oils” includes natural gas and petroleum; (e) “minor minerals” means building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral.” 154. Admittedly, we have no concern with “mineral oil” in the case in hand. All “minerals” other than “minor minerals” can be termed as “major minerals”. Section 2 of MMRD Act, 1957 says that Union of India should take under its control regulation of mines and development of minerals to the extent hereinafter provided. The Court in Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others, JT 2010 (10)SC 157, has held that by virtue of Section 2, State Legislature is denuded of its legislative power to make any law in respect of regulations of mines and mineral development to the extent provided in the Act i.e. MMRD Act, 1957. 155. The Court in Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others, JT 2010 (10)SC 157, has held that by virtue of Section 2, State Legislature is denuded of its legislative power to make any law in respect of regulations of mines and mineral development to the extent provided in the Act i.e. MMRD Act, 1957. 155. It appears that when lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 was executed, concerned authorities did not consider provisions of MMRD Act, 1957, probably for the reason that before enforcement of said Act, a Government Order was issued on 15.12.1956, directing field officials to execute lease in recognition of lease rights under Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951 and in pursuance thereto instrument of lease was executed on 27.4.1959, ignoring the fact that during this period Parliamentary enactment, i.e., MMRD Act, 1957 has already come into picture and now entire scenario has completely changed. After enforcement of MMRD Act, 1957, it was not open to State Government to execute a lease in respect to a major mineral and mining operations controlled and governed by provisions of MMRD Act, 1957, without following the provisions thereof. This exercise was wholly ultra vires and beyond the authority of State of U.P. 156. The only reason assigned by Court below to exclude operation of MMRD Act, 1957 is that by virtue of Section 108 of U.P.Act, 1951, subsisting lease of plaintiff became a statutory lease and, therefore, MMRD Act, 1957 is not applicable. However, the view we have already taken above holding that this reason assigned by Court below is not correct, results in collapse of the entire edifice to hold MMRD Act, 1957 inapplicable. The very basis of holding that MMRD Act, 1957 will apply only in such cases where leases are granted by Government to another person being bad and erroneous falls to ground. 157. After vesting of ‘Estate’ in State of U.P. and in view of specific provisions, as discussed above, contained in U.P.Act, 1951, continuance of lease dated 16.4.1947 was, as if, granted by State of U.P. After enactment of MMRD Act, 1957, matters which came within the ambit of aforesaid Act, could have continued to operate only in accordance with provisions of MMRD Act, 1957 and not otherwise. 158. Section 9, as already discussed above, governs all kind of leases whether contractual or statutory as the case may be. 158. Section 9, as already discussed above, governs all kind of leases whether contractual or statutory as the case may be. It also apply to mining leases whether granted before commencement of MMRD Act, 1957 or after its enforcement. If a person is carrying on any mining operation and is holder of a mining lease, whether contractual or statutory, he is/was liable to pay royalty as per rates specified in Second Schedule of MMRD Act, 1957 in respect to such minerals. The liability is absolute and could not have been obstructed by plaintiff-respondent in any manner. Even transportation of mineral was not permissible without permission of authorities concerned and in terms of Rules, framed under MMRD Act, 1957. With regard to other terms and conditions of leases regarding area, tenure etc., we find various restrictions contained in Section 5, 6, 7 and 8 of MMRD Act, 1957 and the same were also applicable to plaintiff-respondent’s mining operations. It could not have continued with such operations for indefinite period giving a complete go-bye to the provisions of MMRD Act, 1957. In any case, by virtue of Section 16 it was incumbent upon State to modify terms and conditions of lease, even if it was statutory, so as to bring it in consonance with the provisions of MMRD Act, 1957. 159. Moreover, in the present case, deemed statutory lease under Section 108 of U.P. Act, 1951 came to an end on execution of another lease on 27.4.1959, hence statutory lease after enforcement of MMRD Act, 1957 got subjected to that Act, particularly in respect of royalty under Section 9, and thereafter vanished when new agreement was executed by plaintiff with State of U.P. It is a different matter that this new agreement, being in the teeth of MMRD Act, 1957 and Rules framed thereafter was unenforceable, inexecutable and inoperative since inception. 160. Term of lease dated 27.4.1959 noticed above, would show that lease is in perpetuity and not for a fixed tenure. The amount of royalty mentioned therein does not concur to the provisions of MMRD Act, 1957. It permits lessee to excavate and quarry Stone, Ballast, Kankar, Morrum and Sand. A lessee can work out mining operation throughout the year. He is also entitled to sublet the premises to any person but without consent of lessor it shall not assign. The amount of royalty mentioned therein does not concur to the provisions of MMRD Act, 1957. It permits lessee to excavate and quarry Stone, Ballast, Kankar, Morrum and Sand. A lessee can work out mining operation throughout the year. He is also entitled to sublet the premises to any person but without consent of lessor it shall not assign. Further right is given to lessee for renewal with limited enhancement of royalty at the end of every 50 years. The MMRD Act, 1957 admittedly came into force on 1.6.1958 i.e. before execution of lease-deed dated 27.4.1959. After enforcement of said Act to the extent it is applicable, denudation of power of State is total and not partial, as held in P. Kannadasan v. State of Tamilnadu, (1996) 5 SCC 70 : AIR 1996 SC 2560 . 161. All the items for which mining lease was granted vide lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 did satisfy the definition of “minerals” under Section 3(a) and (e) of MMRD Act, 1957. “Minerals” means an organic substance found either on or in the earth which may be garnered and exploited for profits as observed in V.P. Pithupitchal and another v. Special Secretary to the Government of Tamilnadu, AIR 2003 SC 2455 . Neither under provisions of MMRD Act, 1957, mining lease in perpetuity could have been granted nor for more than the area, prescribed as maximum area under Section 6 could have been provided, nor there could have been any occasion to agree for payment of royalty, which is not consistent with Section 9 of MMRD Act, 1957. 162. Thus, in the light of discussion made above, it cannot be doubted that on and after enforcement of MMRD Act, 1957, neither plaintiff-respondent had any right to continue mining on the disputed land nor removal of minerals without payment of royalty. In fact, entire mining operation and removal of minerals on the part of plaintiff-respondent and other sub-lessees was patently illegal, without any authority of law and in flagrant violation of provisions of MMRD Act, 1957. The lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 was completely illegal, nullity and void-ab-initio. Question No. (vii) is answered accordingly. 163. The above findings make it clear that demand of royalty by Collector for the period from 1.1.1952 till 31.5.1958, when MMRD Act, 1957 came into force, being an amount outside statutory lease was not justified and valid. The lease-deed dated 27.4.1959 was completely illegal, nullity and void-ab-initio. Question No. (vii) is answered accordingly. 163. The above findings make it clear that demand of royalty by Collector for the period from 1.1.1952 till 31.5.1958, when MMRD Act, 1957 came into force, being an amount outside statutory lease was not justified and valid. To that extent, impugned demand dated 31.5.1968, by Collector, demanding royalty for the period prior to 1.6.1958, was not valid. However, on and after 1.6.1958 entire mining operation carried out by plaintiff-respondent or sub-lessees including removal of minerals from land in dispute is/was wholly illegal. We also hold that State Government vide letter dated 14.2.1966 rightly informed plaintiff-respondent that he had been quarrying silica sand etc. from disputed villages illegally and in violation of provisions of MMRD Act, 1957. The demand of royalty by Collector for the period 1.6.1958 and onwards is absolutely legal and plaintiff-respondent was/is liable to pay the same. 164. In the result, we set aside impugned judgment and decree dated 2.7.1979 passed by Civil Judge/Judge Small Causes Court at Allahabad in Original Suit No. 107 of 1969 except to the extent that plaintiff-respondent was not liable to pay royalty from 1.7.1952 to 31.5.1958 to Collector as demanded by him under the provisions of MMRD Act, 1957 and Rules framed thereunder vide order dated 31.5.1968, but in respect of all other aspects and all other reliefs sought by plaintiff-respondent including liability on and after 1.6.1958, plaintiff-respondent was/is not entitled for any relief, whatsoever. The suit of plaintiff-respondent, therefore, is also liable to be dismissed in this regard. 165. However, since plaintiff-respondent has continued with mining operations initially under interim injunction granted by Court below and thereafter in the light of final judgment, it is our duty to put defendant-appellant in a position so that it may not stand permanently suffered for the act of the Court by issuing such direction as may restore State to its position in which it would have been. We find it appropriate to decide the appeal in following manner: (i) Demand of Collector vide letter dated 31.5.1968 for payment of royalty from 1.7.1952 to 31.5.1958 is hereby declared illegal. (ii) In respect to all other reliefs sought by plaintiff, impugned judgment and decree dated 2.7.1979 is hereby set aside and the suit hereby is dismissed to that extent. We find it appropriate to decide the appeal in following manner: (i) Demand of Collector vide letter dated 31.5.1968 for payment of royalty from 1.7.1952 to 31.5.1958 is hereby declared illegal. (ii) In respect to all other reliefs sought by plaintiff, impugned judgment and decree dated 2.7.1979 is hereby set aside and the suit hereby is dismissed to that extent. (iii) The defendant-appellant shall henceforth proceed to recover entire amount of royalty payable by plaintiff-respondent on and after 1.6.1958 till the date of this decision alongwith interest, if provided in the statute, as per the rates prescribed therein, and if not provided in Statute at the rate of 9 per cent per annum forthwith and without any further delay. (iv) Plaintiff-respondent shall not carry out mining operations henceforth and defendant-appellant shall forthwith take steps to restrict defendant-appellant and its sub-lessees from undergoing any mining operation in the aforesaid 46 villages in respect to the minerals stated in this judgment and shall proceed to grant lease in accordance with provisions of MMRD Act, 1947 and Rules framed thereunder and only thereafter shall allow mining operations. 166. Appeal is partly allowed in the manner aforesaid. 167. Defendant-Appellant shall be entitled to cost throughout to the extent it has succeeded in this appeal.