JUDGMENT Ram Surat Ram (Maurya),J. 1. Heard Sri Harsh Vardhan Gupta for the petitioner. 2. The writ petition has been filed against the orders of CO dated 20.12.2010, SOC dated 24.9.2012 and DDC dated 31.8.2016. 3. By the impugned orders, the CO has condoned the delay in filing the objection under Section 9 of the Act and the appeal of the petitioner has been dismissed. However, the DDC has allowed the revision of the petitioner and directed the CO to take evidence of the parties while deciding the objection on merit and he shall again examine the issue relating to condonation of delay. Hence this writ petition has been filed. 4. I have considered the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner and examined the records. 5. Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963 provides : - Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. --Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.-- The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. A perusal of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shows that under the Act, the court is competent to admit any application, appeal or revision after prescribed period of limitation, if the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within such period. Thus essential requirement is the explanation due to which the applicant was prevented from moving application within time and there is no requirement of separate application under Section 5 of the Act. In any case, in consolidation matters the court fees is neither required to be paid nor there is any prescribed format for pleading, thus explanation given in the objection is sufficient on which the court can act and condone the delay. 6. So far as the case law relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner of Supreme court in Ragho Singh Vs. 6. So far as the case law relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner of Supreme court in Ragho Singh Vs. Mohan Singh and others, (2001) 9 SCC 717 , is concerned, it is the case where Code of Civil Procedure was applicable in which there is specific provision under Order 41 Rule 3 A CPC which requires for separate application for condonation of delay as well as the jurisdiction of the court is also limited that without condoning the delay the court has no jurisdiction to pass any order. The case law relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner has no application in this case. 7. A full Bench of this Court in Bijai Narain Vs. State of UP, AIR 1970 All, 241 (FB) as well as Supreme Court in Mohd. Shakoor Mian Vs. Raj Mangal Mishra (1999) 7 SCC 461 have held that Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable in the proceeding before consolidation authorities. 8. So far as case law relied upon counsel for the petitioner in Srr Panimoola Devi Temple Vs. Bhuvanchandran Pillai, (2015) 12 SCC 698 is concerned, it relates to Order 41 Rule 23, which prescribed the jurisdiction of the Court for remanding the case. Both the aforesaid cases relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner are not relevant in the facts of this case. 9. The petitioner has liberty to agitate his grievance before CO as such no interference is required by this Court. 10. The writ petition is dismissed.