ORDER : Rajendra Mahajan, J. 1. The applicant has preferred the application under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. seeking leave to present an appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 03.08.2015, passed by the court of JMFC, Jabalpur (Shri Anil Kumar Sahu) in Criminal Complaint Case No. 4174/11 Smt. Shobha Chouhan v. Gopichand, acquitting the respondent of the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘the Act’). 2. The brief facts of the case for just and proper adjudication of the application are given below :- 2.1 The applicant submitted a complaint for prosecution of the respondent under Section 138 of the Act and 420 of the IPC in the trial court on the grounds that she has been on family terms with the respondent since long. After the death of her husband, he used to do the purchase of her household items. He has a big shop in Maharajpur area of Jabalpur. As such, he is a businessman by occupation. At the relevant time of the offence, she had a large amount of money in cash and adequate quantity of gold and silver ornaments. He asked for money for expansion of his business from her. Thereupon, she gave him Rs. 3,15,000/- in cash upon his assurance that he would return the amount within three to four months. Against the said amount, he gave her three cheques bearing No. 755151 for Rs. 1,00,000/-, No. 755152 for Rs. 1,00,000/- and No. 755153 for Rs. 1,15,000/- respectively (for short ‘the cheques’). He drew the cheques on the Dena Bank, Branch Anand Nagar, Jabalpur with which he maintains his bank account bearing No. 109010004695. While giving the cheques, he told her to en-cash the cheques on or after 18.01.2011. She deposited the cheques on 20.01.2011 in her bank account which she maintains with the Punjab and Sindh Bank, Jabalpur. On 20.01.2011, she was informed by the bank that the drawer bank had dishonoured the cheques on account of insufficient funds in the respondent’s account. Thereafter, she asked him to give her the amount. From his demeanor, she got the impression that he is not willing to pay the amount. Thereupon, she gave him a demand notice in terms of Section 138 of the Act. However, he did not pay the amount. Hence this complaint. 2.2. Thereafter, she asked him to give her the amount. From his demeanor, she got the impression that he is not willing to pay the amount. Thereupon, she gave him a demand notice in terms of Section 138 of the Act. However, he did not pay the amount. Hence this complaint. 2.2. Vide order dated 30.04.2011, the trial court ordered the registration of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act. 2.3. On 30.10.2013, the trial court framed the charge against the respondent under Section 138 of the Act. He denied the charge. Thereupon, the case was put on trial. 2.4. At the trial, the applicant examined herself and marked nine documents including the three cheques which are marked as Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-3. In defence, the respondent had not examined either himself nor any witness. However, in the course of cross-examination of the applicant, he confronted her with a document which is marked as Ex.D-1. 2.5. The respondent in his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. denied all the circumstances and the evidence appearing against him and he took the defence that he purchased the applicant’s house by a registered sale-deed Ex.D-1 in the name of his wife Anita. At the time of purchase of the house, it was agreed between them that the applicant with her family shall remain in the house without paying any rent so long as they want and in case the respondent construct a new house dismantling the old one, then he would make available her a rented house of which he would pay the rent. When he started the construction, he shifted the applicant to a rented house and in order that he would pay the rent, he issued signed blank cheques Ex. P-1- to Ex.P-3 to the applicant for security. He paid the rent for two years. Thereafter, he stopped paying the rent. As result, she got offended and filed the complaint by misusing the cheques. 3. Upon the evaluation of evidence on record, the learned JMFC has held that the applicant has filed the complaint complying with the mandatory requirements of Section 138 of the Act. However, she has failed to discharge initial burden that the respondent had issued the cheques to her against the legally enforceable debt. 3. Upon the evaluation of evidence on record, the learned JMFC has held that the applicant has filed the complaint complying with the mandatory requirements of Section 138 of the Act. However, she has failed to discharge initial burden that the respondent had issued the cheques to her against the legally enforceable debt. On the contrary, the respondent has proved on a preponderance of probability by referring to the admissions made by the applicant in her cross-examination and other evidence on record that he issued the cheques for the purpose of the security. Upon the said finding, the learned JMFC acquitted the respondent of the charge under Section 138 of the Act, holding that the same would not come within the purview of Section 138 of the Act. 4. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment, the learned JMFC has given following reasons in support of his finding that the cheques had been given by the respondent to the applicant for security. 4.1 The applicant admits in para 8 of her cross-examination that she is a housewife. Her husband retired from the post of driver which he held in the Madhya Pradesh Food and Civil Supply Corporation. Her husband suffered from paralysis since the year 2008 till his death. She has not produced any evidence regarding the independent source of continuous income. She has also not produced any oral or documentary evidence that she had Rs. 3,15,000/- in cash with her. Under the circumstances, it is well neigh impossible that she had such a big amount in cash with her at the relevant time. 4.2 The applicant in paras 7 and 8 of her cross-examination admits that her husband Pooran Singh sold their house to the respondent’s wife Anita in the year 2006 vide sale-deed Ex.D-1. She further admits that at the time of sale of the house, the respondent agreed that they would reside in the house without giving him any rent as long as they wish. Thereafter, they stayed in the house for two years. After her husband’s death, the respondent dismantled the house and shifted her to a rented house of the Housing Board. He paid the rent of the house at the rate of Rs. 800/- per month for two years. Thereafter, he stopped paying the rent on her behalf. She got offended of the respondent’s deception. After her husband’s death, the respondent dismantled the house and shifted her to a rented house of the Housing Board. He paid the rent of the house at the rate of Rs. 800/- per month for two years. Thereafter, he stopped paying the rent on her behalf. She got offended of the respondent’s deception. She further admits that the respondent promised to give her one room with kitchen and latrine bathroom in the house to be constructed by him, but he backed out of the promise. These admissions made by the applicant amply proves the fact that the respondent had given the cheques for security for compliance of the terms and conditions agreed between them when the respondent had purchased the applicant’s house. 4.3 The applicant admits in para 10 of her cross-examination that her name in the cheques is written in her own handwriting. She also admits that she got all the contents of the cheques filled up by a bank officer in English and thereafter she submitted the cheques for encashment. She also admits that in each of the three cheques, just below the signature of the respondent it is mentioned in English “for security”. The aforesaid admissions and evidence prove that the respondent has given blank cheques by way of security to the applicant. 5. The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant is a marginal literate woman. She does not know English language at all. Taking the advantage of the aforesaid, the respondent below his signature in each of the cheques wrote for security. The learned JMFC is highly impressed by the aforesaid facts. Thus, the learned JMFC has given the said finding by mis-appreciating and misreading the evidence on record. As a result, the impugned judgment is bad in law being based on erroneous findings. Under the circumstances, this court ought to interfere with the impugned judgment in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to provide the applicant complete justice by granting the leave to appeal. 6. I have anxiously considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicant and perused the impugned judgment and material available on record. 7. It is well settled in law that if a cheque is issued for security, then offence under Section 138 of the Act is not made out. 6. I have anxiously considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicant and perused the impugned judgment and material available on record. 7. It is well settled in law that if a cheque is issued for security, then offence under Section 138 of the Act is not made out. In this connection reference may be made to the decisions rendered in Jitendra Sing Flora v. Ravikant Talwar (2001 (1) MPL J 229 M.P.), M.S. Narayan Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala and another (2006 (4) MPL J 97 SC) and Vijay v. Laxmanchand and others ( 2013(2) JLJ (1 ) SC). 8. It is also well settled in law that an accused can rebut the presumption of Section 139 of the Act simply by a preponderance of probability and it is not necessary for him to rebut the said presumption beyond reasonable doubt. He can rebut the presumption by referring the evidence coming out in the evidence adduced by the complainant and it is not necessary for him to adduce independent evidence with regard the stand taken by him vis-a-vis to the issuance of the cheque. 9. Keeping in view the aforesaid propositions of law, I have perused the evidence on record and found that the learned JMFC is justified in arriving at the findings that the cheques are issued by the respondent to the applicant by way of security for due performance of terms and conditions settled between them at the time when the applicant’s husband had sold their house to the respondent’s wife Anita. I am of the view that in the given set of evidence adduced by the applicant no other view much less reasonable and logical is deducible. Hence, the impugned judgment of acquittal is justifiable and sustainable in law and on facts. Therefore, no interference by this court with the impugned judgment is warranted in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the matters of Bhagwati and others v. State of U.P. (1976 SCC (Cr.) 388), Chandrappa & others v. State of Karnataka ( 2007 (4) SCC 415 ) and Ashok Rai v. State of U.P. and others (2014 AIR SCW 3406). 10. In the result, I dismiss the application for grant of leave being meritless and without substance. 11. Accordingly, this application is finally disposed of.