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2016 DIGILAW 3396 (ALL)

DISTRICT SPORTS OFFICER v. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT

2016-10-05

ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA

body2016
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J.—State of Uttar Pradesh through District Sports Officer has filed the present writ petition, challenging an award passed by Labour Court, U.P. at Bareilly, in Adjudication Case No. 148 of 2002, dated 18.5.2015, whereby reference on the question as to whether termination of services of respondent workman w.e.f. 1.8.2000 is valid or not has been answered in favour of respondent workman. It is held that petitioner employer has terminated the services of respondent workman without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), and therefore, he is entitled to reinstatement alongwith continuity of service with 75% back wages. 2. It transpires that dispute was referred by Additional Commissioner, exercising his jurisdiction under Section 4-K of the Act on 29.6.2002, which got registered as Adjudication Case No. 148 of 2002. The respondent workman filed his written statement claiming that he was engaged in February, 1994 as Peon by the petitioner employer and he continuously worked till 1.8.2000, and had drawn last wages at the rate of Rs. 1,105/- per month. Grievance raised before the labour Court was that without complying with the requirement of provisions of Section 6-N and in teeth of Section 6-Q of the Act, respondent workman has been retrenched and accordingly prayer was made for reinstatement alongwith back wages. 3. Petitioner-employer contested the claim stating that employer is not an industry and that any claim at the instance of respondent-workman could be raised only before the Public Services Tribunal, which has already been rejected on 17.8.2000. 4. Parties also filed their rejoinder statement. In its rejoinder statement, petitioner employer made an improvement by stating that respondent workman was engaged depending upon exigency of work, on contract basis, and that there was no employee-employer relationship. The respondent-workman, on the other hand, has stated that he has worked for more than six years and without complying with the requirement of law he was orally terminated w.e.f. 1.8.2000. Oral statement was adduced by the respondent workman and it was stated by him that in respect of alleged termination no claim was raised before the Public Services Tribunal. It was, however, admitted that no appointment letter was issued to him. Claim of working as Peon for more than six years and oral termination without paying retrenchment compensation was stressed. Oral statement was adduced by the respondent workman and it was stated by him that in respect of alleged termination no claim was raised before the Public Services Tribunal. It was, however, admitted that no appointment letter was issued to him. Claim of working as Peon for more than six years and oral termination without paying retrenchment compensation was stressed. It was also stated that he was unemployed since then. Oral evidence on behalf of petitioner employer was also led in which it was stated that respondent-workman was engaged in 1995 on contract basis depending upon the requirement of work and that his engagement came to an end upon expiry of contract. It was also stated that provisions of Section 6-N and 6-P of the Act are not attracted in respect of the contract employee. 5. It seems that upon an application moved, labour Court issued a direction to produce attendance register and salary register for the period from February, 1994 to 31.7.2000, which were not produced by the employer. Employer stated that in respect of contract employee, no attendance register is maintained nor any receipt etc. is issued. Only hand receipt was prepared. The respondent workman produced a certificate issued by the Deputy Sports Officer, Shahjahanpur, certifying workman’s working since 1994. This certificate is dated 10.8.1999 and has been duly exhibited. Petitioner employer however contended that the officer was not authorized to issue such a certificate. The photocopy of the letter issued by Regional Sports Officer dated 21.3.1997 has also been filed as Exhibit W-2, according to which, it appears that in respect of working of respondent workman details were drawn and amount was sanctioned alongwith other employees. The labour Court has recorded that in these documents, there is no reference of respondent-workman’s engagement on contract basis. In such circumstances, labour Court has drawn adverse inference against the petitioner-employer for having not produced relevant materials. The labour Court therefore has granted relief of reinstatement alongwith continuity of service with 75% back wages. 6. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioner employer contends that since engagement of respondent workman was on contract basis, he could not have been granted relief of reinstatement alongwith continuity of service with 75% back wages. It is also urged that claim before labour Court is barred by res judicata as claim stood rejected by the Public Services Tribunal. 6. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioner employer contends that since engagement of respondent workman was on contract basis, he could not have been granted relief of reinstatement alongwith continuity of service with 75% back wages. It is also urged that claim before labour Court is barred by res judicata as claim stood rejected by the Public Services Tribunal. It is also stated no employee-employer relationship came into being. It is also argued that finding of continuous working of 240 days in a calender year is based upon no material and that in the facts and circumstances, no adverse inference could be drawn against the petitioner employer, inasmuch as the records demanded were not in existence at all. It is also stated that even if a finding of violation of Section 6-N of the Act was returned, at best monetary compensation could have been awarded, but relief of reinstatement alongwith 75% back wages is perverse. 7. Sri B.N. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-workman submits that the award of the labour Court is just and valid and requires no interference. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records. 9. From the materials placed before this Court, it appears that although a claim of regularization had been filed before the Public Services Tribunal, which was rejected on the ground that respondent workman is a daily wage employee and not a regular Government servant. It is not in dispute that issue of validity of termination was not the subject-matter before the Public Services Tribunal, and therefore, the argument advanced by learned Standing Counsel that claim before the tribunal was barred by res judicata cannot succeed. 10. So far as the engagement of respondent workman is concerned, it is alleged that he was appointed on contract basis. Such a plea however was not taken in the written statement and was taken for the first time in rejoinder statement. It is further recorded by the labour Court that no agreement or contract has been produced in order to demonstrate that engagement of respondent workman was on contract basis. Such a plea however was not taken in the written statement and was taken for the first time in rejoinder statement. It is further recorded by the labour Court that no agreement or contract has been produced in order to demonstrate that engagement of respondent workman was on contract basis. The alleged letters filed as Annexure-7 to the writ petition recording that monthly wages of persons engaged on contractual basis are being released, were not filed or proved before the labour Court, and therefore, such documents need not be entertained and scrutinized by this Court at the first instance. The engagement of respondent workman, therefore, on the basis of contract was not substantiated before the labour Court by taking specific plea and adducing evidence in support thereof. In such circumstances, the finding of labour Court that engagement of respondent workman was not on contractual basis cannot be faulted. 11. So far as the working of respondent workman from February, 1994 to 31.7.2000 is concerned, a finding in favour of respondent workman has been returned essentially by drawing adverse inference against the petitioner employer. A specific direction was issued to the employer to produce attendance register and wages register for the period in question, which admittedly was not produced. The defence taken that in respect of contract employee such registers are not maintained, has been rejected in view of the finding that petitioner employer had failed to establish that respondent workman was engaged on contract basis. Labour Court has also relied upon the certificate issued by Deputy Sports Officer dated 10.8.1999, which was duly exhibited and proved. Petitioner employer has not been able to dispute such certificate. Labour Court has further relied upon a communication of Regional Sports Officer dated 24.12.1997, which has also been filed before this Court alongwith counter-affidavit as Annexure-2, addressed to the Deputy Sports Officer, for payment in respect of various employees including respondent workman. These two documents were relied upon in the factual backdrop of the present case to arrive at a finding that respondent workman had worked from February, 1994 to 31.7.2000. It is on this basis that the labour Court has returned a finding that working of respondent workman was continuous from February, 1994 to July, 2000. This Court finds no infirmity in the view taken by the labour Court in this regard, as well. 12. It is on this basis that the labour Court has returned a finding that working of respondent workman was continuous from February, 1994 to July, 2000. This Court finds no infirmity in the view taken by the labour Court in this regard, as well. 12. Learned Standing Counsel has relied upon a judgment of the Apex Court in R.M. Yellatti v. Assistant Executive Engineer, 2006 (108) FLR 213, in order to contend that it is for the workman to establish his continuous working. This judgment would not be of much assistance to the petitioner employer inasmuch as in the facts of the present case, the workman had discharged his onus by adducing his oral statement and documentary evidence coupled with adverse inference, which led to a finding of 240 days’ working being returned by the labour Court. Two important documents i.e. the certificate of working as well as release of remittance to workmen had been brought on record and proved. Petitioner’s case of contractual employment has been disbelieved for cogent reasons. The non production of attendance register and wages register was also material. In such circumstances, the finding of continuous working in favour respondent workman cannot be faulted. Para 17 of the judgment in R.M. Yellatti (supra) in this regard is reproduced : “17. Analyzing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the Court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the Court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon facts of each case.” 13. In the facts and circumstances, noticed above, the finding returned by the labour Court of workman’s continuous working from February, 1994 to July, 2000 is based upon appreciation of materials brought before it, which cannot be said to be perverse or erroneous so as to warrant any interference. A further finding of labour Court that no retrenchment compensation was paid has not been shown to be factually incorrect. In view of the fact that finding of continuous working of respondent workman for nearly six years is based upon materials available on record and that no retrenchment compensation is paid, the finding of labour Court that termination is bad in law, suffers from no error. 14. Turning to the next objection regarding grant of relief of reinstatement, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is to be noticed that engagement of respondent workman has not been found to be against a sanctioned post. No procedure for recruitment had been followed. The documentary evidence relied upon by the workman i.e. W.W.-2 clearly goes to show that he was engaged as a daily wager and was paid at the daily rate basis. No procedure for recruitment had been followed. The documentary evidence relied upon by the workman i.e. W.W.-2 clearly goes to show that he was engaged as a daily wager and was paid at the daily rate basis. Such engagement of workman was continued upto the year 2000 and a period of nearly 16 years have lapsed since then. The question, therefore, which arise for consideration is as to what would be the appropriate relief to be granted to respondent workman in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 15. Learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner employer has relied upon a recent decision of the Apex Court in Vice Chancellor Lucknow University, Lucknow v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare, (2016) 1 SCC 521 . Para 18 & 19 of the judgment is reproduced : “18. In considering the violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in Incharge Officer and another v. Shankar Shetty, (2010) 9 SCC 126 and after referring to the various decisions, this Court held that the relief by way of back wages is not automatic and compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice and it reads as under : “2. Should an order of reinstatement automatically follow in a case where the engagement of a daily wager has been brought to end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the ID Act”)? The course of the decisions of this Court in recent years has been uniform on the above question. 3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, (2009) 15 SCC 327 , delivering the judgment of this Court, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the recent decisions of this Court, namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC 479 , Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi, (2007) 9 SCC 353 , State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma, (2007) 1 SCC 575, M.P. Admn. v. Tribhuban, (2007) 9 SCC 748 , Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, (2008) 5 SCC 75 , Jaipur Development Authority v. Ramsahai, (2006) 11 SCC 684 , GDA v. Ashok Kumar, (2008) 4 SCC 261 and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula, (2008) 1 SCC 575 and stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh case (2009) 15 SCC 327 , SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras 7 & 14) “7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. 14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee.” 4. Jagbir Singh (2009) 15 SCC 327 has been applied very recently in Telegraph Deptt. v. Santosh Kumar Seal, (2010) 6 SCC 773 , wherein this Court stated: (SCC p. 777, para 11) “11. In view of the aforesaid legal position and the fact that the workmen were engaged as daily wagers about 25 years back and they worked hardly for 2 or 3 years, relief of reinstatement and back wages to them cannot be said to be justified and instead monetary compensation would subserve the ends of justice.” 19. In view of the aforesaid legal position and the fact that the workmen were engaged as daily wagers about 25 years back and they worked hardly for 2 or 3 years, relief of reinstatement and back wages to them cannot be said to be justified and instead monetary compensation would subserve the ends of justice.” 19. In the light of the above discussion, the impugned judgment of the High Court is modified and keeping in view the fact that the respondents are facing hardship on account of pending litigation for more than two decades and the fact that some of the respondents are over aged and thus have lost the opportunity to get a job elsewhere, interest of justice would be met by directing the appellant-university to pay compensation of rupees four lakhs to each of the respondents. By order dated 11.7.2011, this Court directed the appellant to comply with the requirements of Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and it is stated that the same is being complied with. The appellant-university is directed to pay the respondents rupees four lakhs each within four months from the date of receipt of this judgment. The payment of rupees four lakhs shall be in addition to wages paid under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.” 16. Learned counsel for the respondent workman, on the other hand, has also placed reliance upon judgments of the Apex Court in Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council Sanaur, 2011(3) ESC 514 (SC), Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, (2010) 3 SCC 192 and Anoop Sharma v. Executive Engineer, (2010) 5 SCC 497 , in order to contend that once a finding of violation of Section 6-N of the Act is validly returned, the workman would be entitled to reinstatement alongwith continuity of service and back wages. 17. Sri S.M.I. Hasan, learned Standing Counsel in reply has relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in Assistant Engineer v. Gitam Singh, (2013) 5 SCC 136 , in which judgment of the Apex Court in Harijinder Singh (supra) and Devinder Singh (supra), relied upon on behalf of respondent workman, has been considered. Para 27 to 31 of the judgment in Assistant Engineer (supra) is reproduced : “27. Para 27 to 31 of the judgment in Assistant Engineer (supra) is reproduced : “27. We shall now consider two decisions of this Court in Harjinder Singh and Devinder Singh upon which heavy reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent. In Harjinder Singh, this Court did interfere with the order of the High Court which awarded compensation to the workman by modifying the award of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court. However, on close scrutiny of facts it transpires that that was a case where a workman was initially employed by Punjab State Warehousing Corporation as work-charge motor mate but after few months he was appointed as work munshi in the regular pay-scale for three months. His service was extended from time to time and later on by one month’s notice given by the Managing Director of the Corporation his service was brought to end on 5.7.1988. The workman challenged the implementation of the notice in a writ petition and by an interim order the High Court stayed the implementation of that notice but later on the writ petition was withdrawn with liberty to the workman to avail his remedy under the ID Act. After two months, the Managing Director of the Corporation issued notice dated 26.11.1992 for retrenchment of the workman alongwith few others by giving them one month’s pay and allowances in lieu of notice as per the requirement of Section 25-F(a) of the ID Act. On industrial dispute being raised, the Labour Court found that there was compliance of Section 25-F but it was found that the termination was violative of Section 25-G of the ID Act and, accordingly, Labour Court passed an award for reinstatement of the workman with 50 per cent back wages. The Single Judge of that High Court did not approve the award of reinstatement on the premise that the initial appointment of the workman was not in consonance with the statutory regulations and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and accordingly, substituted the award of reinstatement with 50 per cent back wages by directing that the workman shall be paid a sum of Rs. 87,582/- by way of compensation. It is this order of the Single Judge that was set aside by this Court and order of the Labour Court restored. We are afraid the facts in Harjinder Singh are quite distinct. 87,582/- by way of compensation. It is this order of the Single Judge that was set aside by this Court and order of the Labour Court restored. We are afraid the facts in Harjinder Singh are quite distinct. That was not a case of a daily-rated worker. It was held that Single Judge was wrong in entertaining an unfounded plea that workman was employed in violation of Articles 14 and 16. Harjinder Singh2 turned on its own facts and is not applicable to the facts of the present case at all. 28. In Devinder Singh, the workman was engaged by Municipal Council, Sanaur on 1.8.1994 for doing the work of clerical nature. He continued in service till 29.9.1996. His service was discontinued with effect from 30.9.1996 in violation of Section 25-F of ID Act. On industrial dispute being referred for adjudication, the Labour Court held that the workman had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year preceding the termination of his service and his service was terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F. Accordingly, Labour Court passed an award for reinstatement of the workman but without back wages. Upon challenge being laid to the award of the Labour Court, the Division Bench set aside the order of the Labour Court by holding that Labour Court should not have ordered reinstatement of the workman because his appointment was contrary to the Recruitment Rules and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In the appeal before this Court from the order of the Division Bench, this Court held that the High Court had neither found any jurisdictional infirmity in the award of the Labour Court nor it came to the conclusion that the award was vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record and notwithstanding these the High Court set aside the direction given by the Labour Court for reinstatement of the workman by assuming that his initial appointment was contrary to law. The approach of the High Court was found to be erroneous by this Court. This Court, accordingly, set aside the order of the High Court and restored the award of the Labour Court. In Devinder Singh3, the Court had not dealt with the question about the consequential relief to be granted to the workman whose termination was held to be illegal being in violation of Section 25-F. 29. This Court, accordingly, set aside the order of the High Court and restored the award of the Labour Court. In Devinder Singh3, the Court had not dealt with the question about the consequential relief to be granted to the workman whose termination was held to be illegal being in violation of Section 25-F. 29. In our view, Harjinder Singh and Devinder Singh do not lay down the proposition that in all cases of wrongful termination, reinstatement must follow. This Court found in those cases that judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court was disturbed by the High Court on wrong assumption that the initial employment of the employee was illegal. As noted above, with regard to the wrongful termination of a daily wager, who had worked for a short period, this Court in long line of cases has held that the award of reinstatement cannot be said to be proper relief and rather award of compensation in such cases would be in consonance with the demand of justice. Before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors, including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which the termination has been set aside and the delay in raising the industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. 30. We may also refer to a recent decision of this Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Man Singh[24]. That was a case where the workmen, who were daily wagers during the year 1984-85, were terminated without following Section 25-F. The industrial dispute was raised after five years and although the Labour Court had awarded reinstatement of the workmen which was not interfered by the High Court, this Court set aside the award of reinstatement and ordered payment of compensation. In paragraphs 4 and 5 (pg.559) of the Report this Court held as under: “4. This Court in a catena of decisions has clearly laid down that although an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not be passed. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. 5. This Court in a catena of decisions has clearly laid down that although an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not be passed. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. 5. In view of the aforementioned legal position and the fact that the respondent workmen were engaged as “daily wagers” and they had merely worked for more than 240 days, in our considered view, relief of reinstatement cannot be said to be justified and instead, monetary compensation would meet the ends of justice.” 31. In light of the above legal position and having regard to the facts of the present case, namely, the workman was engaged as daily wager on 1.3.1991 and he worked hardly for eight months from 1.3.1991 to 31.10.1991, in our view, the Labour Court failed to exercise its judicial discretion appropriately. The judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court suffers from serious infirmity. The Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court also erred in not considering the above aspect at all. The award dated 28.6.2001 directing reinstatement of the respondent with continuity of service and 25% back wages in the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be sustained and has to be set aside and is set aside. In our view, compensation of Rs. 50,000/- by the appellant to the respondent shall meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly. Such payment shall be made to the respondent within six weeks from today failing which the same will carry interest @ 9 per cent per annum.” 18. Reliance on behalf of petitioner employer has also been placed upon judgment of the Apex Court in Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation v. Jadeja Govubha Chhanubha, 2015 AIR SCW 35. Para 14-16 of the judgment is reproduced : “14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. Para 14-16 of the judgment is reproduced : “14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee.” [emphasis supplied] 15. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Incharge Officer and another v. Shankar Shetty, (2010) 9 SCC 126 , where this Court said: “5. We think that if the principles stated in Jagbir Singh and the decisions of this Court referred to therein are kept in mind, it will be found that the High Court erred in granting relief of reinstatement to the respondent. The respondent was engaged as daily wager in 1978 and his engagement continued for about 7 years intermittently upto September 6, 1985 i.e. about 25years back. In a case such as the present one, it appears to us that relief of reinstatement cannot be justified and instead monetary compensation would meet the ends of justice. In our considered opinion, the compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One lac) in lieu of reinstatement shall be appropriate, just and equitable.” [emphasis supplied] 16. The case at hand, in our opinion, is one such case where reinstatement must give way to award of compensation. We say so because looking to the totality of the circumstances, the reinstatement of the respondent in service does not appear to be an acceptable option. Monetary compensation, keeping in view the length of service rendered by the respondent, the wages that he was receiving during that period which according to the evidence was around Rs. 24.75 per day should sufficiently meet the ends of justice. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances, we are of the view that award of a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs Fifty Thousand only) should meet the ends of justice.” 19. 24.75 per day should sufficiently meet the ends of justice. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances, we are of the view that award of a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs Fifty Thousand only) should meet the ends of justice.” 19. This Court in Nagar Palika Parishad v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, delivered in Writ Petition No. 25467 of 2013, after elaborately considering judgments of the Apex Court, has observed as under in para 18 & 19 : “18. Having considered the aforesaid submission, this Court finds that law for guidance of the Courts with regard to grant of relief, in such circumstances, has been clearly laid down by the Apex Court. Relief of reinstatement and back wages, in a case of violation of Section 6-N or Section 25-F, is the normal rule. Industrial jurisprudence and service jurisprudence operated in distinct fields. However, after the exhaustive definition assigned to industry in Banglore Water Supply case, this distinction has got blurred. Many of Governmental activities upon which provisions of Articles 14 and 16 apply have come within the definition of industry. Applicability of constitutional provisions, which regulates Governmental activity, cannot be excluded from consideration merely because it is an industry. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Hari Nandan Prasad (supra), considerations like existence of post, manner of recruitment, length of working, entitlement of regularization in case of daily wager etc. are relevant in case of a State instrumentality notwithstanding it being an industry. Grant of relief of reinstatement to a daily wager is not automatic, when no post itself is available. The nature of engagement is relevant, inasmuch as if it is found that initial engagement was contrary to Article 16 of the Constitution of India, the Court may not be justified in granting relief of reinstatement, as it may not subserve the larger cause sought to be addressed by Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Although, as a result of non-compliance of Section 6-N, workman is entitled to be reinstated, but in the absence of existence of any vacant post of Tax Collector, it would not be possible to award relief of reinstatement against a non-existent post. Although, as a result of non-compliance of Section 6-N, workman is entitled to be reinstated, but in the absence of existence of any vacant post of Tax Collector, it would not be possible to award relief of reinstatement against a non-existent post. This is particularly so as the employer herein is a State Authority and in the matter of recruitment thereunder is governed by the statutory service regulations, and dictum of Articles 14 and 16 would clearly be attracted. 19. Even otherwise, reinstatement is permissible on the same status as was held by the workman at the time of his termination. The Labour Court has held that workman was engaged on daily wage basis, and his reinstatement would have to be as a daily wage earner. The workman’s plea of regularization has not been granted. No such relief can otherwise be granted in the matter of employment by State/Agency of State, against a non-existent post without following the procedure for recruitment. In the facts of the present case, engagement of respondent was apparently a back-door entry, Courtesy the then Chairman, without any advertisement or existence of post. Despite a specific plea taken in the written statement, the workman has not adduced any evidence to show that he was appointed against a vacant post, after procedure was followed. Relief of non-compliance of the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act cannot be granted, which has the effect of violating mandate laid under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Consequence flowing from the non-compliance of Section 6-N, therefore, has to be restricted in a manner such that constitutional protection guaranteed under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India itself is not violated.” 20. Considering the fact that engagement of respondent workman was on daily wage basis and he worked till July 2000 and was not appointed against a post, and no procedure for recruitment etc. had been followed and now a period of nearly 16 years have lapsed, this Court is of the opinion that in view of the ratio of law laid down, referred to above, labour Court was not justified in granting relief of reinstatement alongwith continuity of service with 75% back wages, and a lump sum compensation ought to have been awarded to the respondent workman. 21. 21. In the opinion of Court, it would be appropriate to award relief of lump sum compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- to the respondent workman. The amount shall be paid by the petitioner employer to respondent workman within a period of four weeks from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order. The award of the labour Court dated 18.5.2015, published on 30.9.2015, in Adjudication Case No. 148 of 2002 stands modified accordingly. 22. Writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.