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2016 DIGILAW 335 (RAJ)

Seema Jain v. Dhanishth Jain

2016-02-26

VIJAY BISHNOI

body2016
ORDER : Vijay Bishnoi, J. This criminal misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the petitioner being aggrieved with the order dated 28.1.2016 passed by the Sessions Judge, Jaisalmer (hereinafter referred to as 'the revisional court') in Revision Petition No.8/2016 whereby the said revision petition has been dismissed as not maintainable. In the said revision petition, the petitioner had challenged the order dated 8.12.2015 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Jaisalmer (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial court') in Criminal Original Case No.619/2011 whereby the application filed by the petitioner to summon certain documents as well as bank officer as witness was rejected. 2. The trial court had rejected the said application while observing that the petitioner has failed to give cogent reason for summoning the documents or for summoning the bank officer as witness. The trial court while observing that the petitioner wants to delay the proceedings and had rejected the application preferred on behalf of the petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the trial court has grossly erred in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for summoning certain documents as well as the bank officer as witness without giving any reason. It is argued that fair trial is main object of the criminal procedure and it is the duty of the court to ensure that such fairness may not be hampered or threatened in any manner and for that purpose, if the accused person make a request before the trial court for summoning certain documents or for summoning a person as witness, then ordinarily, it should be allowed. It is also argued that for the purpose of proving innocence of the petitioner, certain documents of bank are required to be summoned and the bank officer is also required to be summoned for the purpose of ascertaining whether signatures contained on the said cheque are of the petitioner or not. 4. On the strength of above arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed that the impugned order dated 8.12.2015 passed by the trial court may kindly be quashed and a direction may be issued to the trial court to summon the documents as prayed for by the petitioner and to summon the bank officer as a witness. 5. 4. On the strength of above arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed that the impugned order dated 8.12.2015 passed by the trial court may kindly be quashed and a direction may be issued to the trial court to summon the documents as prayed for by the petitioner and to summon the bank officer as a witness. 5. In support of the above contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as of this Court rendered in the cases of P. Sanjeeva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 2012(2) WLC (SC) Cri.178, Natasha Singh v. CBI (State) reported in 2013(2)WLC (SC) Cri.176, Kalyani Baskar v. M.S. Sampoornam reported in 2007 Cr.L.R. (SC) 453 and in the case of Salman Khan v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2016(2)WLC (Raj.) 345. 6. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the prayer of the petitioner and argued that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the courts below have not committed any illegality in passing the impugned orders and the order passed by the trial court dated 8.12.2015 is not liable to be interfered with. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned orders. 8. The proceedings under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act are pending against the petitioner in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Jaisalmer wherein the petitioner had earlier moved an application for sending the disputed signature to the handwriting expert for comparison and the same was dismissed by the trial court as well as by the revisional court and criminal misc. petition filed by the petitioner against the said order was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 16.12.2015. It is also noticed that the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act are pending against the petitioner since 2001 and same was fixed for final hearing on 21.1.2015. On one occasion, i.e. on 23.03.2015, final hearing was concluded before the trial court and the matter was fixed for pronouncement of judgment, however, on subsequent dates, the petitioner was not present, therefore, the judgment could not be pronounced and on 8.12.2015, when the matter was again fixed for final hearing, an application was moved on behalf of the petitioner with a prayer for summoning certain documents as well as the bank officer as witness. 9. 9. So far as the position of law, in respect of summoning of documents, during the course of pendency of trial or summoning of witnesses by the courts, is concerned, there is no dispute that in a given case, if the facts and circumstances of that case require sommoning of documents for just decision of a case or if any person is required to be summoned as a witness for just decision of the case, the court has ample power to summon the documents or to summon a person as witness as per the provisions of Sections 91 and 311 Cr.P.C. It is also not in dispute that in ordinary course, an accused must be granted opportunity to put his defence in proper manner and for that purpose a reasonable opportunity should be provided to him or her, even if it results in delay in trial. However, in the present case, from perusal of the order of the trial court, it reveals that the matter was fixed for final hearing since 21.1.2015 and thereafter four opportunities were granted to the counsel for the petitioner to argue the matter finally and ultimately the matter was finally argued on 23.3.2015 and the matter was fixed for pronouncement of judgment. However, again on four occasions as the petitioner was not present, the matter was adjourned and was fixed for final hearing on 8.12.2015. On that date also, the petitioner was not present and an application was preferred on behalf of her with a prayer for summoning certain documents and for summoning bank officer as witness. No doubt, prior to moving of application of this nature, the petitioner was having ample opportunity from 21.1.2015 to 8.12.2015 to move such application, but despite availability of opportunities, she failed to do so and looking to this fact, it is clear that she moved the application for summoning certain documents and Bank Officer as witness only with intention to delay the matter. 10. Apart from that the petitioner has also failed to show sufficient reason for summoning those documents or for summoning the bank officer in his application as observed by the trial court. Therefore, also, no case for interference is made out. 11. In view of above discussions, I do not find any merit in this criminal misc. petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed. The stay petition also stands dismissed.