JUDGMENT : Abdullah Gulamahmed Uraizee, J. 1. The present Revision Application under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (For short "the Code") challenges the legality and validity of the order dated 9.10.2015 passed by the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Anjar, Kachchh in Criminal Appeal No. 55 of 2015 whereby the learned Judge has dismissed the Appeal preferred by the appellant (de facto complainant) under Section 378 of the Code relying upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court in case of Bhavuben Dineshbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat and others reported in 2013(2) GLR 1415 (2013 Criminal Law Journal 4225). 2. For the disposal of this Revision Application, it is not necessary to dwell upon the facts of the case. Suffice it to state that the applicant who happens to be de facto complainant filed an Appeal captioned as New Appeal No. 55 of 2015 (old Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 2014) under Section 378 of the Code to challenge the judgment and order of acquittal dated 31.3.2014 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Anjar in Criminal case No. 650 of 2008 whereby the respondent No. 2 herein (original accused) came to be acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 323, 447, 504 and 507(2) of the Indian Penal Code. The learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Anjar, relying upon the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in case Bhaavuben Dineshbhai Makwana (supra) came to the conclusion that the Appeal could not be entertained by the Sessions Court under the provisions of Section 378 of the Code and therefore, the Appeal was not maintainable and accordingly, dismissed it. The applicant-de facto complainant, being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with this judgment, has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court to challenge the said judgment. 3. I have heard Mr. Savan Pandya, learned advocate for the applicant, Mr. N.J. Shah, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent No. 1 State and Mr. K.R. Dave, learned advocate for the respondent No. 2. 4. Mr. Savan Pandya, learned advocate for the applicant has submitted that the learned lower Appellate Court has committed an error in considering and appreciating the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Bhavuben Dineshbhai Makwana (supra) in its proper perspective. K.R. Dave, learned advocate for the respondent No. 2. 4. Mr. Savan Pandya, learned advocate for the applicant has submitted that the learned lower Appellate Court has committed an error in considering and appreciating the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Bhavuben Dineshbhai Makwana (supra) in its proper perspective. He would submit that there was an inadvertent mistake on the part of the applicant in mentioning the provision of the Code in the caption of the Appeal Memo under which the Appeal against the order of acquittal of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate was preferred in the Sessions Court. In his submission, in view of the newly inserted proviso to Section 372 of the Code, the Appeal against an order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate is maintainable in Sessions Court. He therefore, urged that the impugned judgment and order of the lower Appellate Court may be set aside and the Appeal may be remanded to the lower Appellate Court for consideration on merits. 5. Mr. N.J. Shah, learned Additional Public Prosecutor and Mr. K.R. Dave, learned advocate for respondent No. 2 have submitted that appropriate order may be passed in view of the provisions of Section 372 of the Code. They further submitted that the lower Appellate Court may be directed to final hear and disposed of the Appeal within some time bound period. 6. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Bhavuben Dineshbhai Makwana (supra) was called upon to answer the following issues. "(i). Whether an appeal filed by the victim, invoking his right under proviso to section 372 of Cr.P.C., challenging acquittal, or conviction for a lesser offence, or awarding inadequate compensation, is not maintainable, on the ground that the State has filed an appeal against the same order and for the same purpose? (ii). Whether an appeal filed by the State should not be entertained, on the ground that the appeal preferred by the victim invoking his right under proviso to section 372 of Cr.P.C., against the same order, is admitted by the Court? (iii). (ii). Whether an appeal filed by the State should not be entertained, on the ground that the appeal preferred by the victim invoking his right under proviso to section 372 of Cr.P.C., against the same order, is admitted by the Court? (iii). If the victim prefers an appeal before this Court, challenging the acquittal, invoking his right under proviso to section 372 of Cr.P.C., whether that appellant is required to first seek leave of the Court, as is required in case of appeal being preferred by the State?" It further transpires that the Full Bench of this Court was requested to consider the above issues in the context of an order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar in Sessions case No. 147 of 2010 by which the accused persons who were charged for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 223, 324, 325, 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 135of the Bombay Police Act were acquitted. 7. The Full Bench, for the purpose of deciding the first two questions, considered the scope of Appeal at the instance of the victim under the newly introduced Code and held as under: "14. By inserting a proviso vide Section 29 of the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2009, the Legislature has consciously conferred a new substantive right of appeal upon a victim. The term "victim" is also simultaneously defined while amending the Code in Section 2(wa) as quoted hereinabove. The legislature has used the word "shall" in the proviso while conferring such right to the victim and at the same time, maintained the provisions contained in subsection (4) of Section 378 intact thereby making its intention clear that this is an additional right conferred upon a victim who may be the complainant or may not be a complainant but if he is not a complainant, he is not required to comply with the provision of Section 378 (4) which is meant for only that victim who is also a complainant. 15. Once the Legislature confers a substantive right of appeal by a Statute, such a right of appeal cannot be diluted by a judicial pronouncement since the right of a party to file an appeal is an independent, substantial and statutory right. 15. Once the Legislature confers a substantive right of appeal by a Statute, such a right of appeal cannot be diluted by a judicial pronouncement since the right of a party to file an appeal is an independent, substantial and statutory right. The Legislature, in the present case, has not conferred such a right upon the victim making it dependent upon either the State or anyone else, exercising right of appeal under the other provisions of the Code. Historically, the victim, in the past, nowhere figured in the entire scheme of the Code. Broadly speaking, the Code, as it stood prior to the amendment of the year 2009, recognized the following parties only: (i) The complainant (who may or may not be a victim) (ii) The accused (iii) The State/Prosecution." 16. The Law Commission of India, in its 150th Report, laid emphasis on Chapter XV on the subject of victimology and observed that right from the ancient Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (about 1775 BC), the victim of a crime was left with no remedy except to sue for damages in the civil court. The Law Commission of India also noted that in Anglo-Saxon legal system, an English Magistrate advocated the theory of the compensation at the instance of the State to be given to the victims of crime and accordingly, a programme was set up in Britain in the year 1964. The Law Commission has also referred to the declarations made by the General Assembly of the United States Nations in its 96th plenary meeting on 29th November, 1985, laying down the basic principles of justice for victims of crime and abuse of power, recognizing that millions of people throughout the world suffer harm as a result of crime and the abuse of power and that the rights of these families having been adequately recognized. In the report of the Law Commission, apart from referring to earlier Law Commission Reports, reference is also made to the observations of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, (Human Rights- A Judge's Miscellany (1995)), V.N. Rajan (Victimology in India (1995)), R.I. Mawby and S. Walklate, (Critical Victimology (1994)), and Law Reform Commission of Canada (1974). In the report of the Law Commission, apart from referring to earlier Law Commission Reports, reference is also made to the observations of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, (Human Rights- A Judge's Miscellany (1995)), V.N. Rajan (Victimology in India (1995)), R.I. Mawby and S. Walklate, (Critical Victimology (1994)), and Law Reform Commission of Canada (1974). 16.1 Based upon the recommendations of the Law Commission of India in its 154th report, the various recent judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court emphasizing change in legislative policy to take care of the interest of the victims and other factors, the legislature decided to amend the Code. The statements and objects and reasons for amending the Code are reproduced hereunder:-- "Statement of Objects and Reasons.- The need to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to ensure fair and speedy justice and to tone up the criminal justice system has been felt for quite some time. The Law Commission has undertaken a comprehensive review of the Code of Criminal Procedure in its 154th report and its recommendations have been found very appropriate, particularly those relating to provisions concerning arrest, custody and remand, procedure for summons and warrant-cases, compounding of offences, victimology, special protection in respect of women and inquiry and trial of persons of unsound mind. Also, as per the Law Commission's 177th report relating to arrest, it has been found necessary to revise the law to maintain a balance between the liberty of the citizens and the society's interest in maintenance of peace as well as law and order. 2. The need has also been felt to include measures for preventing the growing tendency of witnesses being induced or threatened to turn hostile by the accused parties who are influential, rich and powerful. At present, the victims are the worst sufferers in a crime and they don't have much role in the Court proceedings. They need to be given certain rights and compensation, so that there is no distortion of the criminal justice system. The application of technology in investigation, inquiry and trial is expected to reduce delays, help in gathering credible evidences, minimise the risk of escape of the remand prisoners during transit and also facilitate utilisation of police personnel for other duties. There is an urgent need to provide relief to women, particularly victims of sexual offences, and provide fair-trial to persons of unsound mind who are not able to defend themselves. There is an urgent need to provide relief to women, particularly victims of sexual offences, and provide fair-trial to persons of unsound mind who are not able to defend themselves. 93. The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill, 2006 seeks to achieve the above objectives." (Emphasis supplied by us). 16.2 In view of the fact that the Amendment is made in the Code in the year 2009 with a specific object and purpose of safeguarding the interests of the victims, in our opinion, the view taken in Bhikahbhai's case (supra) whereby an independent and absolute substantive right of appeal statutorily conferred upon the victim is held to be subject to and subservient to the State preferring an appeal, not only runs contrary to the object for which the amendment is made by the legislature but such finding is also against the plain language of the Statute. 17. It appears that the Division Bench in the case of Bhikhabhai (supra) has proceeded on the footing that in every matter the State can prefer an appeal and a victim also can prefer appeal and based upon this foundation i.e. both the State and the victim have equal rights of appeal against acquittal, the Division Bench held that the right of a victim would be dependent upon the right of the State to prefer appeal and if the appeal of the State is not entertained, only then, the victim may claim right of preferring the appeal and such right may not be available if the appeal of the State is already admitted by granting leave. 18. We further find that in taking the above view, the Division Bench in the above matter failed to take into consideration the fact that the scope of appeal at the instance of the victim is different from that of an appeal filed by the State. It appears that the victim (as defined in Section 2(wa) of the Code) shall have a right to prefer an appeal in the following 3 types of cases: (i) Acquittal of the accused (ii) Convicting of the accused for a lesser offence (iii) Imposing inadequate compensation 18.1 In other words, the victim has no right to prefer an appeal against 'inadequacy of sentence', a right which is available only to the State. The State, however, does not have any right to file any appeal against "inadequacy of compensation", a right, which is available only to a victim. 19. The term 'inadequacy of sentence' has a special connotation and a distinct statutory demarcation if the provisions of Section 375(d) and Section 377 of the Code are compared. Scheme of Section 377, which provides for right of appeal to the State/Prosecution, is entirely different from the right of appeal conferred upon a victim under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code. Under the scheme of Section 377 not only the State/Prosecution can file an appeal based upon inadequacy of sentence, but even the accused can plead for his acquittal or for reduction of the sentence as contemplated under Section 377(3) of the Code. 20. As against this, if the Scheme of proviso to Section372 of the Code is compared, only a victim has an absolute right to file an appeal challenging imposition of inadequate compensation in addition to the right of appeal against acquittal and also challenging the conviction based on lesser offence. There is, however, no provision in the entire Code empowering the State/Prosecution to file an appeal against an order imposing inadequate compensation. 21. In light of different types of right of appeal provided to the victim and to the State/Prosecution, it will not be proper to hold that the right of either of them is dependent upon the other. To put it differently, only victim can file an appeal against an order of imposing 'inadequate compensation' in addition to his right of appeal against acquittal and convicting the accused for a lesser offence and therefore, to club his right and make it dependent upon the exercise of right of appeal at the instance of the State would be not only be unworkable but would run contrary to the scheme and lead to absurdity. 22. In the circumstances, the very basic premise upon which the law is laid down in Bhikhabhai (Supra), i.e. the rights of both State and victim are similar and therefore, the right of one (victim) can be dependent upon exercise of the right by the other (State) is, in our opinion, not correct and against the plain and simple language used by the legislature in the proviso to Section 372. Similarly, Section 24(8) of the Code has nothing to do with the right of appeal conferred upon the victim and by taking aid of that section, the substantive right conferred upon a victim cannot be made conditional. 23. In our opinion, the correct law, as emerging from the Scheme of the Code, would be that the right of a victim to prefer an appeal (on limited grounds enumerated in proviso to Section 372 of the Code) is a separate and independent statutory right and is not dependent either upon or is subservient to right of appeal of the State. In other words, both the victim and the State/prosecution can file appeals independently without being dependent on the exercise of the right by the other. Moreover, from the act or omission for which the accused has been charged, there may be more than one victim and the loss suffered by the victims may vary from one victim to the other victims. Therefore, each of such victims will have separate right of appeal and in such appeals, the grievance of each of the appellant may be different. For instance, in an act of arson when a joint property of different persons has been set on fire, the loss suffered by each of the co-sharers may be different. In such a case, each co-sharer has a separate right of appeal and such right of one does not depend even on the filing of such appeal by another victim. 24. Moreover, if not specifically prohibited by law, the right conferred upon one cannot be subject to the exercise of right by the other. Even if one such appeal by one of the victims has been dismissed that cannot be a ground of dismissal of the other appeal by another victim although it is desirable that all the appeals should be heard analogously to avoid conflicting decisions. Unless the legislature, by specific provisions confers right of appeal on conditions specified, a court cannot restrict such unfettered right by imposing conditions through judicial interpretation. 25. The right of appeal being statutory one, the language employed by the legislature should be strictly followed. In this connection, we may preferably refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in a recent case of Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement and Anr. 25. The right of appeal being statutory one, the language employed by the legislature should be strictly followed. In this connection, we may preferably refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in a recent case of Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement and Anr. reported in AIR 2010 SC 2239 while making comment on the right of appeal: "A right of filing a suit, unless it is barred by Statute, as it is barred here under Section 34 of FEMA, is an inherent right (See Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code) but a right of appeal is always conferred by Statute. While conferring such right Statute may impose restrictions, like limitation or pre deposit of penalty or it may limit the area of appeal to questions of law or sometime to substantial questions of law. Whenever such limitations are imposed, they are to be strictly followed. But in a case where there is no limitation on the nature of order or decision to be appealed against, as in this case, the right of appeal cannot be further curtailed by this Court on the basis of an interpretative exercise." (Emphasis supplied by us). 25.1 We are, therefore, of the opinion that the first two questions referred to this Bench should be answered by holding that the appeals mentioned therein are maintainable." 8. Since the Full Bench of the High Court was called upon to consider the questions referred to it which had arisen from a judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, it was concluded that the de facto complainant can prefer an Appeal by virtue of the proviso to Section378 of the Code, after obtaining leave of this Court as provided under Section 378 (3) of the Code. But if the victim proposes to prefer an Appeal against an order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court, he is not required to apply and obtain leave to Appeal as contemplated under Section 378(3) of the Code. 9. It appears that there was an inadvertent mistake in mentioning the relevant provisions of the Code in the caption of the Appeal memo under which the present applicant preferred an Appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Anjar. 9. It appears that there was an inadvertent mistake in mentioning the relevant provisions of the Code in the caption of the Appeal memo under which the present applicant preferred an Appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Anjar. The applicant was required to mention Section 372 of the Code in the caption of the Appeal memo, but due to inadvertent mistake, Section 378 of the Code seems to have been mentioned. The lower Appellate Court, without properly appreciating the overall facts of the case, and the scheme of Chapter 29 of the Code and without properly understanding and appreciating judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Bhavuben Dineshbhai Makwana (supra), has mechanically dismissed the Appeal as being not maintainable under Section 378 of the Code. It is bounden duty of the Court to discharge function to further the cause of justice. The learned Additional Sessions Judge ought to have considered the issue of maintainability of the Appeal in holistic manner by ignoring the Section 378 of the Code under which the Appeal was purportedly preferred. 10. In view of the foregoing discussion and the provisions of Sections 372 and 372(3) of the Code and in view of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Bhavuben Makwana (supra), I am of the view that an Appeal preferred by the applicant in the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Anjar, was maintainable and the lower Appellate Court committed an error of law in dismissing the Appeal on the ground that under Section 378 of the Code, an Appeal is not maintainable in that Court and therefore, the impugned judgment and order warrants interference in this Revision Application. 11. In view of foregoing reasons, the Revision Application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment and order dated 9.10.2015 passed by the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Anjar, Kachchh in Criminal Appeal No. 55 of 2015 is hereby quashed and set aside and New Criminal Appeal No. 55 of 2015 (Old Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 2014) is restored on the file of the lower Appellate Court. The Lower Appellate Court is directed to decide the Appeal on merits and in accordance with law, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the contesting parties. The Lower Appellate Court is directed to decide the Appeal on merits and in accordance with law, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the contesting parties. It appears that the original Appeal was filed in the year 2014. The lower Appellate Court is therefore, directed to decide the Appeal as expeditiously as possible, without being prejudiced by any of the observations made in this judgment. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.