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2016 DIGILAW 335 (JHR)

Most. Shakuntala Mehta v. Steel Authority of India Limited

2016-02-15

APARESH KUMAR SINGH

body2016
ORDER : Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Petitioner preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No. 23 of 2012 challenging the order passed by learned Estate Officer under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 dated 6th October, 2006. Petitioner's appeal has been rejected by the impugned order (Annexure-4) dated 12th June, 2013 by the Court of Principal District Judge, Bokaro. 3. Perusal of the impugned order shows that petitioner approached the writ court for quashing of the order dated 6th October, 2006 and the same was rejected in W. P. (C) No. 5929 of 2006 vide order dated 7th February, 2007. Petitioner's appeal L. P. A. No. 98 of 2007 before learned Division Bench of this Court was also dismissed on 25th April, 2012. Thereafter, petitioner has preferred Miscellaneous Appeal before the court of learned Principal District Judge, Bokaro invoking the appellate remedy. It transpires that one C. M. P. preferred against the order passed in L.P.A. was also dismissed by Division Bench. Noticing these facts, the learned court below found that the appeal in its form is hopelessly barred by limitation. Accordingly, it was dismissed at the stage of admission. 4. Counsel for the petitioner submits that a resolution of the Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation (Directorate of Estates) dated 30th May, 2002 prescribed guidelines for preventing arbitrary use of powers to evict genuine tenants from public premises under the control of Public Sector Undertakings/financial institutions. 5. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment rendered by Apex Court in the case of Banatwala & Company v. L.I.C. of India & Anr. reported in AIR 2011 S.C 3619 and submitted that the Apex Court after referring to the guidelines of the Central Government has clearly observed that the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 should be used for primarily to evict totally unauthorized occupants. Petitioner is not an unauthorized occupant as she was occupying the premises under lease executed on 12th March, 2002 on as is very basis. It is submitted that the lease document was a demised premise in which continuance of the petitioner as an occupant was wholly authorized and the respondents were not justified in treating her as an unauthorized occupant. Petitioner is not an unauthorized occupant as she was occupying the premises under lease executed on 12th March, 2002 on as is very basis. It is submitted that the lease document was a demised premise in which continuance of the petitioner as an occupant was wholly authorized and the respondents were not justified in treating her as an unauthorized occupant. It is submitted that these contentions should have been duly considered not only by the Estate Officer but also by Appellate Court but the miscellaneous appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed on a technical ground on limitation. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents who have appeared and filed their counter affidavit has straightway taken objection to the maintainability of the writ application. Reference is made to the notices dated 30th April, 2002 sent for removal of unauthorized constructions in her leased premises followed by notice dated 4th June, 2003 to which she did not comply. After institution of a case before the court of Estate Officer, the order dated 6th October, 2006 in case no. A/E 112/06 directing her to remove unauthorized construction in her leased premises was passed. Petitioner having failed in the challenge to the said order in the writ court as well as L.P.A has approached the appellate court after 6 years in the present miscellaneous appeal. Therefore, the impugned order is wholly proper and justified in law. 7. Having considered the submissions of the parties in the light of the materials facts noticed hereinabove, it is apparent that the petitioner pursued her remedy before the writ court and being dissatisfied with the dismissal of the writ petition way back by the order dated 7th February, 2007 prosecuted the Letters Patent Appeal before learned Division Bench but lost there also. Both the judgments passed by learned writ court and the Learned L.P. A Court have not been brought on record in the present proceeding, perhaps deliberately so. Apparently after having lost in the challenge petitioner became wise and has thereafter sought to invoke appellate remedy which is to be availed within the statutory time of 12 days. Both the judgments passed by learned writ court and the Learned L.P. A Court have not been brought on record in the present proceeding, perhaps deliberately so. Apparently after having lost in the challenge petitioner became wise and has thereafter sought to invoke appellate remedy which is to be availed within the statutory time of 12 days. Proviso to Section 9 of the Act of 1971 however confers the power of the appellate officer to entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period, if he is satisfied and for the reasons to be recorded that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. As is apparent petitioner preferred an appeal after 6 long years having failed in the challenge to the original order of the Estate Officer passed in October, 2006 itself. 8. In such circumstances, any contention advanced on merits of the case relying upon a resolution of the Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation (Directorate of Estates) dated 30th May, 2002 is not required to be commented upon. Petitioner's appeal itself was grossly barred by limitation and was not entertainable at the threshold on that ground. 9. In such circumstances, this Court is not satisfied that the impugned order suffers from any error or illegality warranting any interference. Accordingly, the writ petitioner is dismissed.